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ABSTRACT 
People with mild and borderline intellectual disability (ID) are 
overrepresented in the Australian criminal justice system as offenders. Offenders 
with an ID tend to serve longer sentences for equivalent crimes compared to those 
without an ID, experience greater disadvantage within the criminal justice system, 
and often do not have access to psychoeducation and rehabilitation programs and 
settings that address their unique needs. Government and independent research 
indicates that offenders with an ID experience systemic discrimination, however 
research investigating interpersonal prejudice and discrimination towards this group 
by those who influence their criminal justice outcomes is negligible. This thesis 
aimed to examine Australians’ stigmatising beliefs and attitudes towards offenders 
with an ID. 
Six studies using two multi-part, factorial survey methodologies were 
conducted. The first survey sampled Australian community members via social 
media and was used for Studies 1-4. The second survey sampled Australian 
community members, criminal justice professionals, disability professionals, and 
‘dual’ professionals (experienced in both criminal justice and disability) via social 
media and professional networks, and was used for Study 5 and 6.  
In Study 1 a measure was developed and validated assessing participants’ (N 
= 1055) beliefs about human rights ideology and its protection of vulnerable 
individuals and social categories. The measure had two dimensions: Belief that 
supporting human rights is a moral imperative; and Belief that Australian society 
supports human rights.  
Study 2 investigated whether Australians experience moral concern for 
criminal offenders and people with an ID, and how this relates to their belief in 
human rights. Participants (N = 1055) completed a rank-order task to determine a 
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hierarchy of relative moral concern for 14 different social categories, including 
people with an ID and criminal offenders. Belief that human rights is a moral 
imperative was significantly and positively associated with number of social 
categories included in participants’ moral circle, as well as the inclusion of both 
people with an ID and criminal offenders.  
Study 3 assessed and compared the stigmatising beliefs Australians hold 
about criminal offenders and people with an ID. Participants (N = 928) were 
randomly allocated to one of two social conditions (person with an ID or criminal 
offender). Participants attributed significantly greater experience, warmth, human 
nature, and moral credit and patiency to people with an ID compared to criminal 
offenders, and attributed significantly greater competence, competitiveness, status, 
and moral responsibility to criminal offenders compared to people with an ID. 
Beliefs about their agency and human uniqueness did not differ.   
In Study 4 Australians’ causal beliefs about people with an ID and criminal 
offenders with and without an ID were compared. Participants (N = 853) were 
randomly allocated to one of three vignette conditions and presented with the same 
narrative of a young adult male (‘John’) described as: 1) possessing a mild ID; 2) 
being recently sentenced for criminal assault and theft; and 3) possessing a mild ID 
and having been recently sentenced for criminal assault and theft. Participants 
provided open-ended written explanations as to what may have caused John’s ID 
(vignette 1) or his criminal offending (vignette 2 and 3).  Inductive thematic analysis 
identified that: 1) causal beliefs about ID were largely focused on biogenetic and 
other uncontrollable biomedical causes; 2) causal beliefs about criminal offending 
when an ID was not specified primarily focused on both controllable and 
uncontrollable psychosocial factors; and 3) when an ID was specified, causal beliefs 
about criminal offending were primarily related to the ID and perceived the 
 13
offending behaviour as uncontrollable. Even when psychosocial causes were 
reported, these were situated within the biogenetic context of the offender’s ID, 
reducing their overall controllability. Cross-case analysis highlighted that 
explanations applied to criminal offending when an ID was not specified (e.g. mental 
illness, addiction and intoxication, desire to impress and attract a romantic partner) 
were not attributed to John when an ID was specified. Participants viewed the 
offender with an ID as possessing limited psychosocial dimensionality, and viewed 
the disability as having had a global impact on multiple domains of their life (not just 
criminal offending).  
Using the second factorial survey, Study 5 compared the attitudes of lay 
people and professionals (criminal justice, disability, and ‘dual’ professionals) 
towards appropriate correctional treatment settings for offenders with an ID. Two 
original unidimensional measures were developed and validated for use by 
participants (N = 679). Each group agreed that the community setting was 
appropriate and the prison setting inappropriate, for the correctional treatment of 
offenders with an ID. Dual professionals expressed significantly less support for the 
prison setting than community members and criminal justice professionals, and 
expressed significantly more support for the community setting than community 
members and criminal justice professionals.  
In Study 6 the attitudes of laypeople and professionals (criminal justice, 
disability, and ‘dual’ professionals) towards criminal justice outcomes for offenders 
with and without an ID were compared for different types of crime. Participants (N = 
653) were randomly allocated to one of three vignettes depicting a criminal offender 
and crime type (sexual assault, physical assault with a weapon, burglary). Within 
each vignette subsample, participants were further randomly allocated to one of two 
conditions describing their criminal offender target as having/not having an ID. This 
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created three 4 x 2 factorial designs. There were no significant two-way interactions 
for the criminal justice attitude outcomes for each crime type. There were significant 
main effects of disability status on various criminal justice attributions by crime type, 
as well as significant main effects of group on criminal justice attributions by crime 
type. Overall, participants attributed less moral culpability and deservingness of 
imprisonment, and greater support for rehabilitation, reintegration, and forgiveness, 
for the offender with an ID (compared to no ID). Community members attributed 
stronger moral culpability and deservingness of imprisonment, and weaker support 
for rehabilitation, reintegration, and forgiveness of offenders, regardless of disability.  
Conclusions 
The thesis concludes that Australians stigmatise people with an ID and 
criminal offenders in different ways, which results in more positive (if patronising) 
attributions and attitudes towards people with an ID, and offenders with an ID, than 
offenders generally. Regardless of professional knowledge, overall Australians 
believe the community setting rather than the prison setting is more appropriate for 
the correctional treatment of offenders with an ID; and they hold more positive 
criminal justice attitudes towards offenders when an ID is specified. Laypeople hold 
more negative, less supportive criminal justice attitudes towards offenders regardless 
of ID; and dual professionals hold more positive, more supportive criminal justice 
attitudes towards offenders regardless of ID.  
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 CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW 
 
Background and Research Rationale 
 People with an ID and other cognitive disabilities such as acquired brain 
injuries (ABI) are overrepresented in the Australian criminal justice system as 
victims and offenders (Fisher, Baird, Currey, & Hodapp, 2016; Fogden, Thomas, 
Daffern, & Ogloff, 2016; Fougere, Thomas, & Daffern, 2013; Haysom, Indig, 
Moore, & Gaskin, 2014). The Australian government has recently acknowledged and 
is making efforts to reduce systemic discrimination towards people with disabilities 
such as ID via the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2013) and National Disability Strategy 2010-2020 (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2011). Various Australian criminal justice departments by State and 
Territory have also acknowledged the overrepresentation of people with an ID in the 
correctional system. To address this, strategic frameworks have been developed 
which aim to improve assessment for cognitive impairment and other psychiatric 
disorders upon entry to custody, and provide specialised facilities, supports, and 
rehabilitation programs suitable for offenders with cognitive impairments such as ID 
and ABI (e.g., Embracing the Challenges - Corrections Victoria Disability 
Framework 2013-2015; Corrections Victoria, 2013).   
However, the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act continues to 
perpetuate structural discrimination against people with an ID by restricting access to 
necessary services and supports to individuals who are currently in custody in the 
criminal justice setting (refer to Section 7.23-7.25 of the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme [Supports for Participants] Rules 2013; Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2013). Furthermore, while strategic frameworks have been developed to 
address the limitations of the correctional system for offenders with cognitive 
impairments, limited investigation as to why people with an ID are overrepresented 
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in the criminal justice system as offenders has been reported by government bodies. 
A recent report by Human Rights Watch (HRW; 2018) highlights that offenders with 
an ID in Australia generally, and those who identify as Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander specifically, continue to experience significant abuse and neglect within the 
criminal justice system related to the provision of disability-related supports, 
services, and safety. Research suggests that people with an ID experience trouble 
navigating the administrative and social processes of the criminal justice system, 
including communicating with police officers prior to being charged, and 
understanding legal proceedings during court proceedings prior to sentencing 
(Cockram, Jackson, & Underwood, 2009; Parsons & Sherwood, 2016; Salekin, 
Olley, & Hedge, 2010). Offenders with an ID tend to receive more severe sentences 
for crimes, receive overall longer sentences, and are more likely to reoffend 
compared to offenders without an ID (Cockram, 2005a, 2005b). They are also less 
likely to be released on probation after serving their minimum sentence due to their 
greater psychosocial needs in the community (including capacity for immediate 
employment and housing; Holland, Persson, McCleland, & Berends, 2007). 
Offenders with an ID tend to be housed in correctional facilities with higher security 
than deserved for their offences due to the limited psychiatric supports and facilities 
provided in lower- security correctional facilities (Cockram, 2005b; Holland & 
Persson, 2011).  
Specialist facilities and programs suited to offenders with an ID are limited in 
Australia, so they may be housed in ‘mainstream’ correctional settings when 
specialist facilities are not available, placing them at increased risk of coercion, 
abuse, and neglect from other inmates and non-specialist prison staff (HRW, 2018). 
For their own protection, people with an ID are also likely to experience extended 
periods of solitary confinement in ‘protection units’ while in secure custody (HRW, 
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2018). In some States and Territories (specifically WA and NT), people with an ID 
can be held in indefinite detention without having been sentenced due to being 
deemed unfit to stand trial (Freckelton, 2014), leaving such people without a clear 
avenue for therapeutic treatment and support (relevant to their disability) and hence 
social justice. Given the overrepresentation of offenders with an ID in the Australian 
criminal justice system, and the systemic and interpersonal discrimination past 
researchers have identified they experience, it is essential to understand how and 
why this discrimination persists despite Australia’s commitment to human rights 
ideology and legislation. While there are several disciplinary routes by which this 
investigation could be conducted, one key route is to examine the social 
psychological mechanisms underlying this systemic and interpersonal discrimination 
using stigma theory and related constructs. 
Beliefs and attitudes are core cognitions underlying stigma and 
discrimination. Community members and professionals in the criminal justice and 
disability sectors are influential social categories whose beliefs and attitudes towards 
offenders with an ID may contribute to their stigmatisation and experience of 
discrimination. Stigmatising beliefs and attitudes may contribute to performed 
behaviour by these influential social categories, be it the provision of professional 
care or treatment in the disability, correctional, or forensic disability setting, or the 
expression of citizens’ perspectives on sentencing practices, and the placement of 
treatment facilities for offenders with an ID in community settings. The stigmatising 
beliefs and attitudes of these influential social categories has received negligible 
attention in the forensic psychology, criminology, and social psychology empirical 
literature to date and requires empirical assessment.  
In Chapter 2, a three-part narrative literature review is presented, describing 
and justifying offenders with intellectual disability (ID) as the target population of 
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interest for this thesis (Section I). Chapter 2 then describes the relevance of stigma 
theory and associated constructs to understanding offenders with an ID’s experience 
of structural discrimination (Section II), and describes theories and synthesises past 
research relevant to understanding stigma towards offenders and people with an ID, 
in lieu of similar research on stigma towards offenders with an ID (Section III). 
Literature reviewed in Chapter 2 is drawn from a variety of disciplines relevant to the 
thesis topic, including social psychology, forensic psychology, criminology, 
sociology, disability studies, and philosophy. The Research Aim and Questions for 
this thesis are explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
Overview of Studies and Methodology 
Six studies, using two multi-part, factorial surveys (Lavrakas, 2008) were 
conducted. The first factorial survey sampled Australian community members via 
social media and was used for Studies 1-4 (Chapters 4-8). The second factorial 
survey sampled Australian community members, criminal justice professionals, 
disability professionals, and ‘dual’ professionals (experienced in both criminal 
justice and disability) via social media and professional networks, and was used for 
Study 5 and 6 (Chapters 9-11).  
Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4 
 The self-report factorial survey used for Studies 1-4 was completed online 
by a sample (N = 1055, 52.7% female) of the general Australian adult population. 
The Method for Studies 1-4 is presented in Chapter 4. These studies addressed 
research questions 1-4. Studies 1-3 (Chapters 5-7) employed quantitative analysis 
methods, while Study 4 (Chapter 8) employed qualitative analysis methods.  
Given the breadth and quantity of valuable responses derived from the first 
large survey of this thesis, I made the decision to present results of this survey as 
four separate studies so the unique research questions they each aim to address could 
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be adequately explored. A further factor influencing my decision to present this first 
survey and its results as four distinct studies is due to the nature of attrition in the 
survey. The study employed a convenience sampling approach, accessing the online 
general population using paid advertising and snowballing on social media sites, and 
participant enthusiasm for the study was strong. Of the initial sample (N = 1236), n = 
56 were excluded on the basis of being non-citizens/permanent residents of 
Australia, and n = 125 were excluded due to early attrition, leaving N = 1055 
participants having completed measures relevant to Study 1 and 2 after cleaning. 
Attrition (n = 127) reduced the sample for Study 3 to N = 928, while further attrition 
(n = 75) reduced the sample for Study 4 to N = 853.  
Study 1 (Chapter 5) addresses research question 1 and reports the 
development and validation of a measure of beliefs about human rights relevant to 
the Australian context. Study 2 (Chapter 6) addresses research question 2. It reports 
on a rank-order task to determine a hierarchy of participants’ moral concern for 
different social categories, and regression analyses to assess associations between 
beliefs about human rights and attributions of moral concern.  
Study 3 (Chapter 7) addresses research question 3, and reports between-
groups comparison results for stigmatising beliefs about people with an ID compared 
to criminal offenders, as distinct social categories. Participants from Study 2 were 
randomly allocated to one of the two target social category conditions, and 
completed a series of measures assessing beliefs about the social status, ‘humanness’ 
and perceived mind, and moral status of their target group. Between-group 
comparisons were conducted to determine whether there were significant differences 
between the types of stigmatising beliefs participants held about their respective 
social categories.  
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Study 4 (Chapter 8) addresses research question 4, and reports inductive 
thematic analysis results exploring causal beliefs about ID, and offending when an 
ID is, and is not, specified. Participants from Study 3 were randomly allocated to one 
of three vignette conditions describing a variation of the social categories addressed 
in Study 2. While all vignettes presented the same narrative of a young adult male 
(‘John’) who was casually employed, sociable, and living with his parents, the first 
vignette described John as possessing a mild ID and did not refer to a criminal 
history, the second vignette described John as having been recently sentenced for 
criminal assault and theft (without referring an ID), and the third vignette described 
John as possessing a mild ID and having been recently sentenced for criminal assault 
and theft. Participants allocated to the first vignette condition were asked to explain 
what they thought may have caused John’s ID, while participants allocated to the 
second and third vignette conditions were asked to explain what they thought may 
have caused John to commit criminal offenses. Each set of vignette responses was 
first analysed independently using an inductive approach, and a cross-case analysis 
was made for vignette 2 and 3, applying themes derived from responses to vignette 1 
to contextualise similarities and differences.  
Studies 5 and 6 
 The factorial survey used for Studies 5 and 6 (Chapter 9-11) was completed 
online by Australian adults (N = 679, 71.6% female) from four subsamples: 
community members (n = 224); professionals experienced in the disability/social 
work sector (n = 184); professionals experienced in the corrections/criminal justice 
sector (n = 113); and professionals experienced across both sectors previously 
described (‘dual professionals’; n = 158). The Method for Studies 5 and 6 is 
presented in Chapter 8. These studies addressed research questions 5 and 6 using 
quantitative analysis methods.  
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Study 5 (Chapter 10) addresses research question 5, and reports the four 
subsamples’ comparative attitudes towards appropriate correctional treatment 
settings (i.e., prisons and within the community) for offenders with an ID. These 
attitudes were assessed by developing original quantitative measures for each setting. 
After validating each measure via exploratory and confirmatory factors analyses, 
one-way ANOVAs were conducted to assess mean differences between subsamples’ 
responses for each measure.  
Study 6 (Chapter 11) addresses research question 6 and reports the four 
subsamples’ comparative attributions for six criminal justice constructs for offenders 
with, or without, an ID specified. An equal number of participants from each 
subsample of Study 5 were randomly allocated to one of three vignettes describing a 
crime (sexual assault, violent assault with a weapon, or burglary) committed by a 
male offender. In each vignette, participants from each subsample were further 
randomly allocated to one of two conditions where the offender either did, or did not, 
have an ID specified. After reading their vignette, participants then completed 
measures assessing their attributions towards criminal justice constructs for their 
respective offender (degree of moral culpability for the offence, deservingness of 
punishment via imprisonment, perceived value of rehabilitation, support for 
reintegration into the community, willingness to forgive once a sentence was served, 
and perceived influence of alcohol and/or other drugs on the offender’s criminal 
behaviour). After validating each criminal justice construct measure via exploratory 
and confirmatory factors analyses, five 4 (subsample) x 2 (disability status) 
ANOVAs were conducted per vignette to assess differences in attributions. 
 
Overview of General Discussion and Conclusions 
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Chapter 12 provides a general discussion of the implications of findings from 
Study 1-6 with respect to influential social categories’ stigmatising beliefs and 
attitudes towards offenders with an ID. I describe a stigmatised portrait of offenders 
with an ID based on my research findings and contextualising this portrait with 
reference to contemporary stigma theory and its functions. I then speculate on how 
this portrait may perpetuate interpersonal and structural discrimination towards 
offenders with an ID, and explore the expression of benevolent stigma and hard 
paternalism as contributors to this. General limitations of the thesis’ research 
program and suggested future research directions are also discussed, followed by a 
concluding summary of the thesis’ findings and their contribution to the theoretical 
and empirical body of knowledge in the area.   
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 CHAPTER TWO: OFFENDERS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY IN 
AUSTRALIA: A NARRATIVE LITERATURE REVIEW OF RELEVANT STIGMA 
THEORY AND RESEARCH 
 
 
The aim of this narrative literature review is to provide an overview of the 
current status of offenders with an ID in Australia and to explore how stigmatising 
beliefs and attitudes may contribute to this. To address this aim, a review of 
offenders with an ID and critical issues associated with their overrepresentation in 
the criminal justice system will be presented (Section I), followed by a brief review 
of stigma theory and associated constructs (Section II), followed by a synthesis of 
relevant past research focused on people with an ID and criminal offenders in lieu of 
there being research on offenders with an ID in this area (Section III). A research 
rationale for the thesis’ research program will conclude this review (Section IV). 
 
Section I 
Offenders with Intellectual Disability: Overview and Critical Issues 
Intellectual Disability 
  An ‘intellectual disability’ is a clinical label and diagnosis signifying a 
generalised neurodevelopmental disorder applied to individuals who are determined 
to have a very low intelligence quotient (IQ) of less than 70, with additional 
impairments in at least two areas of adaptive functioning that affect conceptual, 
social, and practical domains of daily functioning, with onset prior to adulthood, 
according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fifth Edition 
(DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10; 
World Health Organisation, 2016), the diagnostic term ‘mental retardation’ and 
similar criteria as presented in the DSM-V is equivalent. Diagnosis of an ID requires 
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the use of psychometric tools such as intelligence tests (e.g., the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale) and clinical judgement, and is typically conducted by a 
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist. This disability affects 2-3% of the general 
global population (Global Burden of Disease Study 2013 Collaborators, 2015), and is 
typically diagnosed prior to adulthood in order to qualify as a ‘developmental’ 
disorder. Other common labels currently used to refer to ID as a developmental 
disorder in countries other than Australia include ‘general learning disability’ or just 
‘learning disability’ (United Kingdom; Lyall, Holland, & Collins, 1995) and ‘mental 
retardation’ (United States of America) although the latter is being replaced by the 
term ‘ID’ in contemporary clinical and community usage (APA, 2013; Schalock et 
al., 2007). A ‘very low’ IQ is classed as < 70, although meeting this criterion alone is 
not sufficient to diagnose this disability given the margin for testing error and 
allocation of superficial weighting on test scores (APA, 2013), hence the use of 
clinical assessment to confirm that the score reflects adaptive impairments. Overall, 
deficits in intellectual functioning (i.e., reasoning, problem solving, planning, 
abstract thinking, judgement, and academic learning as well as learning from 
experience) and in adaptive functioning (i.e., reasoning in conceptual, social and 
practical domains) result in a failure to meet normative developmental and 
sociocultural standards for personal independence and social responsibility across 
settings (e.g., home, school, work, community (APA, 2013). Nearly 60% of people 
with an ID have severe communication limitations, which distinguishes ID from 
other major disability groups where severe limitations tend to focus more on self-
care and/or mobility (Wen, 2008). 
An ID diagnosis can vary in severity, with the majority of individuals 
(85.2%) diagnosed as having a ‘mild’ impairment (IQ 50-69), then ‘moderate’ (IQ 
35-49, 9.6%), then ‘severe to profound’ (IQ < 35, 5.2%) (APA, 2013; Global Burden 
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of Disease Study 2013 Collaborators, 2015). Each severity rank by IQ range 
represents an associated decrease in adaptive functioning, which is often 
accompanied by comorbid sensory and/or physical developmental conditions and 
disorders (APA, 2013; Harris, 2005). Working memory, cognitive efficacy, and 
executive functioning may vary depending on diagnostic severity (APA, 2013). Most 
people with an ID fall within the ‘mild’ category.  
As clinical diagnosis of ID utilises both standardised intelligence testing and 
clinical assessment of adaptive functioning, it may sometimes arise that a person’s 
IQ is at the lower end of the ‘below average’ range (IQ 70-85) and they also 
experience impaired adaptive functioning. In this case, a person might be informally 
categorised as having a ‘borderline’ intellectual functioning for purposes of clinical 
assessment and academic investigation (Peltopuro, Ahonen, Kaartinen, Seppala, & 
Narhi, 2014), in order to acknowledge that the psychosocial impairments associated 
with a formal ID diagnosis are also experienced by individuals just above diagnostic 
cut-off scores.  
While ID, ABI (also referred to as ‘traumatic brain injury’), and ‘cognitive 
impairment’ are often assessed and discussed in tandem for adult populations in 
psychological and population health research, these terms are not interchangeable. 
Where ID is a developmental disorder and refers to a constellation of syndromes and 
disorders specifically impacting global cognitive and associated adaptive functioning 
prior to adulthood, ABI refers to an injury that can occur at any stage of life after 
birth (postnatal, childhood, older adulthood) and may impact either domain-specific 
or global cognitive and adaptive functioning (APA, 2013). Depending on the type 
and extent of the ABI, a young child or adolescent who receives an ABI may 
therefore not necessarily experience global cognitive impairment and associated 
developmental impairment. ‘Cognitive impairment’ or ‘cognitive disability’ is an 
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umbrella term that is applied when referring to any disorder/condition or set of 
disorders/conditions where neurocognitive function is impaired, regardless of the age 
at which it was acquired. For example, ‘cognitive disability’ has been used to 
simultaneously refer to people with an ID, ABI, and/or neurodegenerative disease 
such as dementia in past research (Baldry, Clarence, Dowse, & Troller, 2013; 
Mackay, 2015). 
Historically and cross-culturally, causes of ID have been poorly understood. 
European religious accounts from the Middle Ages, for example, indicate that ID 
was thought to occur due to the supernatural influence of malevolent spirits, while 
legal accounts from this era describe differing brain disorders (i.e., ‘natural fools’, or 
those with an ID, compared to ‘lunatics’, or those with mental illness; Harris, 2005). 
As medical and legal knowledge has evolved, particularly since the Enlightenment of 
the 1700s and development of psychiatry as a discipline during the 1800s, 
explanations for ID grounded in the physical world (such as family heritability and 
hypothyroidism) became more commonplace (Harris, 2005). The contemporary 
medical and research professions now attribute ID to a multiplicity of causes 
including genetic predisposition, chromosomal abnormalities (e.g., resulting in a 
recognisable classified constellation of symptoms such as Down Syndrome), prenatal 
nutrient deprivation and exposure to infections and toxins, as well as postnatal 
nutrient deprivation, exposure to infections and toxins, and carers’ neglect to foster 
basic cognitive and social development, as well as accidental and non-accidental 
injury leading to brain damage (APA, 2013; Eluvathingal et al., 2006; Global Burden 
of Disease Study 2013 Collaborators, 2015; Harris, 2005). 
According to the Balaratnasingam and Roy (2015), the most common causes 
of ID across 188 countries in 2013 were idiopathic ID, neonatal complications such 
as encephalopathy due to asphyxia and trauma, chromosomal abnormalities and 
 27
syndromes such as Down’s syndrome and Foetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder 
(FASD), cerebrovascular disease and infectious illness such as stroke or meningitis, 
respectively, and alcohol use disorders. Kaufman, Ayub, and Vincent (2010) also 
note that postnatal exposure to environmental factors such as certain teratogens or 
radiation can cause ID, as can severe head trauma or injury causing lack of oxygen to 
the brain. Similarly to Balaratnasingam and Roy (2015), however, the Global Burden 
of Disease Study 2013 Collaborators (2015) and Rauch et al. (2006) concluded that 
about 60% of ID cases were due to unknown causes.  
Overall, this myriad of potential causes impresses that the umbrella label 
‘intellectual disability’ represents a common set of chronic symptoms relevant to 
intellectual and social functioning, but not necessarily a single underlying cause. ID, 
particularly congenital ID, often presents in tandem with other neurodevelopmental 
disorders such as Autism Spectrum, Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder 
(ADHD), and epilepsy (Bhaumik, Tyrer, McGrother, & Ganghadaran, 2008; 
Cervantes & Matson, 2015; Robertson, Hatton, Emerson, & Baines, 2015; Shaaya, 
Grocott, Laing, & Thibert, 2016; Wen, 2008), and with congenital disorders specific 
to sensory and/or communication impairments (Carvill, 2001) and impaired motor 
ability (Gabis, Tsubary, Leon, Ashkenasi, & Shefer, 2015).  People with an ID are 
also more likely to experience physical health problems such as a predisposition to 
cardiovascular system defects (Sobey et al., 2015).  
In addition to increased risk for physical health and other 
neurodevelopmental disorder comorbidities, people with an ID experience higher 
rates of comorbid mental illness. A systematic review by Einfeld, Ellis, and Emerson 
(2011) found that 30-50% of children and adolescents with an ID had a comorbid 
mental illness, compared to 8-18% of children and adolescents without this 
disability; overall those with an ID had a relative risk for mental illness of up to 4.5 
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times higher than the general population. In a UK sample of adults with an ID who 
had recently accessed specialist support services, 33% had a comorbid psychiatric 
disorder (including affective, psychotic, anxiety, and behaviour disorders along with 
ASD and epilepsy; Bhaumik et al., 2008). In another UK sample of adults with an 
ID, 37% were found to be prescribed at least one type of psychotropic medication 
(primarily antipsychotics and antidepressants) to manage a psychiatric illness or 
‘challenging’ behaviour (Bowring, Totsika, Hastings, Toogood, & McMahon, 2017). 
Interestingly, a review of the literature on mental illness in people with an ID, in the 
Australian context, found that while Federal and State/Territory level governments 
acknowledged the mental health of Australians was an issue of national concern and 
had contributed policies and funding to address this, there was negligible provision 
made for people with an ID within these reforms (Torr, 2013). 
The term ‘challenging behaviour’ (sometimes referred to as ‘problem 
behaviour’) appears to be a euphemism used to describe a range of socially non-
normal behaviours common to people with an ID, particularly those with ASD (Hove 
& Havik, 2010). Challenging behaviours are broadly defined as being either socially 
inappropriate (such as screaming, hugging strangers, or inappropriate sexual 
behaviour), stereotypic (such as rocking, humming), or potentially injurious to the 
person with an ID (such as head-hitting) or to those around them (such as 
aggressively lashing out), without necessarily being ‘disordered’. Instead, 
challenging behaviours are explained within the context of the ID and its severity, 
and interpreted as expressions of low inhibition, frustration, confusion, 
stress/distress, and/or anger (Douds & Bantwal, 2011). Despite the position that 
challenging behaviour is not serious enough to be classified as disordered, past 
research indicates a positive correlation between challenging behaviours and 
psychiatric disorder (Grey, Pollard, McClean, McCauley, & Hastings, 2010), as well 
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as off-label prescription of antipsychotic medication to help manage aggressive 
challenging behaviour (Bowring et al., 2017), despite there being little evidence that 
anti-psychotics actually decrease challenging behaviours (Tyrer et al., 2008). 
Challenging behaviours can be dangerous to the self or others, but are typically 
managed within the primary care setting by informal carers or professional disability 
or psychiatric support staff; however. This can leave the distinction between 
challenging and potentially criminal behaviour ambiguous, since the only difference 
may be whether the person with an ID is engaged in the criminal justice system for 
their dangerous behaviour (Reed, Russell, Xenitidis, & Murphy, 2004).   
An ID specific to a certain syndrome can often be inferred via a set of visible 
physical traits, as in the case of people with Down Syndrome and FASD, who 
present with unique and noticeable facial and structural characteristics specific to the 
cause of their ID (APA, 2013). However, not all IDs have an associated phenotypic 
expression, so that a person’s ID is not always identified or even suspected until 
formal psychological assessment during childhood or adulthood. Early identification 
of a child’s ID, and severity of the disability, allows provision of specialised 
education and social supports to ensure approaches to teaching communication, 
numeracy, and socialisation account for anticipated barriers. Specialised education 
and access to appropriate school services has been shown to reduce socialisation and 
communication barriers common to children with an ID (Adeniyi & Omigbodun, 
2016; Jonte & Doris, 2017; Plavnick, Kaid, & MacFarland, 2015; Strogilos, 
Tragoulia, & Kaila, 2015; Zion & Jenvey, 2006), and improve their numeracy skills 
(Hsu et al., 2016). In addition to specialised school-based education, speech therapy 
provided during childhood and adulthood can be used to improve verbal 
communication and comprehension skills (Terband, Coppens-Hofman, Reffeltrath, 
& Maassen, 2017). As adults, and depending on the severity of their impairment and 
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hence their language skills, people with an ID may prefer to access ‘plain English’ 
texts when reading, to use sign language (e.g., Auslan), and to use images to 
facilitate communication with others. People with an ID may also require or prefer 
the assistance of a trusted support person in some or all social and legal situations, 
depending on the severity of their disability. Depending on the severity of their 
disability, adults with an ID may prefer or require support for daily living and 
continue to live with their family indefinitely or live in a residential community. 
However, this is not always the case and some adults with an ID will choose to live 
in a group home or independently, with or without the assistance of disability and/or 
family supports. It is important to understand that the diversity of causes underlying 
ID, the range of severity and hence impact on adaptive functioning, range and 
likelihood of comorbidities, degree of social inclusion, and access to formal 
education, health, and social support services, means that the impact of the ID on an 
individual’s needs and how they navigate this is highly idiosyncratic.  
As recently as the 1970s, and regardless of degree of disability, people with an ID 
were commonly forced to live in institutional settings where they were prone to 
neglect and abuse (Furey, 1989). Disability rights movements of the 1980s (an 
extension of associated human and civil rights movements during the mid to late 20th 
century) included advocacy by people with an ID and their families to reduce 
systemic discrimination (Cooper, 1999). Furthermore, governments perceive fiscal 
incentives to replace institutional services and accommodations with community-
based living and private services for people with a variety of psychiatric and physical 
disabilities (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011; Dowse, 2009). This transition in 
legislation, policy, and associated infrastructure has encouraged and enforced 
autonomy, independence, and person-centred supports and services, and general 
social inclusion for people with an ID and their families. While many people with an 
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ID now live in the community setting, some with complex needs, inadequate 
supports via family, and/or serious challenging or offending behaviour, remain in 
institutional settings (Beadle-Brown, Mansell, & Kozma, 2007). Systemic and 
interpersonal discrimination towards people with an ID has decreased with time or 
has at least grown less overt, yet discrimination remains common in all domains 
relevant to civic and political engagement and contribution, including education, 
employment, health, housing, reproduction and parenting, and participation in leisure 
such as sports and the Arts (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). Underscoring this 
discrimination is the overrepresentation of people with an ID in the criminal justice 
system in Australia and internationally as both victims and offenders, which has been 
attributed to a variety of systemic and psychosocial barriers. Although estimates vary 
across studies, about 9% of the Australian (Queensland) prison population have been 
identified as having an ID, despite only 2-3% of the general Australian population 
having an ID (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2008; Dias et al., 2013a; 
Dias et al., 2013b).  
The Criminal Justice System and Criminal Offenders in Australia 
A criminal offender is defined as someone who has been charged with 
committing one or more crimes by Federal or State/Territory police, according to 
relevant legislation, and has either been sentenced or is awaiting sentencing for their 
crime. Daly and Sarre (2016) highlight that the criminal justice system in Australia 
(and other Western nations such as the UK and America) is best defined as ‘a loosely 
coupled collection of interdependent agencies, each having bureaucratic interests, 
and each having specific functions (which can be in conflict with other agencies) that 
are subject to legal regulations, for which agency workers have great discretion in 
making decisions when responding (or not responding) to harms defined as criminal 
by the state, and where value conflicts exist within and across agencies and in the 
 32
general population about the exact meaning of ‘justice’’ (p.7). In short, the criminal 
justice system includes three broad ‘arms’ (investigative, adjudicative, and 
correctional) which involve a variety of professionals with varying agendas (e.g., 
police officers, prosecutors, defence lawyers and victim support groups, magistrates 
and judges, community and prison corrections officers, and therapeutic/rehabilitative 
professionals; Daly & Sarre, 2016).  The purpose of these three arms is to determine 
the degree of criminal responsibility, or guilt, of an offender with reference to the 
impact of the offending behaviour (‘physical element’), the intention or ‘will’ 
underlying the offending behaviour (‘fault element’), and the general capacity of the 
offender for criminal responsibility (‘voluntariness’ and ‘capacity’), to ensure the 
offender receives their ‘just deserts’ according to the Commonwealth Criminal Code 
(Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, 2002).  
The purpose of sentencing can vary but typically aims to meet one or more of 
the following four outcomes via punishment: individual deterrence; general 
deterrence; rehabilitation; and/or incapacitation (Daly & Sarre, 2016). Individual 
deterrence (also termed specific or special deterrence) aims to dissuade or deter an 
offender from committing a crime in the future; general deterrence aims to dissuade 
or deter members of the broader community from committing a crime in the future; 
rehabilitation aims to change the attitudes or behaviour of offenders so they do not 
commit crime in the future; and incapacitation aims to protect community members 
from certain offenders who may pose a threat to their welfare and safety (Daly & 
Sarre, 2016). 
Sentencing in Australia is generally retributive in the sense that the 
punishment harshness must be proportionate to the harm occasioned by the criminal 
act; for example, shoplifting is considered a less serious offence than robbery, and so 
shoplifting should receive a less harsh punishment than for robbery. A retributive 
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justification for punishment means that a crime must be censured and that a 
punishment (penalty or sanction) should reflect the degree of blameworthiness that 
we attach to the act (Daly & Sarre, 2016).  
 In Australia for 2016-2017, 413,894 people were charged with at least one 
criminal offence (ABS, 2018b). During this period, the most common principal 
offences nationally were: illicit drug offences (20%); acts intended to cause injury 
(i.e., non-fatal, non-sexual; 19%); theft (19%); public order offences (15%); and 
offences against justice (6%; ABS, 2018b). Acts intended to cause injury were the 
most common principal crime among men, while theft was most common among 
women, and overall men were three times as likely to be charged with an offence 
than women (ABS, 2018b). The median age for offenders nationally was 29 years, 
while the median age for prisoners was 35 years (ABS, 2017, 2018b). 
As of 2017, 41,202 Australian adults were imprisoned, with nearly a third of 
these (31%) not yet sentenced (ABS, 2017). The most common offences for 
prisoners were: acts intended to cause injury (23%); illicit drug offences (15%); 
sexual assault (12%); and unlawful entry with intent (10%; (ABS, 2017). While 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people represent about 2% of the Australian 
population, they accounted for over a quarter (27%) of the Australian prisoner 
population in 2017 (ABS, 2017). Furthermore, 92% of all prisoners were men, and at 
least half of prisoners across States/Territories had been previously imprisoned 
(ABS, 2017). Imprisonment can include being held in a medium or maximum 
security facility where the prisoner is confined by a secure physical barrier (79% of 
prisoners), or can include being housed in an ‘open custody’ minimum security 
custodial facility where the prisoner is not confined by a secure physical barrier 
(21% of prisoners) (ABS, 2018a). In addition to the imprisoned offender population, 
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an additional 69, 155 sentenced offenders were completing community-based 
corrections orders in 2017 (ABS, 2018a). 
Offenders in the Australian criminal justice system experience a range of 
socioeconomic and psychosocial impairments, both prior to engaging in the system 
and sometimes as a result of involvement in the system (e.g., imprisonment).  For 
example, a third (32%) of prison entrants had an education level below Year 10, 
nearly half (48%) were unemployed during the month prior to imprisonment, a 
quarter (25%) were homeless in the month prior to imprisonment, and nearly a third 
(31%) expected to be homeless upon release from prison (AIHW, 2015). 
Furthermore, half (49%) of prison entrants reported having ever been told by a 
mental health professional that they have a mental health disorder (including 
substance abuse disorder), over a quarter (27%) of prison entrants reported currently 
taking medication for a mental health disorder, nearly a quarter (23%) of prison 
entrants reported having previously intentionally harmed themselves, and 7% were at 
risk of suicide upon entry (AIHW, 2015). The overrepresentation of mental illness in 
the Australian criminal justice system is consistent with offender demographics in 
other Western countries (Fazel & Danesh, 2002). Interestingly, while nearly a third 
of prisoners (30%) were identified as having a disability upon entry, only 2% of 
entrants’ disabilities were identified as creating profound or severe core activity 
limitations (AIHW, 2015). Substance use disorder and abuse is also common in the 
Australian offender population. For example, over half (58%) of prison dischargees 
reported high risk alcohol use according to the AUDIT-C prior to their most recent 
incarceration, over two-thirds (67%) had used illicit drugs in the year prior to 
incarceration, and 45% had previously used injected drugs (AIHW, 2015). 
Many prisoners report an improvement in their mental and physical health 
outcomes as a result of their imprisonment (AIHW, 2015), which is attributed to 
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their access to assessment, therapeutic and correctional treatment, and routine in the 
institutional setting. However, sentence completion and release back into the 
community can lead to a return of physical and mental health conditions (Winter et 
al., 2016). Complicating this is systemic and interpersonal discrimination on the 
basis of being labelled as an ‘ex-offender’ (Renton, 2013; Winnick & Bodkin, 2008). 
If offenders have been held in secure custodial settings, they must become reoriented 
to the freedom of community living (Renton, 2013), including avoidance of social 
and environmental factors associated with their previous offending and potential 
AOD use (Winter et al., 2016). Ex-offenders may also need to rebuild trust with the 
community (friends and family), and may be faced with systemic and interpersonal 
stigma and discrimination when applying for employment, housing, or financial 
assistance given the need to disclose prior criminal offences (Winnick & Bodkin, 
2008). Experience of discrimination due to a tarnished public identity (public stigma) 
can result in the internalisation of stigmatising beliefs and attitudes (self-stigma), 
further impacting psychosocial health and ability to fully reintegrate into the 
community and desist from further offending.  
Offenders with Intellectual Disability 
In studies on ID offender prevalence, assessment, recidivism, and 
correctional treatment and management outcomes, definitional criteria can vary. 
While ID is technically defined and diagnosed with reference to an IQ of 70 (two 
standard deviations below the average) in addition to adaptive functioning deficits 
(APA, 2013), studies may loosen this criteria depending on their research aims or the 
criteria used by the health or government departments for whom the research is 
commissioned; for example, the sample assessed by Lindsay et al. (2010) included 
ID individuals as having an IQ of less than 75 (IQ 70 +/- 2 standard errors. For 
studies assessing borderline ID as well as ID, criteria for inclusion may go as high as 
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85 (Søndenaa, Rasmussen, Palmstierna, & Nøttestad, 2008). People with a mild ID 
are more likely to offend than those with a moderate or severe ID (Savage & Bouck, 
2017). International research on the prevalence of offenders with an ID in Western 
countries has thus been shown to range from 0%-45% (Lindsay, 2002), suggesting 
that given the methodological differences between prevalence studies, firm 
conclusions on the actual prevalence of offenders with an ID in custody in Western 
nations can not be drawn. Highlighting this inconsistency in prevalence rates, the 
average estimate from a systematic review of prevalence studies featuring 12,000 
prisoners from Australia, United Kingdoms, United States, New Zealand, and Dubai 
estimated around 2.9% of prisoners had an ID (Fazel, Xenitidis, & Powell, 2008); 
however, in a Norwegian study, 10% of the prison population was estimated to have 
an ID (IQ<70), and one-third to have an IQ below 85 (Søndenaa et al., 2008).  
While prevalence rates of offenders with an ID vary from study to study due 
to the assessment tools used, definitional criteria of ID, and demographic differences 
across jurisdictions, there is general consensus among researchers that offenders with 
an ID (and other cognitive impairments such as ABI) are over represented in 
Western criminal justice systems, including Australia (Vanny, Levy, & Hayes, 
2008). In an Australian study with a sample of 843 offenders with an ID, the 
majority were identified as having a borderline (33%) or mild (44%) ID, with the 
remaining 23% having a moderate, severe, or unspecified ID (Cockram, 2005b). 
Australian offenders with an ID, compared to general population offenders, are more 
likely to be male, Indigenous, have less than 10 years formal schooling, unstable 
accommodation immediately prior to imprisonment, low employment, a history of 
juvenile detention, poor self-assessed health status, depression, and polysubstance 
use and dependence (Bhandari, Dooren, Eastgate, Lennox, & Kinner, 2015; Dias, 
Ware, Kinner, & Lennox (2013). These psychosocial comorbidies place offenders 
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with an ID and their additional need for support at risk of being over looked or 
mistaken for other disorders when interacting with the criminal justice system 
(Baldry et al., 2013). 
Like many adolescents and young adults, people with an ID from a lower 
socioeconomic background and with lower school engagement tend to engage in 
more risk-taking and offending behaviour, a predictor of adult criminal offending 
(Savage & Bouck, 2017). Compared to the general population, individuals with an 
ID also tend to have higher rates (up to 50%) of comorbid psychiatric disorder and 
mental health problems, increasing their likely engagement with the criminal justice 
system (O'Brien, 2002; Vanny, Levy, & Hayes, 2008). Baldry et al. (2013) found 
that adult offenders with a cognitive impairment, or cognitive impairment and a 
comorbid mental illness, had their first encounter with police at a younger age (i.e., 
15 years old) than those without a diagnosis (i.e., 18 years old). They also found that, 
regardless of mental illness, those with a cognitive impairment were more likely to 
have had a previous psychiatric admission compared to those with no cognitive 
impairment (Baldry et al., 2013). 
Cockram (2005a) assessed recidivism of Australian male offenders with an 
ID and found that those with an ID had a significantly higher rearrest rate compared 
to general population offenders. While there is a small to medium positive 
correlation between assessed risk severity and level of service/security provision for 
ID offenders (for example, being placed in a generic community or specialist 
forensic program, or a low, medium, or high security prison), this effect is weaker 
than expected (Lindsay et al., 2010). The implication is that there are a number of 
lower-risk ID offenders in higher-risk facilities, and vice versa. For example, an 
Australian longitudinal study over 11-years by Cockram (2005b) found that a third of 
offenders with an ID who were charged with a criminal offence were given a 
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custodial sentence, compared to 13% of offenders without an ID, and that 16% of 
offenders with an ID who were first-time offenders were given custodial sentences, 
compared to 7% of general population offenders. Cockram (2005b) also found that 
while the security level of allocated custody settings did not differ by ID status for 
first time offenders, by the time of exit from custody offenders with an ID more 
likely to have been moved to medium and maximum security facilities than general 
population offenders.  
Explanations for these sentencing differences are complex. Cockram (2005b) 
suggests that the first time offences of offenders with an ID were significantly more 
serious (‘offences against persons’) compared to general population first time 
offenders (‘other assault’), and that offenders with an ID were more likely to be 
recidivists, encouraging sentencing magistrates and judges to order harsher 
punishments for repeated (if ‘lesser’) crimes. However, Cockram (2005b) also 
suggests that an ID may not be initially clear to police upon questioning and arrest, 
resulting in situational confusion, leading questioning, and more serious charges than 
would be accorded were the ID recognised and appropriate supports provided prior 
to charges being laid. Research by Talbot and Jacobson (2010) in the UK found that 
in addition to initial police questioning, defendants with an ID experience trouble 
understanding their court proceedings and own trials, and may agree with 
suggestions throughout to cover their confusion. Finally, Cockram (2005b) suggests 
that the move from minimum to medium or maximum security facilities for people 
with an ID is likely due to the need for ‘protection units’ for people with an ID in 
mainstream custodial settings, which are typically found in higher security settings. 
This explanation is supported by Glaser and Deane (1999) in another Australian 
(VIC) sample of offenders with an ID, and Lindsay et al. (2010) in a Scottish sample 
of offenders with an ID. Cockram’s (2005b) explanation is also supported by reports 
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indicating that offenders with an ID are at greater risk of coercion, exploitation, and 
abuse by other prisoners due to forced association and trouble interpreting social 
cues (HRW, 2018), which may lead to the use of protective units for prisoners with 
an ID and hence transfer to higher security facilities.  
Correctional staff’s inadequate training and limited experience with people 
with an ID and mental illness can also lead to misinterpretation and mismanagement 
of challenging behaviour and/or crisis situations, including the use of, and 
dependence on, protection units to manage these or to punish the offender (HRW, 
2018). While intended to be for the protection of the individual offender from the 
prison population, or for the protection of the prison population from the individual, 
‘protection units’ can in practice be a form of solitary confinement (up to 22 hours a 
day; HRW, 2018). Criminal justice professionals’ stigmatising beliefs towards 
offenders with an ID and mental illness, and accompanying negative attitudes and 
behaviours, were identified by HRW (2018) as underlying the systemic abuse and 
discrimination of these vulnerable offenders. Stigmatising beliefs and attitudes 
identified in this report were extensive, and were attributed to or expressed by police 
staff, prison health staff such as nurses, and correctional officers. In fact, therapeutic 
staff (psychologists and psychiatrists) working in the prison settings appeared to be 
most critical of other criminal justice professionals’ stigmatising behaviours towards 
offenders with an ID and psychosocial disability. As one prison-based psychiatrist 
said (HRW, 2018):  
I haven’t seen anyone with an ID who hasn’t 
gotten worse in prison. They are often punished 
by staff when struggling to communicate or when 
seeking help. The staff don’t get that people with 
an ID don’t understand what’s happening. Staff 
take things personally and then act out in anger 
against the prisoner. 
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 Forensic orders are an alternative to mainstream sentencing and custodial 
approaches, specifically for people with an ID and/or mental illness. A forensic order 
is made at the discretion of the sentencing magistrate or judge, and may vary in the 
level of custodial security required (e.g., community or inpatient, with or without the 
consent of the alleged offender; Carroll et al., 2009). Forensic orders are typically 
applied when a person is deemed unfit to stand trial, such as people with an ID or 
experiencing a serious mental health episode (Carroll et al., 2009). A forensic order 
may allow the offender to continue living in the community if risk to the community 
is low, but may be involuntarily detained in a psychiatric or specialist forensic 
disability setting if risk to the community or themselves is high. Depending on the 
alleged offender, forensic orders may also include completion of intervention and 
rehabilitation programs for substance abuse or other antisocial behaviours (Carroll et 
al., 2009). As the extent of ID and other cognitive impairments in the Australian 
offender population becomes clearer, in addition to the high rate of offenders with 
serious psychological disorder, forensic orders and investment in forensic disability 
settings has taken on greater relevance within the Australian criminal justice system.  
 
 
Critical Issues Relevant to Offenders with Intellectual Disability  
Offenders with an ID are a vulnerable, high-needs group who are over-
represented in prisons, internationally and within Australia (Hayes, Shakell, 
Mottram, & Lancaster, 2007; Herrington, 2009; Vanny et al., 2009). During the last 
20 years or so, research has focused on the problem of prevalence and recidivism 
rates among ID offenders, with efforts made to address shortcomings in prevention 
and rehabilitation (Lindsay, 2002; Lindsay, Elliot, & Astell, 2004; Taylor & Lindsay, 
2010). This research direction is attributed to the growing emphasis in Western 
society on human rights and its influence on standards of practice in forensic 
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psychology (Birgden & Perlin, 2008; Ward, 2008). Both people with an ID, and 
criminal offenders, are distinct populations in Australia who experience significant 
disadvantage relevant to socioeconomic status and social opportunity and are more 
likely to be dependent on social welfare supports and services. Both populations 
(along with people with disability more broadly) are recognised by the United 
Nations (UN) as vulnerable to structural discrimination, neglect, and abuse on the 
basis of their respective disadvantage, and historically limited opportunity for civil 
and political engagement. 
People with an ID have fared poorly under legislation and social policy until 
the late 20th century, which has emphasised segregated and/or limited education and 
employment, institutional care, unpaid labour, forced sterilisation and/or gender 
segregation, and restraints on expression of self-determination (Malacrida, 2006; 
Manning, 2009; Monk, 2010; Vann & Siska, 2006; Wehmeyer, 2013). However, 
Australia’s support for the human rights agenda of the United Nations, beginning 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948) and 
ratification of its associated Covenants, followed by the Declaration on the Rights of 
Mentally Retarded Persons (UN General Assembly, 1971), the Declaration on the 
Rights of Disabled Persons (UN General Assembly, 1975), and the ratification of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, 2006) 
in 2008, highlight an evolution in Australian society’s beliefs, values, and attitudes 
towards people with disability generally. Support for UN ideals and ratification of 
these UN legislative tools has led to numerous changes in Commonwealth, State, and 
Territory legislation and policy relevant to people with disability generally and ID 
specifically, most recent of which is the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 
2013 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013) and the National Disability Strategy 2010-
2020 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) policy framework, which aim to improve 
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social and economic participation of people with disability and their carers by 
increasing autonomy and access to funding and services.  
Criminal offenders (particularly prisoners) have also fared poorly under 
Australian and international legislation well into the 20th century, subjected to forced 
confessions, torture, forced labour, and intra-institutional abuse by correctional staff 
and other inmates, in addition to the deprivation of civil liberties that is meant to 
constitute their total punishment (UN General Assembly, 1951, 1990). While the UN 
has sought to address systemic abuse of criminal offenders via the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948) and associated 
Covenants, and has specifically sought to restrict torture against prisoners of war via 
international legislation such as the Geneva Conventions (UN General Assembly, 
1949), it is notable that there is currently no international human rights legislation 
(i.e., a Convention or Covenant) protecting prisoners and offenders more broadly, 
once sentenced. The UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(UN General Assembly, 1951) and the Basic Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(UN General Assembly, 1990) are both non-binding frameworks for ideal practice, 
rather than international legislation that UN member States vow to adhere to and 
implement at the national level. As such, the Standard Guidelines for Corrections in 
Australia (Australian Institute of Criminology [AIC], 2012) and Australian Offender 
Program and Facilitation Standards (Corrective Services Administrators’ Council, 
2013) are similarly non-binding national policies rather than legislation which guide 
how offenders are to be treated in accordance with international and Australian 
human rights standards, and Australian criminal justice legislation. These policies 
provide a flexible framework by which to guide correctional institutions and 
professionals regarding the appropriate correctional treatment and management of 
offenders in custody, including those with disability and other vulnerabilities. 
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These correctional policies include a great deal of hedging language which 
leaves decisions about access to supports and services for offenders with special 
needs (such as offenders with an ID) to the discretion of individual correctional 
institutions and their staff. For example, in reference to offenders with complex 
needs (section 5.10), the Standard Guidelines for Corrections in Australia (AIC, 
2012) states: “Offenders with a disability should be provided with assistance and 
with programmes, which address their individual needs and their offending 
behaviours where possible” (p. 12, emphasis added). Similar hedging is used 
throughout these policies to imply addressing these needs is preferable but not 
necessary. Overall, the ambiguity of Australia’s national correctional policy 
standards regarding the rights and management of offenders with disability, in 
addition to non-specialist correctional staff making decisions regarding the needs of 
people with an ID, along with fiscal pressures on correctional facilities and their 
provision of resources and services, means that once offenders with an ID are in 
custody they may be at risk of further disadvantage and associated harm within the 
correctional setting. State and Territory-level correctional departments are aware of, 
and seem genuinely concerned about, barriers to the support and management of 
offenders with disability generally, and ID specifically; a range of policy frameworks 
and strategies have been developed to address this, such as the Corrections Victoria 
Disability Framework 2010-2012 and 2013-2015 policies (Corrections Victoria, 
2009, 2012). Such policies specify the value and creation of diversion pathways, the 
development of specialist facilities and programs, allocation of specialist resources 
and supports, staff training, and collaboration of disability and mental health 
stakeholders and services with correctional services. Furthermore, such policies draw 
on empirical research to address these issues, such as problems associated with staff 
characteristics and specialist training (Clarkson, Murphy, Coldwell, & Dawson, 
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2009), the need for specialist facilities and services (Ogloff, 2010), tailoring 
assessment tools to ID offenders (Camilleri & Quinsey, 2011), and tailoring and 
evaluating the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs for offenders with an ID 
(Ford, Rose, & Thrift, 2009; Taylor, Novaco, Gillmer, Robertson, & Thorne, 2005).  
However, there is limited discourse on the role of professionals’ beliefs, 
values, and attitudes towards offenders with an ID specifically (or disability 
generally) and how this may impact service delivery and outcomes. More 
specifically, stigma and discrimination within corrections towards offenders with an 
ID is not explicitly addressed by correctional reports and policies, despite evidence 
of human rights violations towards offenders with an ID (HRW, 2018).  
In addition to professionals’ potential stigma and discrimination towards 
offenders with an ID with regard to their criminal justice experiences, community 
members’ beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours regarding offenders with an ID has been 
given negligible attention by academic research and governmental reports. 
Community members, or citizens, are the primary and secondary victims of criminal 
offenders, as well as the friends and family members of criminal offenders. They 
have personal positive and negative relationships with offenders, and the sentencing 
and correctional treatment an offender receives can have complex repercussions for 
associated community members. Apart from community members with a personal 
connection to an offender, all citizens have the ability to formally and informally 
influence the detection and reporting of crime, along with policy, legislation, 
sentencing, and services and resources impacting the custodial, rehabilitative, and 
reintegration experiences of offenders. Community members (in addition to 
politicians and media organisations) are often overlooked as influential social groups 
in the criminal justice process of offender sentencing and punishment, rehabilitation, 
and reintegration (Daly & Sarre, 2017). 
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In summary, offenders with an ID are a particularly vulnerable social group. 
As independent social groups, people with an ID and criminal offenders have 
historically experienced serious systemic and interpersonal discrimination, including 
neglect and abuse in institutional settings. As human rights ideology and values have 
influenced Australian policy and legislation, human rights violations of people with 
an ID as well as criminal offenders are being acknowledged and addressed. The 
increasing visibility of disability in Australian society, as well as strong social policy 
and legislative initiates to improve the social and economic opportunities of people 
with disability, suggests increasingly positive social values towards people with 
disability generally (and perhaps those with an ID specifically) by Australians. 
Conversely, the nature of criminal offenders as moral transgressors receiving their 
‘just deserts’ via sentencing (as punishment), the ambiguity of correctional policy 
regarding how resources and services are to be allocated and under what conditions, 
fiscal and political pressures, and the limited visibility of Australian offenders’ 
correctional experiences particularly while in custody, means that the human rights 
violations of offenders and associated social processes are not scrutinised and 
addressed with similar intensity. All offenders have the right to protection of their 
human rights, but people with an ID are particularly vulnerable to coercion, neglect, 
and abuse within the social context of correctional custody, in addition to requiring 
specialist supports to manage comorbidities related to communication and physical 
and mental health that correctional institutional settings may be unable, or unwilling, 
to provide. Why offenders with an ID continue to experience systemic discrimination 
is a multi-faceted issue that requires further empirical investigation. One lens by 
which to explore this is through the use of social psychological theories and 
constructs relevant to social stigma. 
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Section II 
Stigma Theory and Social Categories 
 
 Stigma theory refers to a broad set of theories and models developed within 
sociological and social psychological disciplines to explain interpersonal and 
structural discrimination towards an individual or social category on the basis of a 
perceived stereotypical physical, psychological, or cultural feature. These theories 
and associated empirical research typically involve the evaluation of the stigmatiser’s 
negative beliefs, attitudes, affective responses, personal or social values, causal 
attributions, and expectations regarding the nature and associated threat of the 
stigmatised social category (Allport, 1954; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; 
Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Link & Phelan, 2001; 
Sherif, 1958; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Weiner, Perry, & Magnuson, 
1988; Yang et al., 2007); and/or the evaluation of how the stigmatised person or 
group responds to and copes with their awareness of these negative evaluations and 
attributions, and associated discrimination (Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984; Link, 
Cullen, Struening, Shrout, & Dohnrenwend, 1989; Link & Phelan, 2001; Major & 
O’Brien, 2005; Yang et al., 2007). This section of the narrative literature review, a 
general overview of contemporary stigma theory will be presented after first defining 
the stigma theory-specific constructs of social categories and stereotypes.  
Social Categories and Stereotypes 
A ‘social category’ is a theoretical construct relevant to social perception and 
intergroup relations, popularised by social psychologist and social identity theorist 
Tajfel (1981). A social category can be defined as the schematic classification of 
people based on similar minimal characteristics such as a demographic, trait, 
appearance, disorder, behaviour, etc. A social category differs from a social group, in 
that individuals within a social group are aware of, and interact with, one another 
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whereas a social category is an abstract and imposed concept of group belonging, 
where individuals may not necessarily know one another. Social categorisation is 
imposed by individuals and society onto other individuals, although individuals may 
also categorise themselves, leading to self-attribution of a social identity (i.e., 
identification with a preferred social category or ‘ingroup’ (Tajfel, 1981). In this 
thesis, the term ‘social category’ will be applied when referring to potentially 
stigmatised (i.e., people with an ID, criminal offenders, offenders with an ID) or 
stigmatising (i.e., community members, and professionals experienced in the 
criminal justice and/or disability sectors) populations and samples. Previous 
references to ‘social groups’ in this thesis should be interpreted retrospectively as 
referring to ‘social categories’, using lay terms. 
A ‘prototype’ is a typical example or cognitive representation of an 
individual from a social category, encapsulating attributes necessary to belong to said 
social category, and around which all other probable and possible attributes are 
organised, forming a social category ‘schema’ (Tajfel, 1981). When a category 
prototype is representative of humans rather than some other material object (e.g., 
furniture), a prototype is called a ‘stereotype’ (Tajfel, 1981). An individual’s 
prototypical representation of who belongs to a social category may thus be informed 
in varying degrees by a stereotype, which is a culturally shared representation of a 
social category and is positively or negatively valanced to varying degrees depending 
on the quality of the attributes defining the stereotype (Tajfel, 1981). At an 
interpersonal level, negative stereotypes can interact with prejudicial beliefs and 
attitudes and motivate discriminative behaviours, and at an intergroup level negative 
stereotypes can motivate exclusion, oppression, and aggression. On a societal level 
negative stereotypes can lead to structural discrimination via policies and legislations 
encouraging social exclusion, restriction, and containment, absent or restricted 
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allocation of material and social resources, and provide a basis for social, punitive, 
and political scapegoating, aggression, and abuse. One has only to reflect on the 
objective of the human and civil rights movements, and associated legislated 
changes, in Western nations during the 19th and 20th centuries to appreciate how 
stereotypes and associated prejudice can impact interpersonal and intergroup 
relations, and be perpetuated by legislation and institutional norms. People who 
belong to a social category for which there is a strongly negative stereotype are often 
referred to as being ‘stigmatised’ (Goffman, 1963). People who criminally offend 
and people with an ID have historically belonged to two distinctly stigmatised social 
categories, resulting in their social containment via institutionalisation, social 
exclusion, neglect, and abuse, as detailed in Section I of this literature review. 
Stigma Theory 
Two seminal theorists contributing to contemporary theory of stigma are 
Allport (1954) and his The Nature of Prejudice, and Goffman (1963) and his Stigma: 
Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Allport’s (1954) social psychological 
approach argued that prejudice developed as a result of heuristic, categorical thinking 
and resulted in negative, often baseless, attitudes towards a target group or 
individual. Goffman’s (1963) sociological approach argued that stigma develops 
when an individual is perceived by themselves, and/or by others, to have failed to 
meet a normative social standard of behaviour or appearance, and hence have 
discredited their social identity. Goffman argued stigma was a consequence of social 
categorisation, denoting ‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting’ and which reduces 
the possessor of the stigma in the mind of the perceiver ‘from a whole and usual 
person to a tainted, discounted one’ (Goffman, 1963, p.11), and concluded that ‘by 
definition…we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human’ (Goffman, 1963, 
p.14). Extending on Goffman’s broad definition of stigma, Jones et al. (1984) 
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formally defined a stigma as a mark (attribute) linking a person to a set of 
undesirable characteristics (stereotype). Link and Phelan (2001) extended this 
definition further to include four components: (1) distinguishing and labelling 
differences (social categorisation); (2) association of the human difference with 
negative attributes (negative stereotyping); (3) separation of ‘us’ from ‘them’ 
(prejudice, dehumanisation); and (4) status loss and discrimination (structural and 
interpersonal discrimination). They formally (if broadly) defined stigma as ‘stigma 
exists when labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination occur 
together in a power situation that allows them’ (Link & Phelan, 2001, p.377).  
Goffman (1963) proposed three types of stigmatising characteristics by which 
an individual could be categorised and subsequently negatively stereotyped: physical 
traits, particularly evidence of disease or illness such as deformity; psychological or 
personality traits, such as mental illness, addiction, criminality, or non-normative 
sexual preferences; and tribal stigmas such as affiliation with a minority nationality, 
race, or religion. Of these three types of stigmatising characteristics, Goffman 
proposed a person might either be ‘discredited’ or ‘discreditable’, in the sense that 
certain stigmatising characteristics (such as deformity or skin colour) were 
immediately discrediting due to their obviousness, while other characteristics such as 
mental illness or criminality could remain ‘invisible’ unless revealed on purpose or 
by accident. Goffman (1963) also proposed that in addition to the ‘stigmatised’ and 
the ‘normals’ (those attributing stigma), there were ‘wise’ groups or individuals who 
sincerely accepted the stigmatised in roles as friends, family, and/or supporters. 
Contemporary research positions individuals who are ‘wise’ to stigma as having 
insight and empathy for the stigmatised person, due to repeated and positive 
exposure (such as friends and family) or expert knowledge of the stigmatising 
characteristic and its psychosocial implications for the stigmatised (such as specialist 
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health professionals). These people are sometimes framed as ‘de-stigmatisers’, as 
formal or informal allies and advocates for stigmatised social categories (Conti, 
Morrison, & Pantaleo, 2013). 
In addition to Allport’s and Goffman’s theories, contemporary models of 
‘stigma’ and ‘prejudice’ share significant similarities, so much so that a review of 18 
conceptual models of various stigma and prejudice theories found these construct 
terms could be used interchangeably (Phelan et al., 2008). While Phelan et al. (2008) 
acknowledged there was variation within and between the model categories assessed, 
the overlap between these was greater. Overall, they found that stigma theory tended 
to focus on the target social group’s experience of ostracism, including their identity, 
stereotyping, and emotional responses to this, while prejudice theory tended to focus 
on the perpetrator of ostracism and their negative attitudes towards the target. Where 
prejudice theory tended to focus on the target’s race, stigma theory was broader in its 
application to people with disease or disability, or to deviant identities or behaviours; 
Phelan et al., 2008). As the target social category of the current thesis includes 
people with both disabilities (i.e., ID) and ‘deviant’, norm violating behaviours and 
identities (i.e., offenders), I made the decision to use the language of stigma theory to 
explore the social cognitive constructs and processes underlying discrimination 
towards offenders with an ID. However, as there is considerable overlap between 
stigma and prejudice conceptual models in terms of the constructs themselves, in 
addition to their causes and consequences, conceptual models relevant to either 
theoretical domain will be drawn on throughout the current thesis, as necessary.  
 Based on their review of stigma and prejudice models, Phelan et al. (2008) 
developed a typology of stigma including three broad functions: (1) domination with 
an agenda of exploitation, or ‘keeping people down’ (e.g., people with low 
socioeconomic status, slaves); (2) enforcement of social norms, especially regarding 
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morality, or ‘keeping people in’ (e.g., criminal behaviours, ‘deviant’ behaviours such 
as homosexuality); and (3) avoidance of disease, or ‘keeping people away’ (e.g., 
physical and mental illness, intellectual disability, and associated ‘non-aesthetic’ 
characteristics). Where the domination/exploitation and enforcement of social norms 
are proposed to have psychological and social functions, avoidance of disease is 
proposed to have an evolutionary function (Phelan et al., 2008).  These three 
functions exert ‘stigma power’, implicit and normalised structural and interpersonal 
social processes that serve the interests of stigmatisers at the expense of the 
stigmatised (Link & Phelan, 2014). This typology is generally consistent with, if 
more broad than, the typology proposed by Kurzban and Leary (2001), which argues 
these same three functions are purely evolutionary. Overall, Phelen et al.’s (2008) 
three functions serve stigma power, which operates both within and contributes to a 
cultural system by creating and perpetuating negative beliefs and attitudes towards 
stigmatised groups and individuals, by encouraging the internalisation of these 
negative cognitions by stigmatised groups and individuals, and by normalising 
discriminative policies and practices which keep stigmatised groups down, in, and/or 
away to serve the interests of stigmatising groups and individuals (Link & Phelan, 
2014). 
 Once stigmatised via categorisation, labelling, and stereotyping, the 
stigmatised person may experience negative emotions, interactional discomfort, 
social rejection and other forms of discrimination, status loss and other associated 
social limitations, in addition to stigma management and coping by the target 
individual or group (Phelan et al., 2008).  The experiences of different target groups 
may become ‘homogenised’, so that primary stigma functions become 
interchangeable with and reinforced by secondary stigma functions. For example, 
criminal offenders (a large proportion of whom use AOD) might initially be 
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stigmatised for their AOD use and associated antisocial behaviours via norm 
enforcement, and further stigmatised through functional dominance/exploitation to 
provide free or low-cost labour once institutionalised for AOD-related crimes. Given 
their institutionalisation and perceived moral transgressions, offenders may be 
further stigmatised through disease avoidance, having been stereotyped as 
‘disordered’, unintelligent, and perhaps morally contagious. Similarly, people with 
an ID might initially experience stigmatisation via the disease avoidance function, 
but be further stigmatised via dominance/exploitation in being used to provide free or 
low-wage labour, and furthermore by norm enforcement, by being penalised for 
disability-specific behaviours or appearance. 
 Individual and social responses to stigmatised individuals are influenced by 
four key factors: the visibility and ‘evidentness’ of the stigmatising attribute; 
perceived threat associated with the stigmatising attribute; sympathy arousal due to 
the stigmatising attribute; and perceived responsibility of the stigmatised individual 
for their stigmatising attribute (Katz, 2014). Depending on the type of stigmatising 
attribute, the individual and associated social category may be perceived to varying 
degrees as being ‘deviant’ (i.e., deeply flawed human beings) and/or ‘disadvantaged’ 
(i.e., either by the disabling nature of their attribute, by the social and economic 
discrimination the attribute entails, or both). This dual perspective engenders 
contradictory feelings of antipathy and compassion towards stigmatised individuals, 
resulting in attitudinal ambivalence towards them (Goffman, 1963; Katz, 2014). 
Attitudinal ambivalence can be defined as holding both positive (i.e., friendly, 
sympathetic, accepting) and negative (i.e., hostile, denigrating, rejecting) dispositions 
towards some group or social category. The more equal the relative strengths of these 
positive and negative dispositions, the stronger the attitudinal ambivalence. 
Attitudinal ambivalence towards an individual or social category is theorised to 
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result in ambivalence-induced behavioural amplification, either prosocial (e.g., the 
formation of charitable organisations assisting stigmatised groups, altruistic and 
unasked for assistance offered to stigmatised strangers) or antisocial (e.g., physical 
punishment, scapegoating; Goffman, 1968; Katz, 2014).  
 An underexplored aspect of stigma in the social psychology literature is 
paternalism, and how this manifests as stigmatising beliefs and attitudes, and 
discriminative behaviours. Both Goffman (1963) and Katz (2014) describe a variety 
of ways in which stigma is expressed by the ‘normal’ towards a stigmatised person 
or social category, depending on beliefs about the causes and appearance (or 
invisibility) of the stigmatising attribute; with blame, disgust, sympathy, pity, anger, 
embarrassment, empathy, etc. Charitable acts, unasked for assistance, presuming 
limitations, expressing pity or sympathy about the stigmatising attribute, and 
generally treating the person or social category as child-like, simple, and dependent, 
are expressions of soft paternalism.  
While some past research on specific stigmatised social categories has 
explored this (e.g., ‘benevolent sexism’ towards women, ‘benevolent discrimination’ 
towards people with mental illness; Becker & Wright, 2001; Ilic et al., 2013), the 
most relevant model to apply to explore this aspect of stigma is Fiske and colleagues’ 
(Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2012) stereotype content 
model, specifically paternalistic prejudice (as opposed to contemptuous, envious, 
described in Section III. 
  
 54
Section III 
Stigmatising Beliefs and Attitudes: Theory and Past Research Relevant to 
Offenders with Intellectual Disability 
 Stigma (generally synonymous with prejudice) has been operationalised and 
measured in numerous ways in the social psychological, sociological, and 
criminological literature. The most common approach to operationalising stigma has 
been via the beliefs, attitudes, and behavioural intentions of community members or 
other stigmatising social categories towards a target stigmatised social category. 
These three constructs generally reflect the affective, cognitive, and conative 
elements of Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) Theory of Reasoned Action, which in its 
simplest form proposes that beliefs (including subjective norms) inform attitudes, 
which inform behavioural intentions, which in turn influence actual behaviour. 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) define beliefs as the information someone has about an 
object, where a belief links an attribute to an object. A belief can thus be 
conceptualised as an ontological relationship between an object and attribute, 
framing the relative existence of these to one another. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
state that the object of a belief may be ‘a person, a group of people, an institution, a 
behaviour, a policy, an event, etc., and the associated attribute may be any object, 
trait, property, quality, characteristic, outcome, of event’ (p.12). Beliefs are therefore 
subjective, ontological claims (i.e., opinions) an individual makes about their world 
and everything in it. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) propose that beliefs are dimensional, 
varying in strength (strong to weak) and valency (belief to disbelief).  
Some beliefs go beyond associating the existence of an object with an 
attribute, and posit a causal relation between an object and attribute. These causal 
beliefs are referred to as ‘causal attributions’ (Weiner, 1985, 1986). However, the 
term ‘attribution’ is also often used in a general way to refer to the act of cognitively 
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linking an attribute to an object, regardless of whether this link is perceived to be 
causal. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) define an attitude as the amount of affect for or 
against some object, and note that ‘affect refers to a person’s feelings towards and 
evaluation of some object, person, issue, or event’ (p.11-12). This affective 
evaluation, as for beliefs, is conceptualised as bipolar (good to bad, like to dislike) 
and dimensional (weak to strong). Behavioural intentions are defined by Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975) as a unique form of belief, where the object is always one’s self 
and the attribute is always one’s future behaviour (p.12).  
In this thesis, beliefs and attitudes (not intentions or behaviour) will be the 
focus of study. I also emphasise that while Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) Theory of 
Reasoned Action is seminal, this model was cited only to define the foundational 
constructs of belief and attitudes; the Theory of Reasoned Action (or affiliated 
theories) will not be considered further in this review of theory and past research. 
 A common approach to operationalising and measuring stigmatising beliefs 
and attitudes towards people with an ID and offenders is via desired social distance 
from the stigmatised target group (Abrams, Housten, Van de Vyer, & Vasilijevic, 
2015; Antonak & Livneh, 1995; Link, Phelan, & Bresnahan, 1999; Oullete-Kuntz, 
Burge, Brown, & Arseault, 2010; Scior, Connolly, & Williams, 2013a; Werner, 
Corrigan, Ditchman, & Sokol, 2012). ‘Social distance’ generally captures how much 
a respondent socially accepts or includes a stigmatised social category. However, the 
social distance construct is descriptive rather than explanatory in terms of what it can 
tell researchers about the processes associated with stigmatising beliefs and attitudes. 
Other social psychological theories and measures that can be applied to 
explore and explain stigma include Fiske and colleagues’ (Fiske et al., 2002, 2007) 
stereotype content model and measure, Gray and colleagues’ theory and measure of 
mind perception (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007a) as well as moral typecasting (Gray 
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& Wegner, 2009; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012), Haslam and colleagues’ theory of 
dehumanisation (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005; Haslam, Bastian, & 
Bissett, 2004; Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008), Weiner’s (1985, 1986) 
theory of causal attributions, and Laham’s (2009) circle of moral concern task. 
Furthermore, there are a variety of criminological constructs for which potentially 
stigmatising attitudes have been assessed in past research, relevant to moral 
culpability, punishment, rehabilitation, reintegration, and forgiveness of offenders 
(e.g., Crosby, 1995; Ghetti & Redlich, 2001; McCorkle, 1993; Rogers & Ferguson, 
2011).  
Stereotype content theory. Stereotype content theory (Fiske et al., 2002, 
2007) allows the assessment and prediction of relative stereotypic beliefs and 
associated prejudicial attitudes towards different social categories. This model 
assesses attributions of warmth and competence, based on beliefs about the social 
category’s social status and social competitiveness, respectively. According to Fiske 
and colleagues, these constructs capture the evaluations we make of potentially 
threatening or helpful social groups and individuals, and have a heuristic function 
that leads us to either attribute ingroup or outgroup status to others, in addition to 
helpful or harmful social behaviours. Warmth includes traits that are related to 
perceived intent, including friendliness, helpfulness, sincerity, trustworthiness and 
morality; competence includes traits that are related to perceived ability, including 
intelligence, skill, creativity and efficacy (Fiske et al., 2007). Warmth and 
competence are predicted by the perceived social status and competitiveness of a 
social category (Cuddy et al., 2008).  
 Varied degrees and combinations of warmth and competence lead to 
emotional attributions (e.g., admiration, contempt, envy, and pity) and accompanying 
favourable, neutral, or prejudicial intergroup and interpersonal attitudes and 
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behaviours (Cuddy et al., 2007). One’s ingroup and allies are typically attributed 
high status and non-competitiveness, and hence high competence and warmth, and 
are viewed with admiration and pride. Outgroups consisting of high-status, 
competitive groups such as positively stereotyped racial minorities (e.g., ‘intelligent 
Asians’), wealthy people, and non-traditional groups (feminists) are viewed as high 
in competence but low in warmth and are subject to envious prejudice and emotions 
such as jealousy. Outgroups such as elderly people, people with disability, and 
traditional minority groups (e.g., housewives) are viewed as having low social status 
and being non-competitive, and hence are attributed high warmth but low 
competence, and are subject to paternalistic prejudice (including pity and sympathy). 
Finally, outgroups such as welfare recipients and poor people are viewed as low 
status but socially competitive, and are attributed low competence and low warmth. 
This outgroup is subject to contemptuous prejudice, associated with emotions of 
contempt, disgust, anger and resentment (Fiske et al., 2002).  
 According to the stereotype content model, people with an ID may be subject 
to paternalistic prejudice due to being viewed as warm (trustworthy, sociable, moral) 
but non-competitive in the economic and social domains, leaving them deserving of 
pity and support. Conversely, criminal offenders may be subject to contemptuous 
prejudice, where they are viewed as ‘cold’ (Fiske, 2015) and hence hostile and 
immoral, and able to implement this antisociality, making them a potential threat. 
They may also be seen as competitive (‘parasitic’ upon the economy and society) 
and to have low status, so that they are not only threatening but ‘disgusting’ 
compared to one’s self and outgroup (Fiske, 2015). It is possible that when 
evaluating offenders with an ID, one or the other attributional combination and hence 
prejudice-type would win – most likely that attributed to criminal offenders. Given 
that stereotyping and stereotype content is a heuristic device, the application of a 
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further heuristic such as the negativity bias could occur; here, the negative qualities 
(‘coldness’, relatively higher competence) attributed to criminals would be more 
salient and given greater value than those positive and non-threatening qualities 
attributed to people with an ID (warmth, relatively lower competence).  
In their research examining predictive associations between stereotyped 
social perceptions, emotions, and behavioural responses (the behaviour from 
intergroup affect and stereotypes [BIAS] model), Cuddy et al., (2007) found that 
perceived warmth was positively associated with emotions of pity for the target 
social category (implying paternalistic prejudice), which was in turn positively 
associated with tendencies toward active facilitation of support for that category. 
However, perceived warmth was negatively associated with feelings of contempt for 
the social category, which was in turn positively associated with tendencies to 
actively harm that social category. Perceptions of low competence were negatively 
associated with both feelings of contempt and pity for target social categories, which 
were in turn positively associated with tendencies toward passive harm of social 
categories. Cuddy et al. (2007) reasoned that pity (such as that attributed to the warm 
but non-competent people with an ID) is an ambivalent emotion comprising both 
compassion and sadness, and is based on viewing the target’s situation as 
uncontrollable. Pity elicits both active facilitation of support, such as assistance and 
advocacy (due to compassion) but also passive harm, such as inaction and neglect 
(by creating desire to avoid the perceived suffering of the target person or group).  
 Cuddy et al. (2007) further reasoned that contempt and associated disgust 
(such as that theoretically attributed to cold and non-competent, or moderately 
competent, social outcasts like criminal offenders) are directed at individuals and 
groups whose negative outcomes, or at least their onset, are perceived to have been 
controllable by the target individual or group. Contempt/disgust elicits passive harm 
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by leading to ostracising and paternalistic behaviours, and elicits active harm by 
creating a motivation to forcefully expel the object of disgust from one’s interests 
and awareness. Hodson and Costello (2007) found that interpersonal disgust 
predicted negative attitudes toward low-status deviant social categories (e.g., poor 
people, drug addicts). 
 Relevant past research applying stereotype content. Studies applying 
stereotype content theory to understand stigma towards people with an ID and 
offenders as social categories has been limited, and indirect, to date. Sadler, Meagor, 
and Kaye (2012), employed the stereotype content model and a small North 
American sample to examine public stigma towards ‘people with mental illness’ 
relative to other social categories, and towards specific subtypes of this social 
category. They reasoned that disorders known for their perceived unpredictability 
and dangerousness (schizophrenia, drug addiction) and ‘at risk’ groups likely to have 
a mental illness (homeless people, violent criminals) would be considered less warm 
than other subgroups; however, if an illness was not associated with a threat to 
personal safety (mood disorder, ID), warmth would be perceived as higher. They 
found that participants rated people with an ID (belonging to the mental illness social 
subcategory ‘neurocognitive deficit’) as being high in warmth and low in 
competence, while violent criminal offenders (belonging to the mental illness social 
subcategory ‘antisocial’) were rated as low in warmth and moderate in competence. 
Rohmer and Louvet (2012) found that participants attributed lower warmth to 
people with a disability when they were implicitly, compared to explicitly, assessed. 
They reasoned that people might feel compelled to attribute high warmth to people 
with a disability (a positive quality) due to socially desirable responding when 
explicitly assessed, but that attributions of warmth would be lower when implicitly 
assessed and response pressures were removed. Overall, ratings of competence were 
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lower for people with a disability compared to those without a disability, but this 
rating was lowest when assessed implicitly versus explicitly.  
Côté-Lussier (2016) is one of the few researchers to apply the stereotype 
content model to understand stigma towards criminal offenders. Using a United 
Kingdom university sample, Côté-Lussier (2016) found that the emotion of 
‘contempt’ experienced in response to low competence/low warmth social 
categories, was better conceptualised as ‘anger’ and ‘uneasiness’ when applied to 
criminal offenders specifically, as a low competence/low warmth social subcategory. 
Participants’ feelings of anger toward offenders as a social category was positively 
associated with both passive and active harm, while their feelings of uneasiness were 
associated with passive harm only. Emotions of anger and uneasiness were each 
independently predictive of increasingly severe punitive intentions. Côté-Lussier 
(2016) also hypothesised (but did not test) that mixed-stereotype social categories 
(e.g., high warmth/low competence groups such as people with an ID) would evoke 
ambivalent punitive intentions. Their findings highlight that when evaluating 
offenders with an ID’s deservingness of punishment for antisocial behaviours, 
stigmatisers may err on the side of punitive (rather than non-punitive) intention.  
Dehumanisation theory. Haslam and colleagues’ (Haslam et al., 2005; 
Haslam et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2008) theory of dehumanisation also appeals to 
stereotyping as an explanation for stigma and discrimination. Their theory proposes 
that there are two dimensions according to which we attribute ‘humanness’ to other 
individuals and groups, called Human Uniqueness and Human Nature. Human 
Uniqueness distinguishes humans from other animals, while Human Nature attributes 
are those which are essentially or typically ‘human’, being viewed as natural, innate, 
and affective, distinguishing humans from objects and machines. Human Uniqueness 
is characterised by attributes such as civility, refinement, moral sensibility (and 
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related forms of cultural learning), as well as higher cognition and developmental 
maturity. When people are perceived to lack these attributes, they are viewed as 
uncultured, coarse, lacking in self-control, unintelligent or irrational, and childlike, 
immature, or backward. Their behaviour is perceived to be less thoughtful than the 
behaviour of others, and consequently more driven by motives, wants, appetites, and 
instincts (in short, more animalistic; Haslam et al., 2008). Human Nature is 
characterised by emotionality, warmth, openness, agency (desire and vitality), and 
depth; when people or groups are perceived to lack these attributes, they would 
instead be seen as inert, cold, rigid, passive, and superficial –mechanised rather than 
human (Haslam et al., 2008). 
 Haslam et al. (2008) argues that the types of qualities attributed to those with 
human uniqueness and human nature mirror those of Gray et al. (2007a) mind 
perception dimensions of agency and experience, respectively, and that mind 
perception plays a role in dehumanisation via ‘dementalisation’ along these two 
mind perception dimensions (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Haslam and Loughnan 
(2014) also argue that Fiske and colleagues’ stereotype content model can be used to 
explain dehumanisation. When a social category is attributed high competence and 
warmth, it is admired and attributed full and positive human nature and uniqueness; 
when attributions are mixed (e.g., high warmth and low competence), a degree of 
dehumanisation may occur (e.g., the denial of human uniqueness and hence cultural 
and communicative sophistication to people with an ID, as suggested in the current 
study). Groups stereotyped as low in both warmth and competence, such as criminal 
offenders in the current study, may be subject to dehumanisation by being animalised 
(impulsive, unintelligent, irrational) and mechanised (cold and unempathetic). 
Relevant past research applying dehumanisation theory. While 
dehumanisation is not a new construct in the social sciences, its theorisation and 
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investigation as a psychological process is relatively recent. The limited past research 
on dehumanisation of people with an ID and offenders has generally focused on 
animalistic dehumanisation (via human uniqueness attributions). For example, 
Capozza, Di Bernardo, Falvo, Vianello, and Calò (2016) found an Italian community 
sample attributed more non-uniquely human qualities (reminiscent of animal traits), 
than uniquely human qualities, to people with an ID as a target social category. 
People with an ID were attributed more impulsiveness and instinct than reasoning 
and morality. They were also attributed more primary (e.g., pain, pleasure) than 
secondary (e.g., hope, remorse) emotions, although these attributed emotions were 
significantly more positive than negative. Overall, these attributions did not differ 
based on the extent of the person with an ID’s impairment (Capozza et al., 2016). 
There are no studies to date assessing mechanistic dehumanisation (via 
human nature attributions) for people with an ID, and only one assessing this for 
criminal offenders. This latter study by Zhang, Chan, Teng, and Zhang (2015) 
examined mechanistic dehumanisation of a thief social target by a Chinese university 
sample. They found that priming low (versus high) interpersonal security predicted 
increased mechanistic dehumanisation, which in turn predicted increased preference 
for harsh sentencing. Turning to research on animalistic dehumanisation, a United 
Kingdom sample was used to assess the relationship between animalistic 
dehumanisation with attitudes towards the sentencing and punishment of sex 
offenders, and found this dehumanisation was strongly negatively associated with 
attitude towards rehabilitation, and moderately positively correlated with attitude 
towards sentencing (Viki, Fullerton, Raggett, Tait, & Wiltshire, 2012). Labelling a 
sex offender specifically as a ‘child molester’ rather than generic ‘rapist’ 
strengthened the positive association between dehumanisation and intention for 
social exclusion of the offender, and there was a strong positive association between 
 63
dehumanisation and violent intentions toward sex offenders labelled as ‘pedophiles’ 
(Viki et al., 2012). Another rare study assessing animalistic dehumanisation of 
offenders found that of three prison staff groups (execution staff, support staff to 
deathrow inmate and family members, and staff not involved in the execution 
process), the execution team demonstrated the strongest dehumanisation and denial 
of personal responsibility regarding deathrow inmates, while the support staff 
demonstrated the least dehumanisation (Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005).   
  Theory of mind perception. Another social psychology theory that appeals 
to stereotypes to explain prejudice is Gray et al.’s (2007a) theory of mind perception. 
This proposes that people perceive others’ degree of mind along two dimensions: 
‘experience’ (capacity for sentience, including physiological sensations and 
emotional experiences), and ‘agency’ (capacity for intention and actions, associated 
with higher order memory functions, reasoning, self-control, communication, and 
morality). Gray et al. (2007a) found that as perceived experience and agency 
increased (with adult humans, including one’s self, at the zenith of both of these 
dimensions), the target being evaluated was attributed greater value. This value was 
demonstrated via greater liking for the target, wanting to save it from destruction, 
wanting to make it happy, and perceiving it as having a soul (Gray et al., 2007a). 
However, they also found that a target’s perceived deservingness of punishment was 
strongly positively associated with agency and only weakly positively associated 
with experience, while desire to avoid harming the target was strongly positively 
associated with experience and weakly positively associated with agency (Gray et 
al., 2007). They concluded that perceived agency is associated with perceived moral 
agency, while perceived experience is associated with perceived moral patiency, 
including protection of rights and privileges (Gray et al., 2007a). Gray et al. (2007a) 
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found that people typically rate themselves and other adults ‘of sound mind’ as being 
high on both dimensions.  
Relevant past research applying mind perception theory. Application of 
mind perception theory to both people with an ID and offenders has been limited, as 
for stereotype content. The few studies which address these social categories, do so 
in the context of experimental research social psychology.  For example, Gray and 
Wegner’s (2009) theoretical modelling found that, compared to ‘a fully able adult’, 
people with an ID were rated significantly lower on both experience and agency.  
Focusing on the relationship between mind perception and attributions 
regrading moral transgressions, Khamitov, Rotman, and Piazza (2016) found that 
when a target was perceived to be criminally ‘harmful’ (i.e., a violent thief), they 
were attributed lower cognitive agency than both neutral and benevolent targets. This 
was negatively associated with their perceived moral patiency (e.g., protection of 
their interests). Furthermore, Khamitov et al. (2016) found that the ‘rationality’ of 
the criminal influenced attributions of their cognitive agency, and hence their moral 
patiency; when the criminal’s behaviour was deemed low in rationality (i.e., crime 
was committed because it felt ‘fun’) rather than high in rationality (i.e., crime was 
committed due to destitution), the criminal target was attributed less cognitive 
agency, and in turn, less moral patiency.  
Moral typecasting theory. Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray 
et al., 2012) is an extension of Gray and colleagues’ theory of mind perception (Gray 
et al., 2007a) and to some extent compliments both Haslam and colleagues’ 
dehumanisation account, and Fiske and colleagues stereotype content account, of 
how we morally evaluate others. Gray et al. (2012) argue that mind perception 
(specifically perceived experience and agency) is fundamental to the moral status we 
ascribe to others, and hence the moral judgements we make about them. We ascribe 
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mental agency and experience to others based on their perceived capacity for 
intention/planning, and sensation/emotion, respectively. If they are perceived to have 
the capacity for intention/planning, then they are perceived to be a ‘moral agent’ with 
the capacity for moral responsibilities and hence for blame. If they are perceived to 
have the capacity for sensation/emotion, then they are perceived to be a ‘moral 
patient’ (victim) with the capacity for pain and hence moral rights (Gray et al., 
2012). In short, attributions of mind (degrees of mental experience and agency) leads 
to dyadic moral typecasting (as either moral agents or patients). This typecasting 
then has implications for how we evaluate the moral responsibilities and rights of 
target individuals and groups, as well as deservingness of punishment for immoral 
actions (or inactions), praise for moral actions, and protection against immoral 
actions (or inactions; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray et al., 2012). According to Gray 
and Wegner (2009), relative moral agents are attributed both greater moral 
responsibility for doing harm (as an expression of negative moral agency) and 
greater moral credit for doing good (as an expression of positive moral agency) than 
relative moral patients; conversely, relative moral patients are attributed greater 
moral patiency when victimised (i.e., affected by injustice, deserving of protection) 
than moral agents. 
Relevant past research applying moral typecasting theory. Again, there is 
little research focusing on criminal offenders and people with an ID, specifically, in 
research applying moral typecasting theory. However, the limited past research 
highlights this theory (along with mind perception) may provide a sound framework 
by which to understand the implications of stigma stereotypes for moral attributions.  
For example, when exploring their theoretical model, Gray and Wegner (2009) found 
that ‘normal adults’ were attributed significantly higher moral responsibility than 
people with an ID. Attribution of higher agency is related to capacity for 
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consequential reasoning – that is, intention along with the capacity to understand the 
degree of suffering that will be inflicted by the intended action (Gray et al., 2012). 
Gray and Wegner (2009) found that attributions of moral patiency were significantly 
higher for people with an ID than for ‘normal adults’, regardless of whether the 
experience underlying this patiency was positively or negatively valenced (i.e., 
perceived pleasure or pain). They also found that attribution of moral credit 
(positively-valenced moral agency) was significantly higher for ‘normal adults’ than 
for people with an ID, just as they’d found that moral responsibility (negatively-
valenced moral responsibility) was significantly higher for ‘normal adults’ than for 
people with an ID. 
Miller and Borgida (2016) similarly found that when an immoral actor was 
presented as having previously criminally offended, they were attributed both higher 
agency and greater deservingness of punishment (indicative of perceived moral 
blame and hence responsibility) than a similarly immoral actor without a history of 
offending. In contrast to Miller and Borgida’s (2016) findings, Khamitov et al. 
(2016) found that harmful agents (specifically those who commit crime) were denied 
more mental agency than neutral or benevolent moral agents, which in turn was 
associated with reduced moral agency (both positive and negative).  
Gray and Wegner (2009) also found that perceived moral patiency may be 
causally linked to attributed moral agency. When their participants were primed to 
perceive targets with relatively higher versus lower degrees of moral patiency, and 
were then told their target had committed a crime (car theft), the thief with lower 
antecedent moral patiency was judged to have higher moral agency after having 
committed the crime.  
Causal attribution theory. According to Weiner’s (1985, 1986) attribution 
theory, an attribution is a causal belief about, or explanation for, an event or 
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behaviour. Making attributions for our own and others’ behaviours and outcomes 
helps to shape our own emotional and behavioural responses to these events and 
outcomes. Beliefs about the causes of a stigmatising characteristic influence 
stigmatisers’ emotions and potentially behaviours towards individuals from the 
stigmatised social category. Causal attributions are classified on three basic 
dimensions: locus; stability; and controllability. Individuals tend to classify causes of 
important events or outcomes as either internal or external to them (locus), stable or 
unstable over time (stability), and as controllable or uncontrollable (controllability). 
Two additional dimensions Weiner (1985, 1986) suggests might be used to classify 
causal attributions include whether they are perceived to be global (versus specific) 
and intentional (versus unintentional).  
Perceived controllability of the cause of a negative outcome (such as a 
disability) can affect whether an individual is stigmatised for that outcome. The more 
controllable the outcome is perceived to be, the more responsibility and blame are 
attributed to the individual; if a negative outcome is perceived to be uncontrollable 
(that is, the disability has been caused by an agent or event other than the individual), 
then less (or no) responsibility and blame are attributed (Crandall, 2000). Weiner’s 
(1985, 1986) model predicts that perceived controllability of a person’s negative 
outcome influences the perceiver’s emotional responses (i.e., anger if controllable, 
pity or sympathy if uncontrollable) to the target individual or social category. 
Similarly, perceived stability affects perceived degree of optimism that the negative 
outcome will be resolved (i.e., optimism if unstable or temporary, and pessimism if 
stable and enduring). 
Relevant past research applying causal attribution theory. Past research on 
causal beliefs about ID has highlighted that Western populations (e.g., Australians, 
United Kingdom) tend to hold causal beliefs about ID and psychiatric illnesses 
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consistent with the dominant Western medical model, which specifies the interaction 
of biological and environmental factors as the cause of ID (May, Rapee, Coello, 
Momartin, & Aroche, 2014; Scior & Furnham, 2011). Cross-cultural research shows 
that non-Western populations can hold more superstitious or supernatural beliefs 
about the causes of ID and other disabilities (May et al., 2014; Mesfin, 1999; Mulatu, 
1999). Supernatural causal beliefs about ID (and other disabilities and illnesses) 
typically focus on divine or supernatural justice, trial, punishment, possession or 
contamination (Kisanji, 1995; Scior & Furnham, 2011).  
Panek and Jungers (2008) assessed United States university students’ causal 
attributions for ID. They found that participants held the most positive attitudes 
towards people with an ID when their disability was perceived to be uncontrollable, 
caused by genetics (i.e., Down Syndrome), and held the most negative attitudes when 
the disability was perceived to be controllable, self-inflicted (i.e., brain damage due 
to drinking cleaning fluid as a child). They also found that participants attributed 
greater responsibility for the disability to the target with self-inflicted ID than the 
target with Down Syndrome, while responsibility attributions did not differ between 
the target with Down Syndrome and another whose ID was inflicted by another 
person (i.e., Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder).  
A recent extension of attribution theory, mostly within the context of stigma 
research towards those with psychiatric disorder, is perceived dangerousness (degree 
of instability, potential for violence) of the stigmatised target (Corrigan, Markowitz, 
Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 2003). Corrigan et al. (2003) theorised, and found, that 
beliefs about the instability and uncontrollability of mental illness increases 
perceived dangerousness of the person or group, which in turn increases fear and 
avoidance of the person or group. Araten-Bergman and Werner (2017) applied this 
extension of attribution theory to assess social workers’ attributions towards people 
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with an ID with comorbid mental illness, and similarly found that stereotypic 
attributions of dangerousness predicted discriminative behaviour (i.e., avoidance).  
Scior and colleagues’ research has focused on causal attributions towards 
people with an ID and associated stigma (e.g., Coles & Scior, 2012; Scior & 
Furnham, 2011). Scior and Furnham’s (2011) development of a quantitative measure 
to assess peoples’ literacy about ID (including their causal beliefs) identified four 
factors for peoples’ causal beliefs (Adversity, Biomedical, Environmental, and 
Fate/Supernatural). Coles and Scior (2012) also conducted a mixed method study 
including qualitative research involving focus group interviews conducted exploring 
causal beliefs about, and attitudes towards, people with an ID. They found that while 
some participants correctly identified biological causes of ID, they as frequently 
misidentified certain social influences such as migrant acculturation, prolonged 
separation from parents, and past trauma as causes of ID. Scior and colleagues have 
conducted significant cross-cultural research exploring the universality of causal 
beliefs about ID, and psychiatric disorders (Scior, Hamid, Mahfoudhi, Abdulla, 
2013b; Scior, Potts, & Furnham, 2013c).  
Research on causal beliefs about criminal offending has been limited within 
recent research, perhaps because this has been a rich area of (stigmatising) study 
historically. Looking to the later part of the 20th century, Erskine (1974) found the 
American public held the following causal beliefs about crime based on compiled 
poll data: parental upbringing and the breakdown of family life; bad environment; 
leniency in laws and the criminal justice system; drugs; mental illness; 
permissiveness in society; and poverty/unemployment. Erskine’s research was 
conducted during the 1970’s, used an American sample, and included reference to 
both general and specific criminal scenarios (suggesting sociohistorical factors 
within American during this era likely influenced participant responses). Carroll 
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(1978) research examining causal attributions by American expert parole decision 
makers and university students towards criminal offenders’ and their behaviour. 
Carroll (1978) identified drug and alcohol abuse as the most frequently reported 
causal attribution, followed by long term greed or spontaneous desire for money, 
victim precipitation, intoxication, peer influence, lack of control, mental 
illness/problems, and domestic problems. In developing a quantitative measure of 
sentencing attributions and goals, however, Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, and Weaver 
(1987) consolidated their past research on causal attributions for offending into three 
dimensions: Social Causation (crime comes from family problems, criminal 
associations, drugs); Economic Causation (crime comes from societal conditions of 
poverty and inequality); and Individual Causation (crime comes from lazy, 
irresponsible, and uncaring individuals). Similar research by Furnham and 
Henderson (1983), and an associated validated measure by Hollin and Howells 
(1987), identified causal attributions for young peoples’ criminal offending as due to 
defective education, mental instability, temptation, excitement, alienation, and 
parenting. 
Carroll (1978) proposed that causal attributions made towards offenders arose 
via an interaction of case information (provided in court notes or via media) with the 
attitudes and knowledge of the individual attributor. He further proposed that causal 
attributions may use similar structure to schemas, where pieces of information 
provided to the individual are then applied to one’s schema for criminal offending, 
with resultant causal attributions reflecting perceived antecedents within the schema 
(e.g., case information triggers a ‘drug habit’ schema, which contains assumptions 
about the target’s social and criminal history, suggestions for correctional treatment, 
and predictions of future behaviour). Carroll (1978) found that offenders whose 
crimes were attributed to internal (e.g., mental illness, addiction, intoxication, greed) 
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and intentional (e.g., premeditated violence or theft) factors were attributed the 
greatest criminal responsibility by an American university student sample. Internal 
causes were also associated with less liking for the offender, higher ratings of crime 
severity, and advising punishment via imprisonment and a longer term of 
imprisonment by this sample. In comparison to a panel of parole experts, students’ 
attributions were higher for all of these outcomes. Carroll (1978) also found that 
offenders who were attributed stable, enduring causes for their offending (e.g., 
pathological personality traits, chronic socioeconomic disadvantage) by students 
were considered more likely to reoffend, were attributed higher criminality and 
criminal responsibility, and advised imprisonment for incapacitation and a longer 
prison sentence.  
Carroll et al. (1987) similarly found that causal factors attributed to the 
individual positively predicted punitive sentencing goals and negatively predicted 
rehabilitative goals, while both social and economic causal attributions predicted 
rehabilitative sentencing goals. For context, and with reference to Weiner (1985, 
1986) attribution theory, Carroll et al. (1987) categorised these causal dimensions in 
the following ways: social causation was external, unstable, and unintentional; 
economic causation was external, stable, and unintentional; and individual causation 
was internal, stable, and intentional.  
Carroll’s (1978, 1987) findings are supported by more recent studies in this 
area. For example, Sims (2003) found that causal attributions focused on structural 
inequalities and pressure (such as poverty and poor education) were significantly 
associated with support for rehabilitation, while causal attributions focusing on social 
modelling (such as parent and peer influence) were associated with support for 
punishment. Interestingly, Sims (2003) showed that participants held causal beliefs 
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that the criminal justice system’s leniency, in addition to offenders not fearing 
consequences, predicted increased support for punishment. 
Research focused specifically on causal attributions toward criminal 
offenders also found that when participants were primed to believe in biogenetic 
causes for the crime of manslaughter, the offender was perceived to be more 
deserving of legal defence due to diminished capacity and insanity, but more likely 
to criminally reoffend, relative to an ‘environmental cause’ prime and control group 
(Cheung & Heine, 2015), and consistent with Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener’s 
(2013) meta-analysis’ findings concerning perceived dangerousness. 
In a study by Cheung and Heine (2015), when participants were primed to 
believe in biogenetic causes for the crime of manslaughter (relative to environmental 
causes or a control where no cause was primed), the cause of the crime was 
perceived to be less controllable, more stable, more internal, and the target was 
attributed less perceived intent to kill and, in one of three studies, less criminal 
responsibility. Cheung and Heine (2015) also found that participants perceived the 
biogenetic cause for offending as being more specific (versus global) compared to 
the environmental cause prime; this means that participants saw the genetic 
predisposition to violence, specified in the stimulus prime, as being context-specific 
to interpersonal provocation and so only specific to interpersonal violence. It is 
important to note that while a biogenetic causal prime was applied, it was limited in 
the sense that it was relevant only to a single behavioural predisposition – 
aggression. 
Moral concern for vulnerable social categories. Either explicitly or 
implicitly, the theories previously reviewed have acknowledged that stigmatising 
beliefs and attitudes involve evaluations of the stigmatised individual or group’s 
value, which impacts whether we feel concern and/or contempt for them. These 
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theories highlight that underlying stigmatising beliefs and attitudes is whether and 
how we hold moral concern for a stigmatised social category. As such, I will briefly 
describe past theory on moral concern and personal values, and how past research 
has examined moral concern for vulnerable social categories with reference to self-
transcendental personal values.   
‘Moral concern’ is a philosophical term which has been of recent interest as a 
construct within social (moral) psychology, and refers to those entities in the world 
for whom we deem worthy of moral consideration (Laham, 2009). How moral worth 
is attributed may vary, but typically relates to the perceived intrinsic value of the 
entity (e.g., sentience, homo sapiens status, elite physical, cognitive, and cultural 
traits and abilities). Moral concern is distinct from personal values as a construct, but 
the personal values one holds may influence the entities to which moral concern is 
attributed.  
Values are emotion-laden beliefs about perceived desirable goals (Rohan, 
2000; Schwartz, 2006). They are prescriptive in the sense that, when activated 
implicitly or explicitly, they act as standards or criteria which guide how we 
evaluate, approach, and react to actions and events, laws and policies, and entities 
such as people, social groups, and organisations (Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 2006; 
Schwartz, 2009). The value construct is distinct from other constructs such as social 
norms and attitudes, because values are abstract and trans-situational, whereas 
attitudes and norms generally refer to specific actions, objects, and situations 
(Schwartz, 2006). Values are a motivational construct; our decision-making and 
behaviour is influenced by the values to which we give highest priority (Schwartz, 
2006). When our decision-making and/or behaviour fails to accord with our value 
priorities, values-conflict can ensue. 
 74
Schwartz’s theory of universal values, developed over two decades, is now 
the most researched and applied value system and model to date (Rohan, 2000; 
Schwartz, 2006). Schwartz (2006) defines values as emotion-laden beliefs that are 
‘desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance,  that serve as guiding 
principles in people’s lives’ (p.39). The starting point for this values theory is that 
there are three universal requirements of the human condition: the needs of 
individuals as biological organisms; the rudimentary requirements of coordinated 
social interaction; and the survival and welfare needs of groups. Ten motivational 
value types, which comprehensively cover all values proposed by earlier value 
theorists, cross-culturally, and across religions and philosophies, were identified to 
meet these three needs. These include: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism. 
Attitudes are also considered to be ‘value-expressive’, in that an individual’s 
attitudes generally accord with their value priorities (Feather & McKee, 2008; 
Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). For example, value-
expressiveness was found to explain attitude stability and resistance to change in an 
American sample, who failed to alter their position despite the provision of increased 
knowledge about the implications of capital punishment (Vollum & Buffington-
Vollum, 2010). Conservation priorities of power and security have also been 
consistently positively correlated with racial prejudice, and negatively correlated 
with the self-transcendence value priorities, universalism and benevolence (Feather 
& McKee, 2008). McKee and Feather (2008) found that revenge attitudes were 
positively related to power value priorities, and negatively related to universalism 
and benevolence value priorities; and that vengeance attitudes were negatively 
related to support for rehabilitation goals, and positively related to support for 
retribution and incapacitation goals. 
 75
Rohan (2000) defines an ideology as ‘a rhetorical association or set of 
associations between things, people, actions, or activities, and best possible living 
[which] contain either implicit or explicit reference to value priorities’ (p.270). In 
this sense, ideologies are constructions which are applied to the self or to others, in 
order to feel the ‘whole context’ for events has been explained. When used to explain 
phenomena and to self-justify, the ideology used might compliment personal value 
priorities, or social value priorities. Human rights is an ideology which imposes a 
liberal, egalitarian, democratic framework onto the world, and complements those 
whose personal values fall into the self-transcendence dimension (including 
benevolence and universalism values) of Schwartz’ orthogonal values model. In the 
current sociohistorical context of Western legislation, human rights ideology and its 
associated values encourage individuals and societies to hold moral concern for all 
individuals and social categories, regardless of physical and cultural differences and 
abilities.  
Relevant past research applying personal values and moral concern. 
Popular existing human rights measures include the Human Rights Survey (HRQ; 
Diaz –Veizades, Widaman, Little, & Gibbs, 1995) and the Attitudes Toward Human 
Rights Inventory (ATHRI; Getz, 1985), which both focus on assessing individuals’ 
understanding of and support for the specific moral and civil rights articles described 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and other libertarian United 
Nations and United States legislation. However, these measures don’t assess 
individuals’ beliefs about human rights as an open-ended ‘fuzzy’ construct, allowing 
participants to impose their own understanding of what ‘human rights’ are, and their 
value, with respect to themselves, others, and their society. Human rights are a 
dominant Western ideology, including in Australia; however, the nature of ‘rights’ as 
metaphysical and legal constructs is an area of specialist knowledge. Citizens can 
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endorse human rights based on a layperson’s conception of these, and if assessing 
beliefs about human rights and their application to vulnerable groups, it seems 
sensible to assess these as citizens understand them subjectively.  
Stavrova, Köneke, and Schlösser (2016) found that individuals tended to 
evaluate their own attitudes towards sociopolitical issues of personal importance as 
being more supportive than those of others’. This is a self-enhancement bias called 
the ‘better than average’ effect, where individuals tend to attribute ‘better’ traits, 
qualities, and abilities to themselves than others (Guenther & Alicke, 2010; 
Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). A study by Dunbar, Blanco, Sullaway, and Horcajo 
(2004) hypothesised a negative association between age and attitudes towards social 
minorities in the context of human rights, but found these were not significantly 
associated. Diaz-Veizades et al. (1995) found that women endorsed all HRQ factors 
(Social Security, Civilian Constraint, Equality, and Privacy) more strongly than men 
using an American student sample, although this difference was relatively small in 
magnitude. Crowson and deBacker (2008) found that men were more likely than 
women to support restrictions on human rights (using the Human Rights-Civil 
Liberties Scale – Revised; HR – CL-R), also using an American student sample; 
however, Swami et al. (2012) used the unrevised HR-CL to assess attitudes towards 
human rights in a German community sample and found no significant difference 
between men and women for these beliefs.  
McFarland, Webb, and Brown (2012) similarly found small to moderate, 
positive bivariate associations between support for human rights and ‘identification 
with all humanity’ (which assesses the extent to which participants ‘have concern 
for’ and ‘want to help, when in need’ the following narrow, to broad, social 
categories – ‘Americans’, ‘People in my community’, and ‘People all over the 
world’).  McFarland et al. also found that identification with all humanity was a 
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significant predictor of human rights support in multivariate models. Drawing on 
Haslam and colleague’s (Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004; Haslam, Loughnan, 
Kashima, & Bain, 2008) two-dimensional theory of dehumanisation (characterised 
by ‘Human Uniqueness’ and ‘Human Nature’), Bastian et al. (2011) assessed 
university students’ moral attributions toward 24 social categories and found that 
stronger attributions of Human Nature were strongly, positively associated with 
attributions of moral patiency (i.e., moral value, the right to be assisted and protected 
from harm).  
Some past research draws on Schwartz’ theory of universal values to explain 
individual differences in support for human rights. Past studies associate self-
transcendence values (benevolence, universalism) with the egalitarian ideology of 
human rights policy and legislation generally. Applying the theory of universal 
values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994) to a cross-cultural sample of 21 countries, Schwartz 
(2007) identified the personal value of universalism (which represents the goals of 
tolerance and seeking the welfare of all humankind) to predict moral inclusiveness 
towards racial and cultural minorities (immigrants), and to predict prosocial 
behaviour. Using a United States panel sample, Hackett, Omoto, and Matthews 
(2015) also found that personal self-transcendence values (i.e., Universalism, 
Benevolence; Schwartz, 1992, 1994) positively predicted concern for human rights, 
and that this relationship was mediated by a ‘psychological sense of global 
community’.  
Passini (2016) expanded on this association between personal values and 
moral inclusion via a structural equation model, showing that moral inclusion 
intentions predicted self-transcendent values (encouraging independence of thought 
and action and receptiveness to change), whereas priming one’s moral identity 
predicted conservation values (submissive self-restriction, preservation of traditional 
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practices and protection of the status quo). These values are complimentary 
according to Schwartz’ two-dimensional orthogonal model (with self-transcendence 
opposed to self-enhancement, and conservation opposed to openness to experience; 
Schwartz,1992, 1994). Interestingly, Passini’s (2016) results contradict those of Reed 
and Aquino (2003), who found that a highly self-important moral identity was 
associated with a more expansive circle of moral concern. 
One’s circle of moral concern is a philosophical concept developed by Singer 
(Singer, 1981, 2011) and translated to social psychology by Laham (2009) and others 
(Crimston, Hornsey, Bain, & Bastian, 2018). ‘Moral circle’ refers to how expansive 
a person’s sense of moral concern is for others, and at which point beings are 
distinguished as being ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the circle of moral concern. While the 
boundaries of an individual’s moral concern can be assessed in several ways, one 
simple approach is to present participants with a set of target social categories and 
invite them to include (or exclude) whichever social categories they feel more (or 
less) moral concern for (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Laham, 
2009).  
   
Criminal Justice Attitudes  
Theories and past research reviewed in Section III, until this point, have 
focused on social psychological approaches to understanding stigma towards people 
with an ID and criminal offenders. The rest of this section will review criminological 
research on attitudes towards the sentencing and correctional treatment of criminal 
offenders. It should be noted that the past research to be subsequently reviewed is 
largely atheoretical, apart from being contextualised within a punitive criminal 
justice paradigm, and drawing on generic approaches to measuring attitudes. Specific 
criminal justice constructs of interest, and associated attitudinal research, includes 
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perceived moral culpability for criminal behaviour (including attributions of blame 
and responsibility), punishment (via sentencing), rehabilitation (form and 
effectiveness), reintegration, and willingness to forgive an offence.  
Moral agents are framed by moral typecasting theory as being responsible for 
their actions, both positive and negative; positive actions deserve praise, immoral 
actions (including criminal behaviours) deserve punishment (Gray & Wegner, 2009; 
Gray et al., 2012). Past research suggests that higher attribution of moral 
responsibility for actions is associated with stronger attitudes towards punishment via 
imprisonment (Khamitov et al., 2016; Miller & Borgida, 2016; Robbins & Litton, 
2018). Bastian, Denson, & Haslam (2013) similarly identified that ‘moral outrage’ 
(associated with the emotions anger, disgust, and contempt) underlay attributions of 
moral responsibility and blame towards offenders of different crime types, and 
predicted attitudes towards punishment severity. Notably, a study by Murray, 
Thomson, Cooke, and Charles (2011) sampling UK community members and 
criminal justice experts found that experts (including clinical and forensic 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and forensic practitioners – all professions likely to 
work in forensic disability roles) attributed significantly less criminal responsibility 
to offenders than laypeople, regardless of offence (murder, assault, theft). 
Roberts and Indermaur (2007) identified a number of demographic and 
individual differences associated with punitive attitudes in Australian community 
members that may generalise to the IS groups in this study (i.e., being male, older, 
and working-class, holding a right-wing political orientation, relying on commercial 
television as the main source of news, lower education and lower self-reported 
knowledge of the criminal justice system). Of these, lower levels of education and 
self-reported knowledge of the criminal justice system contributed the most variance 
in predicting punitiveness and general dissatisfaction with criminal justice processes. 
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Roberts and Indermaur (2007) concluded that inaccurate perceptions of crime (i.e., 
incidence, sentencing, and expectations of correctional treatment outcomes) led 
community members to hold more punitive attitudes towards offenders. White and 
Knowles (2013) similarly found that lower education level, older age, as well as 
higher legal authoritarianism and the belief that the offending behaviour was caused 
by the individual’s character predicted greater punitiveness.  
Roberts et al. (2007) argued that community members tend to focus on and 
allocate punishment on the basis of the perceived harm resulting from an offender’s 
behaviour, rather than the offender’s moral culpability regarding engagement in the 
behaviour. Crimes against the person and property crimes are typically rated as more 
and less severe, respectively, by community samples due to perceived degree of 
harm experienced by the victim, which impacts attitudes towards the punitiveness of 
sentencing goals (Samuel & Moulds, 1986). Roberts and Gebotys (1989) found that 
American community members’ and students’ ideal criminal sentence length 
correlated only with perceived severity of the offence (where sexual assault and 
manslaughter were considered more serious). They proposed this was due to the 
samples’ ‘just deserts’ approach to sentencing goals and outcomes. 
 Tajalli, De Soto, and Dozier (2013) compared American university students’ 
punitive attitudes towards a variety of offenders who had committed person, 
property, and drug offences, and found that participants were least concerned by 
offenders who were burglars or charged with drug possession. 
Regarding punishment attitudes towards more severe types of offending, 
Kjelsberg et al. (2007) found three-quarters of their Norwegian university student 
sample believed that crimes should be punished more severely, particularly sexual 
offences; and Kjelsberg and Loos (2008) found 78% and 92% of prison employees 
and university students, respectively, thought punishment of sexual offences in 
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Norway was ‘too mild’. Similar research assessing community attitudes towards 
sentencing in Canada found that most participants perceived sentencing to be too 
lenient overall, and in particular towards sexual offenders and offenders using 
weapons (Roberts et al., 2007). Rogers and Ferguson (2011) similarly found that 
American university students attributed greater punitiveness towards sexual offences 
compared to non-sexual offences. Of note, Kjelsberg et al. (2007) and Kjelsberg and 
Loos (2008) also found that prison officers held more negative, punitive attitudes 
towards sexual offenders and prisoners, respectively, compared to other prison 
employees such as administrators and therapeutic staff.  
Hogue and Peebles (1997) found that when participants were primed to 
perceive a sexual offender’s rape as premeditated (compared to unpremeditated), 
they were more likely to hold more punitive attitudes towards their correctional 
treatment (i.e., to recommend jail rather than probation). In a sample of Australian 
community members, White and Knowles (2013) also found that participant 
attributions of individual (rather than social) causation for a crime predicted attitudes 
favouring punishment over rehabilitation. Sexual offenders are among the most 
stigmatised of criminal offender categories, inciting vigilantism (from social 
exclusion to murder) both within the prison setting by other prisoners, and in the 
community by community members (Cubellis, Evans, & Fera, 2018; Grossi, 2017). 
Viki et al. (2012) applied the two-dimensional theory of dehumanisation to explore 
stigmatising attitudes towards the punishment of sex offenders, and found that 
greater dehumanisation of sexual offenders predicted support for longer sentence 
lengths in addition to their exclusion from society and their violent ill-treatment in a 
mixed sample of UK university students and community members. 
Past research on attitudes towards rehabilitation of offenders is less prolific 
than research about punishment. Grossi (2017) found community members and 
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student samples tend to hold negative beliefs and attitudes about sexual offender’s 
capacity for change and likely recidivism. Research assessing Australian community 
members’ attitudes towards the rehabilitation of offenders is limited, but there are a 
few key studies of note. White and Knowles (2013) found that Australians’ attitudes 
towards punishment and rehabilitation were moderately negatively related. While 
they found no demographic factors to be significantly associated with rehabilitation 
attitudes, individual differences predicting greater support for rehabilitation included 
a higher belief that offending was caused by economic factors, lower belief that it 
was caused by individual factors, and higher confidence in the criminal justice 
system. McKee and Feather (2008) explored how Australian university students’ 
personal values and social attitudes were associated with offender sentencing goals 
(including rehabilitation). They found that personal values associated with self-
enhancement (power, self-direction, hedonism) and the social beliefs of social 
dominance orientation, right wing authoritarianism, and desire for revenge were 
associated with less support for rehabilitation, while self-transcendence values 
(universalism, benevolence) were associated with more support for rehabilitation. 
Roberts and Gebotys (1989) found that while American community 
members’ punitiveness was positively correlated with the perceived seriousness of a 
crime (e.g., participants were highly punitive for sexual assault), attitudes towards an 
offenders’ rehabilitation were not. Interestingly, these same participants reported that 
incapacitation, general deterrence, and ‘just deserts’ were all desirable outcomes of 
serious offenders’ sentencing (compared to minor offences such as theft and minor 
assault), while rehabilitation was not; and that likelihood of the serious offender’s 
rehabilitation was significantly lower compared to the likelihood of rehabilitating a 
minor offender (such as a thief).  
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Viki et al. (2012) found that greater dehumanisation of sex offenders 
predicted lower perceived potential for their rehabilitation in a mixed sample of UK 
students and community members. Comparing American university students’ 
rehabilitation attitudes towards sexual and non-sexual offenders, Rogers and 
Ferguson (2011) found that participants held more negative attitudes towards the 
rehabilitation of sexual offenders compared to non-sexual offenders. This 
complemented their finding that participants held more punitive attitudes towards sex 
offenders than non-sex offenders. Leverentz (2011) similarly found that punitiveness 
towards, and belief in the redeemability of, offenders was strongly, negatively 
correlated across four American samples. Of note, Tajalli et al. (2013) found that 
American students reported more vengeful attitudes towards sexual offenders. 
Community support for the reintegration and general social inclusion of ex-
offenders, including re-entry initiatives designed to assist with provision of housing, 
employment and training, and health, has been identified by both offenders and 
professionals as fundamental to successful reintegration and desistance from crime 
(Davis, Bahr, & Ward, 2013; Grossi, 2017). Past Australian and international 
research suggests community members hold complex attitudes towards offender 
reintegration which, while positive overall, tend towards a preference for self-interest 
and personal security over ex-offenders’ social welfare (Garland, Wodahl, & Saxon, 
2017a; Garland, Wodahl, & Schuhmann, 2013; Grossi, 2017; O’Sullivan, 
Holderness, Hong, Bright, & Kemp, 2017). In one of the few Australian studies 
examining attitudes towards the reintegration and ‘redeemability’ of offenders, 
O’Sullivan et al. (2017) found that there were no specific demographic 
characteristics predicting Australians’ beliefs about reintegration overall. However, 
there were participant characteristics significantly associated with one or more of the 
three dimensions of O’Sullivan et al.’s (2017) measure (i.e., Human Capital, 
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Possibility of Change, and Agency). Specifically, participants experienced in law 
enforcement or in human services, or who had been arrested or victimised in the past, 
were more supportive of offenders’ possibility of change compared to those not 
exposed to these factors, and experience in law enforcement also significantly 
predicted the belief that exercising personal agency is necessary for offender 
reintegration.  
Factors associated with reintegration beliefs and attitudes appear inconsistent 
across studies, however. When examining attitudes towards transitional programs 
and housing for ex-prisoners generally, Garland, Wodahl, and Smith (2017b) found 
that being female and believing in a punitive God predicted significantly less support 
for transitional programs and housing, while education and willingness to forgive the 
offenders were significantly associated with increased support for these initiatives. 
However, though Garland et al. (2017a) anticipated individual factors such as age, 
gender, political orientation, and being a parent would impact general attitudes 
towards neighbourhood transitional housing, they found the only predictors of this 
were global support for re-entry initiatives (increasing support for this by 60%) and 
having an imprisoned family member (increasing support by 100%). They found no 
significant predictors for support for neighbourhood transitional housing for sex 
offenders, but did find that as education level increased, support for this housing for 
violent offenders doubled. Also examining American community members’ attitudes 
towards ex-offenders and their re-entry, Rade, Desmarais, and Burnette (2017) found 
that having a growth mindset predicted positive attitudes towards ex-offenders, 
which in turn predicted support for their reintegration. Interesting, significant 
covariates increasing this mediation effect included being female and less religiosity, 
results respectively contrasting with and consistent with Garland et al. (2017b). 
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Garland et al. (2013) examined American community members’ attitudes 
towards prisoner re-entry initiatives within the theoretical framework of values 
conflict. They found that while the majority of community members (up to 90%) 
were supportive of various re-entry initiatives relevant to education, housing, and 
health to support offenders’ reintegration into the community (consistent with 
valuing social justice and welfare values), support dropped as low as 24% when 
financial initiatives were framed as dependent on community members’ own 
investment or sacrifice (e.g., paying higher taxes). Support for transitional housing 
initiatives dropped to 25% and 10% for general offenders and violent offenders, 
respectively, when this was specified as being in participants’ own neighbourhood, 
reflecting a social distance stigma described as ‘not in my backyard’, or NIMBY 
(Garland et al., 2017a; Garland et al., 2013). This decrease in support for re-entry 
initiatives thus occurred when participants’ competing security-based values were 
triggered, including a continued sense of retribution for more serious crimes, and 
concern for self-interest and safety. These results were replicated by Garland et al. 
(2017a), whose American sample reported 10% and 9% support for transitional 
housing for violent and sexual offenders, respectively, when located in their 
neighbourhood. Interestingly, both Garland et al. (2013) and Garland et al. (2017a) 
found stronger support for neighbourhood transitional housing for drug offenders 
(19-25%), suggesting less social distance towards this offender group and relatively 
stronger support for re-entry initiatives in their favour.  
 
Although forgiveness features heavily as a construct and process of interest in 
restorative justice discourse, the research to date examining forgiveness in the 
naturalistic context of criminal offending is limited. Instead, forgiveness research 
tends to focus on non-criminal transgressions. In an Australian sample of community 
members, Koutsos, Wertheim, and Kornblum (2008) found that lower neuroticism, 
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higher agreeableness and spirituality, and a stronger disposition towards forgiveness 
in general, were predictive of willingness to forgive a specific (non-criminal) 
offence. The value of the relationship with the offender to the victim, as well as the 
offender making apologies and demonstrating remorse for the offence, also predict 
greater willingness to forgive (Koutsos et al., 2008). Donnoli and Wertheim (2012) 
similarly found that Australians were more willing to forgive a specific, non-criminal 
offence when the ‘victim’ possessed higher trait empathy and believed the offender 
was remorseful, and were less willing to forgive when the transgression was 
perceived to be more serious and that the transgressor would likely reoffend.   
In their mixed-method study victims’ attitudes towards forgiving their sexual 
or physical attacker, Cooney, Allan, Allan, McKillop, and Drake (2011) similarly 
found that willingness to forgive was contingent on the offender making a sincere 
apology to the victim for their crime, and that primary victims perceived forgiveness 
to benefit themselves by encouraging their own acceptance and coping with being 
victimised; in this way, forgiving their attacker could be empowering. Interestingly, 
primary victims in Cooney et al.’s (2011) study often reported they were able to 
engage in perspective-taking to aid forgiveness of their attacker, unlike secondary 
victims. Quantitative analyses for Cooney et al. (2011) showed that primary victims 
were significantly more willing to forgive their attacker than secondary victims 
(reporting 68% and 23% willingness to forgive, respectively). Unlike for secondary 
victims, there was also a significant association between primary victims and belief 
that forgiveness was personally beneficial. 
Strelan and Prooijen (2013) found that a sample of Australian university 
students were more willing to forgive hypothetical transgressors when the 
opportunity to first punish the transgressor was provided (compared to not). They 
reasoned that punishing a transgressor satisfies a sense of justice having been done 
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(the offender receives their ‘just deserts’), which facilitates forgiveness. An indirect 
effect of punishment on forgiveness via the just deserts motive (but not a revenge 
motive) was found for participants when asked to recall an actual transgressor they 
may have punished (Strelan & Prooijen, 2013). 
 
Beliefs and Attitudes towards Offenders with Intellectual Disability  
 While there are researchers advocating for, and describing organisational and 
legalistic frameworks to, address structural discrimination towards offenders with 
forensic disbailitites such as ID (Birgden, 2016), only one study could be found 
assessing criminal justice professionals’ attitudes toward people with an ID in the 
criminal justice system. Interviewing 28 criminal justice professionals (magistrates, 
forensic and psychiatric nurses, and judges), Cant and Standen (2007) identified 
three key themes. The first focused on concern that people with an ID would not be 
correctly identified upon entering or once in the criminal justice system; the second 
advocated that the system be flexible in its approach to offenders with an ID; and the 
third advocated that offenders with an ID receive equal correctional treatment to all 
other offenders. These themes highlight the dissonant perspectives of these criminal 
justice professions, and invite further research regarding this. 
 This disparate section of the literature review has sought to compile and 
review social psychological theories and past research by social psychologists and 
criminologists, with the aim to provide context and direction for the thesis’ research 
program.  
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Section IV 
Research Rationale 
This review of past research highlights that people with mild and borderline 
ID are overrepresented as offenders in the Australian criminal justice system. They 
also tend to be given a higher rate of custodial sentences, housed in higher security 
facilities than prescribed by their sentence, and serve overall longer sentences, 
compared to offenders without an ID.  This review further found that while some 
Justice Departments at the State/Territory level have developed specific policies and 
protocols to facilitate appropriate pathways through, and treatment within, the 
criminal justice system for offenders with an ID, other States/Territories were yet to 
formalise similar policies, protocols, and services. Of concern, questionable 
legislation allowing indefinite detention of people with an ID charged with a criminal 
offence remains in place in some States/Territories but not others. A range of 
psychosocial disadvantages, compounded by interpersonal and structural 
discrimination unique to their involvement in the criminal justice system, was 
identified as a suspected, underlying contributor to these outcomes.  
A broad review of stigma theory found that the constructs ‘stigma’ and 
‘prejudice’, and associated measures, could be treated as interchangeable when 
exploring and conducting research on the stigmatisation of vulnerable groups. Key 
theorists Goffman, Allport, and Link and colleagues highlighted that in examining 
stigma, the ‘stigmatised’ as well as the ‘stigmatiser’ must be considered in the 
stigmatising process, as stigma involves the implicit and explicit exercise of social 
power by the stigmatiser over the stigmatised. Further review of stigma-relevant 
constructs (stereotyping, beliefs, causal attribution, and attitudes) towards criminal 
offenders and people with an ID as distinct social categories highlighted that these 
social categories appear to be differently stigmatised, yet both vulnerable to 
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discrimination by individuals and various social systems. This review found that past 
research on beliefs, and attitudes towards criminal offenders and towards people with 
an ID in the Australian context is extremely limited, and that research on beliefs and 
attitudes towards the correctional treatment of offenders with an ID specifically does 
not appear to exist in the national and international empirical literature.  
Overall, this review of past research and theory indicated that people with an 
ID face unique challenges when moving through the criminal justice system as an 
offender, and that these challenges could sometimes be attributed to the offender’s 
cognitive limitations (e.g., having difficulty understanding instructions) but may also 
likely be due to interpersonal systemic discrimination. As interpersonal and 
structural discrimination is theorised to be a behavioural expression of stigmatising 
(or prejudicial) cognitions, the discrimination experienced by offenders with an ID 
may be indicative of stigmatising beliefs, values, and attitudes held by individuals 
and members of influential social categories such as community members and 
professionals involved in the intersecting criminal justice and disability sectors. As 
such, how members of influential, potentially stigmatising social categories (i.e., 
community members, disability professionals, justice professionals) perceive people 
with an ID, criminal offenders generally, and criminal offenders with an ID, may 
play a role in how offenders with an ID have come to be overrepresented in the 
Australian criminal justice system. 
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 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH RATIONALE, AIM, AND QUESTIONS 
 
This chapter describes the research agenda, including the aims, 
methodological approach, and research questions of the thesis. Specific hypotheses 
per study are detailed in subsequent study chapters rather than in this chapter.  
 
General Research Aim 
 
The general aim of the research program was to understand Australians’ 
beliefs and attitudes towards offenders with an ID as a social group. This general aim 
was met via two factorial surveys addressing six research questions. The first 
factorial survey used a mixed-methods approach to address research questions 1-4. 
These research questions were addressed through distinct sets of variables and 
analyses, so results relevant to each research question were reported as distinct 
studies (Studies 1-4). Chapter 4 described the overall Method for the first factorial 
survey relevant to Study 1-4, while Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 reported the Aims, 
Hypotheses, Results, and Discussion for Study 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
 The second factorial survey also addressed multiple research questions (5 
and 6) using two distinct sets of variables and analyses. This factorial survey used a 
quantitative, quasi-experimental approach and was presented as two distinct studies 
(Study 5 and 6). Chapter 9 described the overall Method for the second factorial 
survey, while Chapters 10 and 11 reported the Aims, Exploratory Research 
Questions, Results, and Discussion for Study 5 and 6, respectively. A summary and 
evaluation of the commonalities and implications of the six studies’ findings are 
presented in the General Discussion (Chapter 12). 
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Research Questions 
 
1. Do Australians in the general community personally endorse human rights 
ideology? 
2. Do Australians experience moral concern for criminal offenders and people 
with an ID, and how is this related to their belief in human rights? 
3. What stigmatising beliefs do Australians hold about criminal offenders and 
people with an ID as social categories?  
4. What are Australians’ causal beliefs about people with an ID, and about 
criminal offenders with and without an ID, and how do these causal beliefs 
compare? 
5. How do the attitudes held by members of influential social categories (i.e., 
Australian community members, and professionals experienced in the 
criminal justice sector, disability sector, or both sectors) differ regarding the 
appropriate correctional treatment settings (i.e., community, prison) for 
offenders with an ID? 
6. How do the attitudes held by members of influential social categories (i.e., 
Australian community members, and professionals experienced in the 
criminal justice sector, disability sector, or both sectors) differ regarding 
criminal justice constructs (i.e., punishment, culpability, potential for 
rehabilitation, reintegration, and forgiveness) for offenders with and without 
an ID?  
Table 3.1 
Relationship between Thesis’ Factorial Surveys, Studies, and Research Questions 
Factorial Survey Study Research Question 
1 1 1
 2 2
 3 3
 4 4
2 5 5
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 CHAPTER FOUR: METHOD FOR FACTORIAL SURVEY 1 USED FOR 
STUDIES 1-4 - COMMUNITY MEMBERS’ BELIEFS AND ATTRIBUTIONS 
TOWARD CRIMINAL OFFENDERS AND PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITY 
 
This Chapter presents a comprehensive Method for the multi-part, mixed-
method online factorial survey (Factorial Survey 1) used to collect data for Studies 1- 
4, which respectively address research questions 1-4.  
 
Method 
Overview  
Aims, Hypotheses, Results, and Discussion presented in Study 1 (Chapter 5) 
and Study 2 (Chapter 6) used a quantitative approach to address research questions 1 
and 2, respectively. This involved the development and validation of a measure of 
beliefs about human rights (Study 1). In Study 2, participants completed a rank-order 
task to determine a hierarchy of participants’ relative moral concern for different 
social categories, with regression analyses conducted to assess associations between 
beliefs about human rights and attributions of moral concern.  
Aims, Hypotheses, Results, and Discussion presented in Study 3 (Chapter 7) 
also used a quantitative approach to address Research Question 3. For Study 3, 
participants from Study 2 were randomly allocated to one of two conditions 
describing an individual from a specific social category (i.e., a person with an ID, or 
a person who had been sentenced for a criminal offence). Participants completed a 
series of validated measures to assess the degree to which they held stigmatising 
beliefs towards their social category specific to stereotype content (‘social status’), 
dehumanisation and mind perception (‘human’ status), and moral status. Between-
group comparisons were conducted to determine whether there were significant 
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differences between the types of stigmatising beliefs participants attributed to their 
respective social categories.  
Exploratory Aims, Results, and Discussion presented in Study 4 (Chapter 8) 
used a qualitative approach to address Research Question 4. For Study 4, participants 
from Study 3 were randomly allocated to one of three vignette conditions describing 
a variation of the social categories previously addressed. All vignettes presented the 
same narrative of a young adult male (‘John’) who was casually employed, sociable, 
and living with his parents. In the first vignette John was described as possessing a 
mild ID and did not refer to a criminal history, the second vignette described John as 
having been recently sentenced for criminal assault and theft (without referring an 
ID), and the third vignette described John as possessing a mild ID and having been 
recently sentenced for criminal assault and theft. Participants allocated to the first 
vignette condition were asked to explain what they thought may have caused John’s 
ID, while participants allocated to the second and third vignette conditions were 
asked to explain what they thought may have caused John to commit criminal 
offences. An inductive thematic analysis approach was taken to assess each set of 
vignette responses independently, and then a cross-case analysis was conducted to 
compare and contrast final themes between vignette 2 and 3, applying themes 
derived from responses to vignette 1 to contextualise this. 
Participants 
Participants were Australians from the general community who completed an 
online study via the survey hosting platform Qualtrics. Participants were recruited 
via a paid advertisement on Facebook, as well as via unpaid advertisements on 
Australian community Facebook groups. To be eligible to participate in the study, 
individuals had to be an Australian citizen or permanent resident, be aged 18 years or 
older, and have access to the internet.  
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Of the initial N = 1236 cases submitted, n = 56 were excluded on the basis of 
being non-citizens/permanent residents of Australia, and n = 125 were excluded due 
to early attrition, leaving N = 1055 participants after cleaning (52.7% female) aged 
18-84 (M = 46.17, SD = 18.82). These participants had completed all demographic 
and quantitative items assessing beliefs about human rights in Australia and moral 
concern for social categories, so their responses were used for analyses relevant to 
Study 1. 
After conducting analyses for Study 1, an additional n = 126 participants 
were excluded from the sample due to attrition for analyses relevant to 2, leaving N = 
928 participants after cleaning (53.3% female) aged 18-84 (M = 46.24, SD = 18.77). 
Participants in this reduced sample had completed all demographic and quantitative 
items relevant to assessing stigmatising beliefs about target social categories (i.e., 
people with an ID and criminal offenders), and their responses were used for 
analyses relevant to Study 2. 
After conducting analyses for Study 3, a further n = 327 were excluded due to 
not completing the necessary qualitative items relevant to Study 4, leaving N = 853 
participants after data cleaning for use. A detailed description of participant 
demographics is provided in each Results section for both Study 1 and 2 (Chapter 5, 
Table 5.1), 3 (Chapter 7, Table 7.1), and 4 (Chapter 8, Table 8.1). 
Design 
 A multi-part, mixed-method online factorial survey design and methodology 
was employed to assess variables of interest using a variety of self-report 
measurement tools and stimuli. In the first part of the study (relevant to Study 1), 
participants completed quantitative measures assessing their demographics 
(including their identification with one or more social minorities), and beliefs about 
human rights in Australia. In the second part of the study (relevant to Study 2), these 
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participants completed further quantitative measures assessing moral concern for 
various social categories (relevant to Study 2). In the third part of the survey 
(relevant to Study 3), a quasi-experimental approach was used and participants were 
randomly allocated to one of two target social category conditions (Condition 1 = 
Criminal offenders as target social category, Condition 2 = People with an ID as 
target social category). After reading a stimulus describing their target social 
category, participants then completed further quantitative measures of moral status 
attribution (moral responsibility, moral credit, moral patiency), stereotype content 
(competence, warmth, social status, competitiveness), mind perception (experience, 
agency), and dehumanisation (human uniqueness, human nature).  
After completing variables relevant to analyses for Study 3, participants were 
randomly allocated to one of three conditions featuring a vignette stimulus for the 
fourth, qualitative part of the study (relevant to Study 4). Each vignette described a 
man called ‘John’, varied only by the following characteristic (Vignette 1 = John has 
an ID, Vignette 2 = John is a criminal offender, Vignette 3 = John is a criminal 
offender with an ID). We assumed that participants’ interpretation and response to 
their allocated vignette would be influenced by having previously been exposed to 
stimulus materials about a specific social category (either people with an ID or 
criminal offenders), and then having been asked to report their beliefs about the 
moral, social, and human status of these groups. We decided that it was most 
appropriate for participants allocated to a specific target social category in Study 2 to 
also be allocated to provide open-ended responses about that same target social 
category in Study 3.  Subsequently, participants who were randomly allocated to the 
‘people with an ID’ target social category for Study 2 measures, were randomly 
allocated to either the Vignette 1 (John with an ID) or Vignette 3 (John, a criminal 
offender with an ID) in Study 3; and participants who were randomly allocated to the 
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‘criminal offender’ target social category for Study 2 measures, were randomly 
allocated to either Vignette 2 (John, a criminal offender) or Vignette 3 (John, a 
criminal offender with an ID) in Study 3. This allocation approach resulted in the 
subsample for Vignette 3 being twice the size of the Vignette 1 and 2 subsamples. 
Participants provided an open-ended qualitative written response (maximum 500 
words) when asked what they believed to be the ‘cause’ of the person’s ID (Vignette 
1) or criminal offending (Vignettes 2 and 3). A flow chart detailing the design of 
Factorial Survey 1 for Studies 1-4 follows (Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Design overview of Factorial Survey 1 for Studies 1-4.  
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 Measures and Stimuli 
  Demographics. Participants were asked to report their gender, age, highest 
level of education attained, State/Territory of residence, and whether they were an 
Australian citizen or permanent resident. 
Beliefs about human rights in Australia (construct developed for Study 1 
and independent variable for Study 2). Australians’ beliefs about human rights 
were assessed using a measure developed by the author (Appendix II). This measure 
consisted of two subscales: ‘Belief that human rights is a moral imperative’ (seven 
items) and ‘Belief that Australian society supports human rights’ (five items). Items 
for these subscales were based on the principles expressed by the United Nations’ 
human rights instruments, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (1971), Declaration on the 
Rights of Disabled Persons (1975), the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners (1955), and the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1991). 
These instruments were used rather than United Nations Conventions, because the 
Declarations, Standard Minimum Rules, and Principles are expressions of social 
values and ideals, whereas the Conventions are pragmatic legal instruments; and 
furthermore, there does not exist a Convention on the rights of prisoners (other than 
the Geneva Convention [1949], which applies only to ‘prisoners of war’).  Items 
were framed to reflect ontological beliefs held by the participant as to the status and 
value of human rights to themselves as individuals, and to society generally. 
Underlying dimensions and subsequent subscales were assessed and tested via 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in a pilot study (Appendix II). This measure was 
further validated via EFA and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using the current 
study’s sample, with results for this presented in Study 1 (Chapter 5).  
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Eight items were framed to reflect positive beliefs about human rights and 
their possession and protection by one’s self and others in Australian society (e.g., 
“Most Australians respect others’ human rights”), while four items were framed 
negatively (and consequently reverse scored) to reflect negative beliefs about human 
rights and their possession and protection by one’s self and others in Australian 
society (e.g., “Some people don’t deserve the same rights as me”). Participants 
scored items on a forced-choice Likert-type six-point response scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 2 = Moderately disagree, 3 = Slightly disagree, 4 = Slightly agree, 5 = 
Moderately agree, 6 = Strongly agree). 
Identification with a social minority (control variable for Study 1 and 2). 
Participants were asked “Do you identify with any of the following Australian social 
minority groups?”, with categories offered including: ‘Sexual or gender minority 
(e.g., gay/lesbian, bisexual, transgender)’; ‘Cultural minority (e.g., Vietnamese, 
Indian, Sudanese)’; ‘Indigenous Australian (Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander)’; 
‘Religious minority (e.g., Jewish, Muslim)’; ‘Person with a disability’; ‘Migrant’; 
and ‘Other’, with participants able to provide an open-ended response if they 
selected ‘Other’.  Development of the category options were based on open-ended 
responses provided in a prior pilot study (Appendix II). A single dichotomous 
variable was created to indicate whether participants identified with a social minority 
or not (1 = identified with a social minority, 0 = did not identify with a social 
minority). 
Moral concern for social categories (dependent variable for Study 2). To 
assess the social categories participants included in their circle of moral concern, 
participants completed a modified version of the moral circle task developed by 
Laham (2009). Participants were presented with 14 social categories: two social 
categories described variations of criminal offenders, two described variations of 
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people with a disability, and 10 other social categories described a variety of other 
Australian categories to whom participants may attribute moral concern. Refer to 
Table 4.1 for a list of these social categories.  
To complete this measure, participants first read the following statement 
providing a definition for moral obligation (i.e., moral concern): 
Sometimes people feel like they should show concern 
for, care for, support, and/or advocate for the welfare 
and interests of specific social groups. This type of 
concern is generally referred to as feeling a ‘moral 
obligation’ towards that group. 
Participants were then asked to choose social categories for whom they felt 
moral concern:  
If you personally feel morally obligated to show 
concern for the welfare and interests of any of the 
social groups listed below, drag them inside the 
box. You can include as many groups as you want in 
the box.  
After including social categories for which they felt moral concern in the box, 
participants were then instructed:  
Rank the groups you dragged into the box according 
to how strong your feeling of moral concern is for each 
group compared to the others.  The group you feel 
most concerned for should be ‘1’, the group you feel 
second most concerned for should be ‘2’, and so on.  
Three variables were derived from participant responses to this task: (1) a 
dichotomous variable per social category identifying whether or not participants 
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included that social category in their circle of moral concern (1 = Included social 
category in circle of moral concern, 0 = Did not include social category in circle of 
moral concern); (2) a count variable indicating the total number of social categories 
the participant chose to include in their circle of moral concern; and (3) an ordinal 
variable indicating the rank participants accorded each social category. 
 
Table 4.1 
Australian Social Categories Presented to Participants in the Circle of Moral 
Concern Task 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
Adolescent boys 
Adolescent girls 
Adult men 
Adult women 
Centrelink (welfare) recipients (e.g., people who receive family benefits, disability benefits) 
Criminal offenders serving community-based orders (e.g., involving paying a fine and doing unpaid 
community work) 
Elderly people (e.g., people over 70 years old) 
Ex-prisoners who have served a sentence for their crime 
Homeless people (e.g., sleeping rough) 
People experiencing a mental illness (e.g., depression, psychosis) 
People with an intellectual disability (e.g., low intelligence quotient [IQ], poor daily living skills) 
People with a physical disability  
Primary school children 
 
 
 Social category target condition (independent variable for Study 3). After 
completing measures relevant to Study 1 and 2, participants were randomly allocated 
to one of two social category target conditions: people with an ID as a social 
category, or criminal offenders as a social category. These two social category target 
conditions were two levels of the independent variable, ‘social category’.  
Participants allocated to the first condition were instructed: “Questions in this 
section relate to your thoughts about people with an intellectual disability as a social 
group”. Participants were then provided with the following overview of this social 
category: 
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An intellectual disability is a developmental disorder, 
which means a person with this disability has an 
intelligence quotient (IQ) score under 70 and can 
experience trouble with aspects of daily living such as 
self-care, learning new skills and activities, 
understanding complicated instructions, and ‘reading 
between the lines’ in social situations. A person is 
typically diagnosed with an intellectual disability by a 
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and often requires 
specialist supports for education, employment, and 
housing. 
Participants allocated to the second condition were instructed: “Questions in 
this section relate to your thoughts about criminal offenders as a social group”. 
Participants were then provided with the following overview of this social category:  
In Australia, general categories of criminal offending 
include murder, manslaughter, sexual assault, 
kidnapping/abduction, robbery (armed/unarmed), 
blackmail and extortion, various types of theft and 
trespass, and the sale and possession of illicit goods 
(e.g., guns) and substances (e.g., ice). 
 Stereotype content (dependent variable for Study 3). Stereotypic 
attributions regarding the social competence, warmth, status, and competitiveness of 
target social categories was assessed using measures developed by Fiske et al.  
(2002). 
Competence and warmth. To assess stereotypic beliefs about the competence 
and warmth of each target social category, participants were asked, “How do you 
think society views [Condition 1: people with an intellectual disability, Condition 2: 
criminal offenders] as a social group, according to the following qualities?”. 
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Participants rated their target social category on six items representing ‘competence’ 
(i.e., capable, skilful, confident, competent, efficient, intelligent) and six items 
representing ‘warmth’ (i.e., warm, good-natured, sincere, friendly, having good 
intentions, trustworthy) on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all, 2 = Slightly, 
3 = Moderately, 4 = Very, 5 = Extremely). Item presentation was randomised. Scores 
for each item set were averaged, and this composite score was used to indicate 
participants’ stereotypic beliefs about the social competence and emotional warmth 
of their target social category, where higher scores indicated stronger attributions of 
social competence or emotional warmth. Internal consistency reliability was good for 
the subscale ‘Competence’ (D = .88), and was excellent for the subscale ‘Warmth’ (D 
= .95). 
Status and competitiveness. To assess stereotypic beliefs about the social 
status and competitiveness of each target social category, participants were 
instructed, “Indicate the extent to which you personally agree or disagree with the 
following statements about [Condition 1: people with an intellectual disability, 
Condition 2: criminal offenders] as a social group”. Participants rated the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with two items assessing group members’ social 
status (i.e., “Members of this group typically hold prestigious jobs”, “Members of 
this group are usually economically successful”) and two items representing their 
social competitiveness (i.e., “If members of this group get special breaks [such as 
preference in hiring decisions], this is likely to make things difficult for me”, 
“Resources that go to members of this group are likely to take away from the 
resources deserved by people like me”). Ratings were performed using a seven-point 
Likert-type scale (-3 = Strongly disagree, -2 = Moderately disagree, -1 = Slightly 
disagree, 0 = Neither agree nor disagree, 1 = Slightly agree, 2 = Moderately agree, 3 
= Strongly agree. Item presentation was randomised. 
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The average score of each item set was used to indicate participants’ 
stereotypic beliefs about the social status and social competitiveness of members of 
their target social category, where negative scores indicated beliefs that the target 
social group was of low social status or social competitiveness, while positive scores 
indicated stereotypic beliefs that the social target was of high social status or social 
competitiveness. Internal consistency reliability was acceptable for both the 
subscales ‘Status’ (D = .76) and ‘Competitiveness’ (D = .77).  
 Mind perception (dependent variable for Study 3). Participants’ beliefs 
about target social categories’ capacity for mind were assessed using adapted 
versions of the Mind Perception Dimension subscales ‘Experience’ and ‘Agency’, 
from Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007). Participants were asked to “Think about the 
average person [Condition 1: with an intellectual disability, Condition 2: who 
commits a criminal offence”. All participants were then asked, “To what extent do 
they [the social target of interest] have the capacity for the following things?,” and 
were then presented with the 11 items for the subscale ‘Experience’ (i.e., hunger, 
fear, pain, pleasure, rage, desire, a personality, consciousness, pride, embarrassment, 
joy).  
All participants were again asked to think about ‘the average person’ 
belonging to their target social category, and asked, “To what extent do they [the 
social target of interest] have the capacity to do the following things?”, and were 
then presented with the seven items for the subscale ‘Agency’ (i.e., use self-control, 
be moral, recall memories of past experiences and events, recognise emotion in 
others, plan activities and future events, communicate with others, think and reason). 
Item presentation was randomised for both subscales, and all items were rated using 
a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = No capacity for this, 2 = Slight capacity for this, 3 
= Moderate capacity for this, 4 = Strong capacity for this, 5 = Highest capacity for 
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this). Scores for each item set were averaged. Internal consistency reliability was 
excellent for the subscale ‘Experience’ (D = .93) and was good for the subscale 
‘Agency’ (D = .88). 
 Dehumanisation (Study 3). A brief two-dimensional measure of 
dehumanisation (measuring ‘Human Uniqueness’ and ‘Human Nature’) from 
Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, and Koval (2011) was used to assess the extent to 
which participants held dehumanising beliefs about their target social categories. 
Participants were first informed, “Below are six characteristics people possess to 
varying degrees”. Participants were then instructed, “Rate (as a percentage, %) the 
extent to which you think [Condition 1: people with an intellectual disability, 
Condition 2: criminal offenders], as a social group, are likely to possess these 
characteristics”. Participants then responded to six attributes (three per subscale), 
with item presentation randomised. Items representing ‘Human Uniqueness’ were 
“Culturally refined”, “Rational/logical”, and “Lacking self-restraint” (reverse 
scored), while items representing ‘Human Nature’ were “Emotionally responsive”, 
“Warm towards others”, and “Rigid and cold” (reverse scored).  
To simplify the scale and item reversal, percentage responses were converted 
to a 5-point scale where 0-19% = 1 (indicating no capacity for that characteristic), 
20-39% = 2 (indicating low capacity for that characteristic), 40-59% = 3 (indicating 
moderate capacity for that characteristic), 60-79% = 4 (indicating high capacity for 
that characteristic), and 80-100% = 5 (indicating absolute capacity for that 
characteristic). Items scores per set were averaged for use as subscale scores. Internal 
consistency reliability for the ‘human uniqueness’ subscale was poor (D = .47) when 
all three items were included but became acceptable (D = .72) when the reverse-
scored item ‘Lacking self-restraint’ was removed. Similarly, internal consistency 
reliability for the ‘human nature’ subscale was acceptable (D = .73) when all three 
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items were included but became good (D = .82) when the reverse-scored item ‘Rigid 
and cold’ was removed. As such, subscale scores employed the two-item means. 
Moral status attributions (dependent variable for Study 3). Measures 
assessing participants’ attributions of the moral status of target social categories 
(including attributions regarding their moral responsibility for performing immoral 
acts, deservingness of moral credit for performing moral acts, and deservingness of 
moral patiency for experiencing immoral acts) were adapted from Bastian et al. 
(2011), and aimed to complement constructs relevant to Gray and colleagues’ moral 
typecasting theory (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). 
Moral responsibility. To assess attributions of moral responsibility for the 
target social categories, participants were instructed to “rate the degree to which you 
think a person who [Condition 1: has committed a criminal offence in the past, 
Condition 2: has an ID] is morally responsible for the following actions”. All 
participants were then presented with four items detailing minor immoral acts (i.e., 
“They made a serious promise to a friend but didn’t keep the promise”, “They 
pushed someone out of the way so they could be first in line”, “They blamed a 
serious mistake they’d made on a friend instead”, “They cheated on a significant 
other and never told them”). The presentation of items to participants was 
randomised. Participants rated these acts on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at 
all morally responsible, 2 = A little morally responsible, 3 = Moderately morally 
responsible, 4 = Mostly morally responsible, 5 = Absolutely morally responsible). 
Scores for the four items were averaged and used to indicate participants’ attribution 
of moral responsibility to their target social category, where higher scores indicated 
greater attributions of moral responsibility for performing immoral acts. Internal 
consistency reliability for this measure was excellent (D = .92).  
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Moral credit. To assess attributions of moral credit for the target social 
categories, participants were instructed to “rate the degree to which you think a 
person [Condition 1: with an intellectual disability, Condition 2: who has committed 
a criminal offence in the past] deserves moral credit for the following actions”. All 
participants were then presented with five items detailing minor moral acts (i.e., 
“They returned a lost wallet/purse with the money and other contents intact”, “They 
didn’t cheat on a test, even though a friend offered them the answers”, “They helped 
their parents when they were in need”, “They were nice to their co-workers, despite 
feeling stressed and under pressure themselves”, “They helped a stranger get their 
car out of a ditch on the side of the road”). Item presentation was randomised. 
Participants rated these acts on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all 
deserving of moral credit, 2 = A little deserving of moral credit, 3 = Moderately 
deserving of moral credit, 4 = Mostly deserving of moral credit, 5 = Absolutely 
deserving of moral credit). Scores for the five items were averaged and used to 
indicate participants’ attribution of moral credit to their target social category, where 
higher scores indicated greater attributions of moral credit for performing moral acts. 
Internal consistency reliability for this measure was excellent (D = .93). 
Moral patiency. To assess attributions of moral patiency for the target social 
categories, participants were instructed to “rate the degree to which you would feel 
like taking a moral stand and intervening on behalf of [Condition 1: a person with an 
intellectual disability, Condition 2: a known criminal offender] in the following 
situations”. All participants were then presented with four items in which the target 
social category was the victim of a minor immoral act (i.e., “They were pushed out 
of the way by someone else who wanted to be first in line”, “They politely asked a 
stranger on the street for directions to a shop and were given a rude and aggressive 
response”, “You heard someone bad-mouthing them behind their back”, “You saw 
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someone refusing to help them when they really needed it”). Item presentation was 
randomised. Participants rated these acts on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Would 
not feel like intervening on their behalf at all, 2 = Would feel like intervening on their 
behalf a little, 3 = Would moderately feel like intervening on their behalf, 4 = Would 
strongly feel like intervening on their behalf, 5 = Would absolutely feel like 
intervening on their behalf). Scores for the four items were averaged and used to 
indicate participants’ attribution of moral patiency to their target social category, 
where higher scores indicated greater attributions of moral patiency after 
experiencing immoral acts. Internal consistency reliability for this measure was good 
(D = .85). 
 Vignettes - causal beliefs about ‘John’ (stimuli for Study 4). Three vignette 
scenarios were used to assess participants’ causal beliefs about possessing an ID 
(Vignette 1, condition a); committing a criminal offence (theft and assault; Vignette 
2, condition b); and committing a criminal offence (theft and assault) when an ID is 
specified (Vignette 3, condition c). After completing measures relevant to Study 3, 
participants were randomly allocated to one of two vignette conditions: if 
participants had been previously allocated to the ID target social category in Study 3, 
they were now randomly allocated to Vignette 1 or 3 for Study 4; and if they had had 
been allocated to the criminal offender target social category condition in Study 3, 
they were now randomly allocated to Vignette 2 or 3 for Study 4. Refer to the Design 
section in this chapter for an explanation regarding this condition allocation 
approach. All vignettes described a man called John, and varied only in terms of 
whether John had an ID, and/or whether John had committed a criminal offence. 
Participants provided a written explanation of up to 500 words detailing their causal 
beliefs about the person described in the vignette.  
Vignette 1 stated:  
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John is 35 years old and has a mild intellectual 
disability. He has a below normal intelligence quotient 
(IQ) score of 65 and sometimes experiences trouble 
with aspects of daily living such as learning new skills 
and activities, understanding complicated 
instructions, and ‘reading between the lines’ in social 
situations. He works casually for a catering company, 
has some close friends with whom he plays sports and 
sees movies on weekends, and lives with his parents.  
Vignette 2 stated:  
John is 35 years old and has been sentenced for a 
criminal offence including theft and assault. Before he 
was sentenced, he worked casually for a catering 
company, had some close friends with whom he played 
sports and saw movies on weekends, and lived with his 
parents.  
Participants were then asked, “What do you think caused John to commit this 
criminal offence? Provide as detailed an explanation as you can”. 
 
Vignette 3 stated:  
John is 35 years old and has been sentenced for a 
criminal offence including theft and assault. He also 
has a mild intellectual disability. He has a below 
normal intelligence quotient (IQ) score of 65 and 
sometimes experiences trouble with aspects of daily 
living such as learning new skills and activities, 
understanding complicated instructions, and ‘reading 
between the lines’ in social situations. Before he was 
sentenced, he worked casually for a catering company, 
had some close friends with whom he played sports 
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and saw movies on weekends, and lived with his 
parents.  
Open-ended text response to vignette. Participants who read vignette 1 were 
asked, “What do you think caused John to have a mild intellectual disability?” 
Participants who read vignette 2 and 3 were asked, “What do you think caused John 
to commit this criminal offence?” 
Procedure 
 Approval for the conduct of this study was received from the Deakin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee (refer to Appendix I). Participants 
were then recruited to participate in the online study via paid and unpaid 
advertisements on Facebook and associated social media platforms (e.g., Instagram). 
Participants accessed the survey by clicking on the study site URL, embedded in the 
social media advertisements. Participants first read the study’s Plain Language 
Statement and then were informed that by clicking ‘NEXT’ and moving on to 
complete the study items, they indicated their informed consent for their data to be 
used in the study.  
All participants completed demographic items and then the Study 1 and 2 
measures (beliefs about human rights in Australia subscale items and the circle of 
moral concern task). Based on feedback provided from a previous pilot study 
(Appendix II), participants using smartphones to complete the study had trouble 
using the drag, drop, and rank functions associated with the circle of moral concern 
task. As such, the study was programmed via Qualtrics to only allow participants 
completing the study on a computer to complete this specific measure, while 
participants completing the study on a smartphone ‘skipped’ this measure.  
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After completing the Study 1 and 2 measures, Study 3 employed a quasi-
experimental methodology by randomly allocating participants to one of two social 
category target conditions (i.e., people with an ID or criminal offenders). Participants 
then responded to measures assessing their beliefs about stereotype content, mind 
perception, dehumanisation, and moral status regarding their target social category.  
After completing the Study 3 measures, participants were again randomly 
allocated to one of three vignette conditions to complete Study 4. Each vignette 
described ‘John’, a young man who lives with his parents and has a casual job, but 
varied according to the following information: (a) John has an ID; (b) John has 
committed a crime (with no ID specified); (c) John has an ID and has committed a 
crime. After first confirming they had read the vignette, participants were asked to 
provide a qualitative open-ended written explanation for the cause of John’s ID for 
condition (a), or the cause for John’s criminal behaviour in condition (b) or (c).  
After completing the Study 4 task, participants were invited to enter a prize 
draw to win one of two $100 Coles Group & Myer vouchers in appreciation for 
completing the study. Participants were then debriefed via a brief explanation for 
some of the ambiguities of the study (e.g., the focus on specific types of social 
categories, the use of random allocation to various conditions) before being invited 
to leave comments about the study for the researchers, and then exiting the site. The 
survey took approximately 25 minutes to complete. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE: STUDY 1 – AUSTRALIANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
This chapter details Study 1, which addresses research question 1 (described 
in Chapter 3) concerned with understanding Australians’ appreciation of human 
rights. This chapter reports the Aim, Data Treatment and Analysis Approach, 
Results, and Discussion for Study 1. 
 
Aims 
 The aim of Study 1 was to develop and validate a measure of beliefs about 
human rights relevant to the Australian context.  
 
Data Treatment and Analysis Plan 
Assumption testing relevant to factor analysis was conducted, and frequency 
and descriptive statistics were provided for all relevant items and measures. EFAs 
using oblique (direct oblimin) and orthogonal (varimax) rotation methods were 
conducted to determine the underlying dimensionality of the items and whether these 
were consistent with the previous pilot study findings (Appendix II). A confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) using a structural equation modelling (SEM) approach was 
then conducted to confirm that the underlying factors identified via EFA were sound 
measures of beliefs about human rights. A number of absolute and relative model fit 
indices were assessed to confirm the CFA’s soundness. Internal consistency 
reliability of resulting factors was then assessed using Cronbach’s alpha, in 
preparation for their use as subscale measures in subsequent analyses. Differences in 
beliefs about human rights subscales by gender and identification with a social 
minority were determined using independent samples t-tests.  
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Statistical Power Considerations 
The appropriate sample size necessary to conduct sound factor analyses is a 
controversial topic, however Field’s (2018) synthesis of respected statisticians’ 
recommendations on this issue suggest that N = 300 is adequate, N = 500 is good, 
and N = 1000 is excellent. Given our total sample size of N = 677, the sample size 
was suitable for factorial analyses. 
Software 
G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007) was used for statistical power analyses, IBM SPSS AMOS 24 was 
used for CFA analyses, and IBM SPSS Statistics 24 was used for all other statistical 
analyses. 
Results 
Participant Demographics 
 Participants (N = 1055, 52.7% female) were aged 18-84 years (M = 46.17, SD 
= 18.82), with members of the general community from all Australian states and 
territories represented to varying degrees. A variety of education and employment 
statuses were also represented. Participant demographics can be viewed in Table 5.1. 
Measure Validation: Beliefs about Human Rights in the Australian Context 
Assumption testing. Assumptions relevant to factor analysis were first 
addressed in preparation for the EFA and CFA on the beliefs about human rights 
items, and include univariate normality, a homogenous sample, a sufficiently large 
sample size (ideally N = 300+), and linear associations between variables (Field, 
2018). 
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Table 5.1 
Participant Demographics (N = 1055) 
    N % 
Gender  
Female 556 52.8 
Male 473 44.9 
Other 25 2.4
State/Territory 
 
 
New South Wales 361 34.2 
Australian Capital Territory 73 6.9 
Victoria 323 30.6 
South Australia 105 10
Tasmania 51 4.8
Western Australia 115 10.9
Queensland 22 2.1
Northern Territory 1 .1
Not currently residing in Australia 4 .4
Education Level 
Some secondary education 23 2.2
Year 10  58 5.5
Year 12  189 17.9
TAFE Certificate/s 133 12.6
TAFE Diploma/s 103 9.8
Undergraduate degree 289 27.4
Postgraduate degree 179 17
Doctoral degree 30 2.8
Other 52 4.9
Employment status 
 
 
Full time paid employment 257 24.3
Part time/casual paid employment 308 29.2
Volunteer employment 118 11.2
Previously employed in a paid or voluntary role 264 25
Never employed in a paid or voluntary role 107 10.1
Unknown 2 .2
Identification with a social minority ^ 
Total 544 51.5
Sexual/gender minority  241 22.8
Religious minority 66 6.3
Cultural minority 52 4.9
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 52 4.9
Person with a disability 177 16.8
Migrant 94 8.9
Other 111 10.5
Note. ^Participants could identify with more than one social minority. 
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Less than 5% of cases per item were univariate outliers (+/-1.96) and so were 
left untreated, and absolute skew and kurtosis values (skewabsolute = -.04 to 3.01, 
kurtosisabsolute = -.02 to 9.21) were deemed acceptable given the sample’s large size 
and the central limit theorem’s implication that the variables were robust to 
normality assumption violations. As multivariate normality is not necessary for EFA, 
multivariate outliers and normality were not assessed and any multivariate normality 
violations assumed to be robust, also consistent with the central limit theorem (Field, 
2013).  
To determine linear associations between the beliefs about human rights 
items, bivariate Pearson correlations (Table 5.2) were assessed. Items 1-7 tended to 
be significantly positively correlated with one another, while items 8-12 tended to be 
significantly positively correlated with one another, suggesting two potential 
dimensions underlying the items. All items were subsequently included in a series of 
EFAs. Descriptive statistics for the beliefs about human rights items are also 
presented in Table 5.2.  
Exploratory factor analysis. A preliminary model of the factors underlying 
the human rights items was calculated using principal axis factoring with number of 
dimensions determined at eigenvalues > 1, and applied oblique (direct oblimin) 
rotation to account for possible correlations between dimensions (Table 5.3). This 
preliminary model (N = 1017) indicated a sound Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
(KMO) of Sampling Adequacy of .87, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant, F2 (66) = 4022.20, p < .001, indicating the absence of an identity matrix. 
The determinant of the correlation matrix was .02, indicating the absence of 
multicollinearity. This analysis suggested a two-factor solution to explain item 
variance, as anticipated based on pilot study findings (Appendix II).  
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Factor 1 had an eigenvalue of 4.38, explained 36.50% of item variance, and 
included items 1-7 with loadings ranging from .58 to .80. Factor 2 had an eigenvalue 
of 1.94, explained 16.16% of item variance, and included items 8-12 with loadings 
ranging from .52 to .75. The factor correlation matrix indicated that the factors were 
not correlated (-.36), and there were no cross-loading items.  
Given that dimensions did not appear to be correlated, a second EFA was 
conducted using orthogonal (varimax) rotation rather than oblique rotation to 
maximise distance between dimension loadings. A two-factor solution was also 
forced to explain item variance (Table 5.3). All model fit statistics, item 
specifications, eigenvalues, and variance explained were the same as in the first 
EFA. Loadings for items 1-7 on Factor 1 ranged from .56 to .80, and factor loadings 
for items 8-12 ranged from .52 to .72, resembling the prior EFA loadings. There was 
no cross-loading for items. Factor 1 was labelled ‘Belief that supporting human 
rights is a moral imperative’, and Factor 2 was labelled ‘Belief that Australian 
society supports human rights’.  
Confirmatory factor analysis. To confirm the factor structure of the items 
and their appropriateness for use as a two-dimensional measure of Australians’ 
beliefs about human rights, a maximum likelihood estimates SEM approach was 
applied using IBM AMOS version 24. An initial two-factor model was constructed, 
as per the EFA dimensions and relevant loading items previously described.  
As SEM requires assessment of a variety of criteria to determine the 
soundness of a specified model (Kline, 2011), the following absolute fit indices were 
assessed: chi-square goodness of fit statistic; relative chi-square; root mean square 
residual (RMR); and root mean square error of approximation (SRMEA), including 
90% confidence intervals (Table 5.4). RMR was used rather than standardised RMR, 
given all observed variables contributing to the model were similarly scaled (Kline, 
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2011). The Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and comparative fit index (CFI) were used as 
relative fit indexes. To indicate the information theory goodness of fit for each 
model, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) measures were used. Ideally, the chi-square test statistic should be non-
significant; however, this statistic and its significance test becomes an unreliable 
indicator of model fit when N is large (Kline, 2011). To account for this, the relative 
chi-square value is a more stable alternative and indicates a sound absolute fit when 
< 2 (Ullman, 2001). 
The RMR value (Steiger, 1990) and the RMSEA (Hu & Bentler, 1999) 
should each ideally be < .05. The TLI should be >.90 and the CFI should be > .95 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999). Smaller AIC and BIC values, relative to comparison models, 
indicate better model fit (Kline, 2011). The initial model (Model 1) fit indices 
suggested that, with minor respecifications accounting for covariances between the 
error terms for observed variables, the initial two-factor model of beliefs about 
human rights would be confirmed. A second, third, and fourth model were thus 
respecified by addressing standardised covariance values greater than +/- 2 between 
observed variables. All model fit indices for the final CFA model (Model 4) 
demonstrated that the two-factor model initially specified by the EFA process 
provided a sound representation of the relationship between beliefs about human 
rights items and the latent variables underlying these, confirming the appropriateness 
of the subscale constructs and items measuring them. For all CFA model values, 
refer to Table 6.4. 
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Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Bivariate Correlations between Beliefs about Human Rights Items 
  Item 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
M 5.38 5.48 4.63 5.58 5.29 2.03 5.28 3.42 3.92 3.85 3.36 4.49 
SD 1.29 1.17 1.62 1.01 1.15 1.6 1.26 1.54 1.58 1.35 1.69 1.66 
 N 1048 1051 1053 1051 1052 1051 1049 1053 1053 1049 1055 1052 
1. All social groups deserve human 
rights. 1   
2. All people deserve human rights. .68*** 1   
3. Criminal offenders should have the 
same basic human rights as me. .48*** .51*** 1   
4. People with intellectual disability 
should have the same basic human 
rights as me.  .54*** .49*** .40*** 1   
5. It is my responsibility to respect 
and protect the human rights of 
other Australian people. .47*** .49*** .40*** .42*** 1  
6. Some people don’t deserve the 
same rights as me. ^ .46*** .47*** .46*** .35*** .33*** 1  
7. A society that does not respect and 
protect human rights is an immoral 
society. .49*** .49*** .33*** .42*** .54*** -.29*** 1  
8. Human rights are taken seriously in 
Australia.  -.12*** -.14*** -.17*** -.17*** -.14*** .20*** -.23*** 1  
9. Australia does a poor job protecting 
its citizens’ human rights. ^ -.20*** -.19*** -.23*** -.23*** -.28*** -.19*** -.28*** .47*** 1  
10. Most Australians respect others’ 
human rights. -.07* -.11** -.14*** -.08** -.10** .16*** -.12*** .51*** -.36*** 1  
11. I often think that my human rights 
are not respected by Australian 
society. ^ -.06* -.08* -0.05 -.08* -.12*** -.06 -.10** .30*** .44*** .25*** 1  
12. Australian laws restrict the human 
rights of some Australian social 
groups. ^ -.31*** -.31*** -.34*** -.28*** -.30*** -.28*** -.29*** .34*** .50*** .27*** .35*** 1 
Note. ^Items 6, 9, 11, and 12 are reverse scored; M, SD values shown are non-reversed. Each item had a range of 1-7, with higher scores indicating 
stronger endorsement of that belief.  
*p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001, all two-tailed. 
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Table 5.3 
Exploratory Factor Analyses for Beliefs about Human Rights Items (N = 1017) 
EFA 1: Two factor solution    
(oblique rotation) 
EFA 2: Two factor solution    
(orthogonal rotation) 
Item 1. 2. h2 1. 2. h2 
1. All social groups deserve human rights. .80 .65 .80 .65 
2. All people deserve human rights. .79 .64 .79 .64 
3. Criminal offenders should have the same basic human rights as me. .63 .40 .62 .40 
4. People with intellectual disability should have the same basic human rights as me.  .63 .40 .62 .40 
5. It is my responsibility to respect and protect the human rights of other people. .64 .41 .62 .41 
6. Some people don’t deserve the same rights as me.^ .58 .34 .56 .34 
7. A society that does not respect and protect human rights is an immoral society. .63 .40 .60 .40 
8. Human rights are taken seriously in Australia.  .67 .45 .65 .45 
9. Australia does a poor job protecting its citizens’ human rights.^ .75 .56 .72 .56 
10. Most Australians respect others’ human rights. .55 .31 .55 .31 
11. I often think that my human rights are not respected by Australian society.^ .52 .27 .52 .27 
12. Australian laws restrict the human rights of some Australian social groups.^ .59 .40 .53 .40 
Eigenvalue 4.38 1.94    4.38 1.94   
  Variance (%) 36.50 16.16 36.50 16.16  
Note. Principal axis factorisation applied to determine dimensions. Rotations applied with Kaiser normalisation applied. Factor loadings were Structure Matrix  
values rather than Pattern Matrix values. Factor loadings >.30 determined meaningful and used as criterion for factor development. ^Items 6, 9, 11, and 12 are  
reverse scored. H2 = communality value.
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Table 5.4 
Model Fit Indices for Confirmatory Factor Analysis of a Two-Factor Measure of 
Australians’ Beliefs about Human Rights (N = 1017) 
Model  F2 (df) Relative F2 RMR  CFI TLI RMSEA [90%CI] AIC BIC 
1 (initial) 402.00 (53)* 7.59 0.13 0.91 0.89 0.08 [.07, .09] 452.00 575.12 
2 81.40 (32)* 2.54 0.05 0.99 t 0.97 t 0.04 [.03, .05] 173.40 399.94 
3 64.13 (30)* 2.14 0.04^ 0.99 t 0.98 t 0.03 [.02, .05]^ 160.13 396.51 
4 57.57 (29)* 1.99^ 0.04^ 0.99 t 0.98 t 0.03 [.02, .04]^ 155.57 396.87 
Note. F2 (df) = chi square statistic (degrees of freedom); RMR = root mean square residual; RMSEA = 
root mean square error of approximation; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion. *p < .001, indicates poor 
absolute fit according to F2 test of independence. ^ sound absolute fit, t sound relative fit.  
 
 
Internal consistency reliability of beliefs about human rights subscale 
measures. Intercorrelations of items per factor and for all items overall were 
examined using Cronbach’s alpha to determine their degree of internal consistency 
reliability. ‘Belief that supporting human rights is a moral imperative’ (seven items) 
demonstrated good internal reliability (M = 5.23, SD = .95, D = .84), while ‘Belief 
that Australian society supports human rights’ (five items) demonstrated acceptable 
internal reliability (M = 3.30, SD = 1.11, D = .74). Diagnostics indicated that neither 
factor’s internal reliability would be improved by removal of an item, so all items 
were retained per factor. Given the sound internal reliability of each factor it was 
decided to treat each item set as measures in subsequent analyses. To determine 
whether the two subscale dimensions were amenable to use as a composite scale 
yielding a global score indicating beliefs about human rights, internal reliability for 
all items, entered as a single scale, was assessed; internal consistency of all items 
was poor (D = .53). A bivariate Pearson correlation determined the association 
between the dimensions was significant, moderate and negative, r(1054) = -.34, p < 
.001, two-tailed. Given the poor internal consistency between items when combined 
across dimensions, and a significant negative association between dimensions, it was 
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decided that it was most appropriate to apply the subscales as distinct subscale 
measures of beliefs about human rights. A paired-samples t- test found that 
participants significantly differed in their subscale scores and hence human rights 
beliefs, t(1053) = 37.12, p < .001, d = 1.19. Overall, participants believed that 
supporting human rights was a moral imperative more strongly than they believed 
that other Australians supported human rights (Mdifference = 1.93, SE = .05).  
Bivariate correlations between beliefs about human rights subscales and 
demographic variables. Bivariate Pearson correlations were conducted to assess 
significant associations between the beliefs about human rights subscales and age, 
while point-biserial correlations were conducted to assess significant associations 
between the beliefs about human rights subscales, gender, and identification with a 
social minority. The ‘belief that supporting human rights is a moral imperative’ 
subscale had a weak, significant positive association with gender, r(1027) = .19, p < 
.001, suggesting women held this belief more strongly than men. This belief was not 
significantly associated with age (p = .32) or identification with a social minority (p 
= .25). The subscale ‘belief that Australian society supports human rights’ had a 
weak, significant, negative association with gender, r(1027) = -.18, p < .001, 
suggesting men held this belief more strongly than women, and with an 
IDentification with a social minority, r(1054) = -.16, p < .001, suggesting those who 
did not identify with a social minority held this belief more strongly than those who 
did identify with a minority. This belief was not significantly associated with age (p 
= .33).  
 
Discussion 
The aim of Study 1 was to develop and validate a measure of beliefs about 
human rights relevant to the Australian context. A 12-item, two-factor measure 
assessing Australians’ belief about human rights was successfully developed and 
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validated via a pilot study (Appendix II) and continued by the current study. 
Development of this measure was deemed necessary given there exist no measures 
focusing on human rights beliefs or attitudes specific to the Australian context, and 
which evaluate individuals’ personal beliefs about human rights relative to others’ in 
their society. The resultant two-factor measure reflects a different type of construct 
to popular existing human rights measures; both the Human Rights Survey (HRQ; 
Diaz –Veizades, Widaman, Little, & Gibbs, 1995) and the Attitudes Toward Human 
Rights Inventory (ATHRI; Getz, 1985) focused on assessing individuals’ 
understanding of and support for the specific moral and civil rights articles described 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and other libertarian United 
Nations and United States legislation. Our measure, however, focused on assessing 
individuals’ beliefs about human rights as an open-ended ‘fuzzy’ construct, allowing 
participants to impose their own understanding of what ‘human rights’ are, and their 
value, with respect to themselves, others, and their society. The measure had two 
subscales, ‘beliefs that supporting human rights is a moral imperative’ and ‘belief 
that Australian society supports human rights’, which were moderately, negatively 
correlated. On average, participants endorsed the first belief more strongly than the 
second. This difference likely reflects a self-enhancement bias called the ‘better than 
average’ effect, which is the tendency for individuals to attribute ‘better’ traits, 
qualities, and abilities to themselves than others (Guenther & Alicke, 2010; 
Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). This interpretation is supported by Stavrova, Köneke, and 
Schlösser (2016), who found that individuals tended to evaluate their own attitudes 
towards sociopolitical issues of personal importance as being more supportive than 
those of others’. 
Age was not associated with degree of belief for either subscale; this is the 
first study to the author’s knowledge to assess associations of age with human rights 
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beliefs and attitudes. A study by Dunbar, Blanco, Sullaway, and Horcajo (2004) 
hypothesised a negative association between age and attitudes towards social 
minorities in the context of human rights, and similarly found these were not 
significantly associated. We did find significant gender differences for these beliefs, 
though; women believed that supporting human rights is a moral imperative more 
strongly than men, while men believed that Australian society supports human rights 
more strongly than women. Interestingly, Diaz-Veizades et al. (1995) found that 
women endorsed all HRQ factors (Social Security, Civilian Constraint, Equality, and 
Privacy) more strongly than men using an American student sample, although this 
difference was relatively small in magnitude. Crowson and deBacker (2008) found 
that men were more likely than women to support restrictions on human rights (using 
the Human Rights-Civil Liberties Scale – Revised; HR – CL-R), also using an 
American student sample; however, Swami et al. (2012) used the unrevised HR-CL 
to assess attitudes towards human rights in a German community sample and found 
no significant difference between men and women for these beliefs.  
Participants who identified with a social minority group also believed that 
Australian society supports human rights less strongly than those who did not 
identify with a minority. This result is likely due to those who identified with a social 
minority having had personal and hence salient experiences of social injustice 
associated with their minority status. These individuals are also likely to have a 
greater desire and need for human rights policy and legislation in their everyday life, 
and so may be keenly aware of its importance in contexts that non-minority 
individuals are not. An ingroup cognitive bias (i.e., hostile attribution bias) may have 
also been involved, where an individual attributes less positive qualities or intentions 
to an outgroup, compared to their own self-categorised ingroup. Guy, Lee, and 
Wolke (2017) found that United Kingdom adolescents who were victimised (bullied) 
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had a stronger attribution bias than those who were not victimised; in the current 
study’s context, individuals who identify with a minority group may have 
experienced victimisation and hence be more likely to interpret the neutral or 
ambiguous expressions, words, and behaviours of those who do not share this status 
as being negative rather than neutral or positive. This could extend to assumptions 
about the outgroup’s support for human rights generally.  
This interpretation is supported by an experimental study examining the 
effects of social ostracism on meta-perceived dehumanisation (i.e., what participants 
thought others thought of their human status; Bastian & Haslam, 2010). When 
excluded (versus not) during a simulated gaming task, participants felt that others 
perceived them to have less positive and more negative characteristics that are seen 
as essential or fundamental to all humans, such as openness, emotionality, vitality, 
and warmth. Participants who identified with social minority groups may have 
experienced social ostracism due their group identity, and as such hold 
metaperceptions that others view them as ‘less than human’ and hence are less 
supportive of their group’s human rights. 
 
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research for Study 1 
A general strength of this study was the high public interest in the general 
topic of human rights and social justice within Australia during recruitment in 2016. 
This allowed the collection of a large sample with balanced demographics and 
ensured that gradual attrition did not affect the usability of the study data. A key 
strength specific to Study 1 was the development and validation of a new measure 
assessing beliefs about human rights specific to the Australian context. This measure 
demonstrated sound construct validity and internal reliability.  
 126
A key limitation of Study 1 was the researcher’s dependence on scale items 
relevant to beliefs about human rights generated by her and her team. The purpose of 
the measure was to capture participant endorsement of ‘human rights’ as a fuzzy 
construct rather than a specific set of principles and practices. We assumed that 
laypeople would be unlikely to have a nuanced understanding of United Nations 
policy and legislation but would be familiar with the general discourse associated 
with these via media, higher education, and exposure to specific domestic and 
international human rights considerations. However, the dimensions of a measure are 
only reflective of the fundamental items which contribute to it, and so the beliefs 
about human rights in the Australian context represented by this measure are limited 
to and biased by the researchers’ assumptions.  Future research focused on refining 
this measure could explore Australian laypeople’s qualitative beliefs about human 
rights (e.g., what they actually are, and their value in their own and others’ life), to 
better inform a measure of Australians’ beliefs about and endorsement of human 
rights ideology.  
Conclusion 
An original two-dimensional measure was developed and validated to assess 
Australians’ beliefs about human rights. This measure suggested that Australians 
moderately to strongly believe that human rights are a moral imperative but are less 
convinced that ‘Australian society’ supports human rights.  
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 CHAPTER SIX: STUDY 2 – ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRALIANS’ 
BELIEFS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR MORAL CONCERN FOR 
OFFENDERS AND PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AS SOCIAL 
CATEGORIES 
 
This chapter details Study 2, which addresses General Research Question 2 
concerned with understanding how Australians’ beliefs about human rights relates to 
their moral concern for people with an ID and criminal offenders, as relative social 
categories. This chapter reports the Aims and Hypotheses, Data Treatment and 
Analysis Approach, Results, and Discussion for Study 2. 
Aims and Hypotheses 
 The aim of Study 2 was to assess how Australians’ beliefs about human 
rights were associated with their moral concern for criminal offenders and people 
with an ID as relative social categories. It was hypothesised that endorsement of 
beliefs that human rights are a moral imperative, and that Australian society supports 
human rights, would predict the inclusion of a greater number of social categories 
overall in participants’ circle of moral concern (H1), as well as the inclusion of 
people with an ID (H2) and of criminal offenders (H3) in participants’ circle of 
moral concern. 
Data Treatment and Analysis Plan 
Assumption testing relevant to multiple linear regression and multiple binary 
logistic regression was conducted, and frequency and descriptive statistics were 
provided for relevant items and measures. For the circle of moral concern task, 
average number of social categories included in participants’ circle of moral concern, 
proportion of participants who included each social category in their circle, and the 
median ranking per social category were determined. 
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Point-biserial correlations were conducted to determine bivariate associations 
between beliefs about human rights and moral concern for specific social categories. 
Correlations with significant associations of p < .25 rather than p < .05 were used to 
determine which relationships to test via regression (Mickey & Greenland, 1989). To 
determine the inclusion of appropriate control variables in regression models, further 
point-biserial and Pearson bivariate correlation analyses, as relevant, were conducted 
to test associations between the beliefs about human rights subscale scores and 
participant age, gender, identification with a social minority, and total number of 
social categories, as well as specific social categories, included in participants’ circle 
of moral concern.  
A hierarchical linear multiple regression was conducted to determine whether 
participants’ beliefs about human rights predicted total number of social categories 
included in their circle of moral concern; contributions of gender and age were 
controlled for via entry in Step 1, and beliefs about human rights subscales were 
included at Step 2. Three hierarchical binary logistic regressions were conducted to 
determine whether participants’ beliefs about human rights predicted inclusion of ex-
prisoners, criminal offenders serving community-based orders, and/or people with an 
ID, in their circle of moral concern. Each model featured a different social category 
as criterion; again, the contributions of gender and age were controlled for via entry 
in Step 1, and beliefs about human rights subscales were included at Step 2.  
Statistical Power Considerations 
A priori statistical power analyses were conducted to ensure an adequate 
sample size was recruited, and to reduce the risk of Type II error. With an alpha of 
.05 and power of .80, the following sample sizes would be necessary to detect the 
effect sizes specified for a linear multiple regression model with four predictors: N = 
602 to detect a very small effect size (f2 = .02); N = 204 to detect a small effect size 
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(f2 = .06); N = 85 to detect a moderate effect size (f2 = .15); and N = 40 to detect a 
large effect size (f2 = .35). An a priori power analysis was also conducted to 
determine the necessary sample size for a multiple logistic regression (two-tailed) 
with an alpha of .05 and power of .80, and minimum odds ratio of 1.5 along with 
possible R2 between covariates of .09; N = 228 was recommended. Given the large 
size of our sample, sufficient statistical power for all analyses in Study 6 was 
assured. 
Statistical Software  
G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) was used for statistical 
power analyses, and IBM SPSS Statistics 24 was used for all other statistical 
analyses. 
 
Results 
Participant Demographics 
 Participants (N = 1055, 52.7% female) were aged 18-84 years (M = 46.17, SD 
= 18.82), with members of the general community from all Australian states and 
territories represented to varying degrees. A variety of education and employment 
statuses were represented. Participant demographics can be viewed in Table 5.1. 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Internal Reliabilities for Beliefs About Human Rights 
Subscales 
Intercorrelations of items per factor and for all items overall were examined 
using Cronbach’s alpha to determine their degree of internal consistency reliability. 
‘Belief that supporting human rights is a moral imperative’ (seven items) 
demonstrated good internal reliability (M = 5.23, SD = .95, D = .84), while ‘Belief 
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that Australian society supports human rights’ (five items) demonstrated acceptable 
internal reliability (M = 3.30, SD = 1.11, D = .74). A bivariate Pearson correlation 
determined these subscales were moderately and negatively associated, r(1054) = -
.34, p < .001, two-tailed. 
Moral Concern for Social Categories 
 Only participants who accessed the online survey using a personal computer 
(N = 781), as opposed to via a smart phone or tablet, were eligible to complete the 
circle of moral concern task due to limitations of the drag and drop mechanics of the 
task. On average, participants included about nine of the available 14 social 
categories in their circle of moral concern (M = 8.94, SD = 4.21, range 1-14). An 
independent samples t-test showed that men (M = 8.82, SD = 4.40) and women (M = 
8.97, SD = 4.03) did not significantly differ in the average total number of social 
categories they included in their circle of moral concern, t (712.66) = -.47, p =.64, 
(equal variances not assumed, F = 6.92, p < .05). 
Inclusion and ranking of social categories in moral circle. Frequency and 
median rank statistics for social categories included in participants’ circle of moral 
concern (total and by median rank per social category) can be viewed in Table 6.1. 
Overall, the most common social category participants reported feeling moral 
concern for was people experiencing a mental illness (reported by 84.0% of 
participants), followed by homeless people (81.6%), elderly people (81.0%), people 
with a physical disability (79.8%), people with an intellectual disability (78.5%), and 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (72.3%). The least common social 
categories participants reported feeling moral concern for were criminal offenders 
serving community-based orders (38.7%) and ex-prisoners who have served a 
sentence for their crime (44.3%). Interestingly, a smaller proportion of participants 
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expressed moral concern for adult men (39.4%) than for the ex-prisoner social 
category.  
Further chi square tests of independence were conducted to determine 
whether there was a significant difference between the proportion of participants 
who expressed moral concern for criminal offender social categories and for people 
with disability social categories. Overall, participants were more likely to report 
moral concern for ex-prisoners who had already served their sentence than for 
criminal offenders currently serving a community-based order’, F2 (1, N = 781) = 
533.89, p < .001, ) = .83. Furthermore, participants were more likely to report moral 
concern for people with an intellectual disability compared to ex-prisoners who had 
already served their sentence, F2 (1, N = 781) = 108.54, p < .001, ) = .37, and 
compared to criminal offenders serving community-based orders for their crime, F2 
(1, N = 781) = 118.84, p < .001, ) = .39. Notably, participants were more likely to 
report moral concern for people with a physical disability compared to people with 
an intellectual disability, F2 (1, N = 781) = 204.78, p < .001, ) = .51. 
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Table 6.1 
Frequency and Median Rank Statistics for Participant Inclusion of Social Categories in their 
Circle of Moral Concern (N = 762) 
 Social Category 
 
Moral Concern 
Reported 
 Ranked Moral 
Concern 
    n %  Median Rank 
Rank 
Range 
1. People experiencing a mental illness 656 84.0  3 1-13 
2. Homeless people 637 81.6  4 1-14 
3. Elderly people 633 81.0  5 1-14 
4. People with a physical disability 623 79.8  4 1-14 
5. People with an intellectual disability 613 78.5  3 1-13 
6. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 565 72.3  4 1-14 
7. Adolescent girls 496 63.5  6 1-14 
8. Primary school children 494 63.3  5 1-14 
9. Centrelink (welfare) recipients 460 58.9  7 1-14 
10. Adult women 429 54.9  9 1-14 
11. Adolescent boys 423 54.2  8 1-14 
12. Criminal offenders serving community-based orders 346 44.3   11 1-14 
13. Adult men 308 39.4  12 1-14 
14. Ex-prisoners who have served a sentence for their crime 302 38.7  11 1-14 
Note. Categories ordered from most frequently included to least frequently included, overall. % not 
cumulative as people could express moral concern for multiple social categories. Participants who 
completed the study on a smartphone rather than a computer did not complete the circle of moral 
concern task. 
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Bivariate correlations between beliefs about human rights factors and 
moral concern for social categories. Pearson correlation analyses (two-tailed; Table 
6.2) found a moderate, positive, statistically significant association between the total 
number of social categories participants included in their circle of moral concern and 
the belief that supporting human rights is a moral imperative, r (781) = .33, p < .001. 
A small, negative, statistically significant association was also found for the belief 
that Australian society supports human rights with total number of social categories 
included, r (781) = -.15, p < .001, and age, r (761) = -.19, p < .001, but not with 
gender (p =.64). 
Point-biserial correlation analyses (two-tailed; Table 6.2) found that the belief 
that human rights is a moral imperative was significantly and positively associated 
with inclusion of all social categories except elderly people in participants’ circle of 
moral concern. Relationship strength ranged from weak to moderate (r = .08 to .40) 
across social categories. A significant, weak, negative association was also found 
between belief in other Australians’ support for human rights and the inclusion of 
most social categories in participants’ circle of moral concern; as participants’ belief 
that Australian society supports human rights decreased, all social categories (except 
adult men, adolescent boys, primary school children, people with a physical 
disability, and elderly people) were more likely to be included in participants’ circle 
of moral concern (r = -.08 to -.28). Age was also significantly and negatively 
associated with participants’ inclusion of all social categories in their circle of moral 
concern (except people with an ID, elderly people, and indigenous Australians); as 
participants’ age increased, they were less likely to report moral concern for most 
social categories (r = - .08 to - .21). 
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Table 6.2 
Bivariate Correlations between Beliefs about Human Rights, Age, and Moral 
Concern for Social Categories 
  Variable 1. 2. 3. 
1. Belief that human rights is a moral imperative 1  
2. Belief that Australian society supports human rights -.34*** 1 
3. Age -.03 -.03 1 
4. Adult men .08* -.01 -.15*** 
5. Adult women .26*** -.13*** -.21*** 
6. Adolescent boys .13*** -.04 -.16*** 
7. Adolescent girls .23*** -.09* -.19*** 
8. Primary school children .09* .00 -.10** 
9. Criminal offenders serving community-based orders  .24*** -.08* -.16*** 
10. Ex-prisoners who have served a sentence for their crime .26*** -.13*** -.13*** 
11. Centrelink (welfare) recipients  .37*** -.24*** -.11** 
12. People with an intellectual disability .33*** -.08* -.04 
13. People with a physical disability  .21*** -.03 -.14*** 
14. Homeless people  .25*** -.19*** -.08* 
15. People experiencing a mental illness  .27*** .10** -.19*** 
16. Elderly people -.01 .02 .01 
17. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people .40*** -.28*** -.05 
Note. Variables 1-3 are continuous, while variables 4-18 are dichotomous. Pearson correlation coefficients 
provided for associations between continuous variables and point-biserial correlation coefficients provided for 
associations between continuous and dichotomous variables. N = 1054 for variables 1-2, N = 1024 for variable 
3, and N = 781 for variables 4-17. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, two-tailed. 
Hypothesis Testing 
 A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to determine 
whether, after controlling for the influence of gender and age (Step 1), participants’ 
beliefs about human rights (Step 2) predicted the total number of categories they 
included in their circle of moral concern (Table 6.3). The Step 1 model was 
statistically significant, R = .19, F (2, 740) = 14.19, p < .001, and explained 4% of 
total variance; age significantly predicted total number of social categories and 
contributed 4% unique variance to the outcome. The addition of further variables at 
Step 2 significantly improved the model, R = .36, F (2, 738) = 40.55, p < .001, and 
explained an additional 10% variance; belief that supporting human rights is a moral 
imperative was a significant predictor of total number of social categories, 
contributing 8% unique variance to the outcome. Participants’ gender and belief that 
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Australian society supports human rights were not significant predictors of total 
number of social categories included in their circle of moral concern (all p > .05).  
 Three hierarchical binary logistic regression analyses (Table 6.4) were 
conducted to determine whether, after controlling for the influence of gender and age 
(Step 1), participants’ beliefs about human rights (Step 2) predicted the inclusion of 
ex-prisoners, criminal offenders serving a community based sentence, and/or people 
with an ID in their circle of moral concern. Hosmer and Lemeshow test results were 
non-significant for all models (p >.05), indicating goodness of fit across models. 
Case outcomes were correctly classified at a greater than chance rate (>50%) across 
models.  
 Inclusion of gender and age at Step 1 for each model explained only 1-2% of 
total variance in the criterion, while inclusion of both beliefs about human rights 
subscales explained 7-9% of total variance in the criterion. Age was a significant 
predictor of whether ex-prisoners and criminal offenders currently serving a sentence 
were included in participants’ circle of moral concern at Steps 1 and 2 of relevant 
models, with older participants (negligibly) less likely to show moral concern for 
these social categories (both OR = .99 at Steps 1 and 2).  
 Gender was a significant predictor for whether participants included people 
with an ID in their circle of moral concern at Steps 1 and 2 of the relevant model, 
with women nearly twice as likely as men to show moral concern for people with an 
ID (OR = 1.95).  
 At Step 2 of all three models, participants’ belief that supporting human 
rights is a moral imperative significantly predicted inclusion of ex-prisoners (OR = 
2.14), criminal offenders (OR = 2.20), and people with an ID (OR = 2.20) in their 
circle of moral concern; for each incremental increase in participants’ self-reported 
belief, participants’ likelihood to report moral concern for these social categories 
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more than doubled. Participants’ belief that Australian society supports human rights 
was not significantly associated with moral concern for any of the social categories 
at Step 2 across models (all p > .05).  
 
Table 6.3 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model Associating Human Rights Beliefs with 
Total Number of Social Categories Included in Circle of Moral Concern (N = 743) 
 Predictor b SE β rsp R2 Fchange 
Step 1 Constant 10.75 0.42   .04 14.19*** 
 Gender 0.36 0.31 0.04 .04   
 Age -0.04 0.01 -0.20*** -.19   
Step 2 Constant 3.24 1.28 .13 40.55*** 
 Gender -0.17 0.30 -0.20 -.02   
 Age -0.04 0.01 -0.17*** -.17   
 HR- moral imperative 1.47 0.18 0.31*** .29   
 HR- social support -0.09 0.14 -0.02 -.02   
Note. b = unstandardised coefficient; β = standardised coefficient. SE = standard error;  
rsp= Semi Partial r; Adjusted R2 values = R2 values; R2change = .10. HR-moral imperative =  
Belief that human rights is a moral imperative; HR – social support = Belief that Australian  
society supports human rights. For Sex, 0 = male, 1 = female. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
  
  137
Table 6.4 
Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Models Associating Human Rights Beliefs 
with Moral Concern for People with Intellectual Disability and Criminal Offenders 
(N = 743) 
Criterion Predictor b SE OR 
95% CI 
[LL, UL] F2 R2 Model (%) 
Ex-Prisoners   
Step 1 Constant 0.42 0.21 12.56** .01 55.3 
 Gender -0.11 0.15 0.90 [0.67, 1.21]    
 Age -0.01 0.00 0.99*** [0.98, 1.00]  
Step 2 Constant -3.40 0.81  72.59***   .07 61.6 
 Gender -0.38 0.16 0.69* [0.50, 0.94]    
 Age -0.01 0.00 0.99** [0.98, 1.00]  
 HR- moral imperative 0.76 0.12 2.14*** [1.69, 2.72]  
 HR- social support -0.06 0.08 0.94 [0.81, 1.09]  
     
Criminal offenders serving a sentence  
Step 1 Constant 0.34 0.21  18.85***   .02 60.3 
 Gender -0.13 0.16 0.88 [0.65, 1.20]    
 Age -0.02 0.00 0.98*** [0.98, 0.99]  
Step 2 Constant -4.01 0.85   69.05***   .07 66.2 
 Gender -0.35 0.17 0.71* [0.51, 0.98] 
 
 Age -0.02 0.00 0.99*** [0.98, 0.99]  
 HR- moral imperative 0.79 0.13 2.20*** [1.70, 2.84]  
 HR- social support 0.05 0.08 1.05 [0.90, 1.22]       
     
People with an ID   
Step 1 Constant 1.32 0.25   14.22**   .02 78.6 
 Gender 0.67 0.18 1.95*** [1.36, 2.80]  
 Age -0.01 0.01 0.99 [0.98, 1.00]    
Step 2 Constant -3.30 0.80  72.12***   .09 79.9 
 Gender 0.48 0.20 1.62* [1.10, 2.39]  
 Age -0.00 0.01 1.00 [0.99, 1.01]  
 HR- moral imperative 0.79 0.11 2.20*** [1.77, 2.73]  
  HR- social support 0.15 0.09 1.16 [0.97, 1.40]  
Note. b = Unstandardised coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; R2 = McFadden’s pseudo R2; F2 = chi 
square statistic, indicating model improvement from baseline when p < .05. Model % = Percentage of correctly 
classified outcomes for sample cases compared to the null model. HR-moral imperative = Belief that supporting 
human rights is a moral imperative; HR – social support = Belief that Australian society supports human rights. For 
Sex, 0 = male, 1 = female. 
 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Discussion 
Study 2 aimed to assess how Australians’ beliefs about human rights was 
associated with moral concern for people with an ID and criminal offenders as 
relative social categories. We hypothesised that participants’ belief in human rights 
would predict inclusion of a greater number of social categories in their circle of 
moral concern (H1), and inclusion of people with an ID (H2) and criminal offenders 
(H3) in their circle of moral concern. All three hypotheses were partially supported; 
belief that supporting human rights is a moral imperative significantly predicted all 
outcomes, whereas belief that Australian society supports human rights did not.  
That belief that human rights is a moral imperative was positively associated 
with total number of social categories included in participants’ circle of moral 
concern is novel with reference to past research, but unsurprising; overall this belief 
explained 10% variance in the number of social categories included in the circle of 
moral concern, after controlling for age and gender. McFarland, Webb, and Brown 
(2012) similarly found small to moderate, positive bivariate associations between 
support for human rights and ‘identification with all humanity’ (which assesses the 
extent to which participants ‘have concern for’ and ‘want to help, when in need’ the 
following narrow, to broad, social categories – ‘Americans’, ‘People in my 
community’, and ‘People all over the world’).  McFarland et al. also found that 
identification with all humanity was a significant predictor of human rights support 
in multivariate models. While the current study employed different measures to 
McFarland et al., there is a clear similarity between the constructs and associations 
addressed between our studies.   
Drawing on Haslam and colleagues’ (Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004; 
Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008) two-dimensional theory of 
dehumanisation (characterised by ‘Human Uniqueness’ and ‘Human Nature’), 
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Bastian et al. (2011) assessed university students’ moral attributions toward 24 social 
categories and found that stronger attributions of Human Nature were strongly, 
positively associated with attributions of moral patiency (i.e., moral value, the right 
to be assisted and protected from harm).  
Human Nature refers to characteristics that are seen as essential or 
fundamental to all humans, such as openness, emotionality, vitality, and warmth. 
Human Uniqueness refers to characteristics that are believed to distinguish humans 
from (other) animals, and involve refinement, civility, higher cognition, and other 
socially learned qualities (Haslam et al., 2004). When Human Uniqueness attributes 
are denied to people they are explicitly or implicitly likened to animals, and seen as 
immature, coarse, irrational, or backward. When Human Nature attributes are denied 
to people they are explicitly or implicitly likened to objects or machines and seen as 
cold, rigid, inert, and lacking emotion. Our results could be interpreted to suggest 
that participants’ who believed human rights are a moral imperative, are more likely 
to view social categories and the individuals within them as ‘real’ humans (reduced 
objectification) with emotional, subjective selves worth helping and protecting from 
harm.   
Abrams et al. (2015), who drew on Fisk and colleagues’ (Fiske et al., 2002, 
2007) stereotype content model to examine how endorsement of equality values 
related to participants’ support for different social categories rights, found that 
participants exercised their ‘equality for all’ value hypocritically. They found that the 
stronger participants’ endorsement of equality values, the higher they rated the rights 
of paternalistically prejudiced social categories (e.g., women, people with disability, 
elderly people), and the lower they rated the rights of contemptuously prejudiced 
social categories (e.g., Muslim, Black, and homosexual people). Abram et al.’s 
(2015) results generally reflect those of the moral concern rank-order task in Study 2, 
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where social categories perceived to require greater protection were ranked highest 
(i.e., people with mental illness, people with disability, the elderly, the homeless), 
while those likely perceived to be moral transgressors (i.e., current and past 
prisoners) or to hold social privilege (i.e., adult men, adolescent boys) were ranked 
lowest. However, our results also found that even though offenders were ranked very 
low, participants’ belief that human rights are a moral imperative was nonetheless 
associated with inclusion of offenders in their circle of moral concern. Our results 
may differ from Abrams et al.’s (2015) due to the nature of the questions and 
measures used to assess this association; where Abram et al. (2015) measured how 
equality values related to rights endorsement for different groups, and compared 
mean differences between these groups, the current study asked participants to 
simply include or exclude the different social categories in their circle of moral 
concern, comparing the frequency of groups’ inclusion and assessing associations 
between human rights beliefs and dichotomised moral concern. While constructs and 
measures in these two studies are similar, they are not identical. 
Applying the theory of universal values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994) to a cross-
cultural sample of 21 countries, Schwartz (2007) identified the personal value of 
universalism (which represents the goals of tolerance and seeking the welfare of all 
humankind) to predict moral inclusiveness towards racial and cultural minorities 
(immigrants), and to predict prosocial behaviour. Using a United States panel 
sample, Hackett, Omoto, and Matthews (2015) also found that personal self-
transcendence values (i.e., Universalism, Benevolence; Schwartz, 1992, 1994) 
positively predicted concern for human rights, and that this relationship was 
mediated by a ‘psychological sense of global community’. While the directionality of 
this mediation model is contrary to that tested in the current study (where belief that 
human rights is a moral imperative predicts total number of social categories 
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included in one’s circle of moral concern), there is nonetheless a clear similarity 
between key constructs across our studies. This similarity suggests that participants 
who held human rights as a moral imperative in the current study, may have held 
self-transcendence (as opposed to self-enhancing) personal values.  
Passini (2016) expanded on this association between personal values and 
moral inclusion via a structural equation model, showing that moral inclusion 
intentions predicted self-transcendent values (encouraging independence of thought 
and action and receptiveness to change), whereas priming one’s moral identity 
predicted conservation values (submissive self-restriction, preservation of traditional 
practices and protection of the status quo). Interestingly, Passini’s (2016) results 
contradict those of Reed and Aquino (2003), who found that a highly self-important 
moral identity was associated with a more expansive circle of moral concern. The 
current study’s results cannot clearly side with either Passini or Reed and Aquino – 
our measure primed participants toward ‘inclusion’ of social categories in one’s 
moral circle of concern (supporting Passini, 2016), but then predicted a self-
attributed moral principle reflecting participants’ moral identity (supporting Reed 
and Aquino, 2003). It may be that these constructs (self-transcendence and 
conservation values, moral inclusion, and moral identity) hold a complex 
interrelation which depends on which values are primed and hence prioritised (e.g., 
threat primes conservation, empathy/perspective-taking primes self-transcendence). 
These values are complimentary according to Schwartz’ two-dimensional orthogonal 
model (with self-transcendence opposed to self-enhancement, and conservation 
opposed to openness to experience; Schwartz,1992, 1994). 
While there is sufficient literature to provide context for our finding 
regarding the association between belief that human rights is a moral imperative and 
holding an expansive moral circle, our results for hypothesis 2 and 3 (that this belief 
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predicted the inclusion of people with an ID and offenders, respectively, in the circle 
of moral concern) can only be explained with reference to our preliminary analyses. 
Of the 14 social categories assessed in the current study, people with an ID had a 
median rank of 4 (with 78.5% of participants including this social category in their 
circle of moral concern), while the two offender social categories (offenders serving 
community-based orders and ex-prisoners who had served their sentence) both had a 
median rank of 11 (with 44.3% and 38.7% of participants including these respective 
social categories in their circle of moral concern). Regression analyses showed, 
however, that for every incremental increase in their belief that human rights are a 
moral imperative, the likelihood that participants would include each of these social 
categories more than doubled. This indicates that participants who hold this belief 
may use it (or the values underlying it) as a deontological rule for moral decision-
making, where if one social category is of moral value to them, then all social 
categories are of moral value to them. This interpretation is consistent with 
Schwartz’s (1994) definition of personal values as ‘transsituational motivations or 
goals’, and with past studies’ association of self-transcendence values (benevolence, 
universalism) and the egalitarian ideology of human rights policy and legislation 
generally. Participants’ strong consistency between the abstract principles of human 
rights ideology and their situational moral decision-making, with reference to the 
social categories presented to them, also reinforces the transsituational impact of 
personal values within Schwartz’ theoretical framework. 
Additional findings included that age and gender were associated with moral 
concern for different social categories in the multivariate regression models, 
although the magnitude of age’s influence was negligible and any significant 
difference attributable to the sample size being large and hence overpowered. More 
importantly, women were nearly twice as likely as men to include people with an ID 
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in their circle of moral concern. This could be explained by Australian women’s 
socialised gender norms and roles, positioning them as the primary nurturers, carers, 
and advocates for vulnerable or impaired family and community members, including 
people with an ID (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016). However, this explanation 
doesn’t indicate why women were no more likely than men to include other 
vulnerable groups in their circle of moral concern that they would be likely to care 
for (e.g., people with a physical disability, people with mental illness).  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research for Study 2 
In addition to the large sample size overall for the survey used for Studies 1-
4, a strength specific to Study 2 was the use of a rank-order approach to the circle of 
moral concern task. This demonstrated the relative concern Australian participants 
attribute to simple social categories, highlighting that offenders with an ID is indeed 
a complex social category, eliciting incongruent moral attributions towards its two 
component social categories.  
A key limitation of Study 2 relates to the design of the human rights measure 
developed and validated in Study 1. In hindsight, the researchers made an error in 
judgement including items in the human rights measure referring to criminal 
offenders and people with an ID, specifically, i.e., ‘Criminal offenders should have 
the same basic human rights as me’, and ‘People with intellectual disability should 
have the same basic human rights as me’. The purpose of these items was to allow 
participants an opportunity to indicate whether they held egalitarian and inclusive 
views towards traditionally stigmatised and vulnerable social categories specifically 
allocated protections by the United Nations policy legislation. However, given the 
purpose of this measure was as a predictive tool relative to these very social groups, 
inclusion of these items likely inflated the association between the subscale, Human 
Rights as a Moral Imperative, and inclusion of people with an ID and criminal 
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offenders in participants’ circles of moral concern. Future research should reconsider 
the value of these items to the overall measure, if used in a similar context (i.e., to 
research offenders with an ID). One way to refine this measure would be to include 
an item specific to every general social category named by United Nations 
Declarations and associated policy tools as at risk of rights violation (e.g., women, 
children, people with disability, prisoners, religious minorities, racial minorities). 
Alternatively, to limit the number of items in the measure, future researchers could 
just include a generic item referring to ‘social minorities’ instead of specifying one 
or more social categories.  
A second limitation of this study was not controlling for additional known 
correlates of positive attitudes towards offenders and people with an ID, such as 
political orientation and previous contact. Past research suggests that those who hold 
conservative political beliefs (rather than liberal, non-conservative beliefs) tend to 
hold more negative attitudes towards offenders and ex-offenders (Rade, Desmarais, 
& Mitchell, 2016), and as such may be less likely to endorse human rights as a moral 
imperative and to include offenders in their circle of moral concern. Similarly, 
intergroup contact theory and related past research suggests that increased exposure 
and quality time spent with commonly stigmatised groups (including people with an 
ID and offenders) is associated with holding more positive attitudes towards 
members of that group (Keith, Bennetto, & Rogge, 2015; Rade et al., 2016). 
Conclusion 
The majority of Australians within this sample included people with an ID in 
their circle of moral concern, and ranked their concern for this social category quite 
highly relative to others. Conversely, a minority of Australians within this sample 
included criminal offenders in their circle of moral concern, and ranked them second 
lowest in priority (after ‘adult men’). Women were twice as likely to include people 
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with an ID (but no other social category) in their circle of moral concern, and as 
Australians’ belief in human rights as a moral imperative increased, the size of their 
moral circle increased, and the likelihood that they would include people with an ID 
and criminal offenders in their moral circle doubled incrementally. These findings 
frame Australians as being generally invested in social justice and the welfare of 
social minorities, particularly those demonstrating obvious vulnerability such as 
disability, illness, or frailty; however, there appear to be negative biases towards 
social categories perceived to be explicitly morally transgressive (criminal offenders) 
or from social categories perceived to be less vulnerable, relative to those proposed 
in the rank-order task (e.g., adult men, adolescent boys, adult women). 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN: STUDY 3 – A COMPARISON OF AUSTRALIANS’ 
STIGMATISING BELIEFS ABOUT THE MORAL, SOCIAL, AND ‘HUMAN’ 
STATUS OF OFFENDERS AND PEOPLE AN WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
AS SOCIAL CATEGORIES 
 
This chapter details Study 3, which addresses General Research Question 3 
(described in Chapter 3) concerned with understanding the types of stigmatising 
beliefs Australians may hold about criminal offenders and people with an ID as 
distinct and comparative social categories. This chapter reports the Aims and 
Hypotheses, Data Treatment and Analysis Approach, Results, and Discussion for 
Study 3. 
 
Aim and Hypotheses 
 The aim of Study 3 was to assess and compare Australians’ potentially 
stigmatising beliefs relevant to the social status, ‘human’ status, and moral status of 
people with an ID and criminal offenders as distinct social categories. Four belief 
types were assessed: stereotype content beliefs about the social competence, 
emotional warmth, social status, and social competitiveness of the target social 
categories; beliefs about the target social categories’ capacity for mind, specifically 
agency (i.e., rational thought, self-direction, morality) and experience (i.e., sensory 
experience, emotional experience); beliefs about the target social categories’ capacity 
for traits definitive of ‘being human’ as opposed to (dehumanised) automata or 
‘lower’ animals, i.e., ‘human uniqueness’ (capacity for rational thought and self-
awareness, distinct from animals) and ‘human experience’ (capacity for emotional 
and social connection, distinct from automata); and beliefs about the moral status of 
the target social categories (i.e., moral responsibility, credit, and patiency).  
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 Based on Fiske and colleagues’ stereotype content model and its dimensional 
categorisations (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002), it was hypothesised that on average, people 
with an ID would be attributed low social status and non-competiveness, and hence 
high warmth and low competence (H1), while criminal offenders would be attributed 
low social status combined with competitiveness, and hence low warmth and 
competence (H2). It was also hypothesised that participants would attribute greater 
competence (H3), social status (H4), and competitiveness (H5) to criminal offenders, 
and would attribute greater warmth to people with an ID (H6).  
 Applying Gray and colleagues’ theory of mind perception (Gray et al., 2007), 
as well as Haslam and colleagues’ dual dehumanisation theory (Haslam et al., 2004; 
Haslam et al., 2008), it was hypothesised that participants would attribute greater 
agency to criminal offenders compared to people with an ID (H7), but would 
attribute greater experience to people with an ID compared to criminal offenders 
(H8). It was further hypothesised that participants would attribute greater ‘human 
uniqueness’ to criminal offenders compared to people with an ID (H9) and would 
attribute greater ‘human nature’ to people with an ID compared to criminal offenders 
(H10). 
 We initially reasoned that if mental agency was found to be high and mental 
experience low for criminal offenders, while mental agency was found to be low and 
mental experience high for people with an ID (relevant to H7 and H8), then this 
would suggest criminals would be typecast as ‘moral agents’ while people with an 
ID would be typecast as ‘moral patients’ by participants. According to Gray and 
colleagues’ theory of moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray et al., 2012), 
relative moral agents are attributed both greater moral responsibility for doing harm 
(as an expression of negative moral agency) and greater moral credit (as an 
expression of positive moral agency) than relative moral patients; conversely, 
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relative moral patients are attributed greater moral patiency (victimhood, experienced 
injustice) than moral agents. It was therefore hypothesised that participants would 
attribute greater moral responsibility for immoral actions (H11), as well as moral 
credit for moral actions (H12), to criminal offenders than people with an ID. It was 
further hypothesised that participants would attribute greater moral patiency 
(victimhood, deservingness of protection) when subjected to an immoral action 
(H13) to people with an ID compared to criminal offenders.  
 
Data Treatment & Analysis Plan 
 Initial frequency and descriptive statistics were provided for all 
demographic items. Participants allocated to the two target social category conditions 
were then compared by age using an independent-samples t-test, and by gender, 
education level, and identification with a social minority using a series of Pearson’s 
chi square tests, to ensure they were suitable for between-group comparisons on key 
outcome variables. Frequency and descriptive statistics were then provided for all 
items contributing to outcome measures, including those contributing to: social status 
measures (i.e., stereotype content subscales ‘competence’, ‘warmth’, ‘status’, and 
‘competitiveness’); ‘human’ status measures (i.e., the mind perception subscales 
‘experience’ and ‘agency’, and the dehumanisation subscales ‘human uniqueness’ 
and ‘human nature’); and moral status measures (‘moral responsibility’, ‘moral 
credit’, ‘moral patiency’). After assessing measure items for univariate normality, 
composite variables were calculated, descriptive statistics for subscale measures 
were provided, and internal consistency reliabilities were determined. After assessing 
the univariate, bivariate, and multivariate suitability of the data, four one-way 
MANOVAs were then conducted to determine whether participant beliefs pertaining 
to the moral status, social status (i.e., stereotype content), and ‘human’ status (i.e., 
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mind perception and dehumanisation) of the two target social categories (i.e., people 
with an ID and criminal offenders) statistically differed. In each MANOVA, the 
independent variable was the target social category, while the outcome variables 
were the subscale scores per measure. All analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS 
version 24. 
Statistical Power Considerations 
A priori statistical power analyses were conducted to ensure an adequate 
sample size was recruited, and to reduce the risk of Type II error. For a one-way 
MANOVA and associated ANOVAs including two outcome variables and 
comparing two groups, with an alpha of .05 and power of .80, N = 486 would be 
required to detect a very small effect size (f2 = .02), N = 164 would be required to 
detect a small effect size (f2 = .06), N = 68 would be required to detect a medium 
effect size (f2 = .15), N = 32 would be required to detect a large effect size (f2 = .35). 
For a one-way MANOVA and associated ANOVAs including three outcome 
variables and comparing two groups, N = 550 would be required to detect a very 
small effect size; and for a one-way MANOVA and associated ANOVAs including 
four outcome variables and comparing two groups, N = 602 would be required to 
detect a very small effect size. Given our total sample size of N = 928, statistical 
power and sample size was adequate for the proposed one-way MANOVAs. 
Statistical Software  
G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2009; Faul et al., 2007), and IBM SPSS Statistics 
version 24 was used for all other statistical analyses. 
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Results 
Participant Demographics 
Participants (N = 928, 53.4% female) were aged 18-84 (M = 46.24, SD = 
18.77), with members of the general community from all Australian States and 
Territories represented to varying degrees. A variety of education and employment 
statuses were also represented. A complete description of participant demographics 
can be viewed in Table 7.1. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Outcome measure integrity. Univariate normality was sound for all 
continuous variables (skewabsolute  = -1.56 – 1.45, kurtosisabsolute = -1.39 – 1.83), and 
composite scores and internal consistency reliabilities for all outcome variable 
subscales were calculated. Univariate normality was again sound for all subscale 
measures to be used as outcome variables (skewabsolute  = -1.29 – 1.12, kurtosisabsolute = 
-1.09 – 1.11). Descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alphas for stereotype content 
subscales, representing social category social status, can be viewed in Table 7.2; 
descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alphas for mind perception and dehumanisation 
subscales, representing social categories’ ‘human’ status, can be viewed in Table 7.3; 
and descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alphas for moral status subscales can be 
viewed in Table 7.4.  
Suitability of participants for between-group comparisons. Due to 
random allocation to target social category conditions, there were 461 participants 
(49.9%) in the ‘people with an ID’ condition and 463 (50.1%) participants in the 
‘criminal offenders’ condition. Participants in the two target social category 
conditions were compared on key demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, education 
level, employment status, and identification with a social minority) to ensure there 
  151
were no significant differences between conditions, hence making them suitable for 
comparison on key outcome measures.  
An independent samples t-test indicated that there was no significant 
difference in the mean age of participants allocated to the ‘people with an ID’ 
condition (M = 46.54, SD = 19.02) compared to the ‘criminal offenders’ condition 
(M = 45.83, SD = 18.57), t (900) = .57, p = .57 (equal variances assumed, F = .69, p 
= .41).  A series of chi square tests of independence determined that participants 
allocated to the two target social category conditions did not significantly differ by 
gender (after removing the ‘other’ category due to limited cases), F2 (1, N = 901) = 
.81, p = .37, Australian State/Territory of residence, F2 (8, N = 924)  = 7.25, p = .51, 
education level, F2 (8, N = 924) = 7.19,  p = .52, employment status, F2 (3, N = 924) = 
1.04,  p = .79, type of non-employment (i.e., never employed versus retired), F2 (1, N 
= 321)  = .08, p = .78, or by identification with a social minority, F2 (1, N = 924)  = 
.04, p = .84. Given the participants allocated to each condition did not differ on key 
demographics, they were deemed suitable for between-group comparison analyses to 
determine whether stigmatising beliefs differed by target social category.   
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Table 7.1 
Participants Demographics and Between-Groups Comparisons (N = 928) 
    N % 
Gender 
  
 
Female 495 53.4  
Male 410 44.2  
Other 22 2.4 
State/Territory 
  
 
New South Wales 318 34.3  
Australian Capital Territory 66 7.1  
Victoria 282 30.4  
South Australia 97 10.5  
Tasmania 44 4.7  
Western Australia 99 10.7  
Queensland 18 1.9  
Northern Territory 1 0.1 
Not currently residing in Australia 3 0.3 
Education Level 
Some secondary education 20 2.2 
Year 10  45 4.8 
Year 12  166 17.9 
TAFE Certificate/s 121 13 
TAFE Diploma/s 82 8.8 
Undergraduate degree 254 27.4 
Postgraduate degree 167 18 
Doctoral degree 26 2.8 
Other 47 5.1 
Employment status 
Full time paid employment 229 24.7 
Part time/casual paid employment 270 29.1 
Volunteer employment 104 11.2 
Previously employed in a paid or voluntary role 231 24.9 
Never employed in a paid or voluntary role 92 9.9 
Unknown 2 0.2 
Identification with a social minority ^  
Total 478 51.5  
Sexual/gender minority  209 22.5 
Religious minority 41 4.4 
Cultural minority 86 9.3 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 47 5.1 
Person with a disability 59 6.4 
Migrant 154 16.6 
Other 99 10.7 
Note. ^Participants could identify with more than one social minority. 
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Table 7.2 
Descriptive and Internal Consistency Reliability Statistics for Social Status Measures 
  M(SD) 
Measure Item Total 
People 
with an ID 
Criminal 
offenders 
Competence (D = .88, N = 915) 2.06 (0.71) 1.89 (0.64) 2.24 (0.74) 
 Capable 2.09 (0.87) 1.99 (0.84) 2.20 (0.91) 
 Skilful 2.08 (0.88) 1.87 (0.80) 2.30 (0.91) 
 Confident 2.44 (1.02) 2.17 (0.81) 2.70 (1.13) 
 Competent 1.97 (0.85) 1.87 (0.82) 2.08 (0.89) 
 Efficient 1.92 (0.87) 1.77 (0.80) 2.07 (0.91) 
 
Intelligent 
 
1.89 (0.89) 1.69 (0.83) 2.12 (0.91) 
Warmth (D = .95, N = 916) 2.36 (1.04) 3.22 (0.66) 1.52 (0.55) 
 Warm 2.36 (1.15) 3.19 (0.88) 1.55 (0.72) 
 Good-natured 2.49 (1.17) 3.35 (0.82) 1.63 (0.79) 
 Sincere 2.33 (1.23) 3.26 (0.92) 1.40 (0.67) 
 Friendly 2.62 (1.16) 3.41 (0.83) 1.82 (0.87) 
 Having good intentions 2.41 (1.24) 3.39 (0.88) 1.45 (0.66) 
 
Trustworthy 
 
1.97 (1.05) 2.71 (0.91) 1.25 (0.58) 
Status (D = .76, N = 924) 2.09 (1.19) 1.82 (1.05) 2.37 (1.25) 
 
Members of this group typically hold prestigious 
jobs. 
1.92 (1.27) 1.59 (1.05) 2.27 (1.38) 
 
Members of this group are usually economically 
successful. 
 
2.25 (1.37) 2.05 (1.29) 2.46 (1.41) 
Competitiveness (D = .77, N = 924) 2.63 (1.66) 2.11 (1.43) 3.13 (1.72) 
 
If members of this group get special breaks (such as 
preference in hiring decisions), this is likely to 
make things more difficult for people like me. 
2.94 (1.98) 2.46 (1.86) 3.40 (1.99) 
  
Resources that go to members of this group are likely 
to take away from the resources deserved by 
people like me. 
2.31 (1.70) 1.77 (1.36) 2.85 (1.83) 
Note. D = Cronbach’s alpha, indicating strength of internal consistency reliability. Range for 
Competence and Warmth = 1-5, and range for Status and Competitiveness = 1-7, with higher scores 
indicating stronger attribution of quality. 
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Table 7.3 
Descriptive and Internal Consistency Reliability Statistics for ‘Human’ Status 
Measures 
    M(SD) 
Measure Item Total 
People 
with an ID 
Criminal 
offenders 
Mind Perception 
Experience (D = .93, N = 915) 4.01 (0.70) 4.23 (0.59) 3.80 (0.73) 
 Hunger 
4.16 (0.83) 4.39 (0.70) 3.94 (0.87) 
 Fear 
4.13 (0.89) 4.42 (0.69) 3.84 (0.97) 
 Pain 
4.11 (0.87) 4.40 (0.67) 3.83 (0.94) 
 Pleasure 
4.08 (0.82) 4.32 (0.70) 3.84 (0.88) 
 Rage 
4.23 (0.76) 4.21 (0.79) 4.26 (0.73) 
 Desire 
4.18 (0.76) 4.22 (0.75) 4.13 (0.76) 
 A personality 
4.09 (0.86) 4.27 (0.79) 3.91 (0.90) 
 Consciousness 
3.71 (1.07) 3.92 (0.96) 3.52 (1.13) 
 Pride 
3.81 (1.03) 4.04 (0.89) 3.60 (1.10) 
 Embarrassment 
3.67 (1.16) 4.01 (0.94) 3.34 (1.26) 
 
Joy 
 
3.98 (0.98) 4.38 (0.66) 3.57 (1.08) 
Agency (D = .88, N = 915) 3.14 (0.71) 3.14 (0.60) 3.14 (0.80) 
 Use self-control 
2.80 (0.92) 2.94 (0.75) 2.66 (1.05) 
 Be moral 
3.22 (1.07) 3.63 (0.87) 2.82 (1.11) 
 Recall memories of past experiences and events 
3.57 (0.90) 3.50 (0.88) 3.63 (0.91) 
 Recognise emotion in others 
3.02 (0.96) 3.05 (0.87) 3.00 (1.04) 
 Plan activities and future events 
3.09 (0.94) 2.81 (0.84) 3.37 (0.96) 
 Communicate with others 
3.18 (0.84) 3.11 (0.75) 3.25 (0.91) 
 
Think and reason 
 
3.09 (0.92) 2.96 (0.82) 3.22 (1.00) 
Dehumanisation 
Human Uniqueness (D = .73, N = 911) 4.23 (1.89) 4.28 (1.87) 4.18 (1.92) 
 Culturally refined 
3.84 (2.13) 3.99 (2.12) 3.68 (2.14) 
 
Rational/logical 
 
4.65 (2.14) 4.60 (2.08) 4.70 (2.20) 
Human Nature (D = .82, N = 912) 6.03 (2.32) 7.22 (1.70) 4.85 (2.24) 
 Emotionally responsive 
6.05 (2.53) 7.04 (2.11) 5.09 (2.54) 
  Warm towards others 6.01 (2.51) 7.40 (1.75) 4.62 (2.37) 
Note. D = Cronbach’s alpha, indicating strength of internal consistency reliability.  ^Reverse-scored 
items ‘Lacking self-restraint’ and ‘Cold and rigid’ were excluded from the composite variables 
‘Human Uniqueness’ and ‘Human Nature’ as these lowered the internal consistency reliability of each 
subscale to D = .47 and D = .73, respectively, when included. Range for Mind Perception subscales = 
1-5, and range for Dehumanisation measures = 1-10; higher scores indicate stronger attribution of 
quality. 
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Table 7.4 
Descriptive and Internal Consistency Reliability Statistics for Moral Status Measures 
 
    M(SD) 
Measure Item Total 
People  
with an ID 
Criminal 
offenders 
Moral Responsibility (D = .92, N = 919) 3.62 (1.17) 3.14 (1.05) 4.08 (1.12)  
They made a serious promise to a friend but didn’t 
keep the promise. 
3.37 (1.29) 2.83 (1.15) 3.88 (1.22) 
 
They pushed someone out of the way so they could 
be first in line. 
3.57 (1.33) 3.06 (1.21) 4.03 (1.30) 
They blamed a serious mistake they’d made on a 
friend instead. 
3.81 (1.31) 3.29 (1.20) 4.30 (1.24) 
They cheated on a significant other and never told 
them. 
 
3.75 (1.28) 3.36 (1.22) 4.12 (1.24) 
Moral Patiency (D = .85, N = 921) 3.81 (0.95) 4.10 (0.79) 3.51 (0.99) 
They were pushed out of the way by someone else 
who wanted to be first in line. 
3.86 (1.14) 4.22 (0.94) 3.49 (1.20) 
They politely asked a stranger on the street for 
directions to a shop and were given a rude 
and aggressive response. 
3.83 (1.12) 4.10 (0.99) 3.53 (1.19) 
You heard someone bad-mouthing them behind 
their back. 
3.48 (1.23) 3.78 (1.12) 3.17 (1.25) 
  You saw someone refusing to help them when 
they really needed it. 
4.08 (1.03) 4.29 (.89) 3.86 (1.10) 
     
Moral Credit (D = .93, N = 923) 4.19 (0.98) 4.33 (0.90) 4.05 (1.03) 
 They returned a lost wallet/purse with the money 
and other content intact. 
4.36 (1.04) 4.44 (0.97) 4.29 (1.10) 
 They didn’t cheat on a test, even though a friend 
offered them the answers. 
4.07 (1.21) 4.22 (1.08) 3.91 (1.32) 
 They helped their parents when they were in need. 4.12 (1.13) 4.23 (1.04) 4.01 (1.19) 
 They were nice to their co-workers, despite feeling 
stressed and under pressure themselves. 
4.06 (1.16) 4.29 (1.02) 3.79 (1.24) 
 They helped a stranger get their car out of a ditch 
on the side of the road. 
 
4.35 (1.00) 4.47 (0.91) 4.23 (1.07) 
Note. D = Cronbach’s alpha, indicating strength of internal consistency reliability. ^‘They’ and ‘them’ 
refers to the target social category described to the participant (i.e., ‘a person with an intellectual 
disability’, or ‘a criminal offender’). Range = 1-5, with higher scores indicating stronger attribution of 
quality. 
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Assumption testing for MANOVAs. As multivariate normality cannot be 
assessed using SPSS, the univariate normality of outcome variables was instead 
assessed, as recommended by Field (2018); univariate normality for all outcome 
variables was sound. Bivariate Pearson correlations between subscales per measure 
were assessed to ensure subscales were statistically as well as conceptually related, 
but not to the point of multicollinearity; this ensured the MANOVA rather than 
ANOVA approach was most appropriate for between-group comparisons (Table 
7.5). Correlations were generally statistically significant between relevant subscales, 
and ranged from small to strong in magnitude (r = .12 to .55, all p <.001); however, 
for the moral status measure, the subscales ‘Moral responsibility’ and ‘Moral 
patiency’ were not significantly correlated (r = -.04, p = .26), and for the social status 
measure, the subscales ‘Competence’ and ‘Warmth’ were not significantly correlated 
(r = .04, p = .28).  
Given that each set of subscales per measure were theoretically related and 
most were correlated, it was decided that a MANOVA approach to between-group 
comparisons was most appropriate, with a one-way MANOVA conducted per 
measure (i.e., stereotype content, mind perception, dehumanisation, and moral status) 
to determine differences in participants’ stigmatising beliefs towards people with an 
ID compared to criminal offenders. 
Mahalanobis’ Distance values were calculated for each set of outcome 
variables per MANOVA, and multivariate outliers appropriately censured prior to 
multivariate analysis. Box’s Test determined that homogeneity of covariances was 
violated for each of the four one-way MANOVAs conducted (all Box’s M were 
statistically significant at p <.001). Given the large size of the overall sample, and 
that target social category conditions were of equal size, this violation was not 
deemed meaningful (Field, 2018). Pillai’s criterion was assessed to determine 
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statistically significant multivariate differences between conditions by outcome 
measure (Field, 2018). Assumptions of homogeneity of variance appeared to be 
violated for all ANOVA analyses (Levene’s test results all p < .05) per MANOVA, 
however assessment of Hartley’s F max ratio for each apparent violation indicated 
the largest group variance was less than twice the value of the smallest variance, 
suggesting this violation could be ignored (Field, 2018).  
To control for Type I error for the multiple univariate comparisons following 
each MANOVA, a Bonferroni correction was applied when interpreting univariate 
results (i.e., D = .05 divided by number of relevant comparisons). The following 
alpha criteria were used to assess the statistical significance of ANOVA per 
MANOVA: MANOVA 1 used D = .016; MANOVA 2 used D = .013; MANOVA 3 
used D = .025; and MANOVA 4 used D = .025.  
Hypothesis Testing 
 Results for the four one-way MANOVAs and their respective ANOVAs are 
reported in Table 7.6.  
MANOVA 1: Participants’ beliefs about the social status of people with 
an ID compared to criminal offenders. MANOVA 1 included the four subscales of 
the stereotype content measure as outcome variables: competence, warmth, status, 
and competitiveness; results indicated there was an effect of target social category on 
the combined outcome variables, F (4, 934) = 691.34, p < .001, Pillai’s Trace = .75, 
partial K2 = .75. ANOVA results showed that target social category influenced all 
beliefs about social status (all p < .001), with small to very large effect sizes (partial 
K2 = .06-.66). Participants attributed greater competence, status, and competitiveness 
to offenders (Mcompetence = 2.24, SDcompetence = .74; Mstatus = 2.36, SD status = 1.25; 
Mcompetitiveness = 3.12, SDcompetitiveness = 1.71) compared to people with an ID 
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(Mcompetence = 1.88, SDcompetence = .64; Mstatus = 1.81, SD status = 1.04; Mcompetitiveness = 
2.10, SDcompetitiveness = 1.42); and attributed greater warmth to people with an ID (M = 
3.21, SD = .66) compared to criminal offenders (M = 1.52, SD = .55).  
MANOVA 2: Participants beliefs about the human status (mind 
perception) of people with an ID compared to criminal offenders. MANOVA 2 
included the two subscales of the mind perception measure (i.e., experience and 
agency) as outcome variables; results indicated there was an effect of target social 
category on the combined outcome variables, F (2, 920) = 73.75, p < .001, Pillai’s 
Trace = .14, partial K2 = .14. ANOVA results showed that target social category 
influenced beliefs about Experience (p < .001) with a small effect size (partial K2 = 
.09), but not about Agency (p = .95); participants attributed greater experience to 
people with an ID (M = 4.23, SD = .59) compared to offenders (M = 3.79, SD = .73).  
MANOVA 3: Participants beliefs about the human status 
(dehumanisation) of people with an ID compared to criminal offenders. 
MANOVA 3 included the two subscales of the brief two-dimensional measure of 
dehumanisation (i.e., human uniqueness and human nature) as outcome variables; 
results indicated there was an effect of target social category on the combined 
outcome variables, F (2, 907) = 220.77, p < .001, Pillai’s Trace = .33, partial K2 = 
.33. ANOVA results showed that target social category influenced beliefs about 
Human Nature (p < .001), demonstrating a large effect size (partial K2 = .26), but not 
about Human Uniqueness (p = .47); participants attributed greater Human Nature to 
people with an ID (M = 7.22, SD = 1.70) compared to offenders (M = 4.85, SD = 
2.24).  
MANOVA 4: Beliefs about the moral status of people with an intellectual 
disability compared to criminal offenders. MANOVA 4 included the three moral 
status scales (i.e., moral responsibility, moral credit, and moral patiency). Results 
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indicated there was an effect of target social category on the combined outcome 
variables, F (3, 958) = 112.18, p < .001, Pillai’s Trace = .26, partial K2 = .26. 
ANOVA results showed that target social category significantly influenced all beliefs 
of moral status (all p < .001), with small to medium effect sizes (partial K2 = .02-.16). 
Participants attributed less moral responsibility to people with an ID (M = 3.15, SD = 
1.04) compared to offenders (M = 4.10, SD = 1.11), and attributed greater moral 
patiency to people with an ID (M = 4.10, SD = .79) compared to criminal offenders 
(M = 3.51, SD = .99), as well as greater moral credit to people with an ID (M = 4.34, 
SD = .88) compared to criminal offenders (M = 4.05, SD = 1.03).  
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Table 7.5 
Bivariate Correlations between MANOVA Outcome Measures (Scales or Subscales) and Key Demographics 
   Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 
1. Moral responsibility 1     
2. Moral credit .14*** 1     
3. Moral patiency  -.04 .39*** 1     
4. Competence  .09** .00 - .06 1     
5. Warmth -.31*** .14*** .27** .04 1     
6. Status .10** -.06 -.11** .27*** -.15*** 1     
7. Competitiveness .19*** -.20*** -.41** .12*** -.24*** .26*** 1    
8. Experience -.08* .19*** .32** -.09** .28*** -.13*** -.34*** 1    
9. Agency .05 .12** .23** .10** .05 .06 -.29*** .55*** 1    
10. Human Uniqueness .02 .12*** .23** .16*** .09** .10** -.25*** .31*** .53*** 1    
11. Human Nature -.21*** .16*** .33** -.10** .49*** -.11*** -.37*** .49*** .44*** .49*** 1    
12. Social category^ .40*** -.15*** -.31*** .25*** -.81*** .23*** .31*** -.31*** -.00 -.03 -.51*** 1    
13. Gender^ -.04 .18*** .14*** .02 -.04 .03 -.21*** .09** .05 .10** .08* .02 1   
14. Age -.09** .18*** .18*** .07* .01 -.06 -.09** -.14*** -.12*** -.04 -.02 -.02 .15*** 1  
15. Social Minority^ .00 .01 .08* .00 -.04 .06 -.07 .04 .08* .03 -.02 .01 -.02 -.06 1 
  N 919 923 921 915 916 924 924 915 915 911 912 995 905 906 924 
Note. All correlations are Pearson correlations except for those including dichotomous variables marked ^ which use Point-Biserial correlations. Target = Target 
social category, 0 = people with an ID, 1 = criminal offenders. Social minority, 0 = Does not identify with a social minority, 1 = identifies with at least one social 
minority. Gender, 0 = male, 1 = female. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Table 7.6 
One-way MANOVA and ANOVA Results for Stigmatising Beliefs about People with 
an Intellectual Disability Compared to Criminal Offenders 
              
ηp2   ANOVA by Outcome Variable F df SS MS p 
MANOVA 1: Beliefs about Social Status 691.34 4.00 - - <.001 0.75^ 
Error  934      
 Competence 62.23 1 29.63 29.63 <.001* 0.06 
 Error 937 446.11 0.48 
 Warmth 1828.65 1 677.21 677.21 <.001* 0.66 
 Error 937 347.00 0.37 
 Status 54.81 1 72.95 72.95 <.001* 0.06 
 Error 937 1247.22 1.33 
 Competitiveness 98.40 1 244.29 244.29 <.001* 0.10 
 Error 937 2326.35 2.48    
MANOVA 2: Beliefs about Human Status 
(mind perception) 73.75 2 - - <.001 0.14^ 
Error  920      
 Experience 98.71 1 43.32 43.32 <.001* 0.10 
 Error 921 404.22 0.43 
 Agency 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 
 Error 921 465.63 0.51 
   
MANOVA 3: Beliefs about Human Status 
(dehumanisation) 220.77 2 - - <.001 0.33^ 
Error  907   
   
 Human Uniqueness 0.51 1 1.84 1.84 0.47 0.00 
 Error 908 3252.34 3.58 
 Human Nature 321.09 1 1271.64 1271.64 <.001* 0.26 
  Error    908 3596.10 3.96     
         
MANOVA 4: Beliefs about Moral Status  112.18 3 - - <.001 0.26^
Error    958     
         
 Moral Responsibility  187.77 1 217.47 217.47 <.001* 0.16 
 Error   960 1112 1.16   
 Moral Credit  22.39 1 20.73 20.73 <.001* 0.02 
 Error   960 889 0.93   
 Moral Patiency  102.67 1 82.19 82.19 <.001* 0.10 
 Error   962 768.53 0.80   
Note.  *significant according to Bonferroni correction, where ANOVAs for: MANOVA 1 used D = 
.013; MANOVA 2 used D = .025; MANOVA 3 used D = .025; and MANOVA 4 used D = .016. ^Also 
indicates Pillai’s Trace value. ηp2 = partial eta squared. 
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Discussion 
 The aim of Study 3 was to assess and compare Australians’ potentially 
stigmatising beliefs relevant to the social status, ‘human’ status, and moral status of 
people with an ID and criminal offenders as distinct social categories.  
Comparative Stereotype Content Beliefs 
 Comparative beliefs about the social status of people with an ID and criminal 
offenders were examined using Fiske and colleagues’ (Cuddy, Glick, & Fiske, 2007; 
Fiske et al., 2002) stereotype content model, assessing attributions of warmth and 
competence, as well as social status and social competitiveness. According to Fiske 
and colleagues, these constructs capture the evaluations we make of potentially 
threatening or helpful social groups and individuals, and have a heuristic function 
that leads us to either attribute ingroup or outgroup status to others, in addition to 
helpful or harmful social behaviours.  
 Based on Fiske and colleague’s stereotype content model and its dimensional 
categorisations (Fiske et al., 2002), it was hypothesised that on average, people with 
an ID would be attributed non-competiveness and low status, and hence high warmth 
and low competence (H1), while criminal offenders would be attributed 
competitiveness and low status, and hence low warmth and low competence (H2). It 
was also hypothesised that participants would attribute greater competence (H3), 
social status (H4), and competitiveness (H5) to criminal offenders, and would 
attribute greater warmth to people with an ID (H5). All hypotheses were supported.  
 Mean scores for people with an ID and criminal offenders show that both 
social categories were rated as having objectively low status and low competence. 
While offenders were rated as moderately competitive and hence having low 
warmth, people with an ID were rated as being non-competitive and moderately 
warm. These results are generally consistent with Fiske and colleague’s dimensional 
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categorisation using the stereotype content model, confirming that people with an ID 
are categorised with other vulnerable social outgroups, and likely subject to 
paternalistic prejudice (Fiske et al., 2002). These results also suggest that criminal 
offenders are categorised in a similar way to other ‘social outcasts’, such as welfare 
recipients, the homeless, and immigrants (Fiske, 2015), and are likely subject to 
contemptuous prejudice (Fiske et al., 2002).  
  Our results are also generally consistent with findings by Sadler, Meagor, 
and Kaye (2012), who employed the stereotype content model and a small United 
States sample to examine public stigma towards ‘people with mental illness’ relative 
to other social categories, and towards specific subtypes of this social category. They 
reasoned that disorders known for their perceived unpredictability and dangerousness 
(schizophrenia, drug addiction) and ‘at risk’ groups likely to have a mental illness 
(homeless people, violent criminals) would be considered less warm than other 
subgroups; however, if an illness was not associated with a threat to personal safety 
(mood disorder, ID), warmth would be perceived as higher. They found that 
participants rated people with an ID (belonging to the mental illness social 
subcategory ‘neurocognitive deficit’) as being high in warmth and low in 
competence, while violent criminal offenders (belonging to the mental illness social 
subcategory ‘antisocial’) were rated as low in warmth and moderate in competence. 
The current study found simlar results to Sadler et al. (2012) in that Australians rated 
criminal offenders as having low warmth, and people with an ID as having low 
competence; but our results differed in that Australians rated criminal offenders as 
having low (not moderate) competence, and only moderate (not high) warmth.  
Interestingly, the current sample’s explicit rating of people with an ID as 
having only moderate and not high warmth reflects the implicit ratings of Rohmer 
and Louvet (2012) French university sample. Rohmer and Louvet found that people 
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attributed lower warmth to people with a disability when they were implicitly, 
compared to explicitly, assessed. They reasoned that people might feel compelled to 
attribute high warmth to people with a disability (a positive quality) due to socially 
desirable responding when explicitly assessed, but that attributions of warmth would 
be lower when implicitly assessed and response pressures were removed. Overall, 
ratings of competence were lower for people with a disability compared to those 
without a disability, but this rating was lowest when assessed implicitly versus 
explicitly. Implications of Rohmer and Louvet’s findings for the current study may 
be that Australian participants felt low social desirability pressure to respond in a 
non-prejudiced way to the study’s questions about people with an ID, despite being 
explicitly assessed; or alternatively, that Australians generally rate people with an ID 
lower than people with disability generally, or perhaps just rate people with 
disabilities in general lower than samples from other countries (e.g., France, United 
States). If the latter is true, then the use of implicit rather than explicit measures may 
have shown an even lower warmth attribution towards people with an ID, given 
Rohmer and Louvet’s findings.  
 Overall, participants attributed both objectively and relatively greater status, 
and hence competence, to criminal offenders compared to people with an ID. This 
suggests that participants perceived criminal offenders to have greater capacity and 
skill to implement their intentions, compared to people with an ID (Fiske, 2015). 
However, the intentions of criminal offenders were perceived to be competitive in 
addition to being antisocial and immoral, given the objectively and relatively low 
warmth attribution (Fiske, 2015). It’s important to consider the implications of this 
difference in warmth and competence attribution, given ‘criminal offenders’ and 
‘people with an ID’ are being treated as category subtypes within the current study, 
reflecting conflicting stigmatising beliefs towards ‘offenders with an ID’. According 
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to the stereotype content model, people with an ID are subject to paternalistic 
prejudice because they are viewed as warm (trustworthy, sociable, moral) but not 
able to implement this warmth in an effective way, leaving them deserving of pity 
and support. Conversely, criminal offenders are subject to contemptuous prejudice, 
where they are viewed as ‘cold’ (Fiske, 2015) and hence hostile and immoral, and 
are able to implement this antisociality, making them a potential threat. They are also 
seen as competitive (‘parasitic’ upon the economy and society), and have low status, 
so that they are not only threatening but ‘disgusting’ compared to one’s self and 
outgroup (Fiske, 2015). It is possible that when evaluating offenders with an ID, one 
or the other attributional combination and hence prejudice-type would win – most 
likely that attributed to criminal offenders. Given that stereotyping and stereotype 
content is a heuristic device, the application of a further heuristic such as the 
negativity bias could occur; here, the negative qualities (‘coldness’, relatively higher 
competence) attributed to criminals would be more salient and given greater value 
than those positive and non-threatening qualities attributed to people with an ID 
(warmth, relatively lower competence).  
 In their research examining predictive associations between stereotyped 
social perceptions, emotions, and behavioural responses (the behaviour from 
intergroup affect and stereotypes [BIAS] model), Cuddy et al., (2007) found that 
perceived warmth was positively associated with emotions of pity for the target 
social category (implying paternalistic prejudice), which was in turn positively 
associated with tendencies toward active facilitation of support for that category. 
However, perceived warmth was negatively associated with feelings of contempt for 
the social category, which was in turn positively associated with tendencies to 
actively harm that social category. Perceptions of low competence were negatively 
associated with both feelings of contempt and pity for target social categories, which 
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were in turn positively associated with tendencies toward passive harm of social 
categories. Cuddy et al. (2007) reasoned that pity (such as that attributed to the warm 
but non-competent people with an ID) is an ambivalent emotion comprising both 
compassion and sadness, and is based on viewing the target’s situation as 
uncontrollable. Pity elicits both active facilitation of support, such as assistance and 
advocacy (due to compassion) but also passive harm, such as inaction and neglect 
(by creating desire to avoid the perceived suffering of the target person or group).  
 Cuddy et al. (2007) further reasoned that contempt and associated disgust 
(such as that theoretically attributed to cold and non-competent, or moderately 
competent social outcasts, like criminal offenders) are directed at individuals and 
groups whose negative outcomes, or at least their onset, are perceived to have been 
controllable by the target individual or group. Contempt/disgust elicits passive harm 
by leading to ostracising and paternalistic behaviours, and elicits active harm by 
creating a motivation to forcefully expel the object of disgust from one’s interests 
and awareness. While these behavioural implications of the stereotype content model 
are not tested in the current study, they are consistent with common actions taken 
against people with an ID (rights advocacy as a form of active facilitation, neglect 
and legal paternalism as a form of passive harm), as well as against criminal 
offenders (social ostracism and exclusion as passive harm, vigilante attacks by 
community members and abuse during imprisonment by staff/other inmates as active 
harm). Supporting this interpretation, Hodson and Costello (2007) found that 
interpersonal disgust predicted negative attitudes toward low-status deviant social 
categories (e.g., poor people, drug addicts). 
 Research by Côté-Lussier (2016) extended the BIAS model of Cuddy et al. 
(2007) in her research assessing stereotype content and relationship to punitive 
attitudes toward criminal offenders. Using a United Kingdom university sample, 
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Côté-Lussier (2016) found that the emotion of ‘contempt’ experienced in response to 
low competence/low warmth social categories, was better conceptualised as ‘anger’ 
and ‘uneasiness’ when applied to criminal offenders specifically, as a low 
competence/low warmth social subcategory. Participants’ feelings of anger toward 
offenders as a social category was positively associated with both passive and active 
harm, while their feelings of uneasiness were associated with passive harm only. 
Emotions of anger and uneasiness were each independently predictive of 
increasingly severe punitive intentions. Côté-Lussier (2016) also hypothesised (but 
did not test) that mixed-stereotype social categories (e.g., high warmth/low 
competence groups such as people with an ID) would evoke ambivalent punitive 
intentions. Their findings highlight that if ‘people with an ID’ and ‘criminal 
offenders’ are two social subcategories that people apply stereotype content to when 
evaluating offenders with an ID’s deservingness of punishment for antisocial 
behaviours, they may be likely to err on the side of punitive (rather than non-
punitive) intention.    
Comparative Mind Perception and Dehumanisation Beliefs 
 Comparative beliefs about the ‘human’ status of people with an ID and 
criminal offenders were assessed using Gray et al. (2007) two-dimensional theory of 
mind perception, and Haslam and colleague’s (Haslam et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 
2008) two-dimensional theory of dehumanisation. Gray et al.’s (2007a) theory of 
mind perception proposes that people perceive others’ degree of mind along two 
dimensions: ‘experience’ (capacity for sentience, including physiological sensations 
and emotional experiences), and ‘agency’ (capacity for intention and actions, 
associated with higher order memory functions, reasoning, self-control, 
communication, and morality). Gray et al. (2007a) found that as perceived 
experience and agency increased (with adult humans, including one’s self, at the 
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zenith of both of these dimensions), the target being evaluated was attributed greater 
value. This value was demonstrated via greater liking for the target, wanting to save 
it from destruction, wanting to make it happy, and perceiving it as having a soul 
(Gray et al., 2007). However, they also found that a target’s perceived deservingness 
of punishment was strongly positively associated with agency and only weakly 
positively associated with experience, while desire to avoid harming the target was 
strongly positively associated with experience and weakly positively associated with 
agency (Gray et al., 2007). They concluded that perceived agency is associated with 
perceived moral agency, while perceived experience is associated with perceived 
moral patiency, including protection of rights and privileges (Gray et al., 2007).  
 Given Gray et al.’s (2007a) theory, it was hypothesised that participants 
would attribute greater agency to criminal offenders compared to people with an ID 
(H7), and would attribute greater experience to people with an ID compared to 
criminal offenders (H8). Hypothesis 8, but not hypothesis 7, was supported; 
participants attributed greater experience to people with an ID than to criminal 
offenders, but did not differ in their attributions of agency. On average, offenders 
were attributed moderate capacity for experience, while people with an ID were 
attributed high (but not absolute) capacity for experience; and both groups, on 
average, were only attributed moderate capacity for agency. Gray et al. (2007) found 
that people typically rate themselves and other adults ‘of sound mind’ as being high 
on both dimensions; the current study’s results suggest that, on average, participants 
perceived both criminal offenders and people with an ID to have lower agency than 
other adult humans, and perceived criminal offenders (but not people with an ID) to 
have lower experience than other adult humans. Interestingly, according to Gray et 
al.’s (2007a) modelling of their own findings on mind perception attributions, people 
with an ID would be positioned along the Experience-Agency dimensions between 
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animals (such as dogs and apes) and young children. Criminals would be positioned 
somewhere between an adult in a persistent vegetative state (a living being with 
ambiguous capacity for sentience and negligible agency) and one’s self, with no 
closer social category for reference.  It’s important to highlight that this positioning 
of people with an ID as similar to both ‘higher animals’ and children is consistent 
with philosophical and historical stereotypes of people with an ID (Kittay, 2008; 
Swango-Wilson, 2008), and reflects the absence of understanding that people with an 
ID can possess mature emotional and cognitive intra- and interpersonal capacities, 
depending on the extent of their disability.  
 The finding that people with an ID were perceived to have higher experience 
is consistent with research by Gray and Wegner (2009) who found that compared to 
‘a fully able adult’, people with an ID were rated significantly lower on experience. 
However, Gray and Wegner (2009) also found that people with an ID were rated 
significantly lower that ‘a fully able adult’ on their agency, which our study did not 
find.  Our finding that, like people with an ID, criminal offenders were perceived to 
have low agency is also consistent with work by (Khamitov, Rotman, & Piazza, 
2016), who found that when a target was perceived to be criminally ‘harmful’ (i.e., a 
violent thief), they were attributed lower cognitive agency than both neutral and 
benevolent targets. This was negatively associated with their perceived moral 
patiency (e.g., protection of their interests). Furthermore, Khamitov et al. (2016) 
found that the ‘rationality’ of the criminal influenced attributions of their cognitive 
agency, and hence their moral patiency; when the criminal’s behaviour was deemed 
low in rationality (i.e., crime was committed because it felt ‘fun’) rather than high in 
rationality (i.e., crime was committed due to destitution), the criminal target was 
attributed less cognitive agency, and in turn, less moral patiency.  
  170
 There are no past studies examining mind perceptions for people with an ID 
or disability generally, by which to interpret the current study’s findings. However, 
there are clear similarities between the qualities constituting stereotype content’s 
‘warmth’ and mind perception’s ‘experience’ (i.e., emotionality), and of stereotype 
content’s ‘competence’ and mind perception’s ‘agency’ (i.e., rationality, effective 
action); the main difference is that experience and agency as perceived as 
intrapersonal capacities in another individual or group, whereas warmth and 
competence are perceived as interpersonal capacities between the self and another 
individual or group. As such, participants’ high attribution of experience to people 
with an ID is generally consistent with their higher attributions of warmth, while low 
attributions of agency to people with an ID is consistent with their low attributions of 
competence.  While there are similarities between these constructs, they are not 
exactly the same; experience is neutrally-valenced, while warmth (or it’s opposite, 
‘coldness’) has positive/negative valenced interpersonal connotations. This may 
explain why in the current study, criminal offenders were rated low in warmth but 
moderate in experience, and similarly why people with an ID were rated moderate in 
warmth but high in experience; the stereotype content constructs included an 
affective evaluative component, whereas the mind perception constricts did not. It’s 
also important to note that while past research in mind perception theory has not 
accounted for perceptions of people with disability generally, or ID specifically, 
respect for the agency (autonomy, choice) of people with an ID is a long-standing 
goal within advocacy and practice (Antaki, Finlay, & Walton, 2009; Tilley, 
Walmsley, Earle, & Atkinson, 2012).  
 Haslam and colleagues’ theory of dehumanisation proposes that there are two 
dimensions according to which we attribute ‘humanness’ to other individuals and 
groups, called Human Uniqueness and Human Nature (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & 
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Bastian, 2005; Haslam et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2008). Human Uniqueness 
distinguishes humans from other animals, while Human Nature attributes are those 
which are essentially or typically ‘human’, being viewed as natural, innate, and 
affective, distinguishing humans from objects and machines. It was hypothesised that 
participants would attribute greater Human Uniqueness to criminal offenders 
compared to people with an ID (H9), and would attribute greater Human Nature to 
people with an ID compared to offenders (H10); hypothesis 10, but not hypothesis 9, 
was supported. Both people with an ID and criminal offenders were both seen as 
having less than average Human Uniqueness qualities; and while people with an ID 
were attributed above average Human Nature qualities, criminal offenders were 
attributed below average Human Nature qualities.  
Our results suggest that both people with an ID and criminal offenders 
experienced subtle dehumanisation by participants on the dimension of Human 
Uniqueness. Human Uniqueness is characterised by attributes such as civility, 
refinement, moral sensibility (and related forms of cultural learning), as well as 
higher cognition and developmental maturity. When people are perceived to lack 
these attributes, they are viewed as uncultured, coarse, lacking in self-control, 
unintelligent or irrational, and childlike, immature, or backward. Their behaviour 
should be seen as less cognitively mediated that the behaviour of others, and 
consequently more driven by motives, wants, appetites, and instincts (in short, more 
animalistic; Haslam et al., 2008). While people with an ID were perceived to have 
higher than average subjectively sentient and emotional experiences (such as 
warmth, openness, and depth), criminal offenders were further subtly dehumanised 
on the Human Nature dimension. Human Nature is characterised by emotionality, 
warmth, openness, agency (desire and vitality), and depth; when people or groups are 
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perceived to lack these attributes, they would instead be seen as inert, cold, rigid, 
passive, and superficial –mechanised rather than human (Haslam et al., 2008).  
To date, this is the first known study to assess mechanistic dehumanisation 
(via human nature attributions) for people with an ID, and only the second for 
criminal offenders; the limited past research on dehumanisation of these groups has 
generally focused on animalistic dehumanisation (via human uniqueness 
attributions). Capozza, Di Bernardo, Falvo, Vianello, and Calò (2016) found that 
their Italian community sample attributed more non-uniquely human qualities 
(reminiscent of animal traits) than uniquely human qualities to people with an ID as a 
target social category. People with an ID were attributed more impulsiveness and 
instinct than reasoning and morality. They were also attributed more primary (e.g., 
pain, pleasure) than secondary (e.g., hope, remorse) emotions, although these 
attributed emotions were significantly more positive than negative. Overall, these 
attributions did not differ based on the extent of the person with an ID’s impairment 
Capozza et al. (2016). Our results support this work by Capozza et al. (2016). 
In one of the few studies to measure subtle dehumanisation of criminal 
offenders, Zhang, Chan, Teng, and Zhang (2015) examined mechanistic 
dehumanisation of a thief social target by a Chinese university sample. They found 
that priming low (versus high) interpersonal security predicted increased mechanistic 
dehumanisation, which in turn predicted increased preference for harsh sentencing. 
The current study’s results showed that, objectively, Australians also mechanistically 
dehumanised criminal offenders to an extent; however, we would expect the implied 
‘threat’ to interpersonal security to have been higher between groups for participants 
in our criminal offender’s condition compared to the people with an ID condition, 
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leading to a significantly stronger mechanistic dehumanisation of offenders (which 
did not eventuate).  
A United Kingdom sample was used to assess the relationship between 
animalistic dehumanisation with attitudes towards the sentencing and punishment of 
sex offenders, and found this dehumanisation was strongly negatively associated 
with attitude towards rehabilitation, and moderately positively correlated with 
attitude towards sentencing (Viki, Fullerton, Raggett, Tait, & Wiltshire, 2012). 
Labelling a sex offender specifically as a ‘child molester’ rather than generic ‘rapist’ 
strengthened the positive association between dehumanisation and intention for 
social exclusion of the offender, and there was a strong positive association between 
dehumanisation and violent intentions toward sex offenders labelled as ‘pedophiles’ 
(Viki et al., 2012). Another rare study assessing animalistic dehumanisation of 
offenders found that of three prison staff groups (execution staff, support staff to 
deathrow inmate and family members, and staff not involved in the execution 
process), the execution team demonstrated the strongest dehumanisation and denial 
of personal responsibility regarding deathrow inmates, while the support staff 
demonstrated the least dehumanisation (Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005).  
Osofsky et al.’s (2005) and Viki et al.’s (2012) results are consistent with our own, 
and serve as warnings that subtle dehumanisation of criminal offenders may have 
serious consequences when the balance of power to sentence and punish is placed in 
the hands of those who dehumanise them.   
Haslam et al. (2008) argues that the types of qualities attributed to those with 
human uniqueness and human nature mirror those of Gray et al. (2007) mind 
perception dimensions of agency and experience, respectively, and that mind 
perception plays a role in dehumanisation via ‘dementalisation’ along these two 
  174
mind perception dimensions (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). This is reflected by the 
objectively low ratings both of our social categories received for human uniqueness 
and agency, and the above average ratings people with an ID, but not criminal 
offenders, received for human nature and experience in the current study. Haslam 
and Loughnan (2014) also argue that Fiske and colleagues’ stereotype content model 
can be used to explain dehumanisation. When a social category is attributed high 
competence and warmth, it is admired and attributed full and positive human nature 
and uniqueness; when attributions are mixed (e.g., high warmth and low 
competence), a degree of dehumanisation may occur (e.g., the denial of human 
uniqueness and hence cultural and communicative sophistication to people with an 
ID, as suggested in the current study). Groups stereotyped as low in both warmth and 
competence, such as criminal offenders in the current study, may be subject to 
dehumanisation by being animalised (impulsive, unintelligent, irrational) and 
mechanised (cold and unempathetic). Overall, our study results support this 
integrated understanding of the theories of stereotype content, mind perception, and 
dehumanisation, and provides a solid foundation by which to argue that both people 
with an ID and criminal offenders experience stigmatising beliefs, but that the nature 
of these stigmatising beliefs and their implications for moral status attributions and 
associated behaviours towards them, differ.  
Comparative Moral Status Beliefs 
Comparative beliefs about the moral status of people with an ID and criminal 
offenders were assessed via participant attributions regarding their target social 
category’s moral responsibility, moral credit, and moral patiency. Hypotheses were 
formulated with reference to the theory of moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009; 
Gray et al., 2012), which is an extension of Gray and colleagues’ theory of mind 
perception (Gray et al., 2007) and to some extent compliments both Haslam and 
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colleagues’ dehumanisation account, and Fiske and colleagues stereotype content 
account, of how we morally evaluate others. Gray et al. (2012) argue that mind 
perception (specifically perceived experience and agency) is fundamental to the 
moral status we ascribe to others, and hence the moral judgements we make about 
them. We ascribe mental agency and experience to others based on their perceived 
capacity for intention/planning, and sensation/emotion, respectively. If they are 
perceived to have the capacity for intention/planning, then they are perceived to be a 
‘moral agent’ with the capacity for moral responsibilities and hence for blame. If 
they are perceived to have the capacity for sensation/emotion, then they are 
perceived to be a ‘moral patient’ (victim) with the capacity for pain and hence moral 
rights (Gray et al., 2012). In short, attributions of mind (degrees of mental experience 
and agency) leads to dyadic moral typecasting (as either moral agents or patients). 
This typecasting then has implications for how we evaluate the moral responsibilities 
and rights of target individuals and groups, as well as deservingness of punishment 
for immoral actions (or inactions), praise for moral actions, and protection against 
immoral actions (or inactions; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray et al., 2012). 
We initially reasoned that if mental agency was found to be high and mental 
experience low for criminal offenders, while mental agency was found to be low and 
mental experience high for people with an ID (relevant to hypotheses 7 and 8), then 
this would suggest criminals would be typecast as ‘moral agents’ while people with 
an ID would be typecast as ‘moral patients’ by participants. According to Gray and 
Wegner (2009), relative moral agents are attributed both greater moral responsibility 
for doing harm (as an expression of negative moral agency) and greater moral credit 
for doing good (as an expression of positive moral agency) than relative moral 
patients; conversely, relative moral patients are attributed greater moral patiency 
when victimised (i.e., affected by injustice, deserving of protection) than moral 
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agents. It was therefore hypothesised that participants would attribute greater moral 
responsibility for immoral actions (H11), as well as greater moral credit for moral 
actions (H12), to criminal offenders than people with an ID. It was further 
hypothesised that participants would attribute greater moral patiency (victimhood, 
deservingness of protection) when subjected to an immoral action (H13) to people 
with an ID compared to criminal offenders. Hypotheses 11 and 13 were supported, 
but not hypothesis 12.  People with an ID were perceived to be only moderately 
responsible for their immoral acts, while criminal offenders were perceived to be 
highly, and significantly more, responsible for the same immoral acts. Interestingly, 
both people with an ID and criminal offenders were perceived to strongly deserve 
moral praise (credit) for their moral actions, but this was significantly stronger for 
people with an ID than criminal offenders. Similarly, people with an ID were 
attributed strong moral patiency when subject to immoral actions, while criminal 
offenders were attributed only moderate moral patiency for the same actions.  
This overall pattern of moral status attributions for both people with an ID 
and criminal offenders supports Gray and colleagues’ moral typecasting theory to an 
extent (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray et al., 2012). Having been attributed low 
agency, people with an ID were perceived as having reduced moral responsibility for 
their immoral actions; conversely, criminal offenders (attributed moderate agency) 
were perceived to have increased moral responsibility for their behaviour. Our results 
support those of Gray and Wegner (2009), who found that ‘normal adults’ were 
attributed significantly higher moral responsibility than people with an ID. 
Attribution of higher agency is related to capacity for consequential reasoning – that 
is, intention along with the capacity to understand the degree of suffering that will be 
inflicted by the intended action (Gray et al., 2012). Given the criminal offender’s 
higher agency, their immoral actions are perceived as intentionally harmful, whereas 
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the person with an ID’s immoral actions are perceived as impulsive and absent of 
consequential understanding. In this sense, criminal offenders were likely perceived 
as being more blame-worthy than people with an ID (Gray et al., 2012).  
It is interesting that participant ratings for the social groups’ mental agency 
did not significantly differ, while the attribution of moral agency (here, moral 
responsibility) did. This suggests that something beyond degree of mental agency 
may have influenced participants’ moral responsibility attributions. Miller and 
Borgida (2016) found that when an immoral actor was presented as having 
previously criminally offended, they were attributed both higher agency and greater 
deservingness of punishment (indicative of perceived moral blame and hence 
responsibility) than a similarly immoral actor without a history of offending. Miller 
and Borgida’s (2016) results suggest that although mental agency attributions did not 
significantly differ between people with an ID and criminal offenders, just the label 
‘criminal’ may have been sufficient to prime beliefs about this group’s particularly 
bad character and harmful intent, and hence result in greater attributions of moral 
responsibility compared to the less threateningly labelled group, ‘people with an ID’. 
This interpretation is supported by Khamitov et al.’s (2016) findings. ‘Criminal 
offender’, as a social category label, carries connotations of having a ‘bad moral 
character’ or being a ‘villain’, which past research has shown leads to lower mental 
agency attributions in comparison to neutral and benevolent social category labels 
(Khamitov et al., 2016). Using pathway analysis, they found the perceived 
harmfulness of a moral agent was negatively associated with perceived mental 
agency, which was in turn positively associated with perceived moral patiency.  
Importantly, Gray and Wegner (2009) found that when a target was rated 
relatively higher on moral agency (compared to a control condition), they were 
attributed significantly lower moral patiency; but if the target was rated relatively 
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higher on mental agency (compared to a control condition), their attributed moral 
patiency did not significantly differ from the control target. Gray and Wegner (2009) 
concluded that while perceived mental agency may be associated with perceived 
moral agency, this connection is not straight-forward and that dyadic typecasting is 
more relevant to the moral domain than mere mind attribution. This goes some way 
to explaining why in our own study, people with an ID and criminal offenders had 
similar levels of mental agency attributed to them but different levels of moral 
agency (responsibility and credit). 
The objectively and relatively lower moral responsibility score for people 
with an ID should also be considered when explaining differences in moral agency 
attributions. Gray and Wegner (2009) found that perceived moral patiency may be 
causally linked to attributed moral agency. When their participants were primed to 
perceive targets with relatively higher versus lower degrees of moral patiency, and 
were then told their target had committed a crime (car theft), the thief with lower 
antecedent moral patiency was judged to have higher moral agency after having 
committed the crime. Given the possible effect of the negative ‘criminal offender’ 
versus less threatening ‘person with an ID’ social category labels on our participants, 
it is possible that even prior to reading the immoral behaviour stimuli, participants 
had already typecast the degree of moral patiency each category deserved, and then 
anchored their attributed moral responsibility accordingly after reading the immoral 
behaviour stimuli. 
 Our finding that people with an ID were attributed high moral patiency while 
criminal offenders were attributed only moderate moral patiency, and that this 
difference was significant, is supported byGray and Wegner (2009). They found that 
attributions of moral patiency were significantly higher for people with an ID than 
for ‘normal adults’, regardless of whether the experience underlying this patiency 
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was positively or negatively valenced (i.e., perceived pleasure or pain). Our results 
are also consistent with Miller and Borgida (2016). Their study found that when a 
target was described as having previously committed a crime (compared to a control 
target who had not previously committed a crime), and then was falsely accused of 
committing a robbery, they were attributed significantly less moral patiency than the 
control target. However, Miller and Borgida’s (2016) measure of moral patiency was 
more reflective of mental patiency (i.e., feelings of sadness associated with their 
false accusation) than moral patiency (i.e., attribution of victimhood, deservingness 
of protection of moral rights). 
Our finding that both criminal offenders and people with an ID were 
attributed high moral credit, but that this was significantly higher for people with an 
ID, contradicts findings by (Gray & Wegner, 2009). They found that attribution of 
moral credit (positively-valenced moral agency) was significantly higher for ‘normal 
adults’ than for people with an ID, just as they’d found that moral responsibility 
(negatively-valenced moral responsibility) was significantly higher for ‘normal 
adults’ than for people with an ID. Our results were generally consistent with 
Khamitov et al. (2016), however, who showed that harmful agents (specifically those 
who commit crime) were denied more mental agency than neutral or benevolent 
moral agents, which in turn was associated with reduced moral agency (both positive 
and negative).  
The phenomena of moral responsibility (negatively-valenced moral agency) 
has been explored quite thoroughly in the moral typecasting literature, with less 
attention paid to moral credit or praise (positively-valenced moral agency). Our 
results highlight that the attribution of moral credit or praise is an ambiguous 
phenomenon requiring further exploration. While the explanation that both positive 
and negative moral agency (and hence both blame and praise) should be high for 
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moral agents, both our results and Khamitov et al.’s (2016) highlight that there are 
nuances to Gray et al.’s (2012) moral typecasting approach that are not yet clearly 
explained. 
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research for Study 3 
In addition to the high response and completion rate for this study, a key 
strength of Study 3 specifically was the application of four well-developed, 
contemporary social psychology theories relevant to stigmatising beliefs (stereotype 
content, mind perception, dehumanisation, and moral typecasting) to explore how 
Australian community members evaluate the comparative social, human, and moral 
status of people with an ID and criminal offenders. This is the first study to apply 
these complimentary theories to Australian criminal justice research, and one of few 
internationally to do this.  
A key limitation for Study 3 was the researcher’s error in judgement not 
including a third social category condition: that of offenders with an ID, specifically. 
Inclusion of this third condition would have allowed a concrete comparison point for 
participant beliefs about the social, human, and moral status of offenders and people 
with an ID. Had this third condition been included, a clearer picture of how these 
stigmatising beliefs relate to one another and the complex social category being 
studies would have been likely. Future research should replicate this study with the 
inclusion of the third social category condition (offenders with an ID), to reproduce 
current findings and identify how combining these two social categories affects 
participant scores for the constructs specified.  
Conclusion 
Overall, Australians believed people with an ID were objectively low in 
competence and moderate in warmth. This means they were perceived to be 
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unskilled, unintelligent, and incapable, but also good natured, friendly, well-
intentioned, and trustworthy. Conversely, criminal offenders were believed to be low 
in competence but also low in warmth, so that in addition to being unskilled, 
unintelligent, and incapable, they were ill-intentioned and untrustworthy. According 
to stereotype theory, this means people with an ID likely elicited feelings of 
sympathy/pity and would be attributed patronising prejudice associated with passive 
harm but active helping behaviours; criminal offenders likely elicited feelings of 
contempt/disgust and would be attributed contemptuous prejudice, associated with 
both passive and active harm behaviours. Overall, people with an ID were attributed 
significantly higher warmth, while criminals were attributed significantly higher 
competence. These results were consistent with the theory of stereotype content and 
past research in this area. 
Australians believed that people with an ID had high mental experience 
(sentient experience of primary emotions like pain and pleasure, and secondary 
emotions like desire and embarrassment) and moderate mental agency (capacity for 
planning, self-control, and morality), while criminals had moderate mental 
experience and agency. Overall, people with an ID were attributed significantly 
higher experience than criminals, but attributions of agency did not differ between 
these social categories. ‘Normal’ adults (including one’s self) are typically attributed 
high experience and agency, indicating full mind; our results show that apart from 
experience attributions to people with an ID, both people with an ID and criminals 
were rated below ‘normal’ adults. Our results were generally consistent with the 
theory of mind perception, but attribution of agency was expected to be significantly 
higher for criminals than for people with an ID.  
Australians also believed that people with an ID were high in ‘human nature’, 
with strong capacity for positive, intrinsically ‘human’ traits such as emotional 
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connectedness and warmth to others, while criminals were rated to have only 
moderate human nature (making them more cold, less emotionally responsive). Both 
people with an ID and criminals were believed to have only moderate human 
uniqueness (distinction from other animals via qualities of cultural refinement and 
rationality). Overall, people with an ID were significantly higher than criminals on 
human nature, but these groups did not differ on their perceived human uniqueness. 
Our results were generally consistent with dehumanisation theory, although we did 
expect that human uniqueness would be perceived as higher for criminals than for 
people with an ID.  
Finally, moral status attributions showed that, overall, people with an ID were 
attributed greater moral patiency (deservingness of protection) than criminals when 
victimised by the same immoral acts, while criminals were afforded greater moral 
responsibility (negatively-valenced moral agency) than people with an ID when 
committing the same immoral acts. This is consistent with moral typecasting theory, 
which is an extension of mind perception theory. However, there was no significant 
difference between attributions of moral credit for moral acts (deservingness of 
praise) for the two groups. This contradicts moral typecasting theory and some past 
research relevant to this, which suggests moral agents should be attributed both 
higher responsibility and credit for moral acts, regardless of their valency. However, 
research on moral credit is limited compared to that on moral responsibility and 
patiency, so our results are both novel and highlight issues for further investigation.  
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 CHAPTER EIGHT: STUDY 4 – A COMPARISON OF AUSTRALIANS’ BELIEFS 
ABOUT THE CAUSES OF CRIMINAL OFFENDING FOR PEOPLE WITH AND 
WITHOUT AN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
 
This chapter details Study 4, which addresses research question 4 (described 
in Chapter 3) concerned with exploring Australians’ causal beliefs about people with 
an ID, about criminal offenders with and without an ID, and how these causal beliefs 
compare. This chapter reports the Exploratory Aims, Data Treatment and Analysis 
Approach, Results, and Discussion for Study 4. 
Aim and Hypotheses 
The aim of Study 4 was to explore Australians’ causal beliefs about people 
with an ID, and about criminal offenders with and without an ID, and to critically 
compare and contrast these causal beliefs. Given the exploratory aim of Study 4, 
specific hypotheses were not formulated.  
Data Treatment and Analysis Approach 
Sample Integrity 
 Prior to data coding and analyses, quantitative between-group comparisons 
were conducted to ensure the Qualtrics program’s random allocation of participants 
to each of the two target social category conditions (Study 3), and then to each of the 
three vignette conditions (Study 4), resulted in the homogenous distribution of 
participants by key demographics. A series of one-way ANOVAs and Pearson chi-
square tests of independence found that participants did not differ between 
conditions at either stage of random allocation by age, gender, level of education, 
employment status, or whether they had ever personally known a person with an ID 
(all p >.05).  
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Data Integrity 
Braun and Clarke (2013) note that qualitative survey data can present a 
unique challenge to pattern-based analysis approaches such as inductive thematic 
analysis. ‘Rich’ data is typically derived using methods such as semi-structured 
interviewing, focus groups, and ethnographic observation; such methods provide 
opportunities for the researcher to probe, explore, and revisit participant responses 
and behaviours to more clearly ascertain their meaning and hence reduce the 
ambiguity or potential misrepresentations sometimes characterising participants’ 
initial responses to open-ended questions.  
Unlike these methods yielding rich data, the current study’s design and 
method of data collection yielded a large number of participant responses (relative to 
other qualitative methods) but of a ‘thinner’ quality (Braun & Clarke, 2013) than 
what could have been collected using conversational methods. While some responses 
were detailed and nuanced, other responses were brief and vague. This limitation of 
the data was carefully taken into consideration when engaging in data coding, 
analysis, and write-up by the researchers; specifically, the researchers were careful to 
consider both implicit and explicit content in the data, and to avoid imposing 
meaning on participant responses rendered ambiguous by incomplete sentence 
structure or not contextualised by the participant’s further written explanation.  
Data Saturation 
Data saturation is an intuitive qualitative method similar to the idea of 
quantitative ‘statistical power’; data saturation indicates that sufficient qualitative 
data has been collected and coded so that there is enough information to replicate the 
study, additional cases do not yield new information, and further coding is no longer 
feasible (Fusch & Ness, 2015).  Vignette 1 had N = 211 cases, Vignette 2 had N = 
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215 cases, and Vignette 3 had N = 427 cases. Data saturation was assessed by first 
randomly sampling and coding 50% of each Vignette set. Additional cases were 
coded as necessary until no new information could be found in participant responses. 
For Vignette 1, data saturation was reached by 120 (56.9%) cases, and by 110 
(51.1%) cases for Vignette 2. Despite saturation being reached for Vignette 1 and 2, 
it was decided to code all remaining cases for these sets as all data was already 
collected. Vignette 3 had double the cases of Vignettes 1 and 2, so 50% (n = 214) of 
cases from Vignette 3 were randomly extracted and treated as the working dataset for 
initial coding and subsequent interpretation. Data saturation for Vignette 3 was 
reached by 110 (51.4%) of the working dataset cases. Similarly to Vignette 1 and 2, 
it was decided to code all remaining cases of the Vignette 3 working dataset since 
data was already collected. 
Inductive Thematic Analysis 
Braun and Clarke’s (2006, 2013) 15-step approach to conducting ‘good 
thematic analysis’ was followed. Cases were organised and coding was conducted 
using Microsoft Excel. A ‘complete coding’ approach was used (Braun & Clarke, 
2013), meaning that instead of merely extracting information from the data which 
supported pre-existing theory, a bottom-up, inductive approach was applied, ensuring 
all meanings implicit to the data were equally represented. After spending time 
reading and rereading participant responses to ensure familiarity with the data, cases 
were systematically assessed and their key messages coded. Cases varied in length 
from five to 500 words, and cases tended to describe at least two causal explanations 
for ID; as such, most cases treated words rather than sentences as coding units, 
meaning a single case might be coded multiple times.      
After revisiting the dataset several times over to ensure the data was 
thoroughly and accurately coded, themes and subthemes were identified by 
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comparing and contrasting coding labels and explanatory memos (Braun & Clarke, 
2013). Codes and cases were compiled into candidate themes and subthemes (Braun 
& Clarke, 2013). To clarify and refine these, a clear label and definition, as well as a 
description of thematic inclusion and exclusion coding criteria and example quotes, 
were created and the data was systematically coded a final time according to these 
refined thematic criteria. To ensure the trustworthiness of the data’s coding and 
inductive thematic analysis, a second, trained qualitative researcher (ND) selectively 
coded 50% of the subsample datasets using the final, refined coding framework 
(Braun & Clarke, 2013). Inter-coder reliability was determined using Cohen’s Kappa 
statistic. Inter-coder reliability was excellent for all vignettes: Vignette 1, Kappa = 
.85, p < .001, 95%CI [.82, .89], N = 1590; Vignette 2, Kappa = .95, p < .001, 95%CI 
[.94, .97], N = 1177); and Vignette 3 Kappa = .95, p < .001, 95%CI [.92, .97], N = 
1512. 
Final stages of analysis involved synthesising and writing up the results by 
first describing each theme, describing their relevant subthemes, providing key 
quotes as supporting evidence for this description, and then analysing the meaning of 
these subthemes.  
 
Results 
Participant Demographics 
 Participants (N = 853, 53.6% female) were aged 18-84 (M = 46.36, SD = 
18.77), with members of the general community from all Australian States and 
Territories represented to varying degrees. A variety of education and employment 
statuses were also represented. A complete description of participant demographics 
can be viewed in Table 8.1. Overall, 211 (24.7%) participants provided a response to 
Vignette 1, detailing their beliefs about the cause/s of ‘John’s’ mild ID, 215 (25.2%) 
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participants provided a response to Vignette 2, detailing their beliefs about the 
cause/s of ‘John’s criminal offending, who did not have an ID specified, and 427 
(50.1%) participants provided a response to Vignette 3 with half of these randomly 
selected for coding and analysis (n = 214, 25% of the total N), detailing their beliefs 
about the cause/s of ‘John’s’ criminal offending, who also had a mild ID specified. 
Thematic Analysis for Vignette 1: Causal Explanations for Intellectual 
Disability 
 Inductive thematic analysis formulated eight themes and 13 subthemes 
overall; refer to Table 8.2 for an overview of themes, their subthemes, and 
supporting examples. The number and proportion of participants describing each 
subtheme is also included in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.1 
Participant Demographics (N = 853) 
    N % 
Gender 
   
 
Female 457 53.6  
Male 375 44.0  
Other 20 2.3 
State/Territory 
  
 
New South Wales 290 34.0  
Australian Capital Territory 59 6.9  
Victoria 265 31.1  
South Australia 94 11.0  
Tasmania 38 4.5  
Western Australia 87 10.2 
Queensland 16 1.9 
Northern Territory 1 .1 
Not currently residing in Australia 3  .4 
Education Level 
Some secondary education 18 2.1 
Year 10  38 4.5 
Year 12  155 18.2 
TAFE Certificate/s 107 12.5 
TAFE Diploma/s 75 8.8 
Undergraduate degree 234 27.4 
Postgraduate degree 154 18.1 
Doctoral degree 25 2.9 
Other 47 5.5 
Employment status 
Full time paid employment 210 24.6 
Part time/casual paid employment 252 29.5 
Volunteer employment 96 11.3  
Previously employed in a paid or voluntary role 214 25.1  
Never employed in a paid or voluntary role 79 9.3 
Unknown 2 .2 
Identification with a social minority ^ 
Total 439 51.5 
Sexual/gender minority  190 22.3 
Religious minority 53 6.2 
Cultural minority 38 4.5 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 39 4.6 
Person with a disability 147 17.2 
Migrant 76 8.9 
Other 94 11.0 
Note. ^Participants could identify with more than one social minority. 
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Table 8.2 
Overview of Categories and Themes for Causal Beliefs about Intellectual Disability (n = 211) 
 Theme  Subtheme  Example n % 
1. Genetics     
  i. General genetics  A genetic chromosome disorder may have caused John to have a mild 
intellectual disability (case 87) 
121 57.3 
  ii. Specific disorder or 
syndrome  
Fragile X Syndrome (case 45) 46 21.8 
2. Physical trauma     
  i. Forceful impact John may have been involved in an accident where he received trauma to his 
head (case 39) 
 
112 53.1 
  ii. Anoxia John may have been deprived of oxygen in the birthing process and he might 
have sustained some brain damage… (case 54) 
 
43 20.4 
3. Illness      
  i. Infectious illness [The] result of a disease of some kind (eg., bacterial encephalitis) (case 68) 21 10.0 
  ii. Non-infectious illness Possibly some degree of input from the mother during pregnancy (such as 
malnutrition…) (case 81) 
 
15 7.1 
  iii. Unspecified illness He may have had a serious health event, at any time during his life… (case 
35) 
 
16 7.6 
4.  
 
Exposure to chemical toxins    
 
 
 
 i. Alcohol and/or other 
drug use 
...his mother’s bad choices when she was pregnant, such as alcoholism or 
other drug addiction... (case 34) 
41 19.4 
  ii. Environmental toxins  There’s a slight possibility it was caused by...environmental toxins of some 
kind (case 34) 
 
10 4.7 
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 Theme  Subtheme  Example n % 
5. Psychosocial deprivation    
  i. Social environment Much of it could depend on his upbringing, particularly in his education and 
interactions with other people as a child… (case 103)  
21 10.0 
  ii. Psychosocial 
neglect/abuse  
Very low stimulus environment (case 150) 15 7.1 
6. Social construction    
  i. Normative labelling  [S]ocietal labels and expectations of what is ‘normal’ (case 46) 
 
24 11.4 
  ii. Impropriety  I am in no way qualified to answer this question...Speculation can be worse 
than useless (case 76) 
6 2.8 
7. Metaphysical mystery I think John is just unlucky in that he has an intellectual disability, and lucky 
in that it is mild…Could be me, could be you, in this case it is John (case 36) 
7 3.3 
8. Unknown causes Usually there is no known cause for this (case 89) 7 3.3 
Note. ID = intellectual disability. Case number = Vignette 1 subsample case number. Participants could describe multiple causal beliefs, so  
percentage (%) does not sum to 100.  
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Theme 1: Genetics. This theme encompassed participant beliefs that genetic 
influences were likely to have caused John’s ID. Being intrinsic to the individual, 
genetic influences were presented as beyond the control of the individual with an ID, 
and emerged during embryonic or fetal development. Genetic influences were 
described either in the form of inherited or idiopathic abnormalities, or specific 
congenital disorders and/or syndromes attributed to genetic and/or chromosomal 
abnormalities. Two subthemes were identified within this theme: ‘General genetics’ 
and ‘Specific disorder or syndrome’.  
General genetics. Participants referred to John’s ID being caused by his 
genetics using a variety of terms. For example, some participants referred to his ID 
as an anomaly of his ‘genetics’, due to an ‘inherited’ problem, a genetic ‘mutation’, 
‘abnormality’, ‘defect’, or general ‘disorder’.  
Developmental learning difficulties are most 
commonly genetic and can be random mutations or 
inherited from family (case 127). 
I think usually it’s genetic…You’re just born with it 
due to random mutations in your genes (case 104).  
 
Some participants made implicit attributions to John’s genes as a cause of his 
ID, describing John as just having been ‘born with’ the disability, or describing the 
cause of the disability as a ‘congenital’ problem. These latter two terms were 
interpreted to mean the cause of the ID was not due to influences external to the 
fetus, including while in utero.  
Perhaps he was born with the disability (case 194). 
Congenital abnormality… (case 176).  
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Specific disorder or syndrome. Some participants described specific types of 
disorders or syndromes as causes of ID, and often attributed a genetic or 
chromosomal basis to these. The most frequently described disorders and syndromes 
were Autism Spectrum Disorder (usually referred to as ‘Autism’ or ‘Asperger’s’ by 
participants), Down Syndrome, and Fragile X Syndrome. 
I think John might have been born with Downs (sic) 
Syndrome (case 146). 
He could be on the (autism) spectrum which, I think, is 
caused by certain genes (case 5). 
Fragile X Syndrome…(case 45). 
 
 Participants described a number of specific disorders as likely causes of ID, 
including Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (referring to this as “ADHD” or 
“ADD”; e.g., case 98), “dyslexia” (e.g., case 38), “cerebral palsy” (e.g., case 63), and 
“Sensory Processing Disorder” (e.g., case 33). Apart from cerebral palsy (which may 
be comorbid with an ID), these disorders are not legitimate causes or correlates of 
ID, indicating participant misperceptions about what an ID is. These causal 
attributions may also represent subjective experiences of participants with 
individuals who have an ID and comorbid disorders.  
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder (FASD) was also sometimes described as a 
cause of ID by participants, often in association with but distinct from references to 
John’s mothers’ presumed use of alcohol during pregnancy, this latter explanation 
being coded as ‘Exposure to Toxic Chemicals’ (theme), ‘Alcohol and/or other drug 
use’ (subtheme).  
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[H]e had foetal [sic]alcohol syndrome and got brain 
damage prior to birth (case 48). 
Environmental factors like foetal [sic] alcohol 
syndrome… (case 53). 
Theme 2: Physical Trauma. This theme encompassed participant beliefs 
that physical injury, particularly to the head and brain, was a likely cause of John’s 
ID. Participants reported that physical trauma resulting in brain injury and hence 
permanently impaired neurological and cognitive functioning could occur at any time 
during John’s developmental trajectory (in utero to adulthood), seemingly 
confounding brain injuries acquired at a later stage of life with injuries acquired prior 
to formative developmental milestones. This theme contained two subthemes, 
‘Forceful Impact’ and ‘Anoxia’.  
Forceful impact. Many participants attributed John’s ID to a forceful impact 
on his head/brain at some stage of his life, from in utero to adulthood. Some 
participants specifically referred to this as an ‘acquired brain injury’ and used this 
term interchangeably with ‘ID’.  
 
He might have been in an accident and have an 
acquired brain injury which has impaired his cognitive 
ability.  This could have happened at any point in his 
life (case 121). 
 
Forceful impacts to the head/brain were generically described as occurring 
due to an ‘accident’, ‘injury’, or physical ‘trauma’. Some participants described 
specific scenarios where such events might occur, such as a car accident, or playing 
contact sports.  
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John may have been injured in [an] accident involving 
a car, motorbike or bicycle (case 35). 
[P]erhaps John is very sporting, perhaps he played 
body contact sport, or combat sport, such as Rugby 
League, or Boxing, where head injuries are far too 
common (case 34). 
 
Anoxia. Participants also reported that anoxia, experienced while in utero, 
during birth, or in later life, could cause ID.  
 
There is…a chance he may have received brain 
damage due to a …lack of oxygen at some point in his 
life (case 96). 
He could have nearly drowned (case 22). 
 
References to anoxia experienced during birth were sometimes framed 
euphemistically as birth ‘complications’, ‘issues’, or ‘problems’. 
John could have suffered brain damage from a 
complicated birth. Traumatic births can leave a 
newborn without oxygen to the brain for a period of 
time. Lack of oxygen can lead to mild intellectual 
disability (case 167). 
 
Theme 3: Illness. This theme encompassed a broad range of diseases and 
maladies participants believed to be possible causes of John’s ID. Illness was often 
presented as a cause of irreparable neurological damage, subsequently resulting in an 
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ID. Three subthemes contributed to this theme: ‘Infectious illness’, ‘Non-infectious 
illness’, and ‘Unspecified illness’. Most participants contributed to the first two 
subthemes. 
 Infectious illness. The most common infectious illnesses participants 
associated with brain damage leading to ID included viral and bacterial diseases 
(e.g., meningitis, meningococcal), acquired John may have acquired while in utero or 
at any time after birth and into adulthood.  
 
He [John] could have...had an illness like meningitis… 
(case 70). 
He [John] could have developed a debilitating disease 
or infection at some point of his life (meningococcal, 
etc.) (case 141). 
Some form of organic brain damage…[as] a result of 
a disease of some kind (e.g., bacterial encephalitis) 
(case 69). 
Non-infectious illness. Brain damage and resultant ID was also associated 
with a variety of non-infectious illnesses experienced either in utero or after birth and 
into adulthood, such as “malnutrition” (case 81), neurodegenerative diseases such as 
“Alzheimer’s” (case 176), “cancer” (tumours; case 56), seizures (e.g., due to 
epilepsy; case 144), “stroke” (case 169), and metabolic problems impacting 
flourishing or one’s functional status quo. Examples of non-infectious illnesses 
specified by participants follow:  
 
Possible brain injury from…stroke (case 169). 
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Brain degeneration due to Alzheimer’s… (case 176). 
If he is an epileptic he may have sustained 
neurological damage at some stage (case 144). 
 
Unspecified illness. Some participants referred to illness as a cause of ID 
using generic terminology and phrasing, such as “physical illness that caused an 
intellectual disability” (case 90), “brain damage due to sickness” (case 201), “ill 
health” (case 183), or “his [John’s] mother’s health” (case 43). However, most 
participants provided specific examples of infectious and/or non-infectious illnesses 
that could contribute to John’s ID, as described by prior themes.  
Theme 4: Exposure to Chemical Toxins. This theme encompassed 
participant beliefs that John’s ID could have been caused by repeated exposure to 
chemical toxins, either internally while in utero or via ingestion or externally via 
environmental contaminants. Subthemes for this theme were ‘Alcohol and/or other 
drug use’ and ‘Environmental toxins’. While some participants reported exposure to 
such toxins from childhood and into adulthood could cause ID, most participants 
reported this harm was likely to have been caused during John’s fetal development 
while in utero.  
 Alcohol and/or other drug use. Participants reported that in utero exposure to 
alcohol and/or other drugs, both illicit and prescribed, could impact John’s fetal 
development and lead to an ID.  
Maybe his mother smoked, took drugs, or lived an 
unhealthy life while she was pregnant (case 143). 
Intellectual disability may be caused by... in utero 
exposure to alcohol and drugs (e.g., FASD [fetal 
alcohol syndrome disorder]) (case 137). 
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 In such scenarios, blame was sometimes implicitly or explicitly accorded to 
the mother for exposing her unborn child to these toxins. 
There’s a slight possibility it [John’s ID] was caused 
by…his mother’s bad choices while she was pregnant, 
such as alcoholism or other drug addiction, or use of 
dangerous medications whose risks were unknown at 
the time (case 34). 
John may have been born with his intellectual 
disability for reasons that were his mother’s fault 
(FASD [fetal alcohol syndrome disorder], drugs 
during gestation etc.) (case 141). 
 
 Some participants also attributed John’s ID to his own possible alcohol 
and/or drug misuse as an adolescent or adult.   
Brain injury as a result of drinking or drugging too 
much (case 176). 
Maybe he took too many pingas as a young lad that left 
him permanently fried (case 83). 
 
 Environmental toxins. Some participants reported that John’s in utero 
exposure to chemicals or pollutants in his mother’s physical environment, or his 
exposure to such pollutants in his own physical environment as a child or adult, 
could have caused his ID. These were generically referred to as ‘toxins’ or ‘poisons’ 
in the environment.  
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[John’s ID could have been caused by] prenatal 
environmental factors such as… toxic poisoning (case 
110).  
There’s a slight possibility it [John’s ID] was caused 
by…environmental toxins of some kind (case 34).  
 
Some participants specified substances they believed could cause ID, including 
“mercury” (case 192), a “pesticide spill” (case 22), and “chemicals in food or food 
containers” (case 191). 
Theme 5: Psychosocial Deprivation. This theme encompassed participant 
beliefs that systemic deprivation impacting health, education, and psychosocial 
flourishing may have impaired John’s neurological/cognitive development from 
infancy into adulthood, causing or exacerbating his ID. Psychosocial deprivation was 
generally attributed to inadequate formal and informal education and socialisation, or 
to severe neglect or abuse. Subthemes in this theme were ‘Social environment’ and 
‘Psychosocial abuse/neglect’.  
Social environment. Aspects of John’s social environment were often 
described by participants as potentially having stunted his neurological and 
psychosocial development, causing an ID or exacerbating a prior impairment to the 
point of ‘becoming’ an ID. John’s general social environment during childhood (i.e., 
his upbringing/home environment), including the quality and competence of his 
parental support, was often reported as having potentially impaired his development 
and caused his ID.   
 
I imagine that the environment that John was raised 
[in] was [a] pretty significant cause in John’s 
intellectual disability (case 113). 
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[E]nvironment and parenting could also be factors 
(case 98). 
 
Some participants specifically referred to John’s socioeconomic status as a 
contributor to his ID.  
His social environment may have played a little factor, 
in terms of education, socioeconomic access to help 
and resources, parentage, and friends (case 82). 
[S]ocio/economic and demographic environment… 
(case 90). 
 
 More participants assumed John may have lacked access to appropriate 
formal education services, causing or exacerbating his ID. 
 
His education in the home may have been non-existent 
and the school system may not have offered the 
adequate teaching assistance and one on one, or 
enough encouragement at the right time (case 118). 
Learning difficulties, late diagnosis and late 
intervention… (case 98).  
 
 Psychosocial neglect/abuse. Some participants reported that severe neglect 
and/or abuse during key developmental periods as a child may have caused John’s 
ID; these responses implied that John’s psychosocial development was irreparably 
damaged by such experiences.  
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I presume, in rare cases, persistent isolation from 
normal stimuli (physical, social etc.) [could cause an 
ID] (case 26). 
He [John] could have suffered from terrible parents or 
lived in terrible conditions which made it impossible 
for him to obtain basic school education (case 210). 
 
Theme 6: Social Construction. This theme encompassed participant beliefs 
that ID was ‘caused’ to exist via individual and systemic discriminatory discourse 
and behaviour rather than biological or psychosocial factors, implicitly endorsing a 
social model of disability and opposing the dominant medical-disease model of 
disability. Some participants explicitly reported that John’s disability was caused by 
socially constructed norms and expectations regarding ‘normal’ intelligence and 
psychosocial functioning, which devalued difference and diversity (including people 
with an ID). Other participants implicitly endorsed a social constructionist 
perspective of ID by refusing to problematise ID, instead describing John’s positive 
qualities and right to social inclusion.  Interestingly, some participants refused to 
speculate about possible causes of ID; such participants self-attributed a lack of 
expertise and experience with the topic, and were explicit in their desire to not 
contribute to speculative discourse about people with an ID. This theme included two 
subthemes, ‘Normative Labelling’ and ‘Impropriety’. 
 Normative labelling. Some participants were explicit in their belief that ID 
(like other disabilities) is a social construction ‘caused’ by devaluing language, 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours by individuals and society. These participants 
typically referred to the disabling role of social norms and expectations for people 
with an ID. The study itself was critiqued by some participants as contributing to this 
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negative social construction in asking participants to explain their stereotypical 
beliefs about people with an ID. 
In a social model of disability, John’s intellectual 
disability is the result of living in a world that caters 
for people without disability, and does not recognise 
the wide spectrum of ability and difference between 
individuals. This has impacts on John’s ability to fully 
participate in work and community life… (case 137). 
 
Other participants reported that the cause of John’s ID was irrelevant to his 
social status and rights, and so refused to provide a causal explanation. Such 
participants instead tended to describe what they perceived to be John’s ‘positive’ 
qualities (e.g., his employment and social connections) while dismissing his 
‘negative’ qualities (i.e., functional limitations described in the vignette such as 
‘reading between the lines in social situations’) as being a matter of value and 
perspective.  
Frankly the cause is not as important as the future. 
Given a more tolerant world, John could be recognised 
as the valuable human he is. IQ is not everything. What 
is everything is creating and inclusive society that 
values everyone and all their differences…. We need a 
society that values diversity, instead of one that 
pathologises it (case 60). 
The specifics are irrelevant to John’s human rights 
and shouldn’t be part of any outsider’s judgement on 
his life, his humanity and right to respectful 
consideration, ability to cope or necessity to require 
help both personally and structurally through 
government programs (case 50). 
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It doesn’t matter to me what caused the disability-he 
has one. I just need to understand what he need[s] to 
be a participating person in his community (case 128). 
 
 Impropriety. Some participants refused to speculate about the cause of ID as 
a self- monitoring behaviour, seemingly motivated by their self-reported lack of 
credentials (expert or moral) on the issue. This suspension of speculation (and hence 
avoidance of verbalising potentially negative or hurtful opinions) appeared to stem 
from participants’ sense of social and moral propriety. 
There could be any number of reasons but regardless 
of the cause I don’t think it’s something that I have the 
right to know or enquire about (case 190). 
Honestly I wouldn’t even try to guess because I haven’t 
studied it and don’t know enough. If I had met John, I 
wouldn’t ask because that’s his business and if he can 
do things and have a career, then I would be proud of 
him succeeding regardless of anyone else (case 199). 
Theme 7: Metaphysical Mystery. This theme encompassed participant 
beliefs that the cause of John’s ID was metaphysical or at least a result of chance. 
Such explanations explicitly or implicitly described John’s ID as due to ‘luck’, 
‘chance’, ‘nature’, ‘destiny’, or ‘fate’ instead of concrete biological, psychosocial 
causes, or socio-linguistic factors. Most participants reported John’s ID as a random 
occurrence (e.g., ‘luck’, ‘chance’, ‘nature’). 
I think John is just unlucky in that he has an 
intellectual disability, and lucky in that it is 
mild….Could be me, could be you, in this case it is 
John (case 36). 
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Nature is what it is (case 51). 
[I]t [the cause of the ID] may be seemingly random 
and undefinable (case 147). 
 
One participant referred to John’s ID as a predestined ‘spiritual challenge’.    
 
His rebirth could have meant that in this instance his 
Soul was due to face these problems so in its next 
rebirth, it could excel as Isaac Newton, Einstein or 
Anne Frank or some other Male or Female who will 
lead, what we call Earth to better places and explore 
the Universe for the betterment of 
Mankind/Womankind (case 209). 
Theme 8: Unknown Causes. The final theme, ‘Unknown Causes’, 
encompassed participants’ belief that while some empirical causes for ID were 
known, there were others that remained unknown to science, rather than to them 
personally. Participants contributing to this theme often provided multiple causal 
explanations in addition to this. 
The cause of the majority of congenital disorders is 
unknown (case 23). 
Probably he was born with a level of ability lower on 
the normal curve than average. Usually there is no 
known cause for this (case 89). 
Thematic Analysis for Vignette 2: Causal Explanations for John’s Criminal 
Offending without an Intellectual Disability Specified 
Inductive thematic analysis formulated six themes and 13 subthemes overall; 
refer to Table 8.3 for an overview of themes, their subthemes, and supporting 
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examples. The number and proportion of participants describing each subtheme is 
also included in Table 8.3.  Most participants provided multiple explanations for 
John’s offending without an ID specified, and many used hedging language to 
convey their causal beliefs were contingent on other contextual factors. 
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Table 8.3 
Overview of Themes and Subthemes for Causal Beliefs about Criminal Offending without an Intellectual Disability Specified (n = 215) 
 Theme  Subtheme  Example n % 
1. Financial Pressure    
  i. Working Poor He may have needed the money. Even though he had a casual job, 
sometimes the pay isn’t enough (case 2) 
 
104 48.4 
  ii. Addiction Maybe he was a drug addict on a hunger without money (case 39) 27 12.6 
2. Entitlement    
  i. Social Comparison John could be greedy for what other people have (case 162) 
 
45 20.9 
  ii. Preservation of Honour He may have been trying to redress some (real or perceived) wrong 
(case 14) 
 
25 11.6 
  iii. Irresponsible John is likely to be immature, as evidenced by still relying on his 
parents for a home life.  He has not yet learned to stand on his own 
two feet (case 44) 
21 9.8 
3. Impaired Reasoning    
  i.  Psychological Disorder Perhaps he had developed a mental illness – depression possibly, or 
even a more serious condition (case 71) 
 
39 18.1 
  ii. Psychological Distress This may be a one-off event in response to a relationship breakup, 
severe financial stress or other, and he may have made a bad choice 
based on emotional dis regulation (case 97) 
 
61 28.4 
  iii. Substance Impaired He was possibly under the influence of drugs or alcohol (case 8) 
 
47 21.9 
  iv. Low Intelligence He may have been influenced by [an] intellectual disability (case 10) 11 5.1 
 206
 Theme  Subtheme  Example n % 
4. Social Connection    
  i. Peer or Parent Pressure He may have been egged on by his mates (case 14) 
 
33 15.3 
  ii. Lack of Intimacy John has friends, teams and parents but may be frustrated by a lack 
of a companion and thought that money might impress (case 100)  
16 7.4 
5. Moral Disregard    
  i. Immoral  John is immoral (case 61) 
 
38 17.7 
  ii. Thrill-Seeker Maybe he was just bored (case 3) 17 7.9 
6. Innocent Was he even guilty? The judicial system gets it wrong sometimes 
(case 16) 
6 3.8 
Note. Case number = Vignette 2 subsample case number. Participants could describe multiple causal beliefs, so percentage (%) does not sum to 100. 
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Theme 1: Financial Pressure. This theme encompassed participants’ beliefs 
that John’s criminal offending (specifically charges of theft and physical assault) was 
caused by genuine financial pressures associated with his perceived low 
socioeconomic status, and/or to support an addiction to alcohol, drugs, or gambling. 
Low and unreliable income. Many participants concluded that John was of 
low socioeconomic status due to his casual employment with a catering company and 
because he lived with his parents at the age of 35 years. These factors were 
interpreted as John having low and unreliable income due an assumed low-skilled 
job, hence requiring that he live with his parents to manage his ‘poverty’ (a term 
often associated by participants with his employment status).  
If he was only a casual worker, poverty could be part 
of the problem (case 106). 
The only reason I can see is if he robbed a store for 
money that he needed for basic survival such as food 
or rent and got in a fight on the get away (case 205). 
Overall, participants perceived John’s financial and 
associated living situation negatively. As one 
participant succinctly reported, ’35, working casually, 
living with his parents, not a great life...’ (case 14). 
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Participants provided a series of common backstories explaining specific 
events creating a critical level of financial stress leading to John perpetrating theft 
and physical assault. For example, some participants referred to general ‘debts’ or 
‘major expenses’ that John felt pressure to pay for.  
He may have gone into debt that he cannot manage 
because of underemployment and it was the only way 
out of a mess (case 176). 
It may have been overdue fines (since we still 
criminalise poverty in a lot of ways) or a ‘crisis’ 
expense – major car repairs, emergency dentistry, a 
broken washing machine… (case 165). 
Other participants proposed that John’s parents were similarly struggling financially, 
and that John contributed financially to their support.  
John could have a sick relative and he needed money 
to assist with medical expenses (case 162). 
His parents may have been thrown out of their house 
and he wanted to help and he thought this may have 
been his only option (case 168). 
Some participants proposed that John had grown frustrated at living with his parents 
and his low income, which stopped him moving out; his theft and assault was thus 
hypothesised to be motivated by his desire for independence. 
John at 35 saw no way out of living with his parents 
except pawning off goods for money (case 167). 
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John feels unable to get ahead in life, given that 
employment opportunities are very limited, and he 
would feel like a burden upon his parents (case 174). 
Overall, participants reported these scenarios pressured John to steal goods or 
money in order to address financial pressures in the context of having a low and 
unreliable income.  Some participants extended this problem, hypothesising that had 
recently lost his low-income job, increasing his financial pressures.  
John could have lost his job & have a hungry family at 
home (case 162). 
Addiction. Some participants hypothesised that John’s financial stress was 
specifically due to needing to fund an addiction to alcohol, drugs, or gambling. These 
participants attributed John’s theft and assault to his need to fund his addiction. 
It may be that he has addictive behaviours such as 
dependence on drugs or alcohol, or gambling (case 
176). 
A gambling or drug addiction (case 56). 
Some participants provided context for John’s addiction, suggesting they understood 
‘addiction’ to be a complex social psychological phenomenon bridging psychosocial 
well-being and criminal behaviour. 
Probably an unstable home environment and lack of 
productive work leading to drug or alcohol addiction 
and the urge to support his addiction (case 72). 
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Theme 2: Entitlement. This theme encompassed participants’ beliefs that 
John’s criminal behaviour was caused by a sense of personal entitlement, based on 
his self-perceived social status and psychosocial experiences with others. 
Social comparison. Many participants stated that, given his living and 
employment situation, John was likely to feel inadequate and inferior in comparison 
to other men his age due to perceived limited independence. Participants reported 
that John was likely to experience ‘low self-esteem’, which they further saw as a 
motivator for John’s theft and assault.  
John is probably a low-skilled low-educated young 
man with low self-esteem (case 90). 
…lack of self-esteem, and the erosion of his ego due to 
having to live with his parents (case 194). 
Participants attributed a range of cognitive emotional responses to John to 
imply the negative impact of social comparison on John, including that he must feel 
‘frustrated’ (e.g., case 81), ‘shame’ (e.g., case 78), ‘embarrassed’ (e.g., case 68), 
and/or ‘insecure’ (e.g., case 2) about his living arrangements and employment. 
John… may have been embarrassed or frustrated at 
his position in society: he still lives with his parents 
and has a low paying job. This may have led to him 
lashing out at someone or think he could get ahead by 
stealing (case 5). 
Perhaps John is frustrated that his life is not panning 
out to be as successful or fulfilling as he thought it 
would be. He perceives friends and others have a 
better quality of life, more money, success and 
independence (case 81). 
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Some participants also perceived that John would likely be ‘envious’ (e.g., case 55) 
of other people who he perceived to have greater wealth and/or social status.  
He may have been envious of some friends living 
independently in their own homes whilst he was still at 
home with his parents. He may also been unhappy that 
he did not have permanent full time employment and 
therefore not as much money to spend as other people 
and was limited in what activities he could attend (case 
55). 
John is immature and missing out on ‘the good life’ 
usually attained by young men who are married at his 
age, have a child or two, a good education and career 
prospects.  He has doubtless convinced himself that 
what he lacks is money and with no prospects of 
getting it in the short term [and thought] that bottle 
shop – take away looks like easy pickings (case 138). 
Interestingly, some participants hypothesised that John’s desire to attract a 
mate was a likely factor exacerbating his social comparison and resulting motivation 
to obtain wealth and status by criminal means. 
[T]here is no mention of a girlfriend and this may also 
have been a contributing factor [to John’s criminal 
offending] in that he believed that if he had more 
money he would be able to attract a female friend (case 
55). 
 
Overall, the subtheme ‘Social Comparison’ referred to participants’ assumption that 
John’s criminal offending was caused by his feeling entitled to rectify what he 
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perceived to be an unjust difference in resources and status, resulting in theft and 
assault. 
John committed theft because he wrongly believed he 
was entitled to something that was not his, and lacked 
the motivation to get whatever he stole through legal 
means (case 61). 
At 35, living with his parents, John may feel that 
society has not been fair to him….He may feel he lacks 
a future. If he mainly spends his time with similarly 
disenfranchised men, his sense of what he is entitled to 
may be offended. This could turn into rage if he is 
willing to harm other people. He may feel entitled to 
steal to get what he wants (case 172). 
 
Preservation of honour. Some participants reported that John’s offending 
may have been a response to an actual or perceived slight against, or attack on, his 
honour.  
He may have been trying to redress some (real or 
perceived) wrong (case 14). 
Beliefs of this nature centred on John feeling a sense of ‘injustice’ or ‘unfairness’ 
about a social situation or exchange, and hence feeling entitled to react with theft or 
assault. Some participants proposed that John physically assaulted someone only 
after first being provoked or victimised, or to protect a friend.  
Perhaps the victim tried to hit him first? (case 107). 
He may have …been retaliating following a bullying 
incident. Maybe the person he assaulted had assaulted 
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his friend, maybe he was protecting someone or 
something (case 208). 
 
Some participants proposed that the cause of John’s physical assault was a desire to 
protect his identity and hence honour after being discovered during his theft; in this 
type of scenario, John assaulted whoever discovered him to avoid identification and 
capture.  
[A]ssaulting someone was not part of his plan until he 
was caught and saw no other way of getting out of the 
situation (case 167). 
 
Other participants provided detailed explanations about how John’s workplace and 
colleagues may have slighted John by harassing or bullying him, causing him to 
perpetrate physical assault as a form of self-protection. 
Someone at work, or an acquaintance, likely caused 
John stress, pushing him to breaking point and with 
likely having no or limited support – he sought to 
rectify the situation himself (case 52). 
 
Some participants proposed that John felt taken advantage of by his employer and so 
committed theft as a form of compensation; in this type of scenario, John was 
promised promising stable employment by his employer, who failed to deliver on 
this after a period of labour, dishonouring the informal understanding and provoking 
John’s sense of injustice and hence entitled theft.  
John stole items from the catering company. When the 
act was detected and John was told he would be 
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charged with stealing he punched out the company 
manager. John had been working casually for this 
company for some time at low wages with the promise 
of eventual full-time employment. When John realised 
that this promise was a con he decided to take some 
drinks and foodstuffs as recompense (case 29). 
[H]e could have been stealing something that he felt 
was rightfully his or in lieu of something he felt he was 
owed, due to a pre-existing dispute (e.g., with an 
employer or other party he had had dealings with) 
(case 210). 
Irresponsible. Some participants reported that John’s criminal offending was 
likely caused by what they perceived to be his personal ‘irresponsibility’. 
Participants’ reported that John’s living circumstances and employment status 
indicated John had a ‘lack of direction’ (case 33), was ‘lacking motivation’ (case 61), 
was not being ‘independent’ (case 46), and was ‘immature’ (case 44). Overall these 
impressions summed to participants attributing a lack of self-responsibility to John. 
Living with his parents, he wasn’t being responsible 
for himself as a grown-up (case 66). 
Still living at home – possibly not learning 
responsibility (case 211). 
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Participants associated this perceived irresponsibility with the belief that John also 
harboured sentiments of self-entitlement, including assumptions that he expected a 
‘free ride’ through life and would use theft and assault to gain what he desired if it 
wasn’t given to him. 
John is likely to be immature, as evidenced by still 
relying on his parents for a home life.  He has not yet 
learned to stand on his own two feet.  He only works 
casually, which means he is probably lacking funds at 
times, and committing theft seemed an easy way to 
augment his income.  The assault was probably 
incidental to the theft (case 44). 
 John committed theft because he wrongly believed he 
was entitled to something that was not his, and lacked 
the motivation to get whatever he stole through legal 
means (case 61). 
 
Theme 3: Impaired Reasoning. This theme encompassed participant beliefs 
that John’s criminal offending was caused by either a temporary or chronic 
impairment to his cognitions and emotions, impacting his capacity to appreciate the 
consequences of his behaviours. Explanations for why John’s reasoning was 
impaired, and how this resulted in criminal behaviours, included that he had a 
psychological disorder, was experiencing either acute or ongoing psychological 
distress, was under the influence of alcohol or other drugs at the time of the criminal 
behaviour, or that he was of too low intelligence to appreciate the consequences of 
his antisocial actions.   
Psychological disorder. Many participants hypothesised that John may have 
had a psychological disorder, which influenced his criminal behaviour. Most 
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participants with this belief simply referred to John having a generic ‘mental illness’ 
(e.g., cases 2, 3, 10, 37) or ‘mental health issue’ (e.g., cases 125, 128).  
May have some mental illness due to the fact that he is 
still living with his parents, and that he used violence 
during the theft (case 20). 
Some participants specified certain types of psychological disorders they believed 
were likely associated with criminal behaviour, including depression, a personality 
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and psychopathy.  
Perhaps he was suffering from depression from still 
living with his parents which drove him to take some 
control of his life by demonstrating this by an 
inappropriate act (case 36). 
Untreated mental illness like bipolar or BPD 
[borderline personality disorder] (case 202). 
Psychological distress. Distinct from experiencing symptoms of an acute or 
ongoing psychological disorder, many participants proposed that John’s criminal 
behaviour was caused by acute psychological distress. Participants referred to John 
experiencing intense emotional states such as ‘desperation’, ‘anger’, ‘rage’, 
‘frustration’, ‘hate’, ‘stress’, and ‘panic’ which skewed his ability to act or react 
rationally and hence manage his emotions in response to an aversive event or 
situation.   
[The] assault could have been [caused by] panic or 
rage (case 107). 
Most likely a feeling of desperation – he felt like this 
was his only chance, he didn’t do it for fun. Perhaps 
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the theft went awry and that’s where the assault came 
from (case 137). 
Participants attributed this psychological distress to a specific event or 
situation, experienced in the distant or recent past. While some participants 
contributing to this theme identified past trauma as the source of this distress, most 
reported recent events or situations leading to distress, such as relationship conflict 
or loss or problems in the workplace.  
Perhaps John had past traumas…that caused his 
behaviour…(case 3). 
[T]his may be a one off event in response to a 
relationship breakup…he may have made a bad choice 
based on emotional dysregulation…(case 97). 
 
Some participants described existential crises where John questioned his 
purpose and self-worth, resulting in John stealing due to not caring about the 
consequences or committing assault to cope with his internal conflict.  
He felt lonely and disconnected from the world.  He’d 
broken up with his partner, felt useless and under 
loved, he didn’t really like the job he was doing and 
felt like he would never be able to leave home and own 
his own house (case 166). 
He may have hit a patch where his sense of self and 
personal direction had gone awry. He may be unable 
to think through the consequences of his actions (case 
176). 
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Substance impaired. Many participants believed that John was likely to have 
been under the influence of alcohol or other drugs at the time of committing theft 
and/or assault. His intoxication was described as leading to ‘poor judgement’, ‘poor 
decision-making’, or ‘bad decisions’, and as affecting his self-control.  
Over use of alcohol may be a factor in poor judgement 
(case 172). 
He may have been drinking, so that his self-control 
was weakened… (case 63). 
Alcohol was the mostly commonly described substance which led John to criminally 
offending while intoxicated; however, ‘ice’ (methamphetamine; e.g., cases 82, 148, 
189, 210) was also often specified as a likely cause.   
[H]e got high on ice one evening and was angry and 
decided steal something, got caught in the act and 
assaulted the person who tried to restrain him (case 
189). 
[H]e could have been high on crack ice…(case 210). 
 
Low intelligence. A minority of participants believed that John’s offending 
was likely caused by, or compounded by, generally low intelligence or a cognitive 
disability. How or why low intelligence caused John to commit the crimes specified 
was not typically explained in any detail.  
 [T]he fact that he still lives with his parents at his age 
and only works casually indicates some lack of … 
intellectual ability (case 181). 
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He may have an intellectual disability and find making 
decisions difficult (case 14). 
 
Theme 4: Social Connection. This theme encompassed participant beliefs 
that John’s social connections, and his valuing of these, caused him to engage in 
criminal behaviour to maintain, improve, or gain these relationships. 
Peer or parent pressure. Many participants believed that John’s criminal 
offending was caused by explicit or implicit pressure by people he was socially 
connected to, and hence valued the support and opinion of. Participants most 
commonly reported that friends or other peers (e.g., work mates) were the source of 
this pressure, encouraging or coercing John to commit theft and assault.  
[John] may have been influenced or pressured by 
friends, co-workers or other peers (case 10). 
His friends might have pressured him to do something, 
or he might have done something to impress his friends 
(case 185). 
Some participants also reported that John’s parents may have pressured him to 
engage in criminal behaviour, by emphasising John’s inadequacies to the point that 
he felt theft and assault were reasonable solutions to relieve this pressure. 
[T]he primary motivation for turning to theft seems to 
be from a sense of shame and frustration in regards to 
his income and lack of career fulfilment despite his 
age. He’s feeling embarrassed to be depending on his 
parents and may have even been given verbal 
criticism, abuse and an ultimatum to ‘sort out his act’ 
by one or both of them (case 78). 
 220
His parents … reinforce his low self-esteem implying 
that he should be living a different kind of life – 
perhaps married with children in a place of his own 
(case 81). 
 
Lack of intimacy. Some participants believed that John’s criminal behaviour 
(particularly his theft) was caused by a desire to attract an intimate partner by 
demonstrating wealth. 
There is no mention of a girlfriend and this may also 
have been a contributing factor in that he believed that 
if he had more money he would be able to attract a 
female friend (case 55). 
His friends are close, but there doesn’t seem to be a lot 
of indication that he is highly emotionally involved 
with them: they are friends for activities rather than 
engagement, so he probably feels isolated. Still living 
with parents at 35 is also not good socially. It probably 
limits whom he can bring home, and he may feel 
deprived without a stable partner. Sexual pressures 
could also encourage him to seek short term financial 
gain to improve his chances of finding a partner (case 
114). 
 
Other participants believed, along a similar line, that the absence of an intimate 
partner induced a sense of isolation, loneliness, disconnection, or detachment in 
John, leading him to engage in criminal behaviour. 
He felt lonely and disconnected from the world.  He’d 
broken up with his partner felt useless and under loved 
(case 166). 
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Living with his parents at his age probably is seen as 
a turn off, so he may also be bored from a lack of 
intimate human interaction (case 179). 
 
Theme 5: Moral Disregard. This theme encompassed participant beliefs that 
John’s offending was caused by his personal disregard for moral values and 
behaviour, resulting in an immoral approach to life and the pursuit of hedonic or 
destructive pleasure.  
Immoral.  Many participants believed that John’s offending was caused by 
his being generally immoral or unethical, and describe him as not having ‘morals’, 
‘ethics’, or ‘values’.  John’s immorality was often associated with traits such as low 
empathy and selfishness.  
He might not have had a good moral compass and 
decided he really wanted the thing he stole (case 153). 
He committed assault because he had no empathy for 
the person he assaulted. John is immoral (case 61). 
 
Some participants attributed this immorality to John’s exposure to social modelling, 
describing that John had likely not learnt, or been taught, moral or ethical values by 
his parents. Some reported that John had passively learned criminal behaviours via 
display by other family, friends, colleagues, or those in the community. 
 [H]e is not a person with moral responsibilities and 
hasn’t been brought up by decent parents to teach him 
responsibility and ethics (case 27). 
Perhaps a lack of respect for the law … came from the 
parents, with whom John lives, and has pervaded his 
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childhood and convinced him that breaking the law is 
a viable option (case 137). 
Some participants proposed that John was a recidivist or ‘career criminal’, implying 
he had chosen to repeatedly act contrary to normative law and morals. 
Most likely explanation is that [he] is a recidivist 
offence given his age and the fact he was in casual 
unskilled work and living with his parents (case 131). 
John could have been a habitual criminal, using his 
job as a cover, and finally got caught (case 140). 
 Finally, some participants reported John’s offending was possibly caused by malice 
(case 144) and ‘spite’ (case 58) with an aim to harm or cause pain for pleasure or 
satisfaction, implying that John’s behaviour was generally immoral. 
He may be an unpleasant person who sought to cause 
damage to another (case 144). 
John might … be a 35 yr old psychopath from a 
wealthy family who steals, not from those who can 
afford it, but from homeless drunks. Out of sheer spite, 
because he enjoys causing misery and pain for others 
(case 13). 
Thrill-seeker. Participants frequently reported the belief that a cause of 
John’s criminal offending was ‘thrill-seeking’ (e.g., cases 10, 77, 168), describing 
that he was ‘bored’ (e.g., cases 33, 125) prior to the criminal act and wanted some 
‘excitement’, to take ‘risks’, or to act ‘impulsively’ (e.g., case 1, 71).  
[M]aybe he was just bored (case 3). 
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May have desired the ‘thrill’ of committing the offense 
(or may have desired the ‘thrill’ of theft and then felt 
like he ‘needed’ to commit assault to get away with it 
in the moment) (case 10). 
In these scenarios, participants implied that engaging in criminal behaviour was a 
hedonic pursuit, suggesting no purpose to the crime other than sensation-seeking or 
the desire to feel of alive.  
[H]e’s up for the ‘adventure’ because his life is so 
uneventful.... (case 21). 
Perhaps boredom living at home until 35 and needed 
excitement (case 46). 
 
Participants who described this belief also often described John’s offending as 
opportunistic, with little thought give to the possible consequences of his behaviour 
in the heat of the moment.  
He may have simply made a bad decision out of 
boredom or lack of consideration for the consequences 
(case 5). 
The source of the bad choices may be …a passing 
sense they could do this offence and get away with it 
like a bully at school (case 57). 
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Theme 6: Innocent. This theme encompassed participant beliefs that John 
was in fact innocent of criminal offending, despite the vignette scenario; while 
infrequent, this belief was recurrent and reflected some participants’ doubt regarding 
the Australian criminal justice system’s capacity to accurately identify criminal 
offenders. Participants contributing to this theme reported that John may have been 
falsely accused of, charged with, and/or convicted of the offences of theft and 
assault.  
John might be entirely innocent, framed… (case 13). 
Was he even guilty? The judicial system gets it wrong 
sometimes (case 16). 
 
Some participants specifically described the fact that John was a heterosexual man 
(male) as biasing the criminal justice system against him.  
The government and society as a whole don’t take care 
of men and give them harsher sentences. So he may 
have committed a minor offence and got a raw deal. 
He should have been a woman, gay etc., and he would 
not have been convicted (case 34). 
The family court…Being marginalised as a working 
man in Australia (case 150). 
Thematic Analysis for Vignette 3: Causal Explanations for Criminal Offending 
for John with a Mild Intellectual Disability Specified 
Six themes and eight subthemes were generated overall; refer to Table 8.4 for 
an overview of themes, their subthemes, and supporting examples. The number and 
proportion of participants describing each subtheme is also included in Table 8.4. 
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Similarly to the previous analysis detailing participants’ beliefs about the causes of 
John’s criminal offending when an ID was not specified, most participants provided 
multiple explanations for John’s offending when an ID was specified, and were often 
explicit in describing their beliefs as possibilities rather than firm beliefs. 
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Table 8.4 
Overview of Themes and Subthemes for Causal Beliefs about Criminal Offending with an Intellectual Disability Specified (n = 214^) 
 Theme Subtheme  Example n % 
1. Intellectual Disability    
  i. Consequential Reasoning John has a mild intellectual disability and that can limit his ability to 
understand the ramifications of his actions (case 284)  
46 21.5 
  ii. Impulsivity [I] t is possible that John due to his lower intelligence might lack a little 
impulse control (case 215) 
38 17.8 
  iii. Misunderstandings Because of his low IQ & intellectual disability he probably did not understand 
taking things was wrong (case 206) 
66 30.8 
  iv. Situational Stress Assault is most likely due to a low intelligence contributing to low emotional 
intelligence resulting in greater likelihood of conflict and aggressive reactions 
(case 175) 
48 22.4 
2. Social Influences    
  i. Peers 
 
Maybe his intellectual disability would have contributed to him being 
manipulated by peers (case 421) 
53 24.8 
  ii. Media John may have glorified ideas of theft from movies (case 131)  6 2.8 
3. Entitlement    
  i.  Social Comparison I think John wanted to fit in, and saw his criminal offence as a means to getting 
things/money that would enable him to do so (case 219) 
22 10.3 
  ii. Preservation of Honour He may have been provoked or was trying to protect someone he cared about 
(case 298) 
22 10.3 
4. Working Poor It could be the casual work was not enough to support himself so he was 
pushed toward that [theft, assault] (case 354) 
46 21.5 
5. Immoral He may just be an inconsiderate and selfish person like many others in society 
generally (case 296)  
31 14.5 
6. Innocent Maybe someone saw him as an easy target and set him up (case 396)  7 3.3 
Note. ^This n represents 50% of cases randomly extracted from the original n = 427 cases completed for Vignette 3, using for final codign. Case 
number = Vignette 3 subsample case number from total subsample (n = 427). Participants could describe multiple causal beliefs, so percentage (%) 
does not sum to 100. 
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Theme 1: Intellectual Disability. It was unsurprising that participants 
reported John’s ID may have caused his criminal offending, given the vignette had 
explicitly described John as having mild ID, a specific IQ of 65, and that he 
‘sometimes experiences trouble with aspects of daily living as such learning new 
skills and activities, understanding complicated instructions, and “reading between 
the lines” in social situations’. Participants reported a variety of social-cognitive 
factors, framed as impairments associated with an ID, to explain how John’s 
offending behaviour and subsequent sentencing could have occurred. These socio-
cognitive impairments were identified as the following four subthemes, 
‘Consequential Reasoning’, ‘Impulsivity’, ‘Misunderstandings’, and ‘Situational 
Stress’.  
Consequential reasoning.  Some participants reported that John’s ability to 
engage in consequential reasoning was limited or absent as a result of his ID, which 
led to him engaging in unintentionally criminal behaviours, particularly theft. These 
participants suggested that John may have been motivated by perceived short-term 
gain (e.g., money, products from a shop), without being able to appreciate the long-
term consequences (e.g., being accosted by the shop’s security, being charged and 
sentenced for theft). 
Sometimes people with intellectual disabilities are 
unable to fully comprehend the severity of their 
actions…. The consequences of such is that they 
commit a criminal offense without understanding that 
it was as serious as it was (case 90). 
People with low intelligence often have poor future 
time orientation and lack the ability to foresee the 
consequences of their action in the future. For 
example, stealing a wallet may mean they have money 
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now but cannot see that they might be caught and 
charged with a crime (case 135). 
Impulsivity. Some participants reported that John’s ID was likely associated 
with higher impulsivity, which they related to John stealing money and other objects 
he ‘desired’ or ‘fancied’.  
I see John as a primary school child – impulsive and 
taking something that appealed to him without any real 
understanding of the concept of ownership (case 37). 
[S]pontaneous desire to have something he saw (case 
240). 
Some participants described that John likely knew theft was immoral or illegal and 
had tried but failed to control his desire for specific objects. 
He may [have] act[ed] impulsively, driven by a desire 
to have something that he wants but not know how to 
get it any other way (case 258). 
John’s IQ would make impulsivity and self-regulation 
a problem and even if he knew stealing was wrong 
perhaps the temptation was too much (case 73). 
 
Alternatively, some participants framed John’s impulsivity as his possessing poor 
emotional regulation, leading to emotional outbursts expressing anger or frustration, 
which escalated into aggression and hence criminal assault.   
He may have difficulty controlling anger or frustration 
(case 171). 
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I certainly think that this would have to be a 
spontaneous and emotional crime rather than a 
planned thing because he doesn’t sound emotionally 
or intellectually sophisticated enough to manage life’s 
difficulties (lack of coping mechanisms etc.) (case 
184). 
 
Participants who reported that John had poor impulse control, often also referred to 
his having poor consequential reasoning. These two explanations were often 
described as distinct, but reported in tandem to explain how John’s offending 
possibly unfolded.  
Probably his poor forward planning and inability to 
fully think through actions and consequences, coupled 
with an inability to inhibit inappropriate emotional 
responses such as anger and immediate reward (e.g. 
the theft) (case 157). 
 
Misunderstandings. Some participants described complex social scenarios 
involving misunderstandings by John and/or others, as the cause of John’s criminal 
offending. In some of these scenarios, participants reported the belief that John 
sincerely did not comprehend that his behaviour was ‘wrong’, ‘illegal’, or ‘immoral’; 
for example, he could not comprehend that an item on display in a shop was not free 
to take and needed to be purchased.  
He may understand that it is wrong to steal, yet not 
fully understand that taking what he took would be 
stealing (case 416). 
It is very unlikely John committed the offences with any 
malicious intent, but much more likely that he simply 
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didn’t understand why his actions were inappropriate 
for the situation (case 73). 
In another common scenario, participants suggested John had picked up an item in a 
store and absent-mindedly forgotten to pay for it. In these scenarios, sometimes John 
did not realise his error and was targeted by shop staff who thought he intentionally 
tried to steal the item. At other times, John was reported to have realised his mistake 
and tried to return the item, and his noble intention was misunderstood by observers 
(such as shop staff or security guards) as theft.  
It may have been he saw something he liked and simply 
forgot to pay for it then panicked when confronted by 
the shopkeeper (case 234). 
My first assumption would be that he may have been 
unable to fully comprehend the situation & may have 
inadvertently taken something without realising it was 
supposed to be paid for, done it absentmindedly as 
something else excited him & he forgot that he picked 
it up & when later confronted in both cases, committed 
an assault in defending himself in a state of confusion 
(case 128).  
A key factor across scenarios, regardless of whether the initial misunderstanding was 
by John or by others, were participant reports that either John could not clearly or 
meaningfully communicate with those involved in the misunderstanding, or that he 
could not comprehend other people’s responses to his behaviour (e.g., apparent theft) 
in these scenarios. Poor communication and comprehension skills by John, often 
highlighted by references to the vignette’s description that he had trouble ‘reading 
between the lines in social situations’, were reported to likely exacerbate the initial 
misunderstanding and its outcome.   
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It is possible that given John’s intellectual disability 
and associated difficulty with ‘reading between the 
lines’ in social situations, John may have not fully 
understood the nature of his actions…John may also 
have difficulty expressing himself or his feelings in an 
appropriate way. (case 91). 
He may…have had difficulty explaining his actions to 
police, lawyers or in court (case 147). 
 
Situational stress. Some participants reported that the assault aspect of 
John’s criminal offending was caused by situational stress; most situations described 
related specifically to John having intentionally or unintentionally committed theft 
and being subsequently apprehended for this by shop staff, security, or police. 
Participants suggested John was likely to have experienced intense negative 
emotions in such situations, such as distress, frustration, confusion, anger, fear, 
and/or panic. Some participants framed John’s reaction to situational stress in terms 
of simply having ‘been caught’ intentionally engaging in theft and reacting with 
aggression.  
John probably stole something from the catering 
company and when challenged about it, would not 
admit his wrongdoing, but rather attacked the person 
making the allegation (case 46). 
Maybe he wanted something that wasn’t his…. Maybe 
when he was caught he didn’t know how to cope and 
lashed out (case 382). 
Other participants described more complex scenarios explaining John’s perpetration 
of assault, often with reference to an initial misunderstanding from John’s 
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perspective, John’s assumed poor communication and comprehension of social cues, 
and his assumed impulsivity (inability regulate his emotions), all of which generated 
situational stress and culminated in an outburst of aggression or an attempt to flee the 
situation, leading to physical harm to others. 
[I]f he was physically apprehended for the theft, 
(which he did not understand was a crime) he would 
not understand why someone was trying to hold him 
and he would be trying to get the person off him; in the 
way most people would do in self-defence (case 6). 
He may have become frustrated if he was accused of 
stealing and was unable to articulate what his 
intentions were (case 177). 
 
Theme 2: Social Influences. Many participants reported or implied that 
having an ID made John particularly vulnerable to explicit and implicit social 
influences, impacting his decisions and behaviours, including his criminal behaviour. 
John’s vulnerability to social influence is represented by the two subthemes, ‘Peers’ 
and ‘Media’.    
Peers. Many participants reported the belief that John’s criminal offending 
was caused by the influence of friends or peers.  
May have been led astray by “friends” (case 236). 
I would assume John got in with a bad crew (case 230). 
 
Some participants proposed that John engaged in theft and/or assault to impress his 
friends and win their respect, implying that the influence of his peers was implicit, 
and that John chose to behave criminally to meet their perceived expectations.  
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He could have done it to win the adoration or respect 
of someone else whom he feels he needs but overlooks 
him because of his life situation (case 2). 
In trying to keep up with and please his peers he 
committed the crime (case 349). 
Another common scenario reported by participants described John as having been 
intentionally ‘befriended’ by delinquent-type peers and explicitly manipulated, 
goaded, or coerced into committing theft or perpetrating aggression for the 
delinquents’ entertainment or benefit.  
He could have been manipulated into committing the 
crime due to his low IQ (case 2). 
He may have been put up to it by a friend or friends 
who saw it as a joke, or a way to benefit from the theft 
(case 132). 
In this type of scenario, where John was manipulated or coerced by others, 
participants reported beliefs that John was naïve to the immorality or illegality of his 
behaviour. 
[I]t is possible that his friends persuaded or tricked 
him into doing something against the law. Most 
intellectually disabled that I know people have a very 
strong sense of what is “right” and “wrong” and stick 
by it. However, it is possible that someone else who 
was trusted by John convinced him that what he did 
was not really “wrong”. His friends may have tricked 
him and because he was unable to ‘read between the 
lines’, he did not realize this (case 173). 
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He might have been influenced by others around him 
and struggled to differentiate between what was cool 
and what was right (case 411). 
Regardless of how peers were framed as having influenced John’s criminal 
behaviour, participants typically framed this influence as by people without an ID, 
knowingly exploiting John due to his disability.  
Possibly he was influenced by persons of normal 
intelligence (case 40). 
I’d be vigilant about any potential manipulation by 
others since with such a low IQ he would be an easy 
target for highly manipulative people, and probably 
wouldn’t be aware of such manipulation himself / 
wouldn’t be able to express what happened (case 13). 
Media. Interestingly, participants referred to the influence of media, 
particularly movies, as a form of social modelling and hence influence on John’s 
behaviour. In the vignette narrative providing an overview of John’s circumstances, 
it was noted that he enjoyed attending movie theatres with friends on a weekend, 
amongst other details. Some participants incorporated this aspect of John’s history 
into their causal explanations for his criminal offending, suggesting that his ID made 
him susceptible to media stereotypes and tropes about theft, aggression, and 
violence.   
John may’ve been influenced by movies he has seen 
that glorify violence (case 165). 
Because of his low IQ & intellectual disability he 
probably did not understand taking things was wrong 
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and probably saw in the movies that violence gets you 
what you want (case 206). 
Theme 3: Entitlement. Some participants reported that John, possessing an 
ID, may engage in theft and assault due to a sense of entitlement, where he felt he 
‘deserved’ or was justified in his criminal behaviours. Two forms of entitlement 
were typically described, specifically that John felt entitled to engage in theft and 
assault due to a sense of relative deprivation and inadequacy compared to others, or 
that he felt entitled to react aggressively in response to perceived slights or attacks on 
his person or character. These forms of entitlement are represented by the subthemes, 
‘Social Comparison’ and ‘Preservation of Honour’.  
Social comparison. Some participants suggested that John’s criminal 
offending was caused by a sense of low self-esteem and desire to appear more 
successful and competent than he and others perceived himself to be. Underlying this 
causal explanation was the implication that John’s ID limited his opportunities for 
employment, independence, and social status generally.  
He did it in the hopes to improve his life, despite doing 
something immoral and selfish (case 108). 
 [John] needed money to advance his position in 
society (case 573). 
Participants described John as likely experiencing ‘resentment’, ‘frustration’, 
‘pressure’, ‘desire’, and ‘rage’ due to his employment and living situation, when 
compared to those of others. 
Given his difficulty with handling daily tasks and 
understanding complicated instructions, which would 
probably go with his casual employment, John may 
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feel desperate, particularly if his job is low paying and 
is not given enough work for him to be able to live 
adequately. He may feel pressured to live up to the 
expectations of his parents and friends to be able to 
manage himself. That may explain the theft (case 271). 
John can never aspire to the “good life.” Resentment 
at things beyond his control lead him to act outside of 
what society expects of its citizens. The fact that he 
works at all shows he is trying to conform, but the fates 
have left him inadequate to have all the things 
“normal” people have (case 348). 
Preservation of Honour. Some participants reported that John’s theft, but 
more commonly the assault, was actually an attempt to preserve his sense of honour 
after perceiving a slight to his character, or experiencing an attack. In these 
scenarios, John’s theft and/or aggression was perceived to be reactive rather than 
proactive.     
There could have been a range of reasons such as… 
revenge for a perceived wrong (case 362). 
He could also have felt that someone was cheating him 
and felt that assault and taking back what he felt was 
his was his only recourse (case 219).   
Participants sometimes referred specifically to John’s ID as a target for prejudice and 
discrimination, leading to reactive aggression to defend his sense of honour. 
Intellectual disabilities, combined with the prejudices 
people who have them often experience, can lead to 
frustration and anger (case 367). 
 237
If he has been discriminated against because of his 
intellectual disability, that may have resulted in built 
up frustration, resulting in a need to release it, 
explaining the undertaking of the crimes, particularly 
the assault (case 271). 
Theme 4: Working Poor. Many participants attributed John’s criminal 
behaviour, particularly his theft, to his perceived low socioeconomic status, which 
they inferred based on his casual employment and living with his parents. 
Participants perceived John’s criminal behaviour as necessary for survival and an 
expression of desperation.  
He may well be struggling because he is on a very 
limited wage (case 284). 
Economic status is… a strong predictor of criminal 
activity (case 274). 
 
Most of these participants attributed John’s low socioeconomic status to his having 
an ID. These participants also perceived John to be likely experiencing additional 
disadvantages, particularly limited support by social services. 
I tend to think that the primary issue here is that people 
with intellectual disabilities are more likely to 
experience disadvantage thus creating an environment 
where they find themselves involved in petty crime 
(case 194). 
Given his intellectual disability, he would have faced 
many hardships in his life, including economic and 
social disadvantage. This could easily culminate in 
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…desperation… leading to john committing his crime 
(case 336). 
Theme 5: Immoral. Some participants reported beliefs that John engaged in 
criminal behaviour because he was immoral. In identifying this theme, to act 
‘immoral’ or be ‘immoral’ was defined as knowing the difference between right and 
wrong (in a moral sense) and choosing to act ‘wrongly’. Some participants proposed 
that possessing an ID did not preclude John being able to tell right from wrong.    
I think even with an intellectual disability John still has 
the ability to know stealing is wrong (case 215). 
Some people are just bad – evil, morally corrupt. 
John’s not necessarily a good person who did a bad 
thing because he has a low IQ. He might just be a bad 
person who also happens to have a low IQ (case 32). 
Some participants described hypothetical scenarios of theft and/or assault, often 
involving planning and/or malice, that would indicate John had acted intentionally 
and hence immorally.   
If the assault was the initial plan and the theft followed, 
then John is … not a very nice person (because not all 
intellectually disabled people are nice – because 
they’re people!) (case 177). 
Though mildly disabled the fact that he can play sports 
and have friends says he knows right from wrong and 
he chose to commit the offence. If he didn’t know right 
from wrong he would not have been able to hold down 
a job or maintain friendships.  Verdict guilty (case 65). 
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Theme 6: Innocent. A small proportion of participants expressed beliefs that 
due to his ID, John was unlikely to have actually committed a crime at all – instead 
his cognitive impairment may resulted in him being mishandled or scapegoated by 
criminal justice professionals, resulting in a false guilty plea and unwarranted 
criminal sentence.   
I do not know what caused John to commit this offence; 
I’m not even certain that he did. No information has 
been provided. Some of the information concerning his 
disability suggests that he is more likely than the 
average person to have been confused or mistaken; the 
same information suggests that he is more likely than 
the average person to have been bamboozled or 
buffaloed into an unwise plea (case 263). 
It could also be that the story is bogus and the police 
are corrupt and he was picked because his intellectual 
disability makes him easy to coerce (case 138). 
Cross-Case Analysis for Causal Beliefs about John’s Criminal Offending With 
versus Without an Intellectual Disability Specified 
The comparative themes and subthemes identified for Vignettes 2 and 3 are 
presented in Figure 8.1. As stimuli, vignette 2 and 3 provided identical descriptions 
of the hypothetical criminal offender ‘John’, except that vignette 3 specified that 
John had a mild ID and general psychosocial impairments common to people with an 
ID, while vignette 2 did not refer to an ID or associated impairments at all. All 
themes and subthemes identified across these vignettes were hierarchically situated 
beneath the superordinate theme, ‘causal beliefs about John’s criminal offending’. 
Each vignette yielded six themes. When John did not have an ID specified, themes 
included: Financial Pressure; Impaired Reasoning; Entitlement; Social Connection; 
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Moral Disregard; and Innocent. When John did have an ID specified, themes 
included: Working Poor; Intellectual Disability; Entitlement; Social Influences; 
Immoral; and Innocent.  
 
Key similarities between the themes identified included participants’ 
readiness to attribute sociostructural, interpersonal, and intrapersonal causes for 
John’s criminal offending, regardless of whether an ID was specified. 
Socioeconomic status and associated financial pressures due to John’s casual 
employment was presented as a key sociostructural influence on his criminal 
behaviour, particularly theft. Explicit pressure from peers and parents to engage in 
delinquent or criminal behaviour was presented as an interpersonal influence on 
John’s offending.  
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Figure 8.1 A thematic map comparing causal beliefs about John’s criminal offending when an intellectual disability was, and was not, 
specified. 
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Implicit pressure to conform to peer group norms and impress potential 
friends and romantic interests was presented as an intrapersonal influence on John’s 
offending. Another common intrapersonal influence on John’s offending, attributed 
by participants in both conditions regardless of his possessing a disability, included a 
perceived sense of entitlement. Participants proposed that John believed the world 
‘owed’ him something in particular (wealth, social status or inclusion, justice, 
vengeance, an easy life) and that his criminal behaviours were both a reflection of 
and response to this world view. Similarly, participants who responded to either 
vignette framed John as a malevolent or immoral person, whose criminal behaviour 
was an expression of his lack of empathy for others, his dismissal of moral norms, 
and/or his desire to experience pleasure and gain at the expense of others.  
Unexpectedly, some participants portrayed John as wholly innocent of the 
crimes he had been sentenced for, rejecting the vignette narrative as presented and 
instead hypothesising a miscarriage of criminal justice. Regardless of whether he had 
a disability, these participants suggested that perhaps John had been scapegoated, 
framed, or discriminated against for a variety of reasons (such as being a male, or 
having an ID), and was a victim of a flawed justice system.   
   While five of the six themes identified were similar in nature, participants 
tended to present a greater variety of explanations for John’s offending when an ID 
was not specified, resulting in a broader range of subthemes for vignette 2. For 
example, the themes ‘Moral Disregard’ and ‘Financial Pressure’ in vignette 2 each 
yielded two subthemes (‘Immoral’ and ‘Thrill-seeking’, and ‘Working Poor’ and 
‘Addiction’, respectively), whereas for vignette 3 only the themes ‘Immoral’ and 
‘Working Poor’ were identified, reflecting less-nuanced beliefs about the causes of 
John’s offending when an ID is explicitly specified.  
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A key theme (and associated subthemes) on which respondents to each 
vignette diverged was that of ‘Impaired Reasoning’ for vignette 2, and ‘Intellectual 
Disability’ for vignette 3. While these themes hold a similar undertone relating to a 
perceived lack of capacity for rational thought and action, and associated behavioural 
responses such as reactive aggressive outbursts, these themes clearly differ in the 
range of possible causes of this aggressive irrationality. A notable difference between 
explanations for John’s offending based on disability status was that participants 
reported the offending was caused by addiction or intoxication when no ID specified, 
but failed to consider these when an ID was specified. Similarly, when an ID was not 
specified, participants reported that John’s offending could be due to his managing a 
serious mental illness, such as depression or psychosis; however, no participants 
suggested this explanation when John was specified as having an ID.  
There are some superficial similarities between the subthemes ‘Psychological 
Distress’ and ‘Situational Stress’ for the themes ‘Impaired Reasoning’ and 
‘Intellectual Disability’, respectively, in the sense that each subtheme presents John 
as being in a highly emotional and reactive state; however, where an ID was 
specified, John’s emotionality and associated aggressive outburst were attributed to 
being in an immediately confusing and provoking situation (such as having been 
caught engaged in apparent theft and not being able to either comprehend his 
situation or communicate his intentions). While this was a possible scenario for 
John’s psychological distress and associated criminal behaviour when an ID was not 
specified, it is notable that this was not the only scenario that could have resulted in 
John’s distress: relationship breakdown, grief, existential uncertainty, workplace 
woes, and childhood trauma are just some examples of the range of experiences that 
participants attributed to John when an ID was not specified.  Interestingly, some 
participants from vignette 2 did highlight that even when an ID was not specified, 
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that John may have an ID or at least lower than normal intelligence which may have 
led to his criminal offending; but this was not given the same depth of description by 
respondents to vignette 2 as by respondents to vignette 3, and did not appear to 
contextualise all aspects of vignette 2’s themes and subthemes, as it did for vignette 
3. 
  In vignette 3, where John was specified as having an ID, not only did the 
theme ‘Intellectual Disability’ and its subthemes ‘Misunderstandings’, 
‘Consequential Reasoning’, ‘Impulsivity’, and ‘Situational Stress’ provide a strong 
and nuanced description of many participants’ beliefs about the centrality of John’s 
ID to his criminal offending, but all other themes for this vignette were largely 
contextualised by the assumption that John’s ID should be factored into any 
evaluations and attributions to be made about what caused his criminal offending. 
For example, his ‘entitlement’ in the form of preserving his sense of honour or 
engaging in social comparison, was often framed in terms of being bullied for having 
an ID or being disadvantaged by his ID, respectively. His perceived situation as 
being ‘working poor’ was attributed to his having an ID and hence not being able to 
gain full time or reliable employment, while the explicit influence of his peers was 
perceived to be that of mockery, coercion, or exploitation of his disability. It was 
only the theme ‘Immoral’ for vignette 3, reflecting the broader theme ‘Moral 
Disregard’ for vignette 2, which identified John’s character and experiences as 
distinct from his disability, with participants typically reporting that John was 
immoral regardless of his disability, not because of it. 
 This latter issue highlights a significant point of difference between the tone 
of participant responses to John’s criminal offending when an ID was specified, 
compared to when it was not; essentially, participants attributed more hypothetical 
scenarios over which John ultimately had seeming control and hence had to actively 
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exercise his agency, as causes for his criminal offending when an ID was not 
specified. Substance use and abuse, malevolent thrill-seeking, and being an 
irresponsible adult unwilling to take responsibility for himself were additional 
explanations for John’s offending when an ID was not specified. Furthermore, while 
John was perceived to engage in criminal behaviour in response to others’ 
expectations, or to impress others regardless of whether he had a disability, John was 
further portrayed as coerced or manipulated into this behaviour by others, or 
mimicking media stereotypes, when he had an ID specified – in essence, his agency 
was compromised when an ID was specified. When an ID was not specified, John’s 
participating in criminal behaviour was more often framed in terms of peer 
conformity and group membership, or an effort to impress women, suggesting his 
agency was not compromised and instead he just made poor decisions to impress 
people in harmful ways. Overall, participant beliefs about the cause of John’s 
offending tended to attribute less moral responsibility to John when an ID was 
specified, compared to when an ID was not specified, with reference to the themes 
and subthemes explored.  
 Participants overall attributed less moral responsibility to John when an ID 
was specified, compared to when an ID was not specified. This can be explained in 
the context of participants beliefs  is consistent with the themes and subthemes 
identified in response to vignette 1, where participants were asked to explain the 
cause of John’s ID. Seven of the eight themes reflecting beliefs about the cause of 
John’s ID described factors over which John could have had no control – his 
genetics, exposure to physical trauma, various illnesses, exposure to chemical toxins 
while in utero or while developing as a child, impediments to his psychosocial 
development such as poor parenting or access to supporting services, imposed social 
norms, and pure luck. Participants responding to vignette 1 predominantly described 
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John as not being literally or morally responsible for his disability, and so it is a 
reasonable extension that participants who believed John’s ID to be a fundamental 
cause of his criminal offending would allocate less moral responsibility to John for 
this criminal offending.  
 
Discussion 
The aim of Study 4 was to explore Australians’ causal beliefs about people 
with an ID, and about criminal offenders with and without an ID, and to critically 
compare and contrast these causal beliefs. All participants read one of three vignettes 
describing ‘John’, a 35 year old man with casual employment who lived with his 
parents and had an active social life. In the first vignette, John was also described as 
having a mild ID; in the second vignette he was described as recently being 
sentenced for a criminal offence (theft and assault) without an ID specified; and in 
the third vignette, he was described as recently being sentenced for a criminal 
offence (theft and assault) with a mild ID specified. Participants were asked to 
explain what they thought caused John’s ID (vignette 1) or his criminal offending 
(vignette 2 and 3). Given the exploratory aim of Study 4, specific hypotheses were 
not formulated. Inductive thematic analysis was employed to identify relevant 
themes and subthemes within participant responses for each vignette, and a cross-
case analysis for responses to vignette 2 and 3 was conducted to identify similarities 
and differences in the themes specified.  
Causal Beliefs about Intellectual Disability 
Eight themes representing participants’ causal beliefs about why an 
individual might have a mild ID were identified, and are listed here in order from 
most frequently to least frequently coded: Genetics; Physical Trauma; Illness; 
Exposure to Chemical Toxins; Psychosocial Influences; Social Construction; 
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Metaphysical Mystery; and Unknown Causes. Most of the belief themes and 
subthemes reported were factually correct according to Australian and international 
research. In Australia, the most common self-reported causes of peoples’ ID include 
genetic disorders (52%), unknown causes (22%), and disease, illness, or hereditary 
disorders (22%), or that the disability ‘just came on’ (15%)(Wen, 2008). These 
causes are consistent with certain belief themes reported by participants (i.e., 
Genetics, Unknown Causes, Illness). Foetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder (FASD) 
was another cause of ID accurately reported by participants (relevant to the theme 
and subtheme Exposure to Chemical Toxins – Alcohol and/or Other Drug Use), 
which research has identified is particularly relevant to indigenous Australians 
(Balaratnasingam & Roy, 2015). According to the Balaratnasingam and Roy (2015), 
the most common causes of ID across 188 countries in 2013 were idiopathic ID (i.e., 
Unknown Causes), neonatal complications such as encephalopathy due to asphyxia 
and trauma (i.e., Physical Trauma, including subtheme Anoxia), chromosomal 
abnormalities and syndromes such as Down’s syndrome (i.e., Genetics, including 
subthemes General Genetics and Specific Disorder or Syndrome), cerebrovascular 
disease and infectious illness such as stroke or meningitis, respectively (i.e., Illness, 
including Infectious and Non-Infectious Illness subthemes), and alcohol use 
disorders (i.e., Exposure to Chemical Toxins – Alcohol and/or Other Drugs). 
Kaufman et al. (2010) also note that environmental factors such as exposure to 
certain teratogens or radiation can cause ID (i.e., Exposure to Chemical Toxins – 
Environmental Toxins), as can severe head trauma or injury causing lack of oxygen 
to the brain (i.e., Physical Trauma – Forceful Impact, and Anoxia). Interestingly, 
Unknown Causes was found by the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013 
Collaborators (2015) and Rauch et al. (2006) to be the most common cause for ID 
(relevant to about 60% of ID cases), but was one of the least frequently reported by 
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our participants. Also consistent with participant beliefs that ID was primarily caused 
by congenital, neonatal, or early illnesses or exposure to environmental contaminant, 
65% of Australians with an ID acquired their disability before age 5, and an 
additional 30% acquired it before age 20 (Wen, 2008).  
Many participants cited acquired brain injury from John’s prenatal 
experiences and into later adulthood as a cause of ID; while acquired brain injuries 
can result in ID, meaning participants were technically correct, there can be 
ambiguity around the developmental impacts of an acquired brain injury given the 
variety and severity of deficits that might result. Some participants reported that 
other developmental disorders such as ADHD, autism, and epilepsy were ‘causes’ of 
ID (specified in the theme and subtheme Genetics – Specific Disorder or Syndrome); 
this causal association is incorrect, however cormorbidity research supports a clear 
correlation between ID and these and other developmental disorders, which 
highlights why participants associated ID with these disorders (Wen, 2008) 
(Bhaumik et al., 2008; Robertson et al., 2015). Similarly, participant beliefs that lack 
of specialised education suited to people with an ID (specified in the theme and 
subtheme Psychosocial Deprivation – Social Environment) may be a cause of ID is 
incorrect; however, it is true that specialised education and access to appropriate 
school services has been shown to reduce socialisation and communication barriers 
common to children with an ID (Adeniyi & Omigbodun, 2016; Jonte & Doris, 2017; 
Plavnick, Kaid, & MacFarland, 2015; Strogilos, Tragoulia, & Kaila, 2015; Zion & 
Jenvey, 2006), and improve their numeracy skills (Hsu et al., 2016).  
Beyond access to appropriate schooling practices, some participants believed 
the parents of children with an ID would also likely have an ID themselves, resulting 
in substandard parenting practices and exacerbating an existing impairment in their 
child. This is a widely held and stigmatising belief (e.g., Coles & Scior, 2012). While 
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parents with an ID are overrepresented in child protection services, the reasons for 
this are complex; for example, parents with an ID are more likely to experience 
social and economic disadvantage, and to experience social isolation (risk factors for 
child neglect; Lamont & Bromfield, 2009). Parents with an ID, as individuals, also 
have varied levels of social information processing ability and social learning, based 
on their own socialisation. Azar, Stevenson, and Johnson (2012) found that social 
information processing ability was predictive of child neglect by parents with an ID, 
while their actual IQ was not. However, the belief subtheme that Psychosocial 
Neglect/Abuse experienced during critical developmental periods can cause ID is 
supported by research describing naturalistic cases of individuals who have 
experienced this (Eluvathingal et al., 2006). 
The belief theme Social Construction and its subthemes, Normative Labelling 
and Impropriety, were particularly interesting. These subthemes were both 
admonishments against the study’s request for participants to identify what they 
believed to be the cause of John’s ID, with each denying the value and relevance of 
understanding causal beliefs about ID for different reasons. Normative Labelling 
subtheme responses both explicitly and implicitly highlighted the stigmatising effects 
of labelling (including attribution of causes) and stereotyping. This is very 
interesting, because participants overall demonstrated a sound level of layperson 
literacy regarding the many causes of ID; while stereotypical causes of ID may have 
been reported by our participants, they were at least situated within a realistic 
biopsychosocial model understanding of ID. Furthermore, the tone and terms used to 
explain beliefs about the causes of ID by the majority of participants was respectful, 
non-disparaging, and in many cases quite sophisticated (apart from spelling errors or 
misattributed causation in place of correlation). The tone of participant responses 
contributing to this subtheme reframed the purpose of the research exercise to 
 250
refocus on the person ‘behind’ the disability, and on what they perceived to be 
John’s strengths (agency, capacity to flourish) rather than his limitations (disability), 
without ever specifying a causal belief.  
The subtheme Impropriety was similarly interesting; participants contributing 
to this subtheme also refused to specify their causal beliefs about ID, explaining this 
was impolite, rude, or invasive. While the issue of disability in society is now openly 
discussed by government policy, legislation, and media in a more inclusive, 
sensitive, and pragmatic manner than historically, this subtheme may reflect 
traditional beliefs that disability, particularly ID, is actually shameful or 
embarrassing, or may be felt to be shameful or embarrassing by people with an ID 
and/or their family. To present explicit discussion about the cause of our hypothetical 
character’s ID may be considered poor etiquette or even taboo by participants 
contributing to this subtheme, and avoidance of discussion about this may reflect a 
learned strategy which is intended to maintain face.  
Of all the belief themes identified, Metaphysical Mystery was unique. Past 
research on causal beliefs about ID has highlighted that Western populations (e.g., 
Australians, United Kingdom) tend to hold causal beliefs about ID and psychiatric 
illnesses consistent with the dominant Western medical model, which specifies the 
interaction of biological and environmental factors as the cause of ID (May, Rapee, 
Coello, Momartin, & Aroche, 2014; Scior & Furnham, 2011). Cross-cultural 
research shows that non-Western populations can hold more superstitious or 
supernatural beliefs about the causes of ID and other disabilities (May et al., 2014; 
Mesfin, 1999; Mulatu, 1999). Supernatural causal beliefs about ID (and other 
disabilities and illnesses) typically focus on divine or supernatural justice, trial, 
punishment, possession or contamination (Kisanji, 1995; Scior & Furnham, 2011). In 
our study, only one participant reported a supernatural explanation for John’s ID 
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(i.e., John was reincarnated with an ID to learn a divine lesson). The other 
participants who contributed to this subtheme reported that ‘luck’ or ‘chance’ caused 
John’s ID. A review of literature on metaphysical beliefs about disability indicates 
this type of causal attribution has not been previously reported.  The Merriam-
Webster dictionary (2018) defines luck as ‘a force that brings good fortune or 
adversity’, and ‘the events or circumstances that operate for against an individual.’ 
Luck appears to be an external, circumstantial explanation for the cause of ID, 
without actually specifying an antecedent.  
The belief themes identified in the current study support Scior and 
colleagues’ research on stigma and causal attributions towards people with an ID 
(e.g., (Coles & Scior, 2012; Scior & Furnham, 2011). For example, Scior and 
Furnham’s (2011) development of a quantitative measure to assess peoples’ literacy 
about ID (including their causal beliefs) identified four factors for peoples’ causal 
beliefs (Adversity, Biomedical, Environmental, and Fate/Supernatural), which share 
obvious similarities to some of the qualitative themes identified by the current study. 
However, our results have greater breadth and nuance compared to those of Scior 
and colleagues, including those derived via focus group interviews conducted by 
Coles and Scior (2012) exploring causal beliefs about, and attitudes towards, people 
with an ID. Our participants’ literacy regarding causes of ID in the current study also 
appears to be superior to that demonstrated by their sample. They found that while 
some participants correctly identified biological causes of ID, they as frequently 
misidentified certain social influences such as migrant acculturation, prolonged 
separation from parents, and past trauma as causes of ID.  
Weiner (1986) causal attribution theory holds that many attributions are 
classified on three basic dimensions: locus, stability and controllability. Individuals 
tend to classify causes of important event outcomes as either internal or external to 
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them (locus), stable or unstable over time (stability), and as either controllable or 
uncontrollable (controllability). In the current study, causal attributions towards ID 
were stable (e.g., genetic cause) or unstable (e.g., physical injury), internal (e.g., 
genetics) or external (e.g., mother’s illness or substance use), and controllable (e.g., 
substance abuse, acquired brain injury due to risky behaviour) or uncontrollable 
(e.g., genetics, maternal substance abuse). Overall, however, our participants more 
frequently attributed uncontrollable causes for John’s ID than controllable causes. 
Many participants attributed responsibility/blame for John’s perceived 
genetic/congenital problems to his experiences in utero and hence implicitly, as well 
as explicitly, to his mother’s experiences and behaviours during pregnancy. Some 
participants did attribute controllability and hence blame for the ID to John, based on 
their belief he may have been responsible for this via his own risk-taking behaviour 
(e.g., dangerous driving, high impact sports, substance abuse), but this was 
infrequent. Participants tended to attribute external and internal causes, and stable 
and unstable causes, to John’s ID with fairly equal frequency.   
Perceived controllability of the cause of a negative outcome (such as a 
disability) can affect whether an individual is stigmatised for that outcome. The more 
controllable the outcome is perceived to be, the more responsibility and blame are 
attributed to the individual; if a negative outcome is perceived to be uncontrollable 
(that is, the disability has been caused by an agent or event other than the individual), 
then less (or no) responsibility and blame are attributed (Crandall, 2000). For 
example, Panek and Jungers (2008) assessed United States university students’ 
causal attributions for ID. They found that participants held the most positive 
attitudes towards people with an ID when their disability was perceived to be 
uncontrollable, caused by genetics (i.e., Down Syndrome), and held the most 
negative attitudes when the disability was perceived to be controllable, self-inflicted 
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(i.e., brain damage due to drinking cleaning fluid as a child). They also found that 
participants attributed greater responsibility for the disability to the target with self-
inflicted ID than the target with Down Syndrome, and responsibility attributions did 
not differ between the target with Down Syndrome and another whose ID was 
inflicted by another person (i.e., Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder).  
However, the association of biogenetic (and hence uncontrollable) causal 
beliefs with stigma-related attitudes can be complex. For example, some researchers 
have found that the perceived dangerousness and consequent fear of the stigmatising 
disability (e.g., schizophrenia) can increase desire for social distance from the 
individual, even when biogenetic causal attributions are made (Angermeyer & 
Matschinger, 2003; Dietrich et al., 2004; Ellison, Mason, & Scior, 2015). A recent 
meta-analysis found that while biogenetic causal attributions were significantly 
associated with decreased blame for the stigmatising disability or disorder, desire for 
social distance was not significantly associated with these causal attributions. 
Furthermore, biogenetic causal attributions were actually significantly associated 
with perceived dangerousness of, and prognostic pessimism for, the stigmatised 
individual (Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener, 2013).  
While the current study did not assess participant attitudes towards John in a 
standardised way (e.g., using social distance or attitude valency measures), it was 
notable that participants were generally respectful and used inclusive, positive 
language when explaining their opinions. It was rare for participants to actively 
attribute the cause of John’s ID to him personally; the responses to do this related to 
the belief themes-subthemes of Physical Trauma-Forceful Impact (referring to 
acquired brain injury due to risk-related behaviours like fighting and driving- or 
sports-related injuries) and Exposure to Chemical Toxins - Alcohol and/or Other 
Drug Use (referring to John, again, acquiring brain injury due to misuse/abuse of 
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alcohol or other drugs). The majority of belief themes and subthemes (including 
Metaphysical Mystery) focused on uncontrollable causal explanations for John’s ID, 
with many participants implying or explicitly stating that John should not be blamed 
or treated differently for his disability. This latter attitude supports a theme identified 
by Coles and Scior (2012) called ‘universal humanity’, which involved endorsement 
of social inclusion and acceptance of people with an ID, consistent with the 
egalitarian ideology of the United Nations human rights principles.   
Causal Beliefs about Criminal Offending (Disability Not Specified) 
Six themes representing participants’ causal beliefs about why an individual 
might criminally offend (theft, physical assault) were identified, and are listed here in 
order from most frequently to least frequently coded: Financial Pressure; 
Entitlement; Impaired Reasoning; Social Connection; Moral Disregard; and 
Innocent. These causal belief themes and their subthemes for criminal offending are 
similar to those identified by Erskine (1974), who found the American public held 
the following causal beliefs about crime based on compiled poll data: parental 
upbringing and the breakdown of family life; bad environment; leniency in laws and 
the criminal justice system; drugs; mental illness; permissiveness in society; and 
poverty/unemployment. There are obvious differences between our 
themes/subthemes and the categories defined by Erskine (1974), though. Erskine 
specifies two categories emphasising liberal social norms and criminal justice 
practices, which our participants did not refer to; and our themes/subthemes specify 
the influence of situational or existential distress, low intelligence, coercion by 
others, lack of intimacy, thrill-seeking, preservation of honour, and scape-goating as 
causal factors associated with offending. It is notable that although Erskine’s 
research was conducted during the 1970’s, used an American sample, and included 
reference to both general and specific criminal scenarios (suggesting sociohistorical 
 255
factors within American during this era likely influenced participant responses), the 
causal attribution categories she identified were similar to the current study’s causal 
belief themes.  
The current study’s results are also consistent with Carroll (1978) research 
examining causal attributions by American expert parole decision makers and 
university students towards criminal offenders’ and their behaviour. Carroll (1978) 
identified drug and alcohol abuse as the most frequently reported causal attribution, 
followed by long term greed or spontaneous desire for money, victim precipitation, 
intoxication, peer influence, lack of control, mental illness/problems, and domestic 
problems. Some of Carroll’s categories are quite broad (e.g., ‘lack of control’), but 
could reflect attributions about Psychological Distress and Intoxication while 
Substance Impaired (two subthemes of Impaired Reasoning’). Interestingly, Carroll’s 
participants didn’t attribute Immorality to criminal offenders as did participants in 
the current study, nor a sense of personal Entitlement (including subthemes such as 
Social Comparison, Preservation of Honour, and Irresponsible).  
Like Erskine (1974), Carroll’s (1978) participants also didn’t appear to 
believe offenders could have been scape-goated by the criminal justice system 
(identified in the current study as the theme, Innocent), or that offenders might have 
low intelligence (identified in the current study as the theme-subtheme, Impaired 
Reasoning-Low Intelligence). In developing a quantitative measure of sentencing 
attributions and goals, however, Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, and Weaver (1987) 
consolidated their past research on causal attributions for offending into three 
dimensions: Social Causation (crime comes from family problems, criminal 
associations, drugs); Economic Causation (crime comes from societal conditions of 
poverty and inequality); and Individual Causation (crime comes from lazy, 
irresponsible, and uncaring individuals). This latter category from Carroll et al. 
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(1987) more appropriately reflects certain Entitlement subthemes (Social 
Comparison, Irresponsible). Our results are also largely consistent with that of 
Furnham and Henderson (1983), and an associated validated measure by Hollin and 
Howells (1987), who identified causal attributions for young peoples’ criminal 
offending as due to defective education, mental instability, temptation, excitement, 
alienation, and parenting. 
According to Weiner’s (1985, 1986) causal attribution theory, participants in 
the current study identified causes for John’s offending that were both stable (e.g., 
low intelligence) and unstable (e.g., substance impaired), external (e.g., peer/parent 
pressure) and internal (e.g., psychological disorder and distress), and controllable 
(e.g., immorality) and non-controllable (e.g., working poor). However, themes 
tended to reflect more frequent attributions that were both internal and controllable. 
Carroll (1978) proposed that causal attributions made towards offenders arose via an 
interaction of case information (provided in court notes or via media) with the 
attitudes and knowledge of the individual attributor. He further proposed that causal 
attributions may employ a similar structure to schemas, where pieces of information 
provided to the individual are then applied to one’s schema for criminal offending, 
with resultant causal attributions reflecting perceived antecedents within the schema 
(e.g., case information triggers a ‘drug habit’ schema, which contains assumptions 
about the target’s social and criminal history, suggestions for correctional treatment, 
and predictions of future behaviour).  
While we did not assess beliefs about likelihood of recidivism, Carroll (1978) 
found that offenders whose crimes were attributed to internal (e.g., mental illness, 
addiction, intoxication, greed) and intentional (e.g., premeditated violence or theft) 
factors were attributed the greatest criminal responsibility by an American university 
student sample. Internal causes were also associated with less liking for the offender, 
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higher ratings of crime severity, and advising punishment via imprisonment and a 
longer term of imprisonment by this sample. In comparison to a panel of parole 
experts, students’ attributions were higher for all of these outcomes. Carroll (1978) 
also found that offenders who were attributed stable, enduring causes for their 
offending (e.g., pathological personality traits, chronic socioeconomic disadvantage) 
by students were considered more likely to reoffend, were attributed higher 
criminality and criminal responsibility, and advised imprisonment for incapacitation 
and a longer prison sentence. Carroll et al. (1987) similarly found that causal factors 
attributed to the individual positively predicted punitive sentencing goals and 
negatively predicted rehabilitative goals, while both social and economic causal 
attributions predicted rehabilitative sentencing goals. For context, and with reference 
to Weiner (1985, 1986) attribution theory, Carroll et al. (1987) categorised these 
causal dimensions in the following ways: social causation was external, unstable, and 
unintentional; economic causation was external, stable, and unintentional; and 
individual causation was internal, stable, and intentional. 
Carroll’s (1978, 1987) findings are supported by more recent studies in this 
area. For example, Sims (2003) found that causal attributions focused on structural 
inequalities and pressure (such as poverty and poor education) were significantly 
associated with support for rehabilitation, while causal attributions focusing on social 
modelling (such as parent and peer influence) were associated with support for 
punishment. Interestingly, Sims (2003) showed that participants held causal beliefs 
that the criminal justice system’s leniency, in addition to offenders not fearing 
consequences, predicted increased support for punishment. As for the older studies 
cited, this particular type of causal belief was not expressed by participants in the 
current study.  
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Causal Beliefs about Criminal Offending With an Intellectual Disability 
Specified 
Six themes representing participants’ causal beliefs about why an individual 
with a mild ID might criminally offend (theft, physical assault) were identified, and 
are listed here in order from most frequently to least frequently coded in participant 
responses: Intellectual Disability; Social Influences; Entitlement; Working Poor; 
Immoral; and Innocent. The four subthemes for the theme Intellectual Disability (i.e., 
Consequential Reasoning, Impulsivity, Misunderstandings, and Situational Stress) 
each refer to causal factors over which John had no control, although the first two 
subthemes are internal and stable causes, while the latter two subthemes represent 
external and unstable causes (Weiner, 1985, 1986). The subthemes for the Social 
Influences theme (i.e., Peers and Media) both refer to external, unstable, and 
uncontrollable causes, while the theme Working Poor and Innocent refer to external, 
stable, and uncontrollable causes. The only themes-subthemes implying 
controllability by John with an ID were Entitlement (i.e., Social Comparison and 
Preservation of Honour) and Immoral. The theme Immoral denotes a stable, internal 
cause whereas the categorisation of the subthemes Social Comparison and 
Preservation of Honour is less clear. Overall, more causal belief themes and 
subthemes implying uncontrollability, associated with both internal and external 
factors, and both stable and unstable factors, were attributed to John with an ID 
compared to without an ID. It should be noted that while there are descriptive 
empirical reports about the types and frequencies of offences people with an ID tend 
to commit and are sentenced for, there is no past empirical research examining causal 
attributions regrading why people with an ID criminally offend (to my knowledge).  
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Key Findings from the Cross-Case Analysis 
Two key findings emerged from the cross-case analysis of participants’ 
causal attributions regarding John’s offending when an ID was specified versus not. 
The first was that participants reported causes such as intoxication, addiction (and 
associated financial pressure), and mental illness for John’s offending when an ID 
was not specified, but did not report these causes when an ID was specified. 
Aggression and irrationality were associated with these causes for John without an 
ID, but when an ID was specified, any aggression or irrationality associated with his 
offending was attributed to his ID. It is possible these causes weren’t attributed to 
John when an ID was specified because participants genuinely did not believe that 
people with an ID can experience mental illness or substance abuse. Supporting this 
interpretation, an Australian study found a common stereotype attributed to people 
with an ID (specifically people with Down’s Syndrome) was that they are extremely 
happy and affectionate (Gilmore, Campbell, & Cuskelly, 2003) suggesting a 
simplistic view of people with an ID’s potential for mental health issues. This 
stereotype is in stark contrast to research indicating high comorbidity of psychiatric 
disabilities (around 60%), including mood disorders, for people with an ID in 
Australia (Wen, 2008), and that people with an ID and comorbid mental illness are at 
increased risk of both crime perpetration and victimisation (Fogden et al., 2016).  
Complex emotional motivations were similarly attributed to John when an ID 
was not specified, such as existential distress, desire for romantic intimacy, and thrill 
seeking; but these weren’t attributed when an ID was specified. Past research 
indicates that people with an ID do experience complex existential insights and 
emotions, for example concerning grief due to loss of loved ones (McRitchie, 
McKenzie, Quayle, Harlin, & Neumann, 2014), how to balance their desire for 
independence while requiring some assistance from parents or social services (Pryce, 
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Tweed, Hilton, & Priest, 2017), and the role of spiritual and religious faith in 
meaning making in life (Liu, Carter, Boehm, Annandale, & Taylor, 2014). Contrary 
to research demonstrating that people with an ID value and aspire to have intimate, 
sexual relationships (Healy, McGuire, Evans, & Carley, 2009), research on 
community attitudes suggest people with an ID are often viewed as perpetual 
children and hence asexual, or alternatively as being sexually uncontrollable in an 
animalistic way (Swango-Wilson, 2008). Furthermore, like many adolescents and 
young adults, people with an ID from a lower socioeconomic background and with 
lower school engagement tend to engage in more risk-taking (similar to thrill-
seeking) and offending behaviour, a predictor of adult criminal offending (Savage & 
Bouck, 2017). People with a mild ID (as portrayed in the vignettes) are more likely 
to offend than those with a moderate or severe ID (Savage & Bouck, 2017). These 
differences in causal belief themes and subthemes suggest that for participants, when 
an ID was specified, John was attributed limited psychosocial complexity.  
The second key finding of the cross-case analysis was that participants tended 
to attribute causes to John’s offending that were less controllable, or uncontrollable, 
when an ID was specified versus when this was not specified. Most of the causes 
attributed to John’s ID in the initial vignette were due to factors beyond his control, 
such as genetics, in utero trauma, illness, the damaging behaviour of others, or 
‘luck’. For John’s offending where he was specified to have an ID, the causes of his 
offending were perceived to be rooted in his uncontrollable ID, so that even 
behaviours he should have been attributed control over (emotional reactions to 
situational conflict) were framed as being conditional on his ID, reducing their 
perceived controllability. In comparison, when an ID was not specified, John was 
attributed a greater range of causes generally for his offending, and a greater range of 
controllable and uncontrollable causes.  
 261
Participants’ greater attribution of biogenetic explanations for ID, and 
grounding of John’s offending within this biogenetic foundation when an ID was 
specified, is consistent with the concept of genetic essentialist biases or ‘genetic 
essentialism’ proposed by Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011)and critiqued by Haslam 
(2011).  Ahn, Flanagan, Marsh, and Sanislow (2006) and Haslam (2000) found that 
laypeople tend to hold essentialist views about certain psychological disorders; and 
Haslam and Ernst (2002) found that essentialist forms of cognition guide people’s 
reasoning about these disorders. Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) identified that people 
tend to be biased in the degree of importance placed on biogenetic explanations for 
outcomes, including a range of criminal behaviours. Haslam (2011) argues that while 
genetic essentialism is associated with decreased attributions of blame, it is also 
associated with increased stigma on a range of dimensions (e.g., perceived 
dangerousness, pessimism, and social distance), generally reflecting the findings of 
Haslam and colleagues meta-analysis on the same topic, except that their meta-
analysis did not detect a significant association between biogenetic causal 
attributions and social distance (Kvaale et al., 2013).  
Research focused specifically on causal attributions toward criminal 
offenders also found that when participants were primed to believe in biogenetic 
causes for the crime of manslaughter, the offender was perceived to be more 
deserving of legal defence due to diminished capacity and insanity, but more likely 
to criminally reoffend, relative to an ‘environmental cause’ prime and control group 
(Cheung & Heine, 2015), and consistent with Kvaale et al.’s (2013) meta-analysis’ 
findings concerning perceived dangerousness. 
Weiner (1985, 1986) model predicts that perceived controllability of a 
person’s negative outcome affects emotional responses (i.e., anger if controllable, 
pity or sympathy if uncontrollable) to the person and their outcome; similarly, 
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perceived stability affects perceived degree of optimism that the negative outcome 
will be resolved (i.e., optimism if unstable or temporary, and pessimism if stable and 
enduring). In the case of John with an ID, where causal attributions were largely 
perceived to be internal, stable, and uncontrollable due to his disability, Weiner’s 
model suggests participants may feel more pity for John’s circumstances, including 
his offending, and more pessimism that this could be resolved. For John without an 
ID specified, where John’s offending was attributed to both controllable and 
uncontrollable factors, and to both stable and unstable factors, participants may be 
more likely to feel anger instead of, or in addition to, pity for John’s circumstances 
and offending, and a greater degree of optimism that it could be curbed.  
Two additional properties Weiner (1985, 1986) questions as possibly 
associated with causal factors are whether they are perceived to be global (versus 
specific) and intentional (versus unintentional). In fact, Weiner uses degree of 
intelligence (as opposed to aptitude for math) as an example of a global (rather than 
specific) causal attribution for negative and positive outcomes. While these two 
questionable properties are underexplored in attribution theory research, we propose 
that in the case of offenders with an ID, their disability could be perceived as a 
global property by participants in that it biases all other perceived causes of 
offending, and their associated properties. For example, when participants were 
primed to believe in biogenetic causes for the crime of manslaughter (relative to 
environmental causes or a control where no cause was primed), the cause of the 
crime was perceived to be less controllable, more stable, more internal, and the target 
was attributed less perceived intent to kill and, in one of three studies, less criminal 
responsibility (Cheung & Heine, 2015). Of particular note, Cheung and Heine (2015) 
also found that participants perceived the biogenetic cause for offending as being 
more specific (versus global) compared to the environmental cause prime; this means 
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that participants saw the genetic predisposition to violence, specified in the stimulus 
prime, as being context-specific to interpersonal provocation and so only specific to 
interpersonal violence. While a biogenetic causal prime was thus applied, it was 
limited in the sense that it was relevant only to a single behavioural predisposition – 
aggression. In contrast, the primary causal explanation applied to John’s offending 
when an ID was specified, was his actual ID – a pervasive developmental disorder 
which participants implied contextualised all intrapersonal and interpersonal 
experiences.  
 Participant explicitly or implicitly reported that the causes for ID, and for 
offending when an ID was specified, were internal, enduring, uncontrollable, and 
overall global in that it affected multiple domains of John’s life. This has 
implications for the perceived intentionality of John’s offending when an ID was 
specified. Even if John was attributed an intentionally immoral agenda (both internal 
and over which he had control), this was contextualised by his having an ID, 
resulting in perceived controllability and hence intentionality as necessarily reduced.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research for Study 4 
Due to the large sample size, the qualitative data collection approach for the 
three comparative vignettes in Study 4 yielded extensive and nuanced participant 
explanations, which reflected and extended on past qualitative and quantitative 
research examining causal attributions for ID, in addition to criminal offending when 
an ID is specified as present or not.  
A key limitation of this study was that while the qualitative nature of the data 
yielded varied and detailed causal explanations for criminal offending, both with and 
without an ID specified, the capacity to apply attribution theory in a definitive 
manner was limited because the properties of participants’ causal attributions 
(internal-external, stable-unstable, controllable-uncontrollable, specific-global) were 
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inferred by the researcher rather than explicitly reported by participants. As a result, 
the researcher has made inferences about these properties that participants may not 
have intended. Future researchers should consider replicating this study using a 
quantitative methodology to consolidate causal attributions and to further explore 
associated properties and relationships with criminal justice attributions and 
outcomes. For example, using the two criminal offender vignettes as stimuli, the 
causal belief themes generated in the current study could be used as quantitative 
categories in addition to measures of causal attribution properties (such as Peterson 
et al.’s [1982] Attributional Style Survey), as well as measures of perceived moral 
responsibility and sentencing outcomes. 
A second limitation was that while there was a large quantity of qualitative 
data, and most participants made an excellent effort to communicate their detailed 
causal beliefs in writing, this data was of a lower quality than that derived by 
conversational interview-style collection methods. Instead of being ‘rich’, it was 
‘thin’; some participant responses were ambiguous or held internal contradictions 
and could not be followed up and explored further due to the single time point of 
data collection and anonymity of participant responses. Future researchers should 
consider reproducing this part of the study via individual and group interview 
approaches to explore participants’ certainty of their initial responses, and challenge 
initial responses (whether negative or positive).  
A third limitation of this study was that each vignette presented a male target, 
with no comparative female, limiting the generalisability of the causal beliefs 
identified. It is possible that participants would have attributed different causal 
beliefs to a woman whose description fit John’s with the exception of their gender. 
Future research could replicate the vignette component of Factorial Survey 1, 
modifying only the vignette target’s gender, to assess whether causal attributions 
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toward people with an ID, and towards those who offend with or without an ID, are 
similar regardless of the target’s gender.  
Conclusion 
 Overall, Australians reported a variety of causal explanations for ID, and for 
criminal offending when an ID was, or was not, specified. Causal beliefs themes for 
ID were consistent with past research, and indicated Australian participants had 
sound ID literacy. This study provided a more nuanced description of these 
previously identified causes compared to past research, and highlighted that 
Australians predominantly ascribed biogenetic and uncontrollable environmental 
causes to the possession of ID.  It was also notable that Australian participants hardly 
referred to supernatural causes to explain ID. 
 Regarding causal belief themes for offenders with versus without an ID 
specified, Australian participants tended to report a greater variety of causes for 
criminal offending when and ID was not specified, including a range of social, 
intrapersonal, and interpersonal antecedents. When an ID was specified, however, 
participants reported a narrower range of causal beliefs for criminal offending, 
primarily identified the ID as the primary cause of criminal offending, and tended to 
contextualise all secondary causes with reference to the ID. The key difference 
between responses to the two criminal offender vignettes centred around attributions 
of controllability of causes for offending, and hence responsibility for criminal 
behaviours; as well as around the complexity of John’s character when an ID was, 
versus was not, specified. Participants appeared to view John as a victim of his 
uncontrollable disability in spite of this criminal offending when an ID was 
specified, whereas more controllability and hence criminal responsibility was 
attributed to John when an ID was not specified. 
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 CHAPTER NINE – METHOD FOR FACTORIAL SURVEY 2 – COMMUNITY 
MEMBERS’ AND PROFESSIONALS’ CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS OFFENDERS WITH AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
 
This Chapter presents a comprehensive Method for the two-part quantitative 
online factorial survey (Factorial Survey 2) used to collect data for Study 5 and 6, 
which respectively address research questions 5 and 6. 
 
Method 
Overview 
Study 5 (Chapter 10) addressed research question 5. This involved the 
recruitment of four subsamples (i.e., community members, criminal justice 
professionals, disability professionals, and professionals with experience in both the 
criminal justice and disability sectors) deemed ‘influential social groups’ (IS groups), 
and compared their attitudes towards appropriate correctional treatment settings (i.e., 
prisons, within the community) for offenders with an ID. This involved the 
development and validation of two measures, one per setting. After validating each 
measure via exploratory and confirmatory factors analyses, one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to assess mean differences between subsamples’ responses for each 
measure.  
Study 6 (Chapter 11) addressed research question 6. For Study 6, an equal 
number of participants from each IS group in Study 5 were randomly allocated to 
one of three vignettes describing a crime (sexual assault, physical assault with a 
weapon, burglary) committed by a male offender. In each vignette condition, 
participants were further randomly allocated to one of two conditions where the 
offender either did, or did not, have an ID specified. Each vignette condition was 
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thus a 4 x 2 (i.e., IS group x offender ID status) factorial design, with analyses 
conducted by vignette subsample.  
After reading their vignette, participants completed measures assessing their 
attitudes towards criminal justice outcomes for their respective offender; these 
included perceived degree of moral culpability for the offence, deservingness of 
punishment via imprisonment, perceived value of rehabilitation, support for 
reintegration into the community, willingness to forgive once a sentence was served, 
and perceived influence of alcohol and/or other drugs on the offender’s criminal 
behaviour. In Vignette 1, the offender committed a sexual offence and either did 
(condition 1) or did not (condition 2) have an ID specified; in Vignette 2, the 
offender committed a violent offence with a weapon and either did (condition 1) or 
did not (condition 2) have an ID specified; and in Vignette 3, the offender committed 
burglary with a weapon and either did (condition 1) or did not (condition 2) have an 
ID specified. After validating each criminal justice outcome measure via exploratory 
and confirmatory factors analyses, where required, five 4 (IS group) x 2 (offender ID 
status) ANOVAs were conducted per vignette to determine mean differences on each 
criminal justice outcome measure, by subsample and whether or not the offender had 
an ID specified.  
As for the survey used for Studies 1-4, the breadth and quantity of valuable 
responses to this second survey led to the decision to present this data as two 
separate studies (Studies 5 and 6) so that the research questions they each aim to 
address could be adequately explored. Subsequently, Chapters 9 and 10 present the 
Aims and Exploratory Research Questions, Results, and Discussion for Study 5 and 
6, respectively.  
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Participants 
Participants (N = 679) were adult Australians aged 18 to 90 years (Mage = 
39.18, SDage = 13.95). Overall, 28.1% (n = 190) were male, 71.6% (n = 487) were 
female, and 0.3% (n = 2) identified as ‘other’. Four populations were targeted during 
recruitment: community members (n = 224), criminal justice professionals (n = 113), 
disability professionals (n = 184), and professionals experienced in both the 
disability and criminal justice sectors (n = 158). Participants were eligible to 
complete the study if (1) they were an Australian citizen or permanent resident, and 
(2) were aged at least 18 years old. No incentives or reimbursements were provided 
for participating in the study. Given the use of a convenience sampling approach and 
heavy use of snowballing, it was not possible to compute a response rate for this 
study; however, of the 915 participants who accessed the study, 679 completed it, 
indicating a 74.2% completion rate. Of the initial 915, n = 42 were excluded because 
they indicated they were not an Australian citizen or permanent resident, n = 50 were 
false starts, and an additional n = 144 did not complete the Study 5 measures. A 
further n = 26 participants did not complete Study 6 measures. All participant and 
recruitment information relevant to Study 5 and 6 is the same. A detailed description 
of the total sample and each IS group’s demographics (i.e., gender, age, highest 
education level, and current employment status) is provided in Table 11.1 of the 
Results section. 
Recruitment. Participants for all IS groups were recruited using paid and 
unpaid advertisements via the social media platforms Facebook, Instagram, and 
Twitter, in addition to snowballing via these platforms. Participants experienced in 
the disability, criminal justice, and in the forensic disability sectors, and likely to 
work with people with an ID, or with offenders with or without an ID, were also 
recruited by the researchers approaching these professionals via relevant conference 
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email lists, and in person by AH when attending said conferences. These 
professionals were also recruited via the professional social media networking site, 
LinkedIn. Relevant professionals were identified by their current or past role within 
these sectors, as well as by region (i.e., Australia), and then invited to ‘Connect’ with 
researcher AH. Professionals who ‘Connected’ with AH were then sent an 
individualised private message via LinkedIn describing the study and inviting the 
them to access the online Plain Language Statement and survey via the Qualtrics 
URL. Professionals who expressed interest in the study were also encouraged by the 
researcher to share the study invitation with any colleagues they thought were 
relevant via email or social media to encourage snowballing.  
Participants experienced in the disability sector and likely to work with 
people with an ID were also recruited by the researcher approaching relevant private 
and government funded disability organisations within Victoria, Australia. If the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a disability organisation provided written consent 
for their organisation to participate in the study, an administrative assistant from 
within the organisation would disseminate a study invitation and URL to relevant 
staff members via email on the researcher’s behalf. Overall, the CEO’s of 10 
disability private and government-funded organisations from within Victoria 
consented for their organisation’s employees to be invited to participate in the study 
on condition that their organisation’s and employee’s participation remain 
anonymous.   
An attempt was also made to access criminal justice and forensic disability 
professionals via formal applications to the Victorian and South Australian 
Departments of Justice, requesting to invite corrections officers (such as prison 
guards and parole officers) to participate in the study, however both of these 
applications were denied on the basis that the study’s objectives were not deemed to 
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align with these Departments’ strategic frameworks. As such, all government-
employed criminal justice and forensic disability professionals who participated in 
this study were recruited on an individual basis, primarily via snowballing using 
LinkedIn. 
Design 
 A two-part, quantitative online factorial survey design and methodology was 
employed to examine variables of interest using a variety of measurement tools and 
stimuli. The first part of the survey was cross-sectional, and the second part included 
a quasi-experimental manipulation. As for the survey used for Studies 1-4, an online 
survey methodology was used to collect participant responses for this second survey. 
In the first cross-sectional part of the survey relevant to Study 5, participants 
completed measures assessing their demographics, occupation to determine IS group 
(i.e., community member, criminal justice professional, disability professional, dual 
professional), and attitudes toward appropriate correctional treatment settings (i.e., 
prison setting, community setting) for offenders with an ID. In the second quasi-
experimental part of the survey relevant to Study 6, participants from each of the 
four IS groups were randomly allocated to one of three vignettes detailing a different 
criminal/criminal type (sexual assault, physical assault with a weapon, burglary). 
Participants in each vignette were further randomly allocated to one of two 
conditions detailing a different disability status (ID specified, no ID specified). After 
reading their respective stimulus describing their target criminal/crime type and their 
disability status, participants then completed measures assessing their attitude 
towards the moral culpability, deservingness of punishment via imprisonment, value 
of rehabilitation and reintegration, willingness to forgive the offender, and perceived 
role of intoxication on the criminal behaviour. A flow chart detailing the design of 
Factorial Survey 2 for Studies 5 and 6 is detailed below (Figure 9.1). 
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Figure 9.1 Design overview of Factorial Survey 2 for Studies 5 and 6. 
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Measures 
 Screening items. Participants were asked to report whether they were an 
Australian citizen (versus not), and whether they were at least 18 years old. 
Participants who reported they were not an Australian citizen, or were less than 18 
years old, could not continue and complete the study.  
Demographics. Participants were asked to report their age, gender, 
State/Territory of residence, highest level of education, occupational area of study, 
and current employment status.  
Influential social group (independent variable for Study 5 and 6). 
Participants were asked (a) ‘Are you currently, or have you ever, been employed in 
the disability/social work field?’, and (b) ‘Are you currently, or have you ever, been 
employed in the correctional/criminal justice field?’ Participants who answered 
‘Yes’ to either or both of these questions were then asked: ‘For how many years did 
you work in this field?’. Participants who reported at least six months of work 
experience in the criminal justice sector only were categorised as a ‘criminal justice 
professional’, those who reported at least six months of work experience in the 
disability sector only were categorised as a ‘disability professional’, and those who 
reported at least six months of work experience in both the criminal justice sector as 
well as in the disability sector were categorised as a ‘dual professional’. All 
participants who did not identify as having at least six months of work experience in 
either the criminal justice or disability sectors were categorised as being from the 
‘general community’. 
Beliefs about appropriate correctional treatment settings for offenders 
with an ID (dependent variables for Study 5). Two original measures were 
developed to assess participant beliefs about appropriate correctional treatment 
settings (prisons, community) for offenders with an ID. Prior to completing the items 
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for these two measures, participants were presented with the following contextual 
information: 
The following provides some background information 
about offenders who have an intellectual disability. 
Please keep this information in mind as you answer 
future questions. 
An intellectual disability is a developmental disorder, 
which means a person with this disability has an 
intelligence quotient (IQ) under 70 and can experience 
trouble with aspects of daily living such as learning 
new skills and activities, understanding complicated 
instructions, and ‘reading between the lines’ in social 
situations. A person is typically diagnosed with an 
intellectual disability by a psychiatrist or clinical 
psychologist. 
A person who commits a serious antisocial behaviour 
(e.g., a crime) is first charged by police and then, if 
proven guilty of a criminal offence, may be sentenced 
in various ways. Sentencing might include a suspended 
sentence, a community corrections order, or 
imprisonment either with or without parole. 
A suspended sentence is a prison sentence not put into 
immediate effect. A community corrections order is a 
sentence served in the community, and might involve 
frequent reporting to police, home detention, and/or 
community-rehabilitation interventions. Imprisonment 
typically includes rehabilitation and community 
reintegration interventions, and might occur in a 
minimum, medium, or maximum security prison. 
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Offenders with an intellectual disability are sentenced 
in varying ways in Australia. 
 Prison treatment setting. Beliefs about the appropriateness of treating 
offenders with an ID in the prison setting were assessed via seven items (e.g., ‘Prison 
facilities and services should be the same for all prisoners, regardless of whether they 
have an ID’). These items are detailed along with EFA results in Appendix V. Items 
were developed on the basis that beliefs about the appropriateness of a correctional 
treatment setting likely reflect a continuum of beliefs that (a) offenders with an ID 
deserve to be treated similarly to offenders without an ID, (b) imprisonment is an 
effective correctional treatment strategy for criminal offenders generally, and (c) 
only ‘deserving’ criminal offenders will ever be imprisoned. Participants were asked 
to ‘Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements,’ and used a six-point Likert-type rating scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = 
Strongly Agree) to indicate their agreement with the items. A forced-choice approach 
to the response scale was chosen to ensure that participants reflected on and 
confirmed a belief, with only their own knowledge set and the information provided 
to guide them. Internal reliability for this measure was acceptable (α = .78).  Prior to 
completing the items, participants were also asked to read the following information 
to provide them with context about correctional treatment in the prison setting: 
 The following information provides some background 
information about imprisonment in Australia.  
Prison institutions provide a wide range of psycho-
education and therapeutic programs for prisoners 
designed to assist in their rehabilitation and successful 
return to the community after release from custody.  
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Programs are typically dedicated towards reducing 
risk in sexual and violent offenders, as well as 
addressing more general causes of offending (e.g., 
reducing substance use/abuse, improving cognitive 
skills such as problem-solving and perspective taking).  
Community treatment setting. Beliefs about the appropriateness of 
correctional treatment of offenders with an ID in the community setting were also 
assessed via eight items (e.g., ‘Community correction orders are the best way to 
sentence offenders with an ID’). These items are detailed along with EFA results in 
Appendix V.  Items were developed on the basis that beliefs about the 
appropriateness of a treatment setting likely reflect a continuum of beliefs that (a) 
offenders with an ID deserve to be treated similarly to offenders without an ID, (b) 
community-based correctional treatment is a ‘soft’ approach to correctional 
treatment, and so is not deserved by ‘dangerous’ criminal offenders, and (c) criminal 
offenders who serve community-based correction orders have more liberties (and 
hence may pose a greater risk to the community) compared to imprisoned offenders. 
Again, a six-point Likert-type rating scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly 
Agree) was used to assess agreement with these items, using a similar forced-choice 
approach. Internal reliability for this measure was good (α = .88). Prior to completing 
the items, participants were also asked to read the following information to provide 
them with context about treatment in the community setting:  
The following information provides some background 
information about community correction orders in 
Australia.  
A community correction order is a flexible sentencing 
order served in the community. The order can be 
imposed by itself or in addition to imprisonment or a 
fine. The community correction order is often applied 
for minor crimes where imprisonment of the offender 
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is not necessary for the protection of the community. 
They can assist in protecting the offender from 
potential negative influences of the prison 
environment. Offenders serving community 
correction orders can often interact with their friends 
and family at will.  
Offenders serving a community correction order may 
be required to attend community- based rehabilitation 
programs (e.g., for substance use, anger management, 
or driving skills), work-skills or community 
reintegration program, and/or make restitution to the 
community by completing unpaid work benefitting the 
community.   
 Criminal offence vignettes (stimuli for Study 6). Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of three vignette conditions describing a specific type of criminal 
offender: ‘Mark’, charged with sexual assault; ‘David’, charged with physical assault 
with a weapon; and ‘Henry’, charged with burglary. Campregher and Jeglic (2016) 
found that providing case-specific information via a vignette about an offender’s 
criminal behaviour (as opposed to having participants imagine a generic offender) 
reduced bias towards extreme responding for several criminal justice constructs 
(perceived dangerousness, likely recidivism, and punitiveness). As such, the 
vignettes were developed in consultation with two forensic psychology experts 
experienced in designing case-specific vignettes, and were designed to reflect 
realistic, common, criminal offence scenarios. Given the strong association of 
alcohol and/or other drug (AOD) use with criminal offences such as assault and theft, 
and to account for this possible assumption by participants, AOD use by the target 
offender was explicitly described and related to the criminal offence within each 
scenario.  
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Prior to viewing the vignette, participants were informed that they would read 
a description of a person who committed a criminal offence, and were asked to read 
the story carefully before answering the questions that followed. Participants were 
asked to confirm they had read the vignette before being able to progress to answer 
questions about it. 
‘Mark’, sexual assault scenario.  
Mark was attending a house party one night with one of his 
close friends. Having drunk alcohol heavily all evening, they 
noticed a woman they both went to school with passed out in 
a spare room. After a quick conversation, they entered the 
room, checked that she was unconscious, and locked the 
door.  
Mark’s friend, and then Mark, raped the woman and then 
quickly left the house together. A friend of the unconscious 
woman soon found her in the room and suspected that she 
had been sexually assaulted. She called the police. Forensic 
evidence was collected, witnesses described to police seeing 
Mark and his friend near the room the woman was assaulted 
in, and the two were soon charged with rape. In time, Mark 
and his friend were both convicted of rape. 
At the time of the offence, Mark was 25 years old and worked 
casually in a sports store down town. Mark had a close, small 
circle of male friends that he worked with. He came from a 
supportive family and while there were some close shaves 
with the law in the past, he’d never been charged with a 
criminal offence before this rape.    
    
‘David’, physical assault with a weapon scenario. 
On his 25th birthday, David was enraged when a bouncer 
wouldn’t let him into a bar with his mates because he seemed 
too intoxicated. David had recently started carrying a knife 
when out on the town, and was so angry he stabbed the 
bouncer four times in the stomach before being wrestled to 
the ground by security. David’s assault on the bouncer was 
captured by CCTV and witnessed by numerous staff and 
patrons, and he was soon charged and sentenced for assault 
with a weapon. 
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 David grew up in the city and had always been a brawler, 
even as a young boy. As a teenager he used to get into fights 
with boys in the year levels above his. As a young man, David 
kept picking fights when he went out drinking on the weekends 
with his mates. He developed a reputation among his mates 
as someone not to be challenged or provoked. 
 
‘Henry’, burglary scenario. 
Henry broke into a home while the family living there was 
asleep. He managed to collect $5000 worth of their property 
before a family member awoke and found him in the house. 
Henry ran off with the property but without injuring anyone. 
Police were able to track his whereabouts using the GPS of a 
phone he’d stolen from the family, and finding him still in 
possession of numerous stolen items, he was charged and 
ultimately sentenced with home invasion and burglary. 
Henry grew up in a regional town. He’d enjoyed studying at 
school when he was younger, but lost interest as a 
teenager.  In high school he started dabbling with different 
kinds of drugs, and by the time he left school he was addicted 
to methamphetamine. For a while Henry was able to pay for 
his habit with his part time job at Woolworths, but he was 
eventually fired for being unreliable. He was able to 
exchange sex for methamphetamine for a while, but this 
arrangement didn’t last and he eventually began breaking 
into peoples’ homes in neighbouring suburbs to steal money, 
phones, and computers to sell online. Henry was known to the 
local police for property and drug related offences, and was 
25 years old at the time of his latest offence.  
 
Disability status of vignette’s target offender (independent variable for 
Study 6). Within each vignette, participants were also allocated to one of two 
conditions indicating the target offender’s disability status: an ID was specified, or an 
ID was not specified. At the conclusion of each vignette, for the condition where an 
ID was specified, participants were provided with the following additional 
information:  
When [Mark/David/Henry] was 10 years old, he was 
diagnosed by a clinician with an intellectual disability, 
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meaning he has an IQ (intelligence quotient) of 65 and can 
experience trouble with aspects of daily living such as 
learning new skills and activities, understanding complicated 
instructions, and reading ‘between the lines’ in social 
situations. 
 
 Criminal justice attribution measures (dependent variables for Study 6). 
Six unidimensional measures were used to assess participants’ key criminal justice 
attributions toward their vignette’s target offender. The criminal justice constructs of 
moral culpability, punishment, rehabilitation, and reintegration each reflect core 
functions of the Australian criminal justice system. ‘Willingness to forgive’ was 
included as a construct of interest because one purpose of sentencing is to demonstrate 
to society that someone convicted of a criminal offence has ‘repaid’ their moral and 
legal social debt by completing a proportionate sentence (such as paying a fine or 
imprisonment). The influence of AOD on offending behaviour was included as a 
criminal justice construct of interest due to the strong association of AOD use with 
criminal offending, and publicity around this association in media representations of 
criminal offending which may influence participant responses.  
 Perceived moral culpability. A modified five-item version of the Attributions 
of Accountability Scale (Ghetti & Redlich, 2001; Crosby, 1995) was used to measure 
the degree of moral culpability participants attributed to their target offender for their 
criminal behaviour. Originally, the measure included four items: ‘The offender’s age 
should be considered when making a decision about his sentence’ (reverse scored); 
‘The offender has the mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his 
criminal actions’; ‘The offender did not fully understand the wrongfulness of his 
actions’ (reverse scored); and ‘The offender should be considered fully responsible 
for his actions’. Because both the physical and relative mental age of people with an 
ID are considered during conviction and sentencing, the first item described above 
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was replaced with two, more specific items: ‘The offender’s physical age should be 
considered when making a decision about his sentence’, and ‘The offender’s mental 
age should be considered when making a decision about his sentence’ (both reverse 
scored). Participants were informed, ‘The following questions relate to how well you 
think this offender understood the moral implications of their criminal behaviour’, 
and then were asked to rate the five items on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree). A mean scale score was computed for this variable; 
internal reliability was questionable (α = .65) when all five items were included, but 
became acceptable (α = .76) when the item ‘The offender’s physical age should be 
considered when making a decision about his sentence’ was excluded when 
computing the scale score. 
Attitude toward punishment. The four-item Punishment Attitude Scale 
(McCorkle, 1993) was used to assess participant attitudes towards their target 
offender’s punishment severity (via incapacitation and retribution). Participants were 
informed, ‘The following questions relate to how you think this offender should be 
punished for their criminal behaviour’, and then were asked to rate the following 
items on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree): ‘The 
primary concern with this criminal should be to make sure he is severely punished 
for his crime’; ‘If the only way this criminal and others like him can be locked up is 
to build more prisons, then so be it’; ‘The only way to prevent this criminal from 
committing future crimes is to keep him locked up’;  and ‘The courts are generally 
too easy on people who commit this sort of crime’. A mean scale score was 
computed for this variable, and its internal reliability was good (α = .87), and 
consistent with similar past research (McCorkle, 1993; Rogers & Ferguson, 2011). 
Attitude toward rehabilitation. The four-item Treatment Attitude Scale 
(McCorkle, 1993) was used to assess participant attitudes towards the value of 
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rehabilitation treatment for their target offender within the prison setting. Participants 
were informed, ‘The following questions relate to whether you think this offender 
can be rehabilitated’, and then were asked to rate the following items on a 6-point 
Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree): ‘Trying to rehabilitate this 
person would probably be a waste of time’ (reverse scored); ‘This offender would 
probably benefit from the psychological counselling programs offered in the prison’; 
‘If this offender received educational and vocational training in prison, he probably 
would not commit crimes in the future’; and ‘More effort needs to be made to 
expand and improve programs that would give this offender the chance to change his 
life’. A mean scale score was computed for this variable; its internal reliability was 
questionable (α = .68) when all four items were included, but was consistent with 
past similar past research (McCorkle, 1993; Rogers & Ferguson, 2011) and the 
Cronbach’s alpha did not improve by removing items.  
Attitude toward reintegration. An original measure with seven items was 
developed to assess participant attitudes toward reintegration of offenders who have 
completed their sentence back into the community. Participants were informed, ‘The 
following questions relate to reintegrating this person back into the community once 
they have completed their sentence’, and then were asked to rate the items (e.g., ‘The 
general community has a responsibility to help the offender feel like he belongs in 
society once his sentence is done’) items on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree). A mean scale score was computed for this variable, 
and its internal reliability when all items were included was good (α = .87). Items for 
this measure are detailed along with EFA results in Appendix V. 
Attitude toward forgiveness.  An original measure was developed to assess 
participants’ attitudes towards forgiving their target offender once they had 
completed their sentence. Participants were informed, ‘The following questions 
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relate to whether or not you think this person should be forgiven for their criminal 
behaviour, after they complete their sentence’, and then were asked to rate the five 
items (e.g., ‘Everyone deserves a second chance- even this offender’) on a 6-point 
Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree). A mean scale score was 
computed for this variable, and its internal reliability when all items were included 
was good (α = .87). Items for this measure are detailed along with EFA results in 
Appendix V. 
Influence of alcohol and/or other drugs on offending behaviour. To assess 
the degree to which participants believed the offender’s AOD use (described in each 
vignette) influenced their criminal behaviour, participants rated the following two 
items using a percentage slider scale (0 to 100%): ‘How much influence did 
alcohol/drugs have on this offender's criminal behaviour?’; and ‘How likely it is the 
offender would have committed this crime, had he not been affected by 
alcohol/drugs?’ (reverse scored). Percentage scores were converted to a 10-point 
scale to better manipulate the variable (e.g., reverse scoring item 2), and mean scale 
score was computed for this variable using the two items; its internal reliability was 
questionable (α = .69) but could not be assessed for improvement due to the small 
number of items.  
Procedure 
 Approval for the conduct of this study was received from the Deakin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee (refer to Appendix IV). Participants 
were then recruited to participate in the online study via paid and unpaid 
advertisements on Facebook and associated social media platforms (e.g., Instagram, 
LinkedIn), and by approaching relevant professional organisations to assist with 
recruitment via internal email to relevant professionals. Participants accessed the 
survey by clicking on the study site URL, imbedded in the social media 
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advertisements or email invitation. Participants first read the study’s Plain Language 
Statement and then were informed that by clicking ‘NEXT’ and moving on to 
complete the study items, they indicated their informed consent for their data to be 
used in the study.  
All participants completed demographic items, including items assessing 
their professional experience in the criminal justice/correctional and/or 
disability/social work sectors. After viewing information to contextualise offenders 
with an ID, as well as prison and community treatment settings, participants also 
completed items assessing their beliefs about the appropriateness of these two 
correctional treatment settings for offenders with an ID. These items were employed 
in analyses for Study 5. 
Participants were then randomly allocated to view one of the three vignettes 
describing a specific type of criminal scenario and behaviour (‘Mark’, charged with 
sexual assault; ‘David’, charged with physical assault with a weapon; and ‘Henry’, 
charged with burglary). Each participant only viewed one of the three vignettes, 
forming three subsamples. Within each vignette, participants were also randomly 
allocated to one of two conditions indicating the target offender’s disability status: an 
ID was specified, or an ID was not specified. Participants then read their vignette, 
including the target offender’s disability status description, and responded to 
measures assessing their attitude regarding their target’s degree of moral culpability, 
deservingness of punishment via imprisonment, value of rehabilitation, support for 
their reintegration after completing their sentence, their willingness to forgive their 
target’s crime, and the degree to which they felt their target’s use of alcohol and/or 
other drugs influenced their offending behaviour. These items were employed in 
analyses for Study 6. 
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At the end of the study, participants were thanked for their participation and 
invited to leave comments about the study for the researchers before exiting the site. 
The study took approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
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 CHAPTER TEN: STUDY 5 -  A COMPARISON OF COMMUNITY MEMBERS AND 
PROFESSIONALS ATTITUDES TOWARDS APPROPRIATE TREATMENT 
SETTINGS FOR OFFENDERS WITH AN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
 
This chapter details Study 5, which addresses research question 5 concerned 
with understanding how the attitudes held by members of influential social 
categories (i.e., Australian community members, and professionals experienced in 
the criminal justice sector, disability sector, or both sectors) differ regarding 
appropriate correctional treatment settings (i.e., community, prison) for offenders 
with an ID. This chapter reports the Aims and Exploratory Research Questions, Data 
Treatment and Analysis Approach, Results, and Discussion for Study 5. 
 
Aims and Exploratory Research Questions 
The aim of Study 5 was to explore whether and how the attitudes held by 
members of influential social (IS) categories (i.e., Australian community members, 
and professionals experienced in the criminal justice sector, disability sector, or both 
sectors) differ regarding appropriate correctional treatment settings for offenders 
with an ID. While there is past research comparing community member and different 
professional social categories’ attitudes towards offenders and people with an ID as 
independent targets, there is negligible research comparing these IS categories’ 
attitudes toward offenders with an ID specifically. As such, formal hypotheses were 
not developed to address this research aim. However, the following research 
questions were posed to guide IS category attitude comparisons, drawing on general 
trends identified in the review of literature in Chapter 2 Section III: 
1. Compared to the other IS groups, do community members hold more 
positive attitudes towards the correctional treatment of offenders with an 
ID in the prison setting?  
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2. Compared to the other IS groups, do disability professionals hold more 
negative attitudes towards the correctional treatment of offenders with an 
ID in the prison setting? 
3. Compared to the other IS groups, do community members hold more 
negative attitudes towards the correctional treatment of offenders with an 
ID in the community setting? 
4. Compared to the other IS groups, do disability professionals hold more 
positive attitudes towards the correctional treatment of offenders with an 
ID in the community setting?  
 
 
Data Treatment and Analysis Approach 
After cleaning and coding the data, assumptions relevant to EFA and one-
way ANOVA were assessed and addressed. Frequency and descriptive statistics 
detailing demographic characteristics of the overall sample and per IS group were 
provided. 
Measure Validity and Reliability 
To assess the validity of the original measures of beliefs about appropriate 
correctional treatment settings for offenders with an ID (prison, community), as well 
as the justice attribution measures regarding punishment, moral culpability, 
rehabilitation, reintegration, and forgiveness, EFAs were initially conducted per 
measure. All measures were found to have good to excellent internal reliability. 
Detailed descriptive and inferential analyses relevant to the validation of these 
measures can be found in Appendix V.   
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Descriptive and Inferential Analyses 
Descriptive statistics were provided for all relevant measures. Two one-way 
ANOVAs were conducted to determine mean differences in beliefs about the 
appropriateness of the prison setting and the community setting for the correctional 
treatment of offenders with an ID, according to IS group, including four levels (i.e., 
community, criminal justice professional, disability professional, and combined 
disability/criminal justice professional). 
Statistical Power Considerations 
A priori statistical power analyses were conducted to ensure an adequate 
sample size was recruited, and to reduce the risk of Type II error. The appropriate 
sample size necessary to conduct sound factor analyses is a controversial topic, 
however Field (2018) synthesis of respected statisticians’ recommendations on this 
issue suggest that N = 300 is adequate, N = 500 is good, and N = 1000 is excellent. 
Given our total sample size of N = 677, the sample size was adequate for the factorial 
analyses. 
For a one-way ANOVA comparing four groups, with an alpha of .05 and 
power of .80, N = 564 would be required to detect a very small effect size (f 2= .02), 
N = 179 would be required to detect a small effect size (f2 = .06), N = 76 would be 
required to detect a medium effect size (f2 = .15), N = 36 would be required to detect 
a large effect size (f2 = .35). Given our total sample size of N = 677, statistical power 
and sample size was adequate for the proposed one-way ANOVAs. 
Software 
G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2009; Faul et al., 2007), IBM AMOS version 24 was 
used for CFA analyses, and IBM SPSS Statistics version 24 was used for all other 
statistical analyses. 
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Results 
Assumption Testing 
After cleaning the data of missing cases and winsorising univariate and 
multivariate outliers (< 5% of cases per variable), assumptions of normality, 
independence of observations, and homogeneity of variances were assessed and 
deemed met for one-way ANOVA analyses. Levene’s Test of Equality of Error 
Variances was statistically significant for both ANOVAs (i.e., prison treatment 
setting: F(3, 674) = 10.03, p < .001, and community treatment setting: F(3, 674) = 
9.40, p < .001); however assessment of the Fmax ratios for each ANOVA (.76/.29 = 
2.62, and 1/.51 = 1.96, respectively) indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was not violated in either case (Field, 2018). Equal variances were thus 
assumed when interpreting results.  
Preliminary Analyses 
 Sample and influential social group demographic characteristics. Table 
10.1 describes the demographic characteristics of participants by overall sample and 
IS group. The majority of participants in the sample and IS groups were women (64 -
79%), likely reflecting the overrepresentation of women in social service professions, 
as well as gendered volunteer bias. A broad range of participant ages, highest 
education level, region of residence, and employment status was represented within 
IS group’s. Participants in the community members group were aged 18-85 (M = 
35.62, SD = 14.05). Participants categorised as professionals with experience in the 
criminal justice/corrections sector only were aged 20-73 (M = 40.09, SD = 12.79) 
and had worked on average for nearly 11 years in this sector (M = 10.84, SD = 9.83, 
range = .5 - 40 years). Participants categorised as professionals with experience in 
the disability/social work sector only were aged 18-90 (M = 41.03, SD = 15.20) and 
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had worked on average for nearly nine years in this sector (M = 8.70, SD = 9.40, 
range = .5 - 50 years).  Finally, participants categorised as dual professionals were 
aged 21-79 (M = 41.46, SD = 12.07) and had worked on average for nearly 10 years 
across the criminal justice and disability sectors, or within the forensic disability 
sector (M = 9.50, SD = 8. 38, range = .5 - 31 years).  
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Table 10.1 
Participant Demographics by Sample and Influential Social Group 
    Influential Social Group 
   
Total 
 Community 
Members 
 Criminal Justice 
Professionals 
 Disability 
Professionals 
 Dual 
Professionals 
 N % n % n % n % n % 
Sample  679 100  224 33.1  113 16.7  184 27.2  158 23.3 
Gender Female 485 71.4 158 70.5 72 63.7 145 78.8 110 69.6 
Male 190 28.0 64 28.6 40 35.4 38 20.7 48 30.4 
Other 2 0.3 2 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 Unknown 2 0.3  0 0.0  1 0.9  1 0.5  0 0.0 
State/Territory Victoria 297 43.7 78 34.8 49 43.4 77 41.8 93 58.9 
New South Wales 107 15.8 32 14.3 21 18.6 32 17.4 22 13.9 
Australian Capital Territory 105 15.5 54 24.1 9 8.0 33 17.9 9 5.7 
Western Australia 58 8.5 25 11.2 7 6.2 18 9.8 8 5.1 
Queensland 41 6.0 16 7.1 8 7.1 11 6.0 6 3.8 
Tasmania 35 5.2 10 4.5 8 7.1 5 2.7 12 7.6 
South Australia 18 2.7 8 3.6 4 3.5 3 1.6 3 1.9 
Northern Territory 16 2.4 0 0.0 6 5.3 5 2.7 5 3.2 
 Not currently residing in Australia 2 0.3  1 0.4  1 0.8  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Education Level Some secondary education 6 0.9 2 0.9 2 1.8 2 1.1 0 0.0 
Year 10 24 3.5 14 6.3 4 3.5 6 3.3 0 0.0 
Year 12 80 11.8 50 22.3 4 3.5 21 11.4 5 3.2 
TAFE Certificate/Diploma 152 22.4 54 24.1 27 23.9 44 23.9 27 17.1 
Undergraduate degree 226 33.3 58 25.9 42 37.2 67 36.4 59 37.3 
Postgraduate degree 155 22.8 33 14.7 29 25.7 37 20.1 56 35.4 
Doctoral degree 29 4.3 11 4.9 3 2.7 5 2.7 10 6.3 
 Other 7 1  2 0.9  2 1.8  2 1.1  1 0.6 
Employment status Full time paid employment 378 55.7 87 38.8 89 78.8 82 44.6 120 75.9 
Part time/casual paid employment 192 28.3 77 34.4 16 14.2 66 35.9 33 20.9 
Volunteer employment 21 2.5 9 4.0 2 1.8 9 4.9 1 0.6 
Previously employed 68 10.0 31 13.8 6 5.3 27 14.7 4 2.5 
Never employed (paid/voluntary) 19 3.4 19 8.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 Unknown 1 0.1 1 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
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 Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics for each IS group’s mean score 
indicating the degree to which they agreed or disagreed that prison, and the 
community, are appropriate correctional treatment settings for offenders with an ID 
are detailed in Table 10.2. On average, each group disagreed that the prison setting, 
and agreed that the community setting, was appropriate for the correctional treatment 
of offenders with an ID.  
Table 10.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Beliefs about Appropriate Treatment Settings for Offenders 
with an Intellectual Disability by Influential Social Group 
    Prison Setting   Community Setting     
Influential Social Group M SD M SD n 
Community Members 1.94 0.86 4.65 1.02 224 
Criminal Justice Professionals 1.87 0.78 4.79 0.87 113 
Disability Professionals 1.74 0.80 4.86 0.91 183 
Dual Professionals 1.53 0.54   5.11 0.71   158 
Total Sample  1.78 0.78  4.83 0.91  678 
Note. ‘Dual Professionals’ refers to professionals experienced in both the criminal justice and 
disability sectors. Each measure had a range of 1-5, with higher scores indicating more positive 
attitudes towards the treatment setting.   
 
Addressing Exploratory Research Questions 
Two one-way ANOVAs were conducted to compare IS group mean scores 
for participants’ beliefs about the appropriateness of the prison setting and 
community setting for the correctional treatment of offenders with an ID.  There was 
a significant difference between IS groups’ beliefs about the appropriateness of both 
settings (see Table 10.3). Multiple comparisons showed that while all groups 
disagreed that prison was an appropriate setting for offenders with an ID, this 
disagreement was stronger for dual professionals (M = 1.53, SD = .54) compared to 
community members (M = 1.94, SD = .86) and criminal justice professionals (M = 
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1.87, SD = .78). Similarly, while all groups agreed that the community setting was an 
appropriate treatment setting for offenders with an ID, this belief was stronger for 
dual professionals (M = 5.11, SD = .71) compared to community members (M = 
4.65, SD = 1.02) and criminal justice professionals (M = 4.79, SD = .87). Effect sizes 
for these differences were small to medium (d = .40-.57; see Table 10.4). 
 
Table 10.3 
One-way ANOVA Results Comparing Influential Groups’ Beliefs about Prison and 
the Community as Appropriate Correctional Treatment Settings for Offenders with 
an Intellectual Disability 
 
ANOVA: Dependent Variable 
Factor 
SS df MS F Partial η2 
 
ANOVA 1: Prison Treatment Setting    
  IS Group 16.25 3 5.42 9.21*** 0.04 
  Error 396.18 674 0.59   
ANOVA 2: Community Treatment Setting   
  IS Group 19.58 3 6.53 8.05*** 0.04 
  Error 546.49 674 0.81   
Note. IS Group = Influential Social Group. ***p < .001 
 
Table 10.4 
Multiple Comparisons by Influential Social Group for Beliefs about Prison and the 
Community as Appropriate Correctional Treatment Settings for Offenders with an 
Intellectual Disability 
 
ANOVA: Dependent Variable         
  Comparison Groups Mdiff SE 95%CI [LL, UL] 
 
p 
 
d 
ANOVA 1: Prison Treatment Setting   
 CM vs CJP 0.07 0.09 [-0.11, 0.24] .435 0.09 
 CM vs DP 0.19 0.08 [0.04, 0.34] .011 0.24 
 CM vs Dual P 0.40 0.08 [0.25, 0.56] <.001* 0.57 
 CJP vs DP 0.13 0.09 [-0.06, 0.31] .174 0.17 
 CJP vs Dual P 0.34 0.09 [0.15, 0.52] <.001* 0.51 
 DP vs Dual P 0.21 0.08 [0.05, 0.37] .012 0.31 
    
ANOVA 2: Community Treatment Setting   
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ANOVA: Dependent Variable         
  Comparison Groups Mdiff SE 95%CI [LL, UL] 
 
p 
 
d 
 CM vs CJP -0.14 0.10 [-0.35, 0.06] .171 0.15 
 CM vs DP -0.21 0.09 [-0.39, -0.03] .020 0.22 
 CM vs Dual P -0.46 0.09 [-0.64, -0.27] <.001* 0.52 
 CJP vs DP -0.07 0.11 [-0.28, 0.14] .533 0.08 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.31 0.11 [-0.53, -0.10] .005* 0.40 
  DP vs Dual P -0.25 0.10 [-0.43, -0.06] .012 0.31 
Note. CM = Community Members; CJP = Criminal Justice Professionals; DP = Disability 
Professionals; Dual P = Dual Professionals, experienced in both criminal justice and disability. Mdiff = 
mean difference, SE = standard error, 95% CI [LL, UL] = 95% Confidence Interval, with lower limit 
and upper limit specified. d = Cohen’s d. All p values are unadjusted. *p < .008 (significant at p < .05 
with Bonferroni-correction applied). 
 
Discussion 
Study 5 aimed to compare the attitudes of four IS groups (community 
members, criminal justice professionals, disability professionals, and dual 
professionals) towards appropriate correctional treatment settings (i.e., prisons and 
within the community) for offenders with an ID. Overall each group agreed that the 
community setting, and disagreed that the prison setting, were appropriate for the 
correctional treatment of offenders with an ID. This finding is consistent with one of 
the few studies to assess community members’ and criminal justice professionals’ 
comparative attitudes towards correctional treatment settings, which similarly found 
more support for community-based sentencing compared to prisons for offenders 
generally, regardless of subsample (Sigler & Lamb, 1995). In the current study, 
however, dual professionals expressed significantly less support for the prison setting 
than community members and criminal justice professionals, and expressed 
significantly more support for the community setting than community members and 
criminal justice professionals. These results indicated support for exploratory 
research questions 1 and 3, but not for exploratory research questions 2 and 4.  
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Community Members’ Attitudes toward Appropriate Correctional Treatment 
Settings 
Community members’ relatively stronger support for prison-based 
correctional treatment, and weaker support for community-based correctional 
treatment, is consistent with past research from the UK, Canada, and Australia 
indicating laypeople tend to hold largely negative views of community-based 
sentencing and treatment (Brown, 1999; Cumberland & Zamble, 1992). For example, 
Brown (1999) found that while the vast majority of laypeople agreed sex offenders 
should receive treatment, hardly any thought this should occur solely in the 
community setting. Instead, half reported it should occur in both prison and the 
community, while the other half reported treatment should occur solely in prison. 
The majority of Brown’s participants also held negative attitudes towards a treatment 
centre being located within their community, with most reporting they would take 
action against this (campaign, petition). Cumberland and Zamble (1992)found that 
attitudes towards parole and community-based treatment for violent offenders, 
opposed to non-violent offenders, and towards repeat as opposed to first time 
offender, were significantly more negative.  
Our results for community members are also consistent with findings from 
the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AUSSA) (Indermaur & Roberts, 2005), 
one of the few Australian studies to address community attitudes towards criminal 
justice sentencing outcomes. In this study, the punitiveness of community members 
was apparent; the majority (70%) of respondents indicated they had ‘no’ or ‘not very 
much’ confidence in the Australian courts and legal system, thought offenders should 
be given harsher sentences (than what they believed they were given), and nearly 
half reported support for the death penalty for murder. Australian laypeople’s attitude 
that offenders in general are given overly lenient sentences is consistent with results 
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of similar studies in the UK and Canada (Roberts, Crutcher, & Verbrugge, 2007; 
Roberts & Hough, 2005). Research by Harper and Hogue (2017) found laypeople 
typically rely on news media to inform them about crimes and their context, and 
media coverage frequency and detail is skewed to sensationalise crime, so that 
laypeople develop more or less heuristic-based cognitions regarding attitudes 
towards sentencing and treatment of offenders generally.  
Community members’ relatively (if non-significantly) stronger support for 
prison-based correctional treatment, and weaker support for community-based 
correctional treatment, than criminal justice professionals is also consistent with past 
research comparing lay people’s and correctional professionals’ attitudes towards 
offenders, and their sentencing more generally. Research by Kjelsberg and Loos 
(2008) comparing the attitudes of Norwegian college students and prison employees 
towards sexual offenders, found that students held overall more negative attitudes 
towards sexual offenders than prison employees, indicating students were more 
likely to see sexual offenders as deviant individuals who are incapable of change. In 
a similar study comparing Norwegian college students’ and prison employees’ 
attitudes towards prisoners more generally, Kjelsberg, Skoglund, and Rustad (2007) 
found students significantly overestimated the proportion of prisoners imprisoned for 
violent and sexual offences compared to the prison staff, and underestimated the 
number of prisoners with comorbid drug and alcohol problems. These latter findings 
suggest that laypeople may misunderstand the nature of many prisoners’ offences, 
perceiving them to be more violent, and less situated in psychosocial or psychiatric 
disorder, than they may be.   
Sigler and Lamb (1995) found that, compared to criminal justice 
professionals (in this case, court personnel), American community members saw 
prison as the least cost effective but safest, most severe, most deterring, and most 
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punishing option available to sentencing judges. Community based sentencing 
options (fines, community service, victim restitution) were perceived as more cost 
effective but less safe. Community members tend to hold more negative attitudes in 
general towards criminal offenders compared to relevant professionals such as prison 
officers and psychotherapists (Kjelsberg et al., 2007), and report more negative 
attitudes towards community-based corrections than justice professionals (Sigler & 
Lamb, 1995). Community members have also been found to have a poor 
understanding of what community-based sentencing and treatment entails, which 
may make community members less convinced of the safety and efficacy of 
correctional treatment conducted in this setting. Sigler and Lamb (1995) found that 
community members who reported having no knowledge of community-based 
corrections reported significantly more negative attitudes towards this option, 
compared to community members who reported some knowledge of this sentencing 
option. 
Criminal Justice Professionals’ Attitudes toward Appropriate Correctional 
Treatment Settings 
Our finding that criminal justice professionals were also significantly more 
supportive of prison-based correctional treatment and less supportive of community-
based correctional treatment for offenders with an ID than dual professionals was 
unexpected. Cant and Standen (2007) qualitative study assessing UK criminal justice 
professionals’ attitudes toward people with an ID in the criminal justice is the only 
study to explore this issue, to my knowledge. Interviewing 28 criminal justice 
professionals (magistrates, forensic and psychiatric nurses, and judges), three key 
themes were identified. The first focused on concern that people with an ID would 
not be correctly identified upon entering or once in the criminal justice system; the 
second advocated that the system be flexible in its approach to offenders with an ID; 
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and the third advocated that offenders with an ID receive equal treatment to all other 
offenders. These themes highlight the dissonant perspectives of these criminal justice 
professions. The difference between criminal justice professionals’ and dual 
professionals’ attitudes could hence be attributed to the heterogeneity of criminal 
justice roles, and associated experiences and knowledge, within the current study’s 
criminal justice subsample. Past research comparing correctional officers’ and other 
criminal justice employees’ attitudes towards offenders (in general) and their 
correctional treatment indicates that correctional officers hold more negative 
attitudes towards general and specific types of offending, and towards punishment 
and rehabilitative treatment, than other criminal justice staff (Antonio & Young, 
2011; Gordon, 1999; Kelly, 2014).  
Criminal justice professionals’ more negative attitudes towards community-
based correctional treatment, and more positive attitudes towards prison-based 
correctional treatment, compared to dual professionals may also reflect different 
types of values and values-based attributions endorsed by these professions. For 
example, Loza (1993) found that Canadian prison-based corrections officers 
attributed significantly more blame and less likelihood of rehabilitation to sexual 
offenders compared to therapeutic prison staff and social workers employed in 
community corrections. Attributions of personal responsibility by correctional staff 
towards offenders for their crimes, and associated beliefs about moral violations and 
their deservingness of punishment, may motivate correctional staff to prioritise 
retribution and punishment of offenders over the protection and fostering of their 
human rights and rehabilitation (Day & Casey, 2009) (Ward & Birgden, 2007).  
Differences between criminal justice and dual professionals’ attitudes toward 
appropriate correctional treatment settings for offenders with an ID may also be due 
to individual differences such as the age of criminal justice professionals sampled, 
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and level of education and experience regarding correctional treatment settings for 
different types of offenders and severity of offences. For example, Hepburn (1984) 
and Robinson, Porporino, and Simourd (1997) found a positive association between 
education level and attitude towards rehabilitation in corrections officers, while older 
and more experienced officers (Antonio & Young, 2011; Farkas, 1999; Kelly, 2014) 
have been found to hold more positive attitudes toward rehabilitation than junior 
officers. While Kjelsberg and Loos (2008) found that prison employees’ age was 
positively associated with their attitudes towards sexual offenders, indicating that 
older employees were more likely to perceive sex offenders as normal people 
capable of positive change, they also found no significant association between 
attitudes and length of employment of prison employees.  
Interestingly, prison officers have been found to hold more negative attitudes 
to sex offenders (Kjelsberg & Loos, 2008) and to prisoners generally (Lambert & 
Hogan, 2009) compared to other prison employees; and in a similar study, Kjelsberg 
et al. (2007) found that prison officers’ attitudes towards prisoners were fairly 
negative and comparable to a sample of lay college students’. Helfgott and Gunnison 
(2008) found that American community corrections officers who reported less 
desired social distance from offenders were more likely to hold more positive 
attitudes towards their rehabilitation, reintegration, and the general goodness inherent 
to all people. Of particular note, a study by Boccaccini et al. (2016) found that 
American correctional officers tended to mistake psychopathology for intellectual 
disability in a sample of offenders participating in a residential drug and alcohol 
treatment program. They concluded that correctional officers were not sound 
informants regarding behavioural assessments of offenders (with respect to ID), 
which casts doubt on the value of their judgements of correctional treatment setting 
appropriateness for offenders with an ID.  
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Criminal justice staff can experience role-conflict due to the nature of their 
profession: their role is to protect the community from dangerous offenders by 
monitoring containing them, but also to ensure the welfare and facilitate the 
rehabilitation of offenders in the community and/or prison setting. Some researchers 
argue that criminal justice professionals such as correctional officers and forensic 
psychologists perceive their primary role as protecting the welfare of the community 
from the offender, and secondarily as supporting the offender and their rehabilitation 
(Day & Casey, 2009; McGrath, Cumming, & Holt, 2002). This is influenced by 
personal and organisational values and practices (Day & Ward, 2010; Lambert & 
Hogan, 2009). Qualitative research by Short et al. (2009) found that UK prison staff 
reported less confidence and felt unsupported in fulfilling the ‘welfare’ component of 
their role (e.g., supporting prisoners with self-harm tendencies) compared to the 
‘custody’ component. For these reasons, criminal justice professionals may be more 
likely to err on the side of caution and favour the custodial setting when evaluating 
which setting is most appropriate for the treatment of offenders, with or without an 
ID. 
Disability Professionals’ Attitudes toward Appropriate Correctional Treatment 
Settings 
Different personal and professional values, as well as professional training 
and experiences, may also explain why dual professionals were significantly more 
supportive of community-based correctional treatment settings and less supportive of 
prison-based correctional treatment settings than criminal justice professionals. I’d 
originally reasoned that professionals experienced only in the disability/social work 
sector would be most supportive of community-based treatment given their 
profession’s emphasis on respect for dignity and empowerment of people with an ID 
within the context of the social model of disability (Bigby, Clement, Mansell, & 
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Beadle‐Brown, 2009; Bigby & Ozanne, 2001; Luckasson, Ford, McMillan, Frederick 
M. Misilo, & Nygren, 2017). This reasoning was supported by an older study by 
Lyall et al. (1995) which examined UK disability workers’ attitudes toward 
offending behaviour by clients with an ID in non-correctional residential care 
settings. While 80% of disability staff agreed they would always report a major 
assault by a resident to police, only 40% said they would always report rape. 
Furthermore, over 60% said they would never report theft or criminal damage, 50% 
said they would never report sexual assault, and 20% said they would never report 
major assault. Lyall et al. (1995) attributed these results to the residential staff’s fear 
that reporting their clients’ offending behaviour would result in their being unfairly 
and harshly treated by the criminal justice system, being involuntarily admitted for 
psychiatric hospitalisation, or may reflect poorly on the ability of the disability 
service to meet the needs of their clients.  
Like criminal justice professionals, those employed in the disability sector 
include a heterogeneous selection of professions such as social workers, community 
and disability case workers, residential carers, physical and psychological allied 
health professionals, and educators (to name a few). However, research assessing 
disability professionals’ attitudes towards offenders is limited and often focuses on 
university student samples relevant to the caring professions, or staff training 
program evaluations. For example, Kjelsberg et al. (2007) compared Norwegian 
business and nursing students’ attitudes toward prisoners; they found nursing 
students (drawn to and training in a ‘caring’ profession) held more positive attitudes 
towards prisoners, seeing them more as normal people capable of change rather than 
as deviants. Church II, Joshua, Brannen, and Clements (2009) compared the attitudes 
of American undergraduate and postgraduate social work university students toward 
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offenders and found that level of education was associated with more positive 
attitudes to these.  
In the current study, the attitudes of disability-only professionals did not 
significantly differ from any other IS group for either treatment setting. This may 
reflect the fact that attitudes and practices of disability professionals (like criminal 
justice professionals) are not unidimensional and can exhibit conflict between 
principles and action. A number of studies exploring disability professionals’ 
attitudes toward and behaviour with clients with an ID highlight that while 
professionals may endorse principles of empowerment of their clients, their 
behaviours (intentional and unintentional) can be directive, paternal, patronising, and 
hence disempowering (Antaki, Finlay, & Walton, 2007; Bigby, Clement, Mansell, & 
Beadle-Brown, 2009). Bigby et al. (2009) found this discrepancy was justified by 
staff as being either pragmatic or in the best interests of the client. This discrepancy 
between principles and ‘pragmatic’ behaviour may explain why disability 
professionals did not express significantly different views to laypeople and criminal 
justice professionals. It could also be the case that while disability professionals 
endorsed the values previously described and were experienced with people with an 
ID, their inexperience with criminal offenders (either with or without an ID) led them 
to err on the side of caution in expressing strong views on this complex issue.  
Disability and Dual Professionals’ Attitudes toward Appropriate Correctional 
Treatment Settings 
That the attitudes of dual professionals did significantly differ from those of 
criminal justice professionals (as well as community members) could be explained 
by their holding values and attitudes more similar to disability professionals than to 
criminal justice professionals, which they feel more confident to express due to their 
experience across both disability and criminal justice sectors. Doyle’s (1999) 
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qualitative investigation of forensic disability nurses working in Australian prisons 
highlighted that these professionals experienced conflict between their own values 
and those of corrections staff, believed that the prison setting exacerbated offenders’ 
psychiatric symptomology, and resented that offenders associated them with the 
prison administration at large, impairing their ability to develop a therapeutic 
alliance.  
In addition to different values, dual professionals’ actual experiences within 
both the disability and criminal justice sectors, and hence more nuanced 
understanding of the costs and benefits of prison- versus community-based 
correctional treatment for offenders with an ID, may further explain the difference 
between dual professionals’ and criminal justice professionals’ attitudes to 
appropriate treatment settings. While the three professional IS groups in the current 
study tended to have a similar number of years of professional experience, a greater 
proportion of dual professionals reported they were engaged in full time employment 
and had a postgraduate degree or higher compared to the other two. Shackley, 
Weiner, Day, and Willis (2014) found that higher education was associated with less 
negative attitudes towards sex offenders in an Australian community sample, while 
Taylor, Keddie, and Lee (2003) found that more experience in nursing and social 
work was positively associated with current forensic disability staff members’ 
understanding of and positive attitudes towards sex offenders with an ID. Additional 
specialist education and training, in addition to more frequent contact hours with 
forensic disability clients such as those with an ID specifically, may explain why 
dual professionals’ attitudes significantly differed from criminal justice 
professionals; their cross-disciplinary experience and specialised training provided 
them with a unique insight into the most appropriate correctional treatment settings 
for offenders with an ID.  
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Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions for Study 5 
 Key strengths of this study include the development and validation of two 
original unidimensional measures assessing attitudes towards correctional treatment 
settings. This is also the first study to the researcher’s knowledge to investigate 
attitudes to treatment settings for offenders with an ID in the Australian and 
international literature, and to also compare these attitudes for multiple professional 
categories, additional to community members. 
 There are also key limitations to this study. Firstly, it should be noted that to 
be categorised as a ‘professional’ for any of the three professional categories, 
participants self-identified as having ever worked in the ‘disability/social work 
sector’ and/or ‘criminal justice/correctional sector’, and only needed to have a 
minimum of 6 months of professional experience in paid employment or voluntarily 
employment(e.g., completing student placement/training, gaining work experience, 
contributing to community-based charity volunteer program). While the proportion 
of each professional group with volunteer experience only was very low (<1% for 
dual professionals, <2% for criminal justice professionals, and <5% for disability 
professionals), and the average length of professional experience was about 10 years 
for all professional subsamples, inclusion of less experienced ‘professionals’ and 
those with limited contact time per week (common to volunteer and casual staff) may 
have impacted subsample response means. Future research could investigate whether 
attitudes towards appropriate correctional treatment settings for offenders with an ID 
differ within professional subsamples by degree of expertise, perhaps assessed as 
years of employment in addition to frequency of professional contact hours per week 
and specialist education. 
 A second limitation, also relevant to the sample’s demographics, is that each 
IS group was gender-skewed toward women. This gender-skew likely reflects the 
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real over-representation of women in disability, social welfare, and correctional 
roles, in addition to a gendered volunteer bias. Future research could investigate 
whether gender significantly impacts attitudes towards appropriate correctional 
treatment settings for offenders with an ID within and between IS groups. 
  A third limitation of this study was that the design did not include a 
comparison condition assessing IS groups’ attitude towards appropriate treatment 
settings for offenders generally. Inclusion of a comparison condition would have 
enabled identification of differences in attitude not just by IS group but also by the 
disability status of the offender. There is no research to the researcher’s knowledge 
examining attitudes towards treatment settings for offenders with an ID specifically, 
and negligible research focused on attitudes towards treatment settings for offenders 
more generally, so including this comparison condition would have contributed to 
both areas of empirical study.  
Future research could replicate the current study with the addition of a 
comparison condition to determine whether the attitudes identified in the current 
study per IS group are general for all offenders, or specific to offenders with an ID. 
Future research could also consider the inclusion of additional measures related 
cognitions (such as personal and professional values), attributions (such as perceived 
general dangerousness and likelihood of recidivism of offenders with versus without 
an ID, and desire for social distance from these) that may help explain why certain IS 
groups differ in their attitudes toward treatment settings for offenders with an ID. 
A final limitation of this study was that participants were asked to provide a 
generalised attitude towards an appropriate treatment setting for ‘offenders with an 
ID’ rather than towards an offender with an ID who committed a specific type of 
crime. Had participants been presented with case details for a particular type of crime 
(e.g., sexual assault, car theft, drug dealing) committed by an offender with an ID, 
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their attitude towards an appropriate treatment setting may have differed (e.g., less 
likely to support community treatment setting if the offender had committed a sexual 
assault, as opposed to car theft). Further to this, Campregher and Jeglic (2016) found 
that simply providing case-specific information via a vignette about an offender’s 
criminal behaviour (as opposed to having participants imagine a generic offender) 
influenced perceived dangerousness, likely recidivism, and punitiveness (reducing 
these). Future research could investigate the effect of different crime types on 
attitudes towards appropriate correctional treatment settings for offenders with an ID, 
by IS group. Future research could also consider the use of case-specific information 
via vignettes to provide participants with contextual information by which to 
evaluate criminal justice outcomes for offenders with an ID as a target social 
category.  
Conclusion 
Two original unidimensional measures were developed and validated to 
assess attitudes towards appropriate treatment settings for offenders with an ID. 
Regardless of professional knowledge, overall Australians believed the community 
setting rather than the prison setting was more appropriate for the correctional 
treatment of offenders with an ID. However, both lay community members and 
criminal justice professionals were less supportive of community-based treatment, 
and more supportive of prison-based treatment, than dual professionals. These 
findings support past research indicating community members tend to hold more 
negative attitudes towards offenders in general, and compared to relevant 
professionals; and extends on knowledge of how the attitudes of professionals 
engaged in the disability and criminal justice sectors, as well as professionals who 
bridge these sectors, differ regarding appropriate correctional treatment settings for 
offenders with an ID. 
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 CHAPTER ELEVEN: STUDY 6 -  A COMPARISON OF COMMUNITY MEMBERS’ 
AND PROFESSIONALS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
CONSTRUCTS FOR OFFENDERS WITH AND WITHOUT AN INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITY 
This chapter details Study 6, which addresses research question 6 concerned 
with understanding how the attitudes held by members of influential social 
categories (i.e., Australian community members, and professionals experienced in 
the criminal justice sector, disability sector, or both sectors) differ regarding criminal 
justice constructs (i.e., punishment, culpability, potential for rehabilitation, 
reintegration, and forgiveness) for offenders with and without an ID. This chapter 
reports the Aims and Exploratory Research Questions, Results, Data Treatment and 
Analysis Approach, and Discussion for Study 6. 
Aims and Exploratory Research Questions 
The aim of Study 6 was to explore how ID status (i.e., whether the offender 
had an ID specified versus not specified) and IS category (i.e., Australian community 
members, and professionals experienced in the criminal justice sector, disability 
sector, or both sectors) influences criminal justice attributions towards offenders. 
Criminal justice attributions of interest included perceived degree of moral 
culpability for the offence, deservingness of punishment via imprisonment, perceived 
value of rehabilitation, support for reintegration into the community, willingness to 
forgive once a sentence was served, and perceived influence of alcohol and/or other 
drugs (AOD) on the offender’s criminal behaviour. These aims were addressed using 
three different types of criminal scenarios (i.e., sexual assault, physical assault with a 
weapon, burglary). 
While past research, reviewed in Chapter 2 Section III, has identified trends 
in how community members compare to criminal justice professionals in their 
attitudes toward the correctional and social treatment of offenders, and community 
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members compare to disability professionals in their attitudes towards the therapeutic 
and social treatment of people with ID, there is limited past research addressing how 
these IS categories compare in their attitudes towards the correctional and social 
treatment of offenders with ID, or of how the attitudes of professionals experienced 
in both the disability and criminal justice sectors might differ to those of 
professionals experienced in only one of these sectors. Given this lack of specific 
comparison in past research, it was deemed inappropriate to propose formal 
confirmatory hypotheses for Study 6. However, the following exploratory research 
questions were posed to guide comparisons of criminal attributions by offender ID 
status and IS category:   
1.  Is there a main effect of offender disability status on criminal justice 
attributions across vignettes? Regardless of IS group, will participants 
attribute lower moral culpability (1.a.), lower support for punishment via 
imprisonment (1.b.), higher support for rehabilitation (1.c.), higher 
support for reintegration (1.d.), more willingness to forgive (1.e.), and a 
stronger role to AOD (1.f.) for each of the three crimes when committed 
by an offender with an ID, compared to an offender without an ID 
specified? 
2. Is there a main effect of IS group on criminal justice attributions across 
vignettes? Regardless of the disability status of their criminal offender 
target, will community members attribute higher moral culpability (2.a.), 
higher deservingness of punishment via imprisonment (2.b.), lower 
support for rehabilitation (2.c.), lower support for reintegration (2.d.), less 
willingness to forgive (2.e.), and a weaker role to AOD (2.f.) for each of 
the three crimes, compared to the professional IS groups? 
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3. Are dual professionals less supportive of punishment via imprisonment 
(3.a.), and more supportive of the rehabilitation (3.b.) and reintegration 
(3.c.) of offenders with an ID, compared to criminal justice professionals? 
 
Data Treatment and Analysis Approach 
After cleaning and coding the data, assumptions relevant to EFA and two-
way ANOVA were assessed and addressed. Frequency and descriptive statistics 
detailing demographic characteristics of the overall sample and per IS group were 
provided. 
Measure Validity and Reliability 
To assess the validity of the modified and original measures assessing 
criminal justice attributions regarding moral culpability, reintegration, and 
forgiveness, EFAs were initially conducted per measure to assess the validity of 
original measures. These measures were each found to be both valid and to have 
acceptable to good internal reliability. Detailed descriptive and inferential analyses 
relevant to the validation of these measures can be found in Appendix V.  
Descriptive and Inferential Analyses 
Descriptive statistics were provided for all relevant measures, per vignette’s 
subsample. Six two-way ANOVAs per vignette subsample were conducted to 
determine mean differences in attitudes towards the punishment, moral culpability, 
rehabilitation, reintegration, forgiveness, and influence of AOD on the criminal 
behaviour of offenders according to two factors: IS group, including four levels (i.e., 
community, criminal justice disability professional, or combined disability/criminal 
justice professional); and the disability status of the offender described in each 
vignette, including two levels (i.e., an ID specified, versus no ID specified). To 
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explore group differences for significant main effects, the two ‘disability status’ 
levels were compared once, and each ‘IS group’ level was compared to each other 
once (i.e., four levels, yielding six comparisons). In addition to planning the number 
of pairwise comparisons made so as to control the family-wise error (FWE) rate, and 
hence reduce the likelihood of Type I errors, a manual Bonferroni correction (p < 
.008) was used to assess the significance of the reported, unadjusted p values, for 
multiple comparisons based on IS groups.  
Statistical Power Considerations 
A priori statistical power analyses were conducted to ensure an adequate 
sample size was recruited, and to reduce the risk of Type II error. The appropriate 
sample size necessary to conduct sound factor analyses is a controversial topic, 
however Field (2018) synthesis of respected statisticians’ recommendations on this 
issue suggest that N = 300 is adequate, N = 500 is good, and N = 1000 is excellent. 
Given our total sample size of N = 677, the sample size was adequate for the factorial 
analyses.  
For a two-way ANOVA comparing eight groups (i.e., four IS groups times 
two offender categories, ID versus no ID specified, and with an alpha of .05 and 
power of .80, N = 740 would be required to detect a very small effect size (f2 = .02), 
N = 102 would be required to detect a medium effect size (f2 = .15), N = 49 would be 
required to detect a large effect size (f2 = .35). SPSS provides the effect size for 
ANOVA results in the form of partial η2, which is interpreted in an approximately 
equivalent way to both f2 and r2. 
The sample size relevant to the two-way ANOVAs ranged between N = 209 
and N = 230, suggesting this would be sufficiently powerful to detect a statistically 
significant effect with an alpha of .05 and power of .80 for a minimum small effect 
size of f2 = .07 and above, but may be too small to detect statistically significant 
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effect sizes smaller than .07, increasing the risk of Type II error. A review of the 
two-way ANOVA results, however, demonstrated that significant effect sizes as 
small as partial η2 = 0.03 were detected, suggesting the study had sufficient power to 
detect small yet meaningful effects.  
Statistical Software  
G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2009; Faul et al., 2007) and IBM SPSS Statistics 
version 24 was used for all other statistical analyses. 
Results 
Assumption Testing 
After cleaning the data of missing cases and Windorising univariate and 
multivariate outliers (< 5% of cases per variable), possible differences on 
demographics variables (i.e., age, gender) by IS group and disability status condition 
for each vignette’s subsample were also assessed. The sexual assault scenario, 
physical assault with a weapon scenario, and burglary scenario had N = 212, N = 
211, and N = 230 participants, respectively. A 4 x 6 chi square test of equal 
frequencies was conducted to ensure that an equal proportion of participants by IS 
group and by disability status were allocated across vignette scenarios and their 
conditions; no significant difference was found in the number of participants 
allocated across vignettes and their respective conditions (p > .05).  
Two-way ANOVAs determined there were no differences between the IS 
groups or disability status conditions for the sexual assault scenario (all p > .05), and 
there were no differences between disability status conditions for the physical assault 
and burglary scenarios (all p > .05); however, in both the physical assault and 
burglary scenarios, the community members groups were significantly younger than 
each professional group (p values ranged from < .001 to < .05).  
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For each crime scenario subsample, a 2 x 4 and a 2 x 2 chi square test of 
equal frequencies was conducted to ensure that an equal proportion of male and 
female participants were allocated to their IS groups and disability status conditions, 
respectively. An equal number of males and females were found to have been 
allocated to IS groups and disability status conditions, within each criminal 
scenario’s subsample (all p > .05). 
Assumptions of normality, independence of observations, and homogeneity 
of variances were assessed for each criminal offence scenario subsample and deemed 
met, prior to conducting a series of two-way ANOVAs per criminal offence scenario.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Sample and influential group demographic characteristics. Frequency and 
descriptive statistics detailing the demographic characteristics of the sample overall 
and by IS group for Study 6 are detailed in the Results section of Study 5 (Chapter 
10); refer to Table 10.1 for details. 
Descriptive statistics. Table 11.1, Table 11.2, and Table 11.3 present the 
descriptive statistics for all criminal justice attribution outcome variables by IS group 
and disability status condition for the three criminal offence scenarios (sexual 
assault, physical assault with a weapon, and burglary, respectively).  
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Table 11.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Criminal Justice Attributions towards an Offender by Influential Social Group and Disability Status, for Sexual Assault 
Criminal Offence Scenario (N = 212) 
          Criminal Justice Attribution 
 Moral Culpability  Punishment  Rehabilitation   Reintegration  Forgiveness  AOD 
IS Group Disability Status M SD n M SD n M SD n  M SD n M SD n  M SD n 
Community 
Member 
ID specified 3.69 1.15 39 3.10 1.23 39 4.46 0.85 39  3.91 1.00 38 4.09 0.87 38 5.65 1.99 39 
No ID specified 4.67 0.80 27 3.54 1.10 27 4.55 0.84 27  3.75 1.02 27 3.81 0.89 27 5.50 2.32 26 
Total 4.09 1.12 66 3.28 1.19 66 4.50 0.84 66  3.84 1.00 65 3.97 0.88 65 5.59 2.11 65 
    
Criminal 
Justice 
Professional 
ID specified 3.56 1.17 17 2.60 1.33 17 4.68 0.56 17  4.07 0.80 17 4.03 1.09 17 6.18 1.91 17 
No ID specified 4.45 1.15 24 3.20 1.37 24 4.94 0.76 24  3.77 1.00 24 3.78 1.13 23 5.35 2.65 24 
Total 4.08 1.23 41 2.95 1.37 41 4.83 0.69 41  3.89 0.93 41 3.89 1.11 40 5.70 2.38 41 
    
Disability 
Professional 
ID specified 3.10 0.96 24 2.48 1.18 23 4.74 0.85 24  4.46 0.91 24 4.25 0.97 23 6.57 1.68 23 
No ID specified 4.03 1.24 27 2.94 1.36 27 4.97 0.88 27  4.48 1.00 26 4.43 1.05 27 5.27 2.52 28 
Total 3.59 1.20 51 2.73 1.29 50 4.86 0.86 51  4.47 0.95 50 4.35 1.01 50 5.85 2.26 51 
    
Dual 
Professional 
ID specified 3.17 0.96 26 1.91 1.12 26 4.96 0.55 26  4.70 0.91 26 4.63 0.84 26 6.75 1.94 26 
No ID specified 4.32 0.95 28 2.50 1.08 28 4.99 0.62 28  4.40 0.92 28 4.34 0.82 28 5.20 2.10 28 
Total 3.77 1.11 54 2.22 1.13 54 4.98 0.58 54  4.54 0.92 54 4.48 0.83 54 5.94 2.15 54  
    
Total ID specified 3.41 1.08 106 2.59 1.18 105 4.68 0.76 106  4.26 0.97 105 4.25 0.94 104 6.75 1.93 105  
No ID specified 4.36 1.06 106 3.04 1.27 106 4.86 0.79 106  4.11 1.03 105 4.10 1.00 105 5.33 2.36 106 
 CJ Attribution 3.89 1.17 212 2.18 1.29 211 4.77 0.78 212  4.18 1.00 210 4.18 0.97 209 5.77 2.20 211 
Note. IS Group = Influential Social Group. AOD = Influenced by Alcohol and/or Other Drugs. 'Dual Professional' refers to professionals experienced in both the criminal justice and 
disability sectors. CJ Attribution = Criminal Justice Attribution. Possible range for all variables was 1-6, except for AOD which had a possible range of 1-10. 
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Table 11.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Criminal Justice Attributions towards an Offender by Influential Social Group and Disability Status, for Physical Assault 
with a Weapon Criminal Offence Scenario (N = 211) 
 
          Criminal Justice Attribution   
Moral Culpability  Punishment  Rehabilitation   Reintegration  Forgiveness  AOD 
IS Group Disability Status M SD n M SD n M SD n  M SD n M SD n M SD n 
Community 
Member 
ID specified 3.23 1.27 32 2.30 1.15 32 5.00 0.71 32 4.44 0.95 32 4.71 1.03 32 5.48 1.78 32 
No ID specified 4.14 1.03 34 2.63 1.23 34 5.02 0.63 34 
 
4.50 0.72 34 4.62 0.78 34 5.53 1.77 34 
Total 3.70 1.23 66 2.47 1.19 66 5.01 0.67 66 4.47 0.84 66 4.66 0.90 66 5.51 1.76 66 
Criminal 
Justice 
Professional 
ID specified 2.84 1.07 20 2.34 1.14 20 4.85 0.67 20 4.37 0.67 20 4.51 0.83 20 5.60 2.19 21 
No ID specified 3.85 1.05 15 3.42 1.50 15 4.50 0.93 15 3.94 1.07 15 4.13 0.87 15 5.67 2.17 15 
Total 3.27 1.16 35 2.80 1.40 35 4.70 0.80 35 4.18 0.87 35 4.35 0.85 35 5.63 2.15 36 
Disability 
Professional 
ID specified 2.96 0.87 23 2.30 1.07 23 4.58 0.81 23 4.40 1.04 23 4.36 0.97 23 5.46 2.21 23 
No ID specified 3.58 1.16 30 2.54 1.10 30 4.74 0.91 30 4.35 0.84 30 4.53 0.93 29 5.78 2.23 30 
Total 3.31 1.08 53 2.44 1.08 53 4.67 0.86 53 4.37 0.92 53 4.46 0.94 52 5.64 2.21 53 
Dual 
Professional 
ID specified 2.96 1.00 28 1.79 0.78 28 5.01 0.52 28 4.62 0.74 28 4.96 0.63 28 5.37 1.60 27 
No ID specified 3.57 0.86 28 1.88 0.96 28 5.06 0.61 28 4.73 0.92 28 4.95 0.70 28 5.95 2.11 29  
Total 3.27 0.97 56 1.83 0.87 56 5.04 0.57 56 
 
4.68 0.83 56 4.95 0.66 56 5.67 1.88 56       
Total ID specified 3.02 1.08 103 2.17 1.05 103 4.88 0.69 103 
 
4.47 0.87 103 4.66 0.90 103 5.47 1.90 103  
No ID specified 3.79 1.05 107 2.52 1.25 107 4.88 0.78 107 
 
4.44 0.89 107 4.61 0.84 106 5.73 2.03 108  
CJ Attribution 3.41 1.13 210 2.35 1.17 210 4.88 0.74 210 
 
4.45 0.87 210 4.64 0.87 209 5.60 1.97 211 
Note. IS Group = Influential Social Group. AOD = Influenced by Alcohol and/or Other Drugs. 'Dual Professional' refers to professionals experienced in both the criminal justice and 
disability sectors. CJ Attribution = Criminal Justice Attribution. Possible range for all variables was 1-6, except for AOD which had a possible range of 1-10. 
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Table 11.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Criminal Justice Attributions towards an Offender by Influential Social Group and Disability Status, for Burglary Physical 
Assault with a Weapon (N = 230) 
 
          Criminal Justice Attribution 
 Moral Culpability  Punishment  Rehabilitation   Reintegration  Forgiveness  AOD 
IS Group Disability Status M SD n M SD n M SD n  M SD n M SD n M SD n 
Community 
Member 
ID specified 3.34 1.17 40 2.25 1.13 40 4.79 0.86 40  4.35 1.05 39 4.61 0.96 39 7.93 1.46 41 
No ID specified 4.07 0.97 43 2.70 1.46 43 4.96 0.79 43  4.33 1.09 43 4.64 1.01 42 8.45 1.37 43 
Total 3.72 1.12 83 2.48 1.32 83 4.88 0.82 83  4.34 1.07 82 4.63 0.98 81 8.20 1.43 84 
    
Criminal 
Justice 
Professional 
ID specified 3.22 0.94 18 1.61 0.91 18 4.92 0.75 18  4.45 0.79 18 5.13 0.84 18 7.47 1.78 18 
No ID specified 3.92 1.20 16 3.05 1.36 16 4.55 0.73 16  4.07 0.90 16 4.36 0.99 16 7.78 1.81 16 
Total 3.55 1.11 34 2.29 1.34 34 4.74 0.75 34  4.27 0.85 34 4.77 0.98 34 7.62 1.77 34 
    
Disability 
Professional 
ID specified 2.80 1.00 34 1.86 0.85 34 5.01 0.75 34  4.71 0.97 33 5.06 0.68 32 8.47 1.56 34 
No ID specified 3.49 1.01 36 2.23 1.10 35 5.03 0.80 35  4.68 0.98 35 4.92 0.91 34 7.94 1.78 36 
Total 3.15 1.05 70 2.05 0.99 69 5.02 0.77 69  4.69 0.97 68 4.99 0.81 66 8.20 1.68 70 
    
Dual 
Professional 
ID specified 2.86 1.04 19 1.76 1.18 19 5.12 0.62 19  4.80 0.89 19 5.19 0.96 19 6.92 1.48 18 
No ID specified 3.35 0.95 24 2.01 1.09 23 4.87 0.72 23  4.82 0.96 23 5.06 1.03 23 7.33 1.92 24  
Total 3.13 1.01 43 1.90 1.13 42 4.98 0.68 42  4.81 0.92 42 5.12 0.99 42 7.15 1.74 42  
    
Total ID specified 3.07 1.07 111 1.94 1.04 111 4.93 0.77 111  4.55 0.97 109 4.93 0.89 108 7.86 1.62 111 
No ID specified 3.73 1.04 119 2.47 1.31 117 4.91 0.78 117  4.49 1.03 117 4.77 1.00 115 7.98 1.71 119 
 CJ Attribution 3.41 1.11 230 2.22 1.21 228 4.92 0.77 228  4.52 1.00 226 4.85 0.95 223 7.92 1.66 230 
Note. IS Group = Influential Social Group. AOD = Influenced by Alcohol and/or Other Drugs. 'Dual Professional' refers to professionals experienced in both the criminal justice and 
disability sectors. CJ Attribution = Criminal Justice Attribution. Possible range for all variables was 1-6, except for AOD which had a possible range of 1-10.  
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Addressing Exploratory Research Questions 
 Six two-way ANOVAs per criminal offence scenario were conducted to test 
exploratory research questions positing main effects and/or interaction effects of IS 
group and disability status on criminal justice attributions (i.e., moral culpability, 
punishment, rehabilitation, reintegration, forgiveness, and influence of AOD on 
criminal behaviour). Results for each set of ANOVAs per criminal offence scenario 
(vignette) are reported separately.  
Differences between criminal justice attributions by influential social 
group and disability status of offender for the criminal offence scenario, ‘sexual 
assault’. The set of six two-way ANOVAs showed a significant main effect of IS 
group on attributions of moral culpability, deservingness of punishment via 
imprisonment, potential for rehabilitation, support for reintegration, and willingness 
to forgiveness, but not on the influence of AOD on the criminal offence. There was, 
however, a significant main effect of the offender’s disability status on participant 
attributions regarding the influence of AOD on the criminal offence, as well as on the 
offender’s perceived moral culpability and need for punishment. Effect sizes were 
small to medium (partial η2 =.04 -.18) for the significant main effects described. 
There were no significant two-way interactions (all p > .05, partial η2 = .00-.02). See 
Table 11.4 for detailed two-way ANOVA results for the sexual assault criminal 
offence scenario. 
For the main effects of disability status on criminal justice attributions, 
pairwise comparisons showed that, overall, participants attributed lower moral 
culpability to the sexual offender with an ID (M = 3.41, SD = 4.36) compared to the 
sexual offender without an ID (M = 4.36, SD = 1.06), and lower deservingness of 
punishment via imprisonment to the sexual offender with an ID (M = 2.59, SD = 
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1.28) compared to the sexual offender without an ID (M = 3.04, SD = 1.27). 
Participants also attributed a stronger role to AOD use in the sexual assault 
perpetrated by the offender with an ID (M = 6.21, SD = 1.93), compared to the 
offender without an ID specified (M = 5.33, SD = 2.36). The effect size for each 
mean difference described was large (d = .89) for moral culpability, and small for 
punishment (d = .35) and influence of AOD (d = .42). See Table 11.5 for detailed 
pairwise comparisons by disability status for each two-way ANOVA for the sexual 
assault criminal offence scenario.  
For the main effects of IS group on criminal justice attributions, pairwise 
comparisons showed that community members (M = 4.09, SD = 1.12) attributed 
more moral culpability to the sexual offender than disability professionals (M = 3.59, 
SD = 1.20), and that both community members (M = 3.28, SD = 1.19) and criminal 
justice professionals (M = 2.95, SD = 1.37) perceived the sexual offender as more 
deserving of punishment via imprisonment than dual professionals (M = 2.22, SD = 
1.13). Community members (M = 4.50, SD = .84) were less likely than dual 
professionals (M = 4.98, SD = .58) to attribute potential for rehabilitation to the 
sexual offender. Both community members (M = 3.84, SD = 1.00) and criminal 
justice professionals (M = 3.89, SD = .93) each reported less support for the sexual 
offender’s reintegration into the community, than both disability professionals (M = 
4.47, SD = .95) and dual professionals (M = 4.54, SD = .92). Community members 
(M = 3.97, SD = .88), as well as criminal justice professionals (M = 3.89, SD = 1.11), 
were also less willing to forgive the sexual offender compared to dual professionals 
(M = 4.48, SD = .83). Effect sizes for each mean difference described ranged from 
small to large (d = .43 - .91). See Table 11.6 for detailed pairwise comparisons by IS 
group for each two-way ANOVA for the sexual assault criminal offence scenario.  
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Table 11.4 
Two-way ANOVA Results for Criminal Justice Attributions towards a Criminal 
Offender by Disability Status and Influential Social Group for Sexual Assault 
Criminal Offence Scenario 
ANOVA: Dependent Variable      
     Factor SS df MS F Partial η2 
ANOVA 1: Attitude towards Moral Culpability   
Disability Status 49.00 1 49.00 43.95*** 0.18 
IS Group 12.29 3 4.10 3.67* 0.05 
Disability Status* IS Group 0.50 3 0.17 0.15 0.00 
Error 227.48 204 1.12   
ANOVA 2: Attitude towards Punishment    
Disability Status 13.58 1 13.58 9.13** 0.04 
IS Group 36.98 3 12.33 8.29*** 0.11 
Disability Status* IS Group 0.27 3 0.09 0.06 0.00 
Error 301.89 203 1.49   
ANOVA 3:  Attitude towards Rehabilitation    
Disability Status 1.17 1 1.17 2.00 0.01 
IS Group 7.24 3 2.41 4.14** 0.06 
Disability Status* IS Group 0.47 3 0.16 0.27 0.00 
Error 118.77 204 0.58   
ANOVA 4:  Attitude towards Reintegration    
Disability Status 1.75 1 1.75 1.92 0.01 
IS Group 22.00 3 7.33 8.04*** 0.11 
Disability Status* IS Group 0.81 3 0.27 0.30 0.00 
Error 184.13 202 0.91   
ANOVA 5:  Attitude towards Forgiveness    
Disability Status 1.29 1 1.29 1.44 0.01 
IS Group 12.57 3 4.19 4.65** 0.07 
Disability Status* IS Group 1.89 3 0.63 0.70 0.01 
Error 181.06 201 0.90   
ANOVA 6: Attitude towards role of AOD   
Disability Status 46.06 1 46.06 9.84** 0.05 
IS Group 5.46 3 1.82 0.39 0.01 
Disability Status* IS Group 16.46 3 5.49 1.17 0.02 
Error 949.98 203 4.68     
Note. IS Group = Influential Social Group. AOD = Alcohol and/or other drugs. *p < .05, 
**p <.01, *** p < .001 
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Table 11.5 
Disability Status Group Comparison for Criminal Justice Attributions towards a 
Criminal Offender, for Sexual Assault Criminal Offence Scenario 
Comparison Groups       
  
  ANOVA: Dependent Variable Mdiff SE 
95%CI  
[LL, UL] 
 
p 
 
d 
ID specified vs no ID specified    
ANOVA 1: Attitude towards Moral Culpability -0.98 0.15 [-1.28, -0.69] <.001*** 0.89  
ANOVA 2: Attitude towards Punishment -0.52 0.17 [-0.86, -0.18] .003** 0.35  
ANOVA 3:  Attitude towards Rehabilitation -0.15 0.11 [-0.36, 0.06] .158 0.23 
ANOVA 4:  Attitude towards Reintegration 0.19 0.14 [-0.08, 0.45] .167 0.15 
ANOVA 5:  Attitude towards Forgiveness 0.16 0.13 [-0.10, 0.43] .232 0.15 
  ANOVA 6: Attitude towards role of AOD use 0.96 0.31 [0.36, 1.56] .002** 0.41 
Note. ID = Intellectual Disability. Mdiff = Mean difference. AOD = Alcohol and/or other drugs.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 11.6 
Multiple Comparisons by Influential Social Group for Criminal Justice 
Attributions towards a Criminal Offender for Sexual Assault Criminal Offence 
Scenario 
ANOVA: Dependent Variable         
  Comparison Groups Mdiff SE 95%CI [LL, UL] 
 
p 
 
d 
ANOVA 1: Attitude towards Moral Culpability  
 CM vs CJP 0.18 0.21 [-0.24, 0.60] .410 0.01 
 CM vs DP 0.61 0.20 [0.22, 1.01] .002* 0.43 
 CM vs Dual P 0.43 0.20 [0.05, 0.82] .028 0.29 
 CJP vs DP 0.44 0.22 [-0.00, 0.88] .052 0.40 
 CJP vs Dual P 0.26 0.22 [-1.18, 0.69] .247 0.26 
 DP vs Dual P -0.18 0.21 [-0.59, 0.23] .381 0.16 
ANOVA 2: Attitude towards Punishment  
 CM vs CJP 0.42 0.45 [-0.07, 0.91] .090 0.26 
 CM vs DP 0.61 0.23 [0.15, 1.06] .009 0.44 
 CM vs Dual P 1.11 0.23 [0.67, 1.56] <.001* 0.91 
 CJP vs DP 0.19 0.26 [-0.32, 0.70] .472 0.17 
 CJP vs Dual P 0.69 0.26 [0.19, 1.20] .007* 0.58 
 DP vs Dual P 0.51 0.24 [0.03, 0.98] .036 0.42 
ANOVA 3:  Attitude towards Rehabilitation  
 CM vs CJP -0.30 0.15 [-0.61, 0.00] .051 0.43 
 CM vs DP -0.35 0.14 [-0.64, -0.07] .015 0.42 
 CM vs Dual P -0.47 0.14 [-0.75, -0.19] .001* 0.67 
 CJP vs DP -0.05 0.16 [-0.37, 0.27] .761 0.04 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.17 0.16 [-0.48, 0.15] .289 0.24 
 DP vs Dual P -0.12 0.15 [-0.41, 0.17] .421 0.16 
ANOVA 4:  Attitude towards Reintegration  
 CM vs CJP -0.09 0.19 [-0.47, 0.29] .639 0.05 
 CM vs DP -0.64 0.18 [-1.00, -0.28] <.001* 0.65 
 320
ANOVA: Dependent Variable         
  Comparison Groups Mdiff SE 95%CI [LL, UL] 
 
p 
 
d 
 CM vs Dual P -0.72 0.18 [-1.07, -0.37] <.001* 0.73 
 CJP vs DP -0.55 0.20 [-0.95, -0.15] .007* 0.62 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.63 0.20 [-1.02, -0.24] .002* 0.70 
 DP vs Dual P -0.08 0.19 [-0.45, 0.29] .673 0.08 
ANOVA 5:  Attitude towards Forgiveness  
 CM vs CJP 0.04 0.19 [-0.34, 0.42] .828 0.08 
 CM vs DP -0.39 0.18 [-0.75, -0.04] .031 0.40 
 CM vs Dual P -0.54 0.18 [-0.88, -0.19] .003* 0.60 
 CJP vs DP -0.43 0.20 [-0.83, -0.03] .034 0.43 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.58 0.20 [-0.97, -0.19] .004* 0.60 
 DP vs Dual P -0.14 0.19 [-0.51, 0.22] .441 0.14 
ANOVA 6: Attitude towards role of AOD use  
 CM vs CJP -0.19 0.44 [-1.05, 0.68] .668 0.05 
 CM vs DP -0.34 0.41 [-1.15, 0.47] .408 0.12 
 CM vs Dual P -0.40 0.40 [-1.19, 0.40] .326 0.16 
 CJP vs DP -0.15 0.46 [-1.06, 0.75] .742 0.16 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.21 0.45 [-1.10, 0.68] .646 0.11 
 DP vs Dual P -0.06 0.42 [-0.89, 0.78] .894 0.04 
Note. CM = Community Members; CJP = Criminal Justice Professionals; DP = 
Disability Professionals; Dual P = Dual Professionals, experienced in both criminal 
justice and disability. Mdiff = Mean difference. AOD = Alcohol and/or other drugs. All 
p values are unadjusted.  
*p < .008 (significant at p < .05 with Bonferroni-correction applied). 
 
Differences between criminal justice attributions by influential social 
group and disability status of offender for the criminal offence scenario, 
‘physical assault with a weapon’.  The set of six two-way ANOVAs showed a 
significant main effect of IS group on attributions of punishment via imprisonment, 
rehabilitation, reintegration, and forgiveness, but not on perceived moral culpability 
or the influence of AOD on the criminal offence. There was a significant main effect 
of the offender’s disability status on the moral culpability of the offender and his 
deservingness of punishment via imprisonment, though. There were no main effects 
for the ANOVA assessing attributions toward the influence of AOD on the 
offender’s behaviour, and there were no two-way interactions for any of the 
ANOVAs all (p > .05, partial η2 = .00-.02). Effect sizes were small to medium 
(partial η2 =.04 -.12) for the significant main effects described. See Table 11.7 for 
detailed two-way ANOVA results for the criminal offence scenario, ‘physical assault 
with a weapon’. 
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Pairwise comparisons by disability status for significant main effects showed 
that, overall, participants attributed lower moral culpability to the violent offender 
with an ID (M = 3.02, SD = 1.08) compared to the violent offender without an ID (M 
= 3.79, SD = 1.05), and lower deservingness of punishment via imprisonment to the 
violent offender with an ID (M = 2.17, SD = 1.05) compared to the violent offender 
without an ID (M = 2.52, SD = 1.25). Effect sizes for these mean differences were 
medium (d = .72) and small (d = .30), respectively. See Table 11.8 for detailed 
pairwise comparisons by disability status for each criminal justice attribution for 
each two-way ANOVA for the criminal offence scenario, ‘physical assault with a 
weapon’. 
For the main effects of IS group on criminal justice attributions, pairwise 
comparisons showed that community members (M = 2.47, SD = 1.19), criminal 
justice professionals (M = 2.80, SD = 1.40), and disability professionals (M = 2.44, 
SD = 1.08) each reported stronger support for punishment via imprisonment for the 
violent offender, than dual professionals (M = 1.83, SD = .87). Disability 
professionals attributed a lower potential for rehabilitation (M = 4.67, SD = .86) to 
the violent offender compared to dual professionals (M = 5.04, SD = .57), while 
criminal justice professionals (M = 4.18, SD = .87) reported less support for 
reintegration of the violent offender into the community, compared to dual 
professionals (M = 4.68, SD = .83). Both criminal justice professionals (M = 4.35, SD 
= .85) and disability professionals (M = 4.46, SD = .94) were less willing to forgive 
the violent offender, compared to dual professionals (M = 4.95, SD = .66). Effect 
sizes were medium to large (d = .51 - .83) for the mean differences described. See 
Table 11.9 for detailed pairwise comparisons by IS group for each two-way ANOVA 
for the criminal offence scenario, ‘physical assault with a weapon’. 
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Table 11.7 
Two-way ANOVA Results for Criminal Justice Attributions towards a Criminal 
Offender by Disability Status and Influential Social Group for Criminal Offence 
Scenario, ‘Physical Assault with a Weapon’ 
 
ANOVA: Dependent Variable      
      Factor SS df MS F Partial η2 
ANOVA 1: Attitude towards Moral Culpability     
Disability Status 30.35 1 30.35 27.19*** 0.12 
IS Group 7.43 3 2.48 2.22 0.03 
Disability Status* IS Group 1.48 3 0.49 0.44 0.01 
Error 225.45 202 1.12   
ANOVA 2: Attitude towards Punishment     
Disability Status 9.05 1 9.05 7.37** 0.04 
IS Group 25.54 3 8.51 6.93*** 0.09 
Disability Status* IS Group 5.75 3 1.92 1.56 0.02 
Error 248.26 202 1.23   
ANOVA 3:  Attitude towards Rehabilitation     
Disability Status 0.04 1 0.04 0.08 0.00 
IS Group 6.55 3 2.18 4.18** 0.06 
Disability Status* IS Group 1.43 3 0.48 0.91 0.01 
Error 105.51 202 0.52   
ANOVA 4:  Attitude towards Reintegration     
Disability Status 0.30 1 0.30 0.39 0.00 
IS Group 6.19 3 2.06 2.74* 0.04 
Disability Status* IS Group 1.73 3 0.58 0.77 0.01 
Error 152.15 202 0.75   
ANOVA 5:  Attitude towards Forgiveness     
Disability Status 0.28 1 0.28 0.39 0.00 
IS Group 10.96 3 3.65 5.05** 0.07 
Disability Status* IS Group 1.57 3 0.52 0.72 0.01 
Error 145.40 201 0.72   
ANOVA 6: Attitude towards role of AOD drug use    
Disability Status 3.23 1 3.23 0.37 0.01 
IS Group 0.82 3 0.27 0.07 0.00 
Disability Status* IS Group 2.54 3 0.85 0.89 0.00 
Error 806.12 203 3.97   
Note. IS Group = Influential Social Group. AOD = Alcohol and/or other drugs. 
 *p < .05, **p <.01, ***p < .001. 
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Table 11.8 
Comparison by Disability Status for Criminal Justice Attributions towards a 
Criminal Offender for Criminal Offence Scenario, ‘Physical Assault with a Weapon’ 
 
Comparison Groups      
 ANOVA: Dependent Variable Mdiff SE 95%CI  
[LL, UL] 
 
p 
 
d 
ID specified vs not      
 ANOVA 1: Attitude towards Moral Culpability -0.79 0.15 [-1.08, -0.49] <.001*** 0.72 
 ANOVA 2: Attitude towards Punishment -0.43 0.16 [-0.74, -0.12] .007** 0.30 
 ANOVA 3:  Attitude towards Rehabilitation 0.03 0.10 [-0.17, 0.23] .780 0.00 
 ANOVA 4:  Attitude towards Reintegration 0.08 0.12 [-0.17, 0.32] .532 0.03 
 ANOVA 5:  Attitude towards Forgiveness 0.08 0.12 [-0.16, 0.32] .535 0.06 
 ANOVA 6: Attitude towards role of AOD use -0.26 0.28 [-0.81, 0.30] .369 0.13 
Note. ID = Intellectual Disability. Mdiff = Mean difference. AOD = Alcohol and/or other drugs.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Table 11.9 
Multiple Comparisons by Influential Social Group for Criminal Justice Attributions 
towards a Criminal Offender for Criminal Offence Scenario, ‘Physical Assault with 
a Weapon’ 
ANOVA: Dependent Variable      
 Comparison Groups Mdiff SE 95%CI [LL, UL] p d 
ANOVA 1: Attitude towards Moral Culpability   
 CM vs CJP 0.34 0.22 [-0.09, 0.78] .124 0.36 
 CM vs DP 0.42 0.20 [0.04, 0.81] .033 0.34 
 CM vs Dual P 0.42 0.19 [0.04, 0.80] .030 0.39 
 CJP vs DP 0.08 0.23 [-0.38, 0.54] .737 0.04 
 CJP vs Dual P 0.08 0.23 [-0.38, 0.53] .741 0.00 
 DP vs Dual P -0.00 0.20 [-0.40, 0.40] .992 0.04 
ANOVA 2: Attitude towards Punishment     
 CM vs CJP -0.41 0.23 [-0.87, 0.05] .079 0.25 
 CM vs DP 0.04 0.21 [-0.36, 0.45] .840 0.03 
 CM vs Dual P 0.63 0.20 [0.23, 1.03] .002*** 0.61 
 CJP vs DP 0.45 0.24 [-0.03, 0.94] .064 0.29 
 CJP vs Dual P 1.04 0.24 [0.57, 1.52] <.001*** 0.83 
 DP vs Dual P 0.59 0.21 [0.17, 1.01] .006*** 0.62 
ANOVA 3:  Attitude towards Rehabilitation     
 CM vs CJP 0.34 0.15 [0.04, 0.64] .028 0.42 
 CM vs DP 0.36 0.13 [0.09, 0.62] .009 0.44 
 CM vs Dual P -0.03 0.13 [-0.28, 0.23] .851 0.05 
 CJP vs DP 0.02 0.16 [-0.29, 0.33] .904 0.04 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.36 0.16 [-0.67, -0.05] .022 0.49 
 DP vs Dual P -0.38 0.14 [-0.66, -0.11] .007* 0.51 
ANOVA 4:  Attitude towards Reintegration     
 CM vs CJP 0.31 0.18 [-0.05, 0.67] .089 0.34 
 CM vs DP 0.10 0.16 [-0.22, 0.41] .555 0.11 
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ANOVA: Dependent Variable      
 Comparison Groups Mdiff SE 95%CI [LL, UL] p d 
 CM vs Dual P -0.21 0.16 [-0.52, 0.10] .186 0.25 
 CJP vs DP -0.22 0.19 [-0.59, 0.16] .257 0.21 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.52 0.19 [-0.89, -0.15] .006* 0.59 
 DP vs Dual P -0.30 0.17 [-0.63, 0.03] .070 0.35 
ANOVA 5:  Attitude towards Forgiveness     
 CM vs CJP 0.34 0.18 [-0.10, 0.70] .057 0.35 
 CM vs DP 0.21 0.16 [-0.10, 0.53] .178 0.22 
 CM vs Dual P -0.29 0.16 [-0.60, 0.01] .060 0.37 
 CJP vs DP -0.13 0.19 [-0.50, 0.24] .494 0.12 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.64 0.18 [-1.00, -0.27] .001* 0.79 
 DP vs Dual P -0.51 0.16 [-0.83, -0.18] .002* 0.60 
ANOVA 6: Attitude towards role of AOD use    
 CM vs CJP -0.12 0.42 [-0.95, 0.70] .766 0.06 
 CM vs DP -0.11 0.37 [-0.84, 0.62] .760 0.07 
 CM vs Dual P -0.15 0.36 [-0.87, 0.56] .674 0.09 
 CJP vs DP 0.01 0.44 [-0. 85, 0.87] .980 0.00 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.03 0.43 [-0.88, 0.82] .947 0.02 
 DP vs Dual P -0.04 0.38 [-0.80, 0.72] .918 0.02 
Note. CM = Community Members; CJP = Criminal Justice Professionals; DP = Disability 
Professionals; Dual P = Dual Professionals, experienced in both criminal justice and 
disability. Mdiff = Mean difference. AOD = Alcohol and/or other drugs. All p values are 
unadjusted.  
*p < .008 (significant at p < .05 with Bonferroni-correction applied). 
 
Differences between criminal justice attributions by influential social 
group and disability status of offender for the criminal offence scenario, 
‘burglary’. The set of six two-way ANOVAs showed a significant main effect of IS 
group on attributions of moral culpability, punishment via imprisonment, 
reintegration, forgiveness, and the influence of AOD on the criminal offence; 
however, there was no main effect of IS group on attributions of rehabilitation. There 
was also a significant main effect of the offender’s disability status on the moral 
culpability of the offender and his deservingness of punishment via imprisonment, 
but no main effect of disability status on attributions of rehabilitation, reintegration, 
forgiveness, and influence of AOD on the criminal offence. There were no two-way 
interactions for any of the ANOVAs (p > .05, partial η2 = .00-.03), and effect sizes 
were small to medium (partial η2 =.04 -.08) for the significant main effects 
described. See Table 11.10 for detailed two-way ANOVA results for the burglary 
criminal offence scenario.  
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Pairwise comparisons by disability status for significant main effects showed 
that, overall, participants attributed lower moral culpability to the burglar with an ID 
(M = 3.07, SD = 1.07) compared to the burglar without an ID (M = 3.73, SD = 1.04), 
and lower deservingness of punishment via imprisonment to the burglar with an ID 
(M = 1.97, SD = 1.04) compared to the burglar without an ID (M = 2.47, SD = 1.31). 
Effect sizes for these mean differences were medium (d = .63) and small (d = .45), 
respectively. See Table 11.11 for detailed pairwise comparisons by disability status 
for each criminal justice attribution for each two-way ANOVA for the burglary 
criminal offence scenario. 
For the main effects of IS group on criminal justice attributions, pairwise 
comparisons showed that community members (M = 3.72, SD = 1.12) attributed 
higher moral culpability to the burglar compared to both disability professionals (M 
= 3.15, SD = 1.05) and dual professionals (M = 3.13, SD = 1.01); community 
members (M = 4.63, SD = .98) were also less willing to forgive the burglar for their 
offence, compared to dual professionals (M = 5.12, SD =.99). Both community 
members (M = 8.20, SD = 1.43) and disability professionals (M = 8.20, SD = 1.68) 
attributed a stronger influence of AOD use on the burglar’s offence compared to dual 
professionals (M = 7.15, SD = 1.74). All effect sizes were medium (d = .50 - .66) for 
the mean differences described. See Table 11.12 for detailed pairwise comparisons 
by IS group for each two-way ANOVA for the burglary criminal offence scenario. 
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Table 11.10 
Two-way ANOVA Results for Criminal Justice Attributions towards a Criminal 
Offender by Disability Status and Influential Social Group for the Burglary Criminal 
Offence Scenario 
ANOVA: Dependent Variable      
      Factor SS df MS F Partial η2 
ANOVA 1: Attitude towards Moral Culpability    
Disability Status 21.33 1 21.33 19.93*** 0.08 
IS Group 17.09 3 5.70 5.32** 0.07 
Disability Status* IS Group 0.39 3 0.13 0.12 0.00 
Error 237.62 222 1.07   
ANOVA 2: Attitude towards Punishment     
Disability Status 19.58 1 19.58 14.50*** 0.06 
IS Group 12.41 3 4.14 3.06* 0.04 
Disability Status* IS Group 8.34 3 2.78 2.06 0.03 
Error 297.15 220 1.35   
ANOVA 3:  Attitude towards Rehabilitation     
Disability Status 0.57 1 0.57 0.96 0.00 
IS Group 2.34 3 0.78 1.31 0.02 
Disability Status* IS Group 2.35 3 0.78 1.32 0.02 
Error 130.99 220 0.60   
ANOVA 4:  Attitude towards Reintegration     
Disability Status 0.54 1 0.54 0.55 0.00 
IS Group 10.59 3 3.53 3.62* 0.05 
Disability Status* IS Group 0.97 3 0.32 0.33 0.01 
Error 212.40 218 0.97   
ANOVA 5:  Attitude towards Forgiveness     
Disability Status 3.16 1 3.16 3.68 0.02 
IS Group 8.96 3 2.99 3.47* 0.05 
Disability Status* IS Group 3.79 3 1.26 1.47 0.02 
Error 185.11 215 0.86   
ANOVA 6: Attitude towards role of AOD use    
Disability Status 1.65 1 1.65 0.63 0.00 
IS Group 40.83 3 13.61 5.22** 0.07 
Disability Status* IS Group 11.92 3 3.97 1.52 0.02 
Error 578.73 222 2.61   
Note. IS Group = Influential Social Group. AOD = Alcohol and/or other drugs. 
 *p < .05, **p <.01, ***p < .001. 
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Table 11.11 
Comparison by Disability Status for Criminal Justice Attributions towards a 
Criminal Offender for the Burglary Criminal Offence Scenario 
Comparison Groups      
 ANOVA: Dependent Variable Mdiff SE 95%CI [LL, UL] p d 
ID specified vs no ID specified       
 ANOVA 1: Attitude towards Moral Culpability -0.65 0.15 [-0.94, -0.36] <.001*** 0.63 
 ANOVA 2: Attitude towards Punishment -0.63 0.16 [-0.95, -0.30] <.001*** 0.45 
 ANOVA 3:  Attitude towards Rehabilitation 0.11 0.11 [-0.11, 0.32] .330 0.03 
 ANOVA 4:  Attitude towards Reintegration 0.10 0.14 [-0.17, 0.38] .458 0.06 
 ANOVA 5:  Attitude towards Forgiveness 0.25 0.13 [-0.01, 0.51] .057 0.17 
 ANOVA 6: Attitude towards role of AOD use -0.18 0.23 [-0.63, 0.27] .427 0.07 
Note. Mdiff = Mean difference. ID = Intellectual Disability. AOD = Alcohol and/or other drugs. 
 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Table 11.12 
Multiple Comparisons by Influential Social Group for Criminal Justice Attributions 
towards a Criminal Offender for the Burglary Criminal Offence Scenario 
ANOVA: Dependent Variable     
 Comparison Groups Mdiff SE 95%CI [LL, UL] p d 
ANOVA 1: Attitude towards Moral Culpability    
 CM vs CJP 0.13 0.21 [-0.28, 0.55] .527 0.15 
 CM vs DP 0.56 0.17 [0.22, 0.99] .001* 0.53 
 CM vs Dual P 0.60 0.20 [0.22, 0.99] .002* 0.55 
 CJP vs DP 0.43 0.22 [0.00, 0.86] .049 0.37 
 CJP vs Dual P 0.47 0.24 [0.00, 0.94] .050 0.40 
 DP vs Dual P 0.04 0.20 [-0.36, 0.44] .840 0.02 
ANOVA 2: Attitude towards Punishment     
 CM vs CJP 0.15 0.24 [-0.32, 0.61] .542 0.14 
 CM vs DP 0.43 0.19 [0.05, 0.80] .025 0.37 
 CM vs Dual P 0.59 0.22 [0.15, 1.02] .008 0.47 
 CJP vs DP 0.28 0.24 [-0.20, 0.76] .249 0.20 
 CJP vs Dual P 0.44 0.27 [-0.09, 0.97] .102 0.31 
 DP vs Dual P 0.16 0.23 [-0.29, 0.61] .485 0.14 
ANOVA 3:  Attitude towards Rehabilitation     
 CM vs CJP 0.14 0.16 [-0.17, 0.45] .373 0.18 
 CM vs DP -0.15 0.13 [-0.40, 0.10] .236 0.18 
 CM vs Dual P -0.13 0.15 [-0.41, 0.17] .402 0.13 
 CJP vs DP -0.29 0.16 [-0.61, 0.03] .075 0.37 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.26 0.18 [-0.62, 0.09] .141 0.34 
 DP vs Dual P 0.03 0.15 [-0.27, 0.33] .863 0.06 
ANOVA 4:  Attitude towards Reintegration     
 CM vs CJP 0.08 0.20 [-0.32, 0.48] .690 0.07 
 CM vs DP -0.36 0.16 [-0.68, -0.04] .029 0.34 
 CM vs Dual P -0.47 0.19 [-0.84, -0.10] .013 0.47 
 CJP vs DP -0.44 0.21 [-0.85, -0.03] .037 0.46 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.55 0.23 [-1.00, -0.10] .016 0.61 
 DP vs Dual P -0.12 0.19 [-0.50, 0.27] .548 0.13 
ANOVA 5:  Attitude towards Forgiveness     
 CM vs CJP -0.12 0.19 [-0.50, 0.25] .524 0.14 
 328
ANOVA: Dependent Variable     
 Comparison Groups Mdiff SE 95%CI [LL, UL] p d 
 CM vs DP -0.37 0.15 [-0.67, -0.06] .019 0.40 
 CM vs Dual P -0.50 0.18 [-0.85, -0.15] .005* 0.50 
 CJP vs DP -0.24 0.20 [-0.63, 0.14] .216 0.25 
 CJP vs Dual P -0.38 0.22 [-0.81, 0.04] .077 0.36 
 DP vs Dual P -0.14 0.18 [-0.50, 0.22] .452 0.14 
ANOVA 6: Attitude towards role of AOD use    
 CM vs CJP 0.56 0.33 [-0.08, 1.21] .088 0.36 
 CM vs DP -0.02 0.26 [-0.53, 0.50] .947 0.00 
 CM vs Dual P 1.07 0.31 [0.46, 1.67] .001* 0.66 
 CJP vs DP -0.58 0.34 [-1.25, 0.09] .087 0.34 
 CJP vs Dual P 0.50 0.38 [-0.24, 1.24] .182 0.27 
 DP vs Dual P 1.08 0.32 [0.46, 1.71] .001* 0.61 
Note. CM = Community Members; CJP = Criminal Justice Professionals; DP = Disability 
Professionals; Dual P = Dual Professionals, experienced in both criminal justice and 
disability. Mdiff = Mean difference. AOD = Alcohol and/or other drugs. All p values are 
unadjusted.  
*p < .008 (significant at p < .05 with Bonferroni-correction applied). 
 
Discussion 
Study 6 compared the criminal justice attitudes of community members, 
criminal justice professionals, disability professionals, and dual professionals 
towards three types of offender (committed sexual assault, physical assault with a 
weapon, or burglary) that varied by disability status (ID specified versus not). There 
were no significant two-way interactions between participants’ IS group and the 
disability status of their target offender for the six criminal justice attitude outcomes, 
for each crime type. There were, however, significant main effects of disability status 
and of IS group on certain criminal justice attitudes, across crime types.  
Effect of Offenders’ Disability Status on Criminal Justice Attributions 
Moral culpability and deservingness of punishment via imprisonment. 
Results support exploratory research questions 1.a., 1.b., and 1.f., but not 1.c., 1.d., or 
1.e. Regardless of their IS group, participants attributed significantly lower moral 
culpability and deservingness of punishment via imprisonment to offenders with an 
ID (compared to offenders without an ID) for each crime type. These results are 
consistent with findings of Study 3 (Chapter 7), where participants attributed lower 
moral responsibility to people with an ID than to criminal offenders. While Study 3 
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compared attributions towards people with an ID and criminal offenders as two 
distinct social categories, the presence of an ID in each study appears to have 
influenced attributions similarly, regardless of offender status. In Study 3, 
attributions of moral responsibility were explained within the context of moral 
typecasting theory (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray et al., 2012), describing the target 
social category with higher attributed moral responsibility as a moral agent. Moral 
agents are framed by moral typecasting theory as being responsible for their actions, 
both positive and negative; where positive actions deserve praise, immoral actions 
(including criminal behaviours) deserve punishment (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray et 
al., 2012). This theory can be used to explain why people who held stronger attitudes 
towards offenders without an ID as being morally responsible for their actions, also 
held stronger attitudes towards their deserving punishment via imprisonment. Past 
studies exploring moral typecasting with reference to attitudes towards offenders’ 
deservingness of punishment support this explanation (Khamitov et al., 2016; Miller 
& Borgida, 2016; Robbins & Litton, 2018).   
Also in Study 3, stereotype content theory was applied to understand how 
participants perceived offenders and people with an ID. Participants were found to 
stereotype criminal offenders as an outgroup subject to contemptuous prejudice 
(associated with emotions of contempt, disgust, anger and resentment), whereas 
people with an ID were stereotyped as an outgroup subject to paternalistic prejudice 
(associated with emotions of sympathy and pity) (Fiske et al., 2002). (Bastian, 
Denson, & Haslam, 2013) also identified that ‘moral outrage’ (associated with the 
emotions anger, disgust, and contempt) underlay attributions of moral responsibility 
and blame towards offenders of different crime types, and predicted attitudes towards 
punishment severity. In the current study, it may be that participants’ paternalistic 
prejudice tempered their contemptuous prejudice towards offenders with an ID, 
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reducing feelings of anger, disgust, and contempt and, consequently, moral outrage. 
This reduced moral outrage may have contributed to a perceived lesser deservingness 
of punishment via imprisonment for offenders with an ID compared to those without. 
Lower attributions of moral culpability for offenders with an ID (compared to 
those without an ID) in the current study is also generally supported by the 
qualitative themes representing causal explanations provided in Study 4 (Chapter 8). 
When an ID was specified in the Study 4 vignette, participants contextualised the 
target offender’s crime (theft and assault) with reference his ID and associated 
psychosocial deficits; however, when an ID was not specified, the same crime was 
attributed to a variety of internal and external causes such as addiction, mental 
illness, poverty, and social comparison motivations. Study 4 participants who 
explained the offender with an ID’s criminal behaviour as symptomatic of his ID, 
also implied the ID was an internal, uncontrollable, and stable property of the 
offender (Weiner, 1985, 1986). As such, many participants tended to present the 
offender with an ID as a victim of his own disability, reducing attributions of moral 
agency and hence moral culpability. As one participant noted of the target offender 
in Study 4 when an ID was specified: It is very unlikely John committed the offences 
with any malicious intent, but much more likely that he simply didn’t understand why 
his actions were inappropriate for the situation. Results of the current study lend 
quantitative support to the qualitative results of Study 4. 
 That participants reported less support for punishment via imprisonment to 
when an ID was specified across crime types, and regardless of IS group, is also 
consistent with results from Study 5 (Chapter 10). Overall, participants in Study 5 
tended to disagree that prison was an appropriate correctional treatment setting for 
offenders with an ID, and generally agreed that the community was a more 
appropriate treatment setting. The general view by IS groups that offenders with an 
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ID should not be treated in prison (described in Study 5), and the current study’s 
finding that participants viewed offenders with an ID as less deserving of punishment 
via imprisonment than offenders without an ID, despite committing the same type of 
crime and regardless of crime type, suggests that it is the ID specifically as a 
property of the offender that influences attitudes towards the offenders’ moral 
culpability and severity of punishment.  
Role of alcohol and/or other drugs. Regardless of IS group, participants 
also attributed a significantly stronger role to AOD use for the sexual offender with 
an ID, compared to the sexual offender without an ID specified. That intoxication 
might reduce moral culpability is a key consideration in sentencing, and a common 
argument used by defendants during trial (Rumgay, 1998). In their critical analysis of 
the role of alcohol intoxication on moral culpability and criminal responsibility 
within the context of retributive justice, Dingwall and Koffman (2008) suggest that 
for an individual to commit an offence when intoxicated, where intoxication is 
perceived to be for the ‘first time’ or ‘out of character’, less moral culpability might 
be attributed to that person. This is because their intention prior to intoxication 
(assumedly) was not to commit a crime, and had they been sober, they would have 
acted differently (presumably, more morally and less criminally).  
In the sexual assault vignette, the offender was presented as being intoxicated 
at a house party, did not have a history of AOD misuse specified, did not have a 
criminal history, and committed an opportunistic sexual assault on an unconscious 
woman in the company of an accomplice. Given the opportunism of the crime, the 
offender’s state of intoxication, and implicit social pressure to participate in the 
crime by an accomplice, participants may have attributed a stronger role to being 
intoxicated for the offender when an ID was specified (versus not), because the ID 
implied poorer baseline reasoning and impulse control skills prior to intoxication. 
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Participants also may have attributed naivety to the offender with an ID regarding 
AOD use; given their ID, participants may have believed they were unlikely to have 
been previously exposed to or desire to use AOD, and so they were unused to the 
effects of being intoxicated. Participants may have thus perceived the offender with 
an ID to be a first-time or rare consumer of alcohol, unprepared and unable to 
negotiate their own reduced inhibitions.  
It should be noted that results of the current study regarding the stronger role 
of AOD in the offender with an ID’s crime appears at odds with key themes 
identified in Study 4. In the qualitative study, participants attributed addiction and 
intoxication as causes of offending when an ID was not specified, but didn’t mention 
these factors when an ID was specified. This is interesting because it suggests that 
participants in Study 4, unlike in the current study, perceived the ID itself (and its 
psychosocial impact) to be sufficient to explain offending (theft and assault), without 
the need to appeal to external factors (such as AOD) impairing reasoning and 
impulse-control.  
A third explanation for this finding could be that people with an ID are 
stereotyped as ‘Holy Innocents’, possessing a disposition that is warm, affectionate, 
happy, and eternally ‘childlike’ (naïve, innocent) in nature (Wehmeyer & Berkobein, 
1996). If participants attribute this stereotypical disposition to people with an ID, 
then they may feel their criminal behaviour is likely caused by external influences 
such as social modelling, peer pressure, or coercion (as suggested in Study 4), or 
intoxication (as suggested in the current study). That the offender described in the 
vignette was specified to not have a criminal history, and was in the company of 
someone without an ID who may have been perceived as exerting peer pressure, may 
have supported participants’ use of this stereotype, affirming the offender with an 
ID’s naturally innocent disposition. 
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Effect of Influential Social Group Membership on Criminal Justice Attributions 
Regardless of the disability status of their target offender, IS groups 
significantly differed in their criminal justice attitudes towards moral culpability, 
punishment, rehabilitation, reintegration, and forgiveness of the sexual offender. 
Overall, community members reported significantly more negative attitudes towards 
all criminal justice outcomes compared to one or more professional groups, for at 
least one of the crime types portrayed. Criminal justice professionals also expressed 
significantly more negative attitudes than disability and dual professionals towards 
some criminal justice outcomes for sexual and violent offenders. These results are 
generally consistent with findings of Study 5 (Chapter 10) of this thesis, where 
community members and criminal justice professionals reported significantly less 
support for community-based correctional treatment and significantly more support 
for prison-based correctional treatment of offenders with an ID. Interestingly, 
disability professionals’ attitudes also significantly differed to dual professionals’ 
attitudes for certain criminal justice outcomes, particularly for violent offenders. 
Moral culpability. Community members attributed greater moral culpability 
to the sexual offender than disability professionals, and attributed greater moral 
culpability to the burglar than both the disability and dual professionals. These 
results lend support to exploratory research question 2.a., which proposed that 
community members would attribute significantly stronger moral culpability to 
offenders across crime types compared to one or more professional groups. There 
were no differences in attitude toward moral culpability between the three 
professional groups.  
That community members attributed greater moral culpability to the sexual 
offender and burglar than professionals experienced in the disability sector is a novel 
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finding. While there is no past research examining differences between the 
attributions of community members and such professionals towards offenders, a 
study by Murray, Thomson, Cooke, and Charles (2011) sampling UK community 
members and criminal justice experts found that experts (including clinical and 
forensic psychologists, psychiatrists, and forensic practitioners – all professions 
likely to work in forensic disability roles) attributed significantly less criminal 
responsibility to offenders than laypeople, regardless of offence (murder, assault, 
theft). 
 Past research indicates community members tend to hold negative attitudes 
towards sexual offenders specifically (Rogers & Ferguson, 2011), and that these 
attitudes can be more negative than those of correctional professionals (Kjelsberg & 
Loos, 2008). Similarly, past research suggests that both Australian and American 
community members hold negative, stigmatising attitudes towards illicit drug 
addiction (Barry, McGinty, Pescosolido, & Goldman, 2014; Meurk, Carter, 
Partridge, Lucke, & Hall, 2014). Interestingly, Meurk et al. (2014) survey of 
Australian community members’ attitudes found about a third of participants viewed 
heroin addiction alone as sufficient reason for imprisonment, and that when 
participants attributed the cause of the addiction to ‘personal qualities’ as opposed to 
biological or social causes, they were twice as likely to agree (than disagree) that the 
heroin addict should be imprisoned. Barry et al. (2014) and Meurk et al. (2014) 
results suggest that attributions of personal responsibility for the burglar’s addiction 
(a key motivator for the burglar’s offence) may be interwoven with attributions of 
moral culpability for the crime itself. That community members reported the highest 
scores for moral culpability overall for both the sexual offender and burglar is hence 
not surprising.  
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That professionals experienced in the disability sector reported the lowest 
moral culpability scores for sexual offending and burglary, and that these 
significantly differed from those of community members, could be explained by their 
professional training and experience. Professionals employed in fields likely to work 
in the disability sector may be more likely to value and apply a ‘sociological   
imagination’ (Mills, 2000) (originally published 1959) to better understand and 
support their clients and patients. Application of the sociological imagination 
involves perspective taking and consideration of the individual’s behaviours and 
outcomes within the sociostructural context in which they occur. As such, applying 
this perspective may result in a greater appreciation of external social and structural 
pressures on individuals’ internal motivations, intentions, and behaviours, including 
morally repugnant behaviours like sexual assault and theft to fund addiction. 
Application of a sociological imagination could perhaps lead to reduced attributions 
of moral culpability for criminal behaviours. In Study 4, participants (all of whom 
were community members) could be said to have applied a sociological imagination 
when providing causal explanations for their target offender’s behaviour; many 
participants identified sociostructural pressures and norms as possible influencers on 
their offender’s crime. However, professionals experienced in the disability sector 
with university education emphasising sociological approaches to understanding 
health, well-being, and disability (e.g., the social model of disability and mental 
health), may be more systematic in applying the sociological imagination when 
evaluating individuals’ behaviours, and their causes and implications, than 
community members overall. Disability and dual professionals’ stronger sociological 
imagination may thus explain differences in attribution of moral culpability for these 
IS groups. 
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Punishment. Both community members and criminal justice professionals 
reported stronger support for punishment via imprisonment for both the sexual and 
violent offenders, compared to dual professionals. These results lend support to 
exploratory research question 2.b., which proposed community members would hold 
significantly more supportive attitudes towards punishment across crime types 
compared to one or more professional groups. These results also support exploratory 
research question 3.a., which proposed that dual professionals would be less 
supportive of punishment via imprisonment compared to criminal justice 
professionals.  
In Study 5 (Chapter 10), a comparison of the same IS groups’ attitudes 
towards appropriate treatment settings for offenders with an ID found that both 
community members and criminal justice professionals held significantly less 
negative attitudes towards prison-based treatment, and significantly less positive 
attitudes towards community-based treatment, compared to dual professionals. That 
this pattern of results was replicated in the current study indicates that community 
members and criminal justice professionals may generally hold punitive attitudes 
towards criminal offenders, regardless of the offender’s ID status.  
Roberts and Indermaur (2007) identified a number of demographic and 
individual differences associated with punitive attitudes in Australian community 
members that may generalise to the IS groups in this study (i.e., being male, older, 
and working-class, holding a right-wing political orientation, relying on commercial 
television as the main source of news, lower education and lower self-reported 
knowledge of the criminal justice system). Of these, lower levels of education and 
self-reported knowledge of the criminal justice system contributed the most variance 
in predicting punitiveness and general dissatisfaction with criminal justice processes. 
Roberts and Indermaur (2007) concluded that inaccurate perceptions of crime (i.e., 
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incidence, sentencing, and expectations of correctional treatment outcomes) led 
community members to hold more punitive attitudes towards offenders. White and 
Knowles (2013) similarly found that lower education level, older age, as well as 
higher legal authoritarianism and the belief that the offending behaviour was caused 
by the individual’s character predicted greater punitiveness.  
That community members and criminal justice professionals expressed 
greater punitiveness for sexual and violent offences, but not burglary, likely relates to 
the perceived seriousness of the three crimes.  Roberts et al. (2007) argued that 
community members tend to focus on and allocate punishment on the basis of the 
perceived harm resulting from an offender’s behaviour, rather than the offender’s 
moral culpability regarding engagement in the behaviour. Crimes against the person 
and property crimes are typically rated as more and less severe, respectively, by 
community samples due to perceived degree of harm experienced by the victim, 
which impacts attitudes towards the punitiveness of sentencing goals (Samuel & 
Moulds, 1986). Roberts and Gebotys (1989) found that American community 
members’ and students’ ideal criminal sentence length correlated only with perceived 
severity of the offence (where sexual assault and manslaughter were considered more 
serious). They proposed this was due to the samples’ ‘just deserts’ approach to 
sentencing goals and outcomes. 
 Tajalli, De Soto, and Dozier (2013) compared American university students’ 
punitive attitudes towards a variety of offenders who had committed person, 
property, and drug offences, and found that participants were least concerned by 
offenders who were burglars or charged with drug possession. It is possible that IS 
groups’ punitive attitudes towards the burglary offence did not significantly differ 
due to common attributions of lesser harm caused to the offender’s victims, and 
hence less perceived deservingness of punishment via imprisonment. It is notable, 
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however, that while community members attributed significantly more moral 
culpability to the burglar compared to disability and dual professionals, they did not 
attribute stronger support for imprisonment as punishment. This result is in contrast 
to findings by Meurk et al. (2014), where a third of Australian community members 
reported heroin addiction deserved punishment via imprisonment.  
The current study’s results regarding community members’ and criminal 
justice professionals’ punitiveness towards sexual offenders corroborates findings by 
Kjelsberg et al. (2007), who found three-quarters of the Norwegian university 
students sampled reported crimes should be punished more severely, particularly 
sexual offences; and results of Kjelsberg and Loos (2008), who found 78% and 92% 
of prison employees and university students, respectively, thought punishment of 
sexual offences in Norway was ‘too mild’. Similar research assessing community 
attitudes towards sentencing in Canada found that most participants perceived 
sentencing to be too lenient overall, and in particular towards sexual offenders and 
offenders using weapons (Roberts et al., 2007). Rogers and Ferguson (2011) also 
found that American university students attributed greater punitiveness towards 
sexual offences compared to non-sexual offences. Of note, Kjelsberg et al. (2007) 
and Kjelsberg and Loos (2008) also found that prison officers held more negative, 
punitive attitudes towards sexual offenders and prisoners, respectively, compared to 
other prison employees such as administrators and therapeutic staff.  
Hogue and Peebles (1997) found that when participants were primed to 
perceive a sexual offender’s rape as premeditated (compared to unpremeditated), 
they were more likely to hold more punitive attitudes towards their correctional 
treatment (i.e., to recommend jail rather than probation). In a sample of Australian 
community members, White and Knowles (2013) also found that participant 
attributions of individual (rather than social) causation for a crime predicted attitudes 
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favouring punishment over rehabilitation. It may be that community members and 
criminal justice employees attributed greater premeditation and individual motivation 
to the sexual offender (perhaps supported by the vignette describing the offender and 
his friend discussing the crime prior to committing it). Conversely, dual 
professionals may have attributed less premeditation and more contextual pressures 
to the crime (perhaps supported by the vignette describing the offender and his friend 
as finding the woman passed out and making a decision to sexually assault her in the 
moment, while heavily intoxicated).  
It is important to note that sexual offenders are among the most stigmatised 
of criminal offender categories, inciting vigilantism (from social exclusion to 
murder) both within the prison setting by other prisoners, and in the community by 
community members (Cubellis, Evans, & Fera, 2018; Grossi, 2017). Viki et al. 
(2012) applied the two-dimensional theory of dehumanisation to explore stigmatising 
attitudes towards the punishment of sex offenders, and found that greater 
dehumanisation of sexual offenders predicted support for longer sentence lengths in 
addition to their exclusion from society and their violent ill-treatment in a mixed 
sample of UK university students and community members. As community members 
fear being victims of sexual offenders, and criminal justice professionals are 
responsible for punishing and containing sexual offenders, these two groups may be 
particularly prone to holding dehumanising views of sexual offenders to justify their 
respective beliefs and behaviours. Conversely, disability and dual professionals may 
be more likely to apply a sociological imagination to humanise the offender and 
understand the sociocultural context within which sexual assault occurs (in order to 
therapeutically support victims and offenders, respectively). 
The disposition and history of the man presented in the violent offender 
vignette could explain why community members, criminal justice professionals, and 
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disability professionals, held more punitive attitudes compared to dual professionals. 
This offender was portrayed as having had an aggressive disposition throughout 
childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood; he had a history of ‘looking for trouble’ 
in the school yard and when out drinking as an adult, and a reputation amongst his 
own ‘friends’ as being volatile and potentially irrational when angered. This portrait 
thus described an unpredictable, aggressive, provocative young man whose violence 
had escalated to carrying and using a deadly weapon. It may be that all but the dual 
professionals perceived the harm caused to his victim, in addition to the escalating 
violence and hence dangerousness of the violent offender, as sufficient justification 
for imprisonment. Dual professionals, conversely, may have been more likely to 
query the offender’s ‘aggressive disposition’ and contextualise this as potentially 
related to a psychiatric or substance abuse disorder, consistent with the types of 
clients, patients, or offenders that dual professionals work with.  
Rehabilitation. Community members attributed significantly less value to 
the rehabilitation of the sexual offender than dual professionals, lending support to 
exploratory research question 2.c. (that community members would hold more 
negative attitudes towards offenders’ rehabilitation compared to one or more 
professional groups). Interestingly, disability professionals (not criminal justice 
professionals (relevant to exploratory research question 3.b.) attributed significantly 
less value to the rehabilitation of the violent offender than dual professionals. The IS 
groups did not differ in their attitude towards the rehabilitation of the burglar. 
Interpreting IS group differences for rehabilitation attitudes included an element of 
ambiguity, as the measure’s items assessed attitudes regarding the value of 
rehabilitative treatment delivered from within the prison setting. As such, it is not 
clear whether IS groups’ attitudinal differences relate to an offender’s capacity for 
rehabilitation generally, or to an offender’s capacity for rehabilitation within the 
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confines of prison (for better or worse). Given the current study’s results showing 
community members were more supportive of punishment via imprisonment of 
sexual offenders compared to dual professionals, and past research indicating 
community members and student samples tend to hold negative beliefs and attitudes 
about sexual offender’s capacity for change and likely recidivism (Grossi, 2017), I 
chose to interpret these results in terms of attitudes towards rehabilitation generally.  
Research assessing Australian community members’ attitudes towards the 
rehabilitation of offenders is limited, but there are a few key studies of note. White 
and Knowles (2013) found that Australians’ attitudes towards punishment and 
rehabilitation were moderately negatively related. While they found no demographic 
factors to be significantly associated with rehabilitation attitudes, individual 
differences predicting greater support for rehabilitation included a higher belief that 
offending was caused by economic factors, lower belief that it was caused by 
individual factors, and higher confidence in the criminal justice system. McKee and 
Feather (2008) explored how Australian university students’ personal values and 
social attitudes were associated with offender sentencing goals (including 
rehabilitation). They found that personal values associated with self-enhancement 
(power, self-direction, hedonism) and the social beliefs of social dominance 
orientation, right wing authoritarianism, and desire for revenge were associated with 
less support for rehabilitation, while self-transcendence values (universalism, 
benevolence) were associated with more support for rehabilitation. Dual 
professionals’ greater support for rehabilitation overall may thus reflect unique 
individual differences common to those bridging the disability and criminal justice 
sector, such as an appreciation of sociocultural context in criminal offending, 
confidence in the criminal justice system, and self-transcendence personal values.   
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A further explanation for why disability professionals reported more negative 
attitude towards the of rehabilitation of the violent offender, compared to dual 
professionals, is their lack of experience in the criminal justice sector and regular 
contact with offenders. Exposure to violent offenders, and involvement in their 
rehabilitative process (e.g., program delivery, psychotherapy), means those 
employed in the criminal justice sector have professional insight into, and 
appreciation for, aims and realistic outcomes of rehabilitative treatment. Where 
disability professionals may view the violent offender portrayed in the current study 
as ‘broken’ due to his consistent and escalating violence, and hence requiring both 
retribution and incapacitation as sentencing outcomes, dual professionals may be 
more likely to view the same violent offender as engaging in a recognisable pattern 
of cognitions and behaviours that can be modified with appropriate support.   
The finding that community members were less supportive of rehabilitation 
of sex offenders than dual professionals is supported by Kjelsberg and Loos (2008) 
comparison of Norwegian university students’ and prison employees’ (including 
therapeutic staff, likely to have dual profession experience). They found that overall 
students held more negative attitudes towards sex offenders than prison employees. 
However, this study only compared these two groups on their punitive attitudes, 
limiting the generalisability of this finding to related but still unique attributions 
about sex offender rehabilitation.  
While relevant research comparing community members’ and professionals’ 
attitudes towards sex offender rehabilitation is sparse, there are numerous single-
sample studies assessing students’ and community members’ attitudes about this. 
Roberts and Gebotys (1989) found that while American community members’ 
punitiveness was positively correlated with the perceived seriousness of a crime 
(e.g., participants were highly punitive for sexual assault), attitudes towards an 
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offenders’ rehabilitation were not. Interestingly, these same participants reported that 
incapacitation, general deterrence, and ‘just deserts’ were all desirable outcomes of 
serious offenders’ sentencing (compared to minor offences such as theft and minor 
assault), while rehabilitation was not; and that likelihood of the serious offender’s 
rehabilitation was significantly lower compared to the likelihood of rehabilitating a 
minor offender (such as a thief).  
Viki et al. (2012) found that greater dehumanisation of sex offenders 
predicted lower perceived potential for their rehabilitation in a mixed sample of UK 
students and community members. Comparing American university students’ 
rehabilitation attitudes towards sexual and non-sexual offenders, Rogers and 
Ferguson (2011) found that participants held more negative attitudes towards the 
rehabilitation of sexual offenders compared to non-sexual offenders. This 
complemented their finding that participants held more punitive attitudes towards sex 
offenders than non-sex offenders. Leverentz (2011) similarly found that punitiveness 
towards, and belief in the redeemability of, offenders was strongly, negatively 
correlated across four American samples. Of note, Tajalli et al. (2013) found that 
American students reported more vengeful attitudes towards sexual offenders. Given 
McKee and Feather (2008) finding that vengefulness (as a social attitude) was 
negatively associated with support for rehabilitation of offenders, it may be that the 
current study’s community sample felt particularly vengeful towards the sexual 
offender described in the vignette, leading to less support for their rehabilitation. 
Reintegration. Both community members and criminal justice professionals 
reported significantly less support for the reintegration of the sexual offender back 
into the community once their sentence was served compared to both dual 
professionals and disability professionals. These results lend support to exploratory 
research question 2.10., which proposed that community members would be less 
 344
supportive of offenders’ reintegration across crime types. Criminal justice 
professionals were also significantly less supportive of the violent offender’s 
reintegration compared to dual professionals (but not disability professionals). These 
results lend support to exploratory research question 3.c., which proposed that dual 
professionals would be more supportive of offenders’ reintegration across crime 
types, compared to criminal justice professionals. The IS groups did not differ in 
their attitude towards the reintegration of the burglar.   
Community support for the reintegration and general social inclusion of ex-
offenders, including re-entry initiatives designed to assist with provision of housing, 
employment and training, and health, has been identified by both offenders and 
professionals as fundamental to successful reintegration and desistance from crime 
(Davis, Bahr, & Ward, 2013; Grossi, 2017). Community members’ lower support for 
offenders’ reintegration back into the community after completing their sentence is 
generally consistent with past Australian and international research suggesting 
community members hold complex attitudes towards offender reintegration which, 
while positive overall, tend towards a preference for self-interest and personal 
security over ex-offenders’ social welfare (Garland, Wodahl, & Saxon, 2017a; 
Garland, Wodahl, & Schuhmann, 2013; Grossi, 2017; O’Sullivan, Holderness, Hong, 
Bright, & Kemp, 2017). In one of the few Australian studies examining attitudes 
towards the reintegration and ‘redeemability’ of offenders, O’Sullivan et al. (2017) 
found that there were no specific demographic characteristics predicting Australians’ 
beliefs about reintegration overall. However, there were participant characteristics 
significantly associated with one or more of the three dimensions of O’Sullivan et 
al.’s (2017) measure (i.e., Human Capital, Possibility of Change, and Agency). 
Specifically, participants experienced in law enforcement or in human services, or 
had been arrested or victimised in the past, were more supportive of offenders’ 
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possibility of change compared to those not exposed to these factors, and experience 
in law enforcement also significantly predicted the belief that exercising personal 
agency is necessary for offender reintegration.  
Factors associated with reintegration beliefs and attitudes appear inconsistent 
across studies, however. When examining attitudes towards transitional programs 
and housing for ex-prisoners generally, Garland, Wodahl, and Smith (2017b) found 
that being female and believing in a punitive God predicted significantly less support 
for transitional programs and housing, while education and willingness to forgive the 
offenders were significantly associated with increased support for these initiatives. 
However, when Garland et al. (2017a) anticipated individual factors such as age, 
gender, political orientation, and being a parent would impact general attitudes 
towards neighbourhood transitional housing, they found the only predictors of this 
were global support for re-entry initiatives (increasing support for this by 60%) and 
having an imprisoned family member (increasing support by 100%). They found no 
significant predictors for support for neighbourhood transitional housing for sex 
offenders, but did find that as education level increased, support for this housing for 
violent offenders doubled. Also examining American community members’ attitudes 
towards ex-offenders and their re-entry, Rade, Desmarais, and Burnette (2017) found 
that having a growth mindset predicted positive attitudes towards ex-offenders, 
which in turn predicted support for their reintegration. Interesting, significant 
covariates increasing this mediation effect included being female and less religiosity, 
results respectively contrasting with and consistent with Garland et al. (2017b). 
Garland et al. (2013) examined American community members’ attitudes 
towards prisoner re-entry initiatives within the theoretical framework of values 
conflict. They found that while the majority of community members (up to 90%) 
were supportive of various re-entry initiatives relevant to education, housing, and 
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health to support offenders’ reintegration into the community (consistent with 
valuing social justice and welfare values), support dropped as low as 24% when 
financial initiatives were framed as dependent on community members’ own 
investment or sacrifice (e.g., paying higher taxes). Support for transitional housing 
initiatives dropped to 25% and 10% for general offenders and violent offenders, 
respectively, when this was specified as being in participants’ own neighbourhood, 
reflecting a social distance stigma described as ‘not in my backyard’, or NIMBY 
(Garland et al., 2017a; Garland et al., 2013). This decrease in support for re-entry 
initiatives thus occurred when participants’ competing security-based values were 
triggered, including a continued sense of retribution for more serious, and concern 
for self-interest and safety. These past findings may in part explain our results, where 
security-based values are more salient to community members (since the re-entry of 
offenders may be perceived as increasing risk of assault) but also more salient to 
criminal justice professionals, whose role it is to protect the community from 
recidivists. 
These results were replicated by Garland et al. (2017a), whose American 
sample reported 10% and 9% support for transitional housing for violent and sexual 
offenders, respectively, when located in their neighbourhood. Interestingly, both 
Garland et al. (2013) and Garland et al. (2017a) found stronger support for 
neighbourhood transitional housing for drug offenders (19-25%), suggesting less 
social distance towards this offender group and relatively stronger support for re-
entry initiatives in their favour. This latter finding may explain why IS groups did 
not differ in their reintegration attitudes towards the drug offender vignette. 
Kjelsberg and Loos (2008) found that the majority of prison employees 
(92%) and university students (77%) sampled, believed that sexual offenders were 
aroused by and hence preyed on both adults and children, but that prison employees 
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were significantly more likely to believe that most sexual offenders were paedophiles 
(72% compared to 50%, respectively). Prison employees in this study were also 
significantly more likely than students to report the belief that sexual assault victims 
were known to their attacker (91% compared to 72%, respectively). As one of the 
few studies comparing criminal justice professionals’ and laypeoples’ beliefs and 
attitudes towards sexual offenders, these results highlight that criminal justice 
professionals may hold particularly strong and negative views on the safety of 
community members from sexual offenders, post release, for fear of predation on 
children as well as adults, known to the offender within the community setting.  
That criminal justice professionals but not community members reported 
significantly lower support for reintegration of the violent offender, compared to dual 
professionals, is surprising given the trend in the IS groups’ attitudes towards all 
other criminal justice constructs for the current study. Criminal justice professionals’ 
role, and their exposure to recidivists re-entering the criminal justice system, may 
result in holding more conservative attitudes towards the value of re-entry supports 
and the reintegration agenda of social inclusion and ‘second chances’, for serious 
offenders such as violent and sexual offenders. In comparison, professionals 
experienced in the disability sector and community members are less likely to be 
exposed to these salient security concerns, and those experienced in the disability 
sector (including dual professionals) may be more likely to apply an empathetic, 
therapeutic ‘sociological imagination’ when evaluating the reintegration prospects 
for serious offenders. That criminal justice professionals may be overall less 
supportive of offenders’ reintegration, and that this lack of support might be 
communicated to offenders under their care either implicitly or explicitly, could 
impact offenders’ confidence in their reintegration and motivation to desist from 
crime upon re-entry into the community.  
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Forgiveness. Both community members and criminal justice professionals 
were significantly less willing to forgive the sexual offender once their sentence had 
been served, compared to dual professionals. Both criminal justice and disability 
professionals (but not community members) were less willing to forgive the violent 
offender, compared to dual professionals. Community members (but not disability or 
criminal justice professionals) were less willing to forgive the burglar compared to 
dual professionals. These results support exploratory research question 2.e., which 
proposed that community members would be less willing than one or more 
professional groups to forgive offenders across crime types. However, why this 
overall pattern of results emerged by IS group and offence type is unclear and cannot 
be explained with reference to past research, given there are no known studies 
comparing professionals’ and community members attitudes towards forgiveness of 
offenders.  
Criminal justice professionals could perceive sexual and violent offenders to 
be more likely to reoffend, and hence see them as less deserving of forgiveness. 
Community members have consistently demonstrated negative attitudes to sexual 
offenders for all criminal justice constructs in the current study, so their being less 
willing to forgive sexual offenders is unsurprising. Community members’ lower 
willingness to forgive the burglar, however, is unexpected; this could reflect 
community members’ stigma towards addiction as a weakness in character that 
should be under the addict’s control, or it could also reflect community members’ 
own experience of burglary and projected desire for retribution. Disability 
professionals’ lower willingness to forgive the violent offender could reflect their 
professional training and experience with clients where ‘challenging behaviour’ is 
tolerated, but violent behaviour including use of weapons is deemed criminal and 
grounds for police intervention.   
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The only constant across these differences is that dual professionals were 
more likely than the other IS groups to forgive offenders, regardless of the offence 
committed. As suggested for similarly patterned responses for the prior criminal 
justice constructs explored, it is possible that dual professionals’ training and 
experience in both the disability sector (which is dominated by empathetic, person-
centred, social justice  values and practices) and criminal justice system (lending 
exposure to the realities of offenders’ correctional and therapeutic treatment) allows 
a more nuanced and humanising perspective towards different types of offenders, 
their motivations, and the sociocultural context of their offending. This could lead to 
a greater willingness to forgive their criminal transgressions. 
Although forgiveness features heavily as a construct and process of interest in 
restorative justice discourse, the research to date examining forgiveness in the 
naturalistic context of criminal offending is limited. Instead, forgiveness research 
tends to focus on non-criminal transgressions. In an Australian sample of community 
members, Koutsos, Wertheim, and Kornblum (2008) found that lower neuroticism, 
higher agreeableness and spirituality, and a stronger disposition towards forgiveness 
in general, were predictive of willingness to forgive a specific (non-criminal) 
offence. The value of the relationship with the offender to the victim, as well as the 
offender making apologies and demonstrating remorse for the offence, also predict 
greater willingness to forgive (Koutsos et al., 2008). Donnoli and Wertheim (2012) 
similarly found that Australians were more willing to forgive a specific, non-criminal 
offence when the ‘victim’ possessed higher trait empathy and believed the offender 
was remorseful, and were less willing to forgive when the transgression was 
perceived to be more serious and that the transgressor would likely reoffend.   
In their mixed-method study victims’ attitudes towards forgiving their sexual 
or physical attacker, Cooney, Allan, Allan, McKillop, and Drake (2011) similarly 
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found that willingness to forgive was contingent on the offender making a sincere 
apology to the victim for their crime, and that primary victims perceived forgiveness 
to benefit themselves by encouraging their own acceptance and coping with being 
victimised; in this way, forgiving their attacker could be empowering. Interestingly, 
primary victims in Cooney et al.’s (2011) study often reported they were able to 
engage in perspective-taking to aid forgiveness of their attacker, unlike secondary 
victims. Quantitative analyses for Cooney et al. (2011) showed that primary victims 
were significantly more willing to forgive their attacker than secondary victims 
(reporting 68% and 23% willingness to forgive, respectively). Unlike for secondary 
victims, there was also a significant association between primary victims and belief 
that forgiveness was personally beneficial. In addition to not controlling for 
individual differences that may have impacted attitudes towards forgiveness in the 
current study, the experience of participants as primary or secondary victims of 
crime was not assessed or controlled for in this study. It is possible that secondary 
victims of crime were overrepresented within and between IS groups, skewing 
accounts of willingness to forgive.  
Strelan and Prooijen (2013) found that a sample of Australian university 
students were more willing to forgive hypothetical transgressors when the 
opportunity to first punish the transgressor was provided (compared to not). They 
reasoned that punishing a transgressor satisfies a sense of justice having been done 
(the offender receives their ‘just deserts’), which facilitates forgiveness. An indirect 
effect of punishment on forgiveness via the just deserts motive (but not a revenge 
motive) was found for participants when asked to recall an actual transgressor they 
may have punished (Strelan & Prooijen, 2013). In each of the vignette scenarios, the 
offenders were described as having been charged with their specific offences but 
their sentence (punishment) was not described. Given the absence of a clear 
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punishment for their criminal behaviour, participants within and between IS groups 
may have perceived the offenders to have not received their just deserts, and so feel 
less willing to forgive their crimes once they had served their generic ‘sentence’ (as 
described in the forgiveness measure). While an effort has been made to provide 
possible explanations for the between-group differences in forgiveness attitudes in 
the current study, these explanations are largely speculative.  
Role of alcohol and/or other drugs. While the IS groups did not differ in 
their attitude towards the role of AOD in the sexual and violent offences, both 
community members and disability professionals attributed a significantly greater 
role to AOD in the burglary offence, compared to dual professionals. These results 
partially support exploratory research question 2.f., which proposed that community 
members would attribute a stronger role to AOD across crime types compared to 
dual professionals. Of the three crime types portrayed, it is not surprising that overall 
IS groups attributed a higher score to AOD as an influence on the burglary offence, 
given the offender’s portrayed history of addiction and related desperation to fund 
this. However, that the two IS professions with experience in the criminal justice 
sector perceived the influence of AOD on the burglary as lower than community 
members and disability professionals suggests their professional training and 
experience in the criminal justice system may be responsible for this difference.  
Illicit drug-related offences are one of the most common offences (15%) 
leading to imprisonment in Australia, second only to acts intended to cause injury 
(23%) (ABS, 2017). As such, professionals experienced in the criminal justice sector 
are likely to work with offenders with a current or recent substance abuse disorder. 
Substance use disorder is also highly comorbid with a variety of psychological 
disorders, and mental illness is overrepresented in offenders within Western 
countries (Fazel & Danesh, 2002) and the Australian correctional system (AIHW, 
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2015). In 2015, 50% of Australian prison entrants reported ever having a mental 
health problem, including substance abuse disorder, and 22% of entrants were 
referred for mental health/AOD assessment upon initial entrance screening (AIHW, 
2015). Close and regular contact with offenders who present with complex 
psychosocial histories and needs, in addition to specialist training regarding AOD 
rehabilitation as an aspect of offending punishment and rehabilitation, may result in 
professionals in the criminal justice sector taking a more holistic perspective towards 
the causal role of addiction in criminal offending, even in the case of burglary to 
fund an addiction. Just as professionals experienced in the disability sector might 
apply a sector-specific sociological imagination to understand the context within 
which people with an ID function, professionals experienced in the criminal justice 
sector might apply their own sector-specific sociological imagination to situate the 
individual offender and their self-responsibility, within the complex psychosocial 
web of their likely comorbidies. 
 
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions for Study 6 
 There are several key strengths of this study. Firstly, the use of vignette 
scenarios provided contextual information for participants to refer to when 
formulating attitudinal responses. Campregher and Jeglic (2016) found that 
providing case-specific information via a vignette about an offender’s criminal 
behaviour (as opposed to having participants imagine a generic offender) reduced 
bias towards extreme responding for several criminal justice constructs (perceived 
dangerousness, likely recidivism, and punitiveness). As such, the use of vignettes in 
the current study likely contributed to participants’ providing considered and 
conservative responses regarding their criminal justice attitudes.  
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  A second strength of this study was the inclusion of a comparison (control) 
offender group by which to assess whether participants’ criminal justice attitudes 
differed by the offender’s disability status. In Study 5, interpretation of participants’ 
attitudes towards appropriate correctional treatment settings for offenders with an ID 
was limited due to the lack of a non-ID offender comparison group. Study 6 
improved upon this limitation and found a main effect of disability status on several 
criminal justice outcomes, justifying its value. 
 A third strength of this study is the use of an Australian sample. There is little 
research relevant to the Australian context and population assessing the individual or 
comparative attitudes of community members and professional groups towards 
criminal justice outcomes for offenders generally, let alone offenders with an ID 
specifically. Results of this study contribute to the body of knowledge on Australian-
specific attitudes towards offenders, and support results based on American, UK, and 
Canadian samples (relevant to community and professionals’ attitudes towards 
punitiveness and rehabilitation for offenders generally). 
A fourth and final strength of this study was the comprehensive comparison 
of IS groups for six important criminal justice attitudes, across three common crime 
types. Past research has tended to assess the attitudes of community members, 
criminal justice professionals, or disability professionals, separately; or to compare 
community members attitudes to only one other professional group; or to compare 
students relevant to the professionals’ disciplines (e.g., nursing, social work).  Past 
research has also tended to focus on assessing attitudes of punishment and 
rehabilitation, without exploring attitudes towards moral culpability, reintegration, 
forgiveness, and the role of AOD in criminal behaviour. Furthermore, past research 
in this area has focused primarily on attitudes toward sex offenders or prisoners as 
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specific social categories, limiting the generalisability of study results to other types 
of offenders.    
 There are also some limitations to this study. Along with the limitations 
identified for Study 5 regarding self-reported professional status and the 
overrepresentation of women in the sample, a third limitation was that participants’ 
attitude toward ‘risk of recidivism’ for each offender was not assessed. Subjective 
attitude towards risk of offender recidivism is rarely assessed in the forensic 
psychology and social psychology literature, and would have contributed greatly to 
research in this area. Understanding participants’ attitudes toward potential 
recidivism would have also provided contextual information by which to interpret 
attitudes towards punishment severity, rehabilitation, and reintegration in the current 
study. A fourth limitation of this study is that the offenders featured in all vignettes 
were male. While offenders were presented as male in each vignette to control for 
possible effects of offender gender on attitudes attributed to them, it is notable that 
most existing research assessing attitudes towards offenders and their social and 
correctional treatment focuses only on male offenders.  
Future researchers could replicate the current study, and include an additional 
comparison group (females) to determine whether the gender of the offending target 
influences criminal justice attitudes of community members and/or professional 
groups. Care would have to be taken to ensure the vignettes were modified so that 
the criminal scenarios described (sexual assault, violent assault with a weapon, and 
burglary) are equally realistic and believable when committed by either gender. If 
future researchers choose to replicate this study, attitudes toward each offender’s 
‘risk of recidivism’ could also be included as an additional criminal justice outcome, 
to contribute to the paucity of empirical knowledge on this particular issue. 
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Conclusion  
 Australians, regardless of IS group membership, attributed less moral 
culpability and deservingness of punishment via imprisonment to offenders with an 
ID (compared to no ID) for the crimes of sexual assault, violent assault with a 
weapon, and burglary. Participants also attributed less influence to AOD in sexual 
offending for offenders with an ID (compared to no ID). Australian community 
members and criminal justice employees tended to hold more negative attitudes 
towards criminal justice outcomes for offenders compared to dual professionals, 
regardless of disability status, and particularly for the sexual and violent assault 
crime types. Disability professionals also held more negative, less supportive 
attitudes towards offenders, particularly for the violent assault crime type. These 
findings extend on international research assessing community members’ and 
relevant professionals’ attitudes toward criminal justice outcomes for offenders 
generally, and offenders with an ID specifically. Findings from this study also extend 
on the limited empirical research assessing community members’ and relevant 
professionals attitudes toward offenders (with and without an ID) specific to the 
Australian context.  
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 CHAPTER TWELVE: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This Chapter provides a summary synthesis of findings of this thesis’ six 
studies, a general evaluation of the relevance of these findings for empirical theory 
and knowledge relevant to stigma towards offenders with an ID, and speculation 
regarding the implications of these findings for policy and practice. Strengths, 
limitations, and future research directions for the thesis’ program of research is also 
presented, followed by the thesis’ conclusion.  
  
Summary of the Research Program 
Chapter 2 presented a narrative review of research from a variety of 
disciplines relevant to addressing stigma towards offenders with an ID (social 
psychology, forensic psychology, sociology, criminology, and disability studies), and 
identified a broad gap in empirical knowledge about offenders with an ID. Past 
research on offenders with an ID has focused on describing their characteristics in 
the context of correctional practice, such as relative prevalence by region and 
custodial setting, pathways through the criminal justice system, criminal careers, and 
barriers and facilitators to rehabilitation and recidivism including the role of policy 
and legislation. Only a passing nod was made to the possible role of interpersonal 
and structural stigma, specifically the role of stigmatisers, in the social processes 
underlying these descriptive characteristics of offenders with an ID. Interestingly, 
there was negligible research from Australia or elsewhere investigating how 
community members and professionals from the criminal justice and disability 
sectors (all influential social categories regarding criminal justice outcomes for 
offenders with an ID) conceptualise offenders with an ID as a potentially stigmatised 
social category, despite distinct bodies of research indicating that people with an ID 
and criminal offenders are each stigmatised social categories. Two multi-part 
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factorial surveys were conducted to examine community members’ and relevant 
professionals’ stigmatising beliefs and attitudes towards offenders with an ID, and 
relevant social subcategories (people with an ID and offenders). Results of these two 
factorial surveys were reported as six distinct studies; Survey 1 contributed to Study 
1-4, while Survey 2 contributed to Study 5-6. Factorial Survey 1 sampled Australian 
community members. Factorial Survey 2 sampled community members and three 
professional groups (those experienced in the criminal justice sector, experienced in 
the disability sector, dual professionals experienced in both sectors) deemed IS 
groups. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, a two-factor measure was developed and validated to 
quantitatively assess Australians’ beliefs about human rights as a ‘fuzzy construct’ 
and Australian social value. The measure’s two subscales (‘belief that human rights 
are a moral imperative’ and ‘belief that Australian society supports human rights’) 
were negatively correlated; average support for the beliefs was strong and average, 
respectively. Bivariate correlations showed that gender and identification with a 
social minority, but not age, was significantly associated with each subscale. Women 
and social minorities were more likely to believe human rights are moral imperative, 
while men and non-minorities were more likely to believe Australian society 
supports human rights.  
Study 1 findings suggest that Australians generally value human rights (as a 
subjective concept), and they tend to personally over-value their personal support for 
human rights compared to others in their community. Unlike women and social 
minorities, men and social non-minorities may have experienced less social 
discrimination or identify less with historical social oppression, and so feel less 
invested in supporting human rights as a moral imperative. Similarly, men and non-
 358
minorities may view Australia’s enshrinement of human rights principles in policy 
and legislation as evidence that Australian society generally values human rights, 
untempered by personal experiences of relevant discrimination attributable to human 
rights concerns. Overall, Study 1’s findings demonstrated a new measure of beliefs 
about human rights in the Australian context, and indicated that overall, community 
members personally value human rights, given their subjective understanding of 
these.  
Study 2 
In Study 2, community members’ beliefs about human rights were used to 
predict moral concern for criminal offenders and people with an ID, after first 
ranking these two social categories relative to other vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
Australian social categories via the circle of moral concern task. People with an ID 
were included in the circle of moral concern of three quarters of participants, and had 
a median rank of  3 out of 14 (the highest median rank along with people with mental 
illness); in contrast, less than half of participants included current and ex-offenders in 
their circle, and both offender types had a median rank of 11 out of 14 (the second 
lowest median rank, prior to adult men). The circle of moral concern task presents a 
stark picture of contrasting attitudes towards the deserved moral patiency of people 
with an ID compared to offenders, when presented as abstract social categories.  
Controlling for gender and age, Study 2 also used participants beliefs about 
human rights as predictors of moral concern for total number of social categories, for 
people with an ID specifically via inclusion in the moral circle, and similarly for 
current and ex-offenders. Belief that human rights is a moral imperative significantly 
predicted each outcome variable, but belief that Australian society supports human 
rights did not. Likelihood that participants would include offenders and people with 
an ID in their circle of moral concern more than doubled for every incremental 
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increase in their personal valuing of human rights. Interestingly, youth was 
significantly associated with the size of one’s moral circle but not with the inclusion 
of people with an ID or offenders. Gender was also a significant, interesting 
predictor; men were more likely to include current and ex-offenders in their circle, 
while women were more likely to include people with an ID. These additional 
findings from Study 2 highlight that perceiving human rights to be a moral 
imperative has a powerful influence on expression of moral concern for total number 
of social categories, and on the inclusion of social categories who have been ranked 
dramatically differently in their relative deservingness of moral concern.    
Study 3 
In Study 3, between-group comparisons were made assessing community 
members’ beliefs about the social, ‘human’, and moral status of people with an ID 
and offenders, as social categories. Social status was assessed using Fiske and 
colleagues’ (Fiske et al., 2002) stereotype content model, ‘human’ status was 
assessed using Gray and colleagues’ (Gray et al., 2007) theory of mind perception, as 
well as Haslam and colleagues’ two-dimensional theory of dehumanisation, and 
moral status was assessing using Grey and colleagues’ moral typecasting theory. 
Overall, participants perceived both offenders and people with an ID to be low on the 
stereotype content subscales of status, competitiveness, and competence; 
additionally, offenders were perceived to be low on warmth while people with an ID 
were perceived to be average in this.  
According to the stereotype content model, social categories who are 
attributed low status and non-competitiveness should be culturally stereotyped as 
having lower competence and higher warmth, evoking emotions such as pity and 
sympathy and resulting in paternalistic prejudice towards the stereotyped outgroup 
(Fiske et al., 2002). People with disabilities fall within this particular outgroup, 
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according to Fiske et al. (2002). Social categories who are attributed low status but 
higher competitiveness should be culturally stereotyped as having both lower 
competence and warmth, evoking emotions such as disgust, anger, and resentment, 
leading to contemptuous prejudice towards the stereotyped outgroup (Fiske et al., 
2002). Fiske (2015) and Fiske et al. (2002) identified that ‘social outcasts’, who are 
seen as ‘parasitic’, fall within this outgroup, such as low SES people, welfare 
recipients, and homeless people. Community members’ overall responses suggest 
that both people with an ID and criminal offenders should be attributed paternalistic 
prejudice given their perceived status and competitiveness; however, their perceived 
warmth and competence suggests only people with an ID may fall (barely) into this 
category, while offenders appear to be attributed contemptuous prejudice. These final 
Competence/Warmth classifications reflect anticipated categorisations and associated 
prejudices according to theory and similar past research (Sadler et al., 2012), 
however the internal consistency of Fiske et al.’s (2002) stereotype content model 
requires further investigation by future researchers, specifically the contributions of 
Status/Competitiveness weightings to Competence/Warmth and associated prejudice 
classifications. 
Between-group comparisons for the stereotype content model dimensions 
found that community members perceived offenders to be significantly higher in 
status, competitiveness, and competence than people with an ID, and perceived 
people with an ID to be higher in warmth. While the difference between perceived 
status, competitiveness, and competence of the two social categories was relatively 
small, the difference in perceived warmth was quite large. It appears the perceived 
warmth (agreeableness, friendliness, sociableness) of people with an ID distinguishes 
them most strongly from offenders, as abstract social categories.   
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Grey and colleagues’ (Gray et al., 2007a) theory of mind perception did not 
present a clear typology by which to predict how community members might 
perceive the mind dimensions (agency and experience) for people with an ID and 
offenders. However, research by Gray and Wegner (2009) found that people with an 
ID were rated lower on both agency and experience compared to an adult without an 
ID, and Khamitov et al. (2016) found that offenders were rated lower on agency 
compared to a neutral or benevolent social category. In Study 3, participants 
perceived offenders as fairly average in both agency and experience, while people 
with an ID were perceived as average in agency but high in experience. Between-
group comparisons showed a small significant difference in perceived experience but 
not agency for the two social categories. In the case of mind perception, people with 
an ID were attributed a greater capacity for emotional and sensory experience than 
offenders, but community members appeared ambivalent regarding the capacity of 
both people with an ID and offenders for cognitive agency.  
Haslam and colleagues’ (Haslam et al., 2004, 2005, 2008) theory of 
dehumanisation suggests that individuals attribute high human uniqueness and 
human nature to themselves, and to their ingroup; conversely, people dehumanise 
outgroups by attributing lower human uniqueness (likening the outgroup to 
unsophisticated animals) and/or lower human nature (likening the outgroup to non-
sentient, non-sociable machinery such as robots). In Study 3, both people with an ID 
and offenders were overall attributed below average human uniqueness, indicating 
community members perceived both social categories to be relatively 
unsophisticated in terms of capacity for culture, rationality, and self-control, and 
hence more similar to non-human animals. While offenders were also attributed just 
below average human nature (suggesting community members perceived them to be 
cold, passive, and superficial, more like automata than themselves), people with an 
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ID were attributed fairly high human nature (indicating community members 
perceived them to be warm and open, with emotional depth, and hence more similar 
to themselves in this regard). This difference in attributed human nature was 
statistically significant and quite large, reflecting the difference between groups 
regarding the experience dimension for mind perception.  
The perceived moral status of people with an ID and offenders was assessed 
using three constructs (moral responsibility, moral credit, and moral patiency), with 
results interpreted in the context of Grey and colleagues’ (Grey et al., 2012; Grey & 
Wegner, 2009) moral typecasting theory. This theory is an extension of mind 
perception theory (Grey et al., 2007), and suggests that if perceived cognitive agency 
is high, then greater moral agency is attributed to that target for their moral, or 
immoral, behaviours, casting them respectively as a hero or villain. When cast as a 
hero, a person is attributed moral credit, and when cast as a villain, they are 
attributed moral responsibility. Conversely, if cognitive agency is perceived to be 
low, then moral agency (and associated moral responsibility and credit) should be 
similarly low. Those perceived to be lower in agency and high in experience are cast 
as victims of a villainous moral agent, or as ‘patients’ of moral heroes who receive 
their help. Given moral typecasting theory, it was expected that a target perceived to 
have higher cognitive agency would be cast as a hero and villain, while a target with 
lower cognitive agency would be cast as a victim or patient.  
In Study 3, people with an ID were attributed average moral responsibility for 
immoral acts, and above average moral patiency and moral credit for experiencing 
immoral acts, and doing moral acts, respectively. Offenders were attributed above 
average moral responsibility and moral credit for immoral and moral acts, 
respectively, but were attributed average moral patiency for experiencing immoral 
acts. It is important to keep in mind that people with an ID and offenders did not 
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significantly differ in their cognitive agency, according to mind perception theory; 
nonetheless, between-groups comparisons found that community members attributed 
significantly greater moral responsibility to offenders, and significantly greater moral 
patiency and credit to people with an ID. Where the effect sizes for group differences 
regarding moral responsibility and patiency were medium, the difference between 
groups for moral credit was quite small, and so requires replication with additional 
design controls.  
These results partially support the moral typecasting theory’s dyadic model of 
morality (that is, agents and patients are dyadically typecast), but suggests that this 
theory may not adequately distinguish between attributions of moral responsibility 
and credit, and that the role of high cognitive agency in itself is not sufficient to 
typecast a villain.  
Overall, findings of Study 3 suggest that community members stigmatise 
people with an ID and criminal offenders is many similar ways, but that there are 
also key distinctions. Both social categories are perceived to have low social 
competence, and both are subtly dehumanised by failing to clearly distinguish their 
capacities and qualities from those of non-human animals. Neither social category is 
attributed the same degree of cognitive agency that a ‘normal’ adult like one’s self 
would be deemed to possess. In short, both social categories are perceived to possess 
‘less’ of the qualities and capacities that contribute to community members’ 
prototypical schemas of ‘ingroup’, ‘mind’, and ‘human’. However, additional 
stigmatising beliefs towards offenders appear to frame them further as even ‘less’ 
than people with an ID; as possessing less capacity for sentience and less depth of 
emotion, less interpersonal warmth, as more mechanistic and hence less human, and 
ultimately as more blameworthy, less deserving of protection, and less deserving of 
acknowledgement for good deeds.  
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Study 4 
 In Study 4, community members were allocated to one of three vignette 
conditions featuring ‘John’, a 35 year old man with casual employment who lived 
with his parents and had an active social life. In the first vignette condition, John had 
an ID, in the second vignette John committed a criminal offence (theft, physical 
assault) but did not have an ID specified, and in the third vignette John committed 
the criminal offence and also had an ID specified. Participants read their vignette and 
then provided a qualitative explanation as to what they though the cause of John’s ID 
was (for vignette 1), or what they thought the cause of his criminal offending was 
(vignette 2 and 3). This study aimed to explore and compare community members’ 
causal attributions regarding criminal offending when an ID was, and was not, 
associated with the offender. Exploring the cause of the ID itself contributed context 
for participants’ responses to vignette 3 (offender with an ID specified). Weiner’s 
(1986) causal attribution was employed after themes were generated inductively, to 
further interpret the causal belief themes identified. 
Eight themes representing participants’ causal beliefs about why an 
individual might have a mild ID were identified, and are listed here in order from 
most frequently to least frequently coded: Genetics; Physical Trauma; Illness; 
Exposure to Chemical Toxins; Psychosocial Influences; Social Construction; 
Metaphysical Mystery; and Unknown Causes. Six themes representing participants’ 
causal beliefs about why an individual might criminally offend (theft, physical 
assault) were identified, and are listed here in order from most frequently to least 
frequently coded: Financial Pressure; Entitlement; Impaired Reasoning; Social 
Connection; Moral Disregard; and Innocent. Furthermore, six similar yet distinct 
themes representing participants’ causal beliefs about why an individual with a mild 
ID might criminally offend (theft, physical assault) were identified, and are listed 
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here in order from most frequently to least frequently coded in participant responses: 
Intellectual Disability; Social Influences; Entitlement; Working Poor; Immoral; and 
Innocent.  
Overall, Australians reported a variety of causal explanations for ID, and for 
criminal offending when an ID was, or was not, specified. Causal belief themes for 
ID were consistent with past research (Coles & Scior, 2012; May, Rapee, Coello, 
Momartin, & Aroche, 2014; Scior & Furnham, 2011; Scior, 2011), and suggested 
Australian participants had generally sound ID literacy (Scior & Furnham, 2011). 
This study also provided a more nuanced description of these previously identified 
causes compared to past research (Coles & Scior, 2012; Scior & Furnham, 2011), 
and highlighted that Australians predominantly ascribed biogenetic and 
uncontrollable environmental causes to the possession of ID.  It was also notable that 
Australian participants hardly referred to supernatural causes to explain ID, unlike in 
some studies involving non-Western populations (May et al., 2014; Mesfin, 1999; 
Mulatu, 1999). Participants expressed generally positive attitudes towards ‘John’ 
through their qualitative responses. 
 The themes reported for offenders without an ID specified were generally 
consistent with similar, if older, past research (Carroll, 1978; Carroll et al., 1987; 
Erskine, 1974; Furnham & Henderson, 1983; Hollin & Howells, 1987), with any 
differences attributable to changes in sociohistorical policies and education. With 
respect to causal attribution theory, themes identified for offenders without an ID 
specified were varied in terms of attributes, but tended to more commonly reflect 
internal, controllable causes.  
Regarding causal belief themes for offenders with versus without an ID 
specified, Australian participants tended to report a greater variety of causes for 
criminal offending when an ID was not specified, including a range of social, 
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intrapersonal, and interpersonal antecedents. When an ID was specified, however, 
participants reported a narrower range of causal beliefs for criminal offending, 
generally identified the ID as the primary cause of criminal offending, and tended to 
contextualise all secondary causes with reference to the ID. The key difference 
between responses to the two criminal offender vignettes centred around attributions 
of controllability of causes for offending, and hence responsibility for criminal 
behaviours. Responses also differed in the depth of character attributed to John (his 
motivations, desires, and breadth of psychological experience) when an ID was, 
versus was not, specified. Participants appeared to view John as a victim of his 
uncontrollable disability in spite of his criminal offending when an ID was specified, 
whereas more controllability and hence criminal responsibility was attributed to John 
when an ID was not specified. 
Overall, findings of Study 4 suggest that Australian community members 
have a fairly good lay understanding of how ID can be caused, and appreciate the 
complex psychosocial factors that can lead to criminal offending. However, when an 
offender was also described as having an ID, explanations for offending became 
largely one-dimensional, contextualised by the disability. Well-established 
criminogenic risk factors attributed to offenders without an ID by participants, were 
not attributed when ID was present; and the offending was more frequently perceived 
as reactive than premeditated. The overall tone of participant explanations for John’s 
offending when an ID was specified was sympathetic, pitying, and protective; in 
contrast, the tone of responses for John when an ID was not specified was a mixture 
of sympathy and contempt. 
Study 5 
In Study 5, between-groups comparisons were made to assess the IS groups’ 
attitudes towards prison and the community as appropriate correctional treatment 
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settings for offenders with an ID. Overall, community members and each profession 
agreed the community was an appropriate treatment setting, and disagreed that prison 
was an appropriate treatment setting. However, community members and criminal 
justice professionals held significantly less positive attitudes than dual professionals 
regarding community-based treatment, and significantly more positive attitudes than 
dual professionals towards prison-based treatment, for offenders with an ID. 
Community members’ attitudes towards appropriate correctional treatment settings 
for offenders with an ID were consistent with previous research, which suggests they 
hold generally negative attitudes toward offenders and, while expressing support for 
their rehabilitation, tend to not want offenders housed or treated in their 
neighbourhood (Brown, 1999; Cumberland & Zamble, 1992; Indermaur & Roberts, 
2005; Kjelsberg & Loos, 2008; Roberts et al., 2007; Roberts & Hough, 2005; Sigler 
& Lamb, 1995). However, that professionals experienced in the criminal justice 
system significantly differed from dual professionals regarding attitudes to 
correctional treatment settings was novel and unexpected.  
Overall, Study 5 highlighted that Australians (both community members and 
professionals affiliated with offenders with an ID) hold positive attitudes towards the 
correctional treatment of offenders with an ID in the community setting, and hold 
negative attitudes towards their correctional treatment in prisons. However, the 
strength of these attitudes was weaker for community members and criminal justice 
professionals compared to dual professionals. The attitudinal differences between the 
criminal justice and dual professional groups indicate these professionals hold 
different professional beliefs and attitudes that are likely informed by, and influence, 
their practice with offenders with an ID. 
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Study 6 
            In Study 6, IS groups were treated as natural groups and randomly allocated 
to one of three crime scenarios (sexual assault, physical assault with a weapon, and 
burglary). In each crime subsample, participants were further allocated to one of two 
conditions describing the target offender a having and ID, or not. Three 4x2 
between-group comparisons were conducted to assess how attitudes towards the 
moral culpability, punishment, rehabilitation, reintegration, forgiveness, and 
influence of AOD, for three types of offender, differed by IS group and disability 
status of the target offender.  
Study 6 showed that Australians, regardless of IS group membership, 
attributed less moral culpability and deservingness of punishment via imprisonment 
to offenders with an ID (compared to no ID) for the crimes of sexual assault, violent 
assault with a weapon, and burglary. They also attributed greater influence to AOD 
for the sexual offender with an ID (compared to no ID). Australian community 
members and criminal justice professionals tended to hold more negative attitudes 
towards criminal justice outcomes for offenders compared to dual professionals, 
regardless of disability status, and particularly for the sexual and violent assault 
crime types. Disability professionals also held more negative, less supportive 
attitudes towards offenders, particularly for the violent assault crime type.  
Overall, findings from Study 6 extend on international research assessing 
community members’ and relevant professionals’ attitudes toward criminal justice 
outcomes for offenders generally. Findings from this study also extend on the limited 
empirical research assessing community members’ and relevant professional’s 
attitudes toward offenders (with and without an ID) specific to the Australian 
context.  
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Original Contributions to, and Implications For, Research and Practice  
 
This thesis makes several original contributions to the empirical literature on 
offenders with an ID by employing social psychological theory and constructs to 
explore, identify, and compare stigmatising beliefs and attitudes towards offenders 
with an ID, in addition to people with an ID and offenders as constituent, social 
categories. These contributions include developing original quantitative measures 
assessing beliefs about human rights in the Australian context, and attitudes to 
appropriate correctional treatment settings for offenders with an ID, challenging 
moral typecasting theory’s dyadic structure, particularly the role of cognitive agency 
in attributing moral credit, and extending causal attribution findings relevant to ID, 
criminal offending, and offenders with an ID. Furthermore, the thesis provides novel 
findings regarding professionals’ criminal justice attitudes regarding moral 
culpability, punishment, rehabilitation, reintegration, forgiveness, and role of 
intoxication, towards offenders with an ID. Findings are also specific to the 
Australian population and context, ensuring they are unique and relevant to the 
country’s current sociohistorical context and, as such, will appeal to Australian 
researchers and professionals/practitioners invested in the correctional management 
and treatment of offenders with an ID. Past research exploring criminal justice 
attitudes and attributions using community and professional samples has tended to 
focus on United Kingdom and North American populations, and are infrequently 
published, meaning recent research, and research specific to the current Australian 
sociohistorical context, is limited. Furthermore, the application of a social 
psychological lense to examine criminal justice attitudes and attributions may present 
researchers immersed in the forensic and disability psychology fields with new 
constructs and theoretical frameworks by which to interpret and reflect on their own 
findings and professional insights.  
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Findings of the thesis, particularly those concerning the differing attitudes of 
community members and professionals towards correctional treatment settings, 
objectives, and outcomes, have serious implications for policies and practices around 
training, employment, and supervision of professionals in the correctional and 
forensic disability sectors. Dissemination of the thesis’s empirical findings and real-
world implications in lay language to politicians, policy makers, and executive and 
managerial staff within the criminal justice and correctional sector should be pursued 
with an aim to educate and guide those with power over the psychosocial health and 
well-being of offenders with an ID. 
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this thesis to the empirical 
literature is the application of stigma and prejudice theories, such as the stereotype 
content model, mind perception theory, and the theory of two-factor dehumanisation 
to a concrete social problem. These theories are typically employed in purely 
experimental social psychological studies to better understand the mechanisms by 
which these specific theories operate, and can employ a standard set of American-
centric social categories by which to theorise outgroup stigma (particularly the 
stereotype content model). As purely experimental studies, research examining the 
mechanisms of these theoretical processes also tend to depend on samples from 
university student populations and paid services such as MechanicalTurk/ 
TurkPrime. While these sample types are sound for experimental work, the 
applicability of findings from such samples discounts the naturalistic noise cross-
sectional community or other population samples generate, which is arguably 
important to consider when exploring applied social problems in which numerous 
beliefs and attitudes compete. This thesis’ findings have demonstrated that even 
including the naturalistic noise of cross-sectional samples, the social psychology 
theories employed generally operate as theorised in an applied context, and 
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contribute meaningful knowledge to understand the social cognitive processes that 
can influence correctional treatment and outcomes for offenders with an ID, for 
better or worse. More specifically, these findings have contributed to understanding 
the expectations of diverse potential stigmatisers, and how interrogation of different 
social categories’ beliefs, values, and attitudes may underpin the development of 
better policy and practice, and perhaps thereby influence outcomes.   
By applying a social psychology lens to examine community members’ and 
professionals’ stigmatising beliefs and attitudes towards offenders with an ID, this 
thesis has extended on the theoretical perspective of interpersonal and systemic 
stigma as a partial explanation for the overrepresentation of people with an ID in 
Australia’s criminal justice system. Past research on this issue has focused on 
describing the prevalence, characteristics, and sentencing pathways and outcomes for 
offenders with an ID, or alternatively has described the persistence of interpersonal 
and structural discrimination against people with an ID in the criminal justice system 
without really exploring how or why this occurs. This thesis, however, has explored, 
identified, and compared stigmatising beliefs held by Australian community 
members towards people with an ID and offenders, and has further explored, 
identified, and compared the attitudes of community members and professionals 
towards offenders with, and without, an ID for a variety of crime types. This is a 
unique approach to understanding the challenges faced by offenders generally, and 
by people with an ID specifically, in Australian research.  
The thesis’ findings have real-world implications for training, professional 
development, and the ethical practice of professionals in both the criminal justice and 
disability sectors involved in the policing, sentencing, diversion, custodial 
management, therapeutic and correctional treatment, and post-release and 
community support of offenders with an ID. Findings highlighted that professionals 
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experienced only in the criminal justice sector may be more prone than professionals 
experienced in the disability sector to stigmatising offenders with and without an ID. 
Having identified the nature of these stigmatising beliefs and attitudes, and the types 
of beliefs and attitudes on which professions differ, in addition to how these attitudes 
vary with respect to offence types, professional educators and organisational 
managers could make use of this knowledge to assist staff to gain insight into their 
own potential stigmatising beliefs and attitudes towards their clients, patients, and 
custodial charges. Although de-stigmatisation theories and approaches were beyond 
the scope of investigation for this research program, the identification of specific 
stigmatising beliefs and attitudes towards offenders with an ID and their constituent 
social categories may nonetheless contribute to future professional training programs 
designed to de-stigmatise offenders with an ID in order to reduce interpersonal, and 
ultimately structural, discrimination towards them. Findings relevant to dual 
professionals experienced in both the criminal justice and disability sectors 
highlighted that this influential social category has the potential to play a significant 
role in the de-stigmatisation of offenders with an ID. Overall, dual professionals 
were supportive and positive regarding offenders’ correctional outcomes, which 
could be attributed to their being more likely to have postgraduate education relevant 
to their professional role, as well as their experience (and perhaps synthesis of) two 
opposing professional agendas (support for the individual offender, and protection of 
the community).  
The thesis’ findings also have real-world implications for de-stigmatising 
interventions for the broader Australian community. The findings highlighted that 
although community members hold the most stigmatising attitudes overall towards 
offenders with an ID compared to the professionals sampled, and that community 
members are more contemptuous in their stigmatisation of offenders than of people 
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with an ID, they nonetheless value human rights within their society, and hold moral 
regard for social categories they perceive as vulnerable. As citizens, community 
members play important formal and informal roles in the sentencing and 
reintegration of offenders with and without an ID. The identification of how 
community members’ beliefs and attitudes towards people and offenders with and 
without an ID vary, presents a selection of cognitions government and community 
campaigners might aim to modify in community members, to improve social 
inclusion of these social categories.  
   
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions 
 The research program of this thesis has several strengths. Firstly, empirical 
knowledge from a variety of disciplines was synthesised, and appropriate theories 
and constructs were applied, to investigate stigmatising beliefs and attitudes towards 
offenders with an ID. This approach integrated past research and constructs from 
social and forensic psychology, as well as from sociology, criminology, and 
disability studies, in order to acknowledge the complex, intersectional factors 
influencing the historical and current status of offenders with an ID, and the variety 
of research perspectives and methodological approaches contributing to the area of 
enquiry.  
A second strength of this research program was the targeted, effective use of 
social media platforms to recruit large general population samples for Survey 1 and 
2, in addition to a variety of professionals for Survey 2. While samples for both 
factorial surveys in this thesis were of convenience, the samples themselves were 
quite large and varied in key demographics. Facebook and associated social media 
platforms and forums (e.g., Instagram, Reddit) have become popular recruitment 
mediums for psychology research during the past decade, but less attention seems to 
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have been paid to professional social networking sites such as LinkedIn for 
convenience sampling of specific professions. The successful sampling of 
professionals for Survey 2 highlights that future researchers should consider 
LinkedIn and other ‘professional’ social platforms as valuable recruitment mediums.  
A third strength of this research program was the use of online, multi-phase 
factorial surveys, allowing the efficient collection of cross-sectional and quasi-
experimental data, and both quantitative and qualitative data, relevant to associated 
constructs. A unique feature of the factorial survey is the use of multiple vignettes 
with controlled variations to isolate the factor of influence on participants’ responses. 
In the current thesis, the factorial survey design was shown to be an efficient and 
effective method by which to examine qualitative and quantitative responses to 
varied vignette sets.      
A fourth strength of this research program was the development of multiple 
orginal measures, including a measure of Australians’ beliefs about human rights, a 
measure of Australians’ attitudes towards appropriate correctional treatment setttings 
for offenders with an ID, and measures of attitudes towards the reintegration and 
forgiveness of offenders. While applied only to the current thesis’ samples and the 
Australian population, these measures demonstrated promising construct validity, 
predictive validity, and internal reliability, highlighting their value for future 
researchers in this area of investigation.  
The research program also had several limitations. Primary among these was 
the use of convenience sampling methods to recruit both community members and 
professionals. While the community member samples for Survey 1 and 2 were 
generally quite large and included varied demographics in terms of gender, age, 
education, and employment, there is no assurance that these samples were 
meaningfully representative of the Australian general population. Similarly, 
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professionals were conveniently recruited using word of mouth, snowballing, paid 
and unpaid advertisements on Facebook, and via individual invitation on LinkedIn. 
While the demographics of professionals within each subsample were varied, and did 
not significantly differ between professional subsamples, it cannot be assumed that 
these subsample beliefs are representative of their respective professional sectors. 
Furthermore, inclusion in these subsamples was based on self-identification as being 
currently or previously employed in the disability/social work sector, criminal 
justice/correctional sector, both of these sectors, or neither of these sectors. As 
specific past and current occupations and roles were not reported by participants, it is 
not possible to determine what types of sub professions contributed to each 
professional subsample, or the role/status of professionals within in each subsample.  
Some researchers may consider the use of social media a limitation to the 
research program’s convenience approach to sampling, in addition to the use of 
purely online data collection. This approach limited the population of potential 
participants to those with access to the internet generally (including workplace and 
private settings in the case of professionals), and access to the previously described 
online social media platforms, specifically. It is likely that this approach limited a 
variety of subpopulations from participating in the study (e.g., Australians who may 
not be active on social media, those who are wary of accessing advertisements online 
due to fear of cybercrime, those without access to the internet due to socioeconomic 
status, lifestyle, or lack of regional infrastructure allowing this). Findings regarding 
the representativeness of social media users, particularly Facebook users, are mixed. 
For example, Mellon and Prossor (2017) found Facebook and Twitter users were 
younger, better educated, and more liberal than the general population of the UK. 
Wells and Link (2014) found 50% of a large US, nationally representative, 
probability-based panel sample with data collected via meters were Facebook users, 
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with Facebook users more likely to be young, white, female, and with a minimum 
high school education. A systematic review of 35 studies detailing Facebook 
recruitment for health research, by Whitaker, Stevelink, and Fear (2017), similarly 
found young, white women were overrepresented using this approach; however, they 
also concluded that in addition to pragmatic benefits of reduced cost and reduced 
recruitment period, representation of targeted populations was better when compared 
to traditional recruitment approaches (e.g., print, radio, television, email). These 
studies are presented only as examples of the topical and dissonant perspectives 
regarding social media sampling in the social sciences, and by no means justify the 
validity of this sampling approach.  
A further limitation of this research program was the focus on casting 
offenders in vignette scenarios are male only. This was an intentional design decision 
to reflect the fact that most criminal offenders in Australia are men and to ensure 
findings were comparable between studies within the thesis. I do acknowledge that 
this approach not only perpetuates offender stereotypes (by casting all offenders as 
men), but also impedes researchers’ and practitioners’ understanding of stigma and 
associated discrimination towards female offenders with an ID. I assume that gender 
stereotypes would influence the degree to which paternalistic prejudice is imposed 
on offenders with an ID, and impact attributions about the causes of their offending, 
and associated attitudes to their correctional treatment and outcomes.  
The final and most significant limitation of this thesis is that I have not 
generated empirical evidence that the stigmatising beliefs and attitudes towards 
offenders with an ID identified in these studies actually relate to community 
members’ and professionals’ intention to discriminate against offenders with an ID, 
or to their actual discrimination against them. The association of beliefs and attitudes 
with behavioural intention and action generally, and in the context of stigma and 
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prejudice specifically, is assumed on the basis of theoretical models such as the 
Theory of Reasoned Action and Planned Behaviour and the stereotype content 
model. As such, findings of this thesis are limited to cognitions towards offenders 
with an ID and constituent social categories, and can only be applied to explain 
behavioural intention and action in a speculative way. These findings therefore 
provide some foundations to explain discrimination towards offenders with an ID, 
but do not tell a complete story.  
Given these limitations of the research program, future researchers should 
consider replicating (with or without modifying) the factorial surveys contributing to 
this thesis, using both probability and non-probability sampling approaches to 
recruiting Australians. Furthermore, replication using Australian samples obtained 
through both online and traditional recruitment methods should be considered, to 
compare the representativeness and generalisability of beliefs and attitudes described 
in this thesis between traditional and online recruitment approaches. Future 
researchers interested in extending on this research program should consider 
manipulating the gender of target social categories to determine whether and how 
gender stereotypes influence stigmatising beliefs and attitudes. Furthermore, future 
researchers who choose to extend on this research should consider developing 
designs which examine the progression of stigmatising beliefs and attitudes that 
translate to discriminative intention and behaviour towards offenders with an ID and 
their constituent social categories.  
 
Conclusion 
The thesis shows that Australians stigmatise people with an ID and criminal 
offenders in different ways, which results in more positive (if patronising) 
attributions and attitudes towards people with an ID, and offenders with an ID, than 
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offenders generally. Regardless of professional knowledge, overall Australians 
believe the community setting rather than the prison setting is more appropriate for 
the correctional treatment of offenders with an ID; and they hold more positive 
criminal justice attitudes towards offenders when an ID is specified. Laypeople hold 
more negative, less supportive criminal justice attitudes towards offenders regardless 
of ID; and dual professionals hold more positive, more supportive criminal justice 
attitudes towards offenders regardless of ID. 
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 APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Factorial Survey 1 for Studies 1-4 -  Ethics Approval, Materials, 
and Supplementary Results 
Ethics Modification Approval Granted for Factorial Survey 1 for Study 1-4 
 
  
Memorandum
To:
From:
Date:
Subject: 2016-095
Community and Professional Beliefs, Values and Attitudes towards Offenders with Intellectual
Disability in Australia
Dr Arlene Walker
School of Psychology
F
Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DUHREC)
26 September, 2016
Please quote this project number in all future communications
The modification to this project, submitted on 12/09/2016 has been approved by the committee executive on
26/09/2016.
cc: Alexa Hayley
Human Research Ethics
Deakin Research Integrity  
Burwood Campus 
Postal: 221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood Victoria 3125 Australia 
Telephone 03 9251 7123  
research-ethics@deakin.edu.au
Approval has been given for Alexa Hayley, under the supervision of Dr Arlene Walker, School of Psychology, to 
continue this project as modified to 3/08/2020.
In addition you will be required to report on the progress of your project at least once every year and at the
conclusion of the project. Failure to report as required will result in suspension of your approval to proceed with
the project.
DUHREC may need to audit this project as part of the requirements for monitoring set out in the National
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007).
• Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants
• Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time.
• Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the project.
• The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.
• Modifications are requested by other HRECs.
The approval given by the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee is given only for the project and 
for the period as stated in the approval. It is your responsibility to contact the Human Research Ethics Unit 
immediately should any of the following occur:
Human Research Ethics Unit
research-ethics@deakin.edu.au
Telephone: 03 9251 7123
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Materials 
 Promotional materials. Paid Facebook advertisement materials inviting 
Australians aged 18 years and older to complete the online study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accompanying text: ‘Tell us your thoughts on human rights and different social 
groups in Australia. Win a $100 Coles Myer gift card. Complete this 15 minute 
online survey by Deakin University.’ 
Informal (unpaid, snowballing) Facebook invitation to Australians aged 18 years and 
older in the researcher’s online social network to complete the online study. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Accompanying text: ‘Hi Everyone! Do you have 15 minutes to spare? This Deakin 
University study explores your beliefs about human rights and how we think about 
different social groups in Australia. You could win a $100 Coles Myer voucher. All 
responses are anonymous and confidential. Please share this study link with your 
friends and family. Thank you!’  
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Online plain language statement. 
 
 
To:  Participant 
Date: 1st October 2016 
Full Project Title: Australians’ Beliefs about Human Rights and the Moral Status of 
Social Groups 
Principal Researcher: Dr Arlene Walker 
Student Researcher: Alexa Hayley (PhD Candidate) 
Associate Researcher(s): Prof. Joe Graffam, Dr Lucy Zinkiewicz 
 
Hello,  
 The aim of this study is to understand Australians’ beliefs about human rights 
and the moral status of different social groups.  
 
Methods 
This study is an online survey and takes approximately 20 minutes to complete. It 
includes questions asking about your: demographics; beliefs about human rights; 
beliefs about the moral status of different social groups and your moral concern for 
them; and beliefs about underlying characteristics of specific social groups. 
 
Consent and Withdrawal 
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To consent to participate in this online survey, simply read and save this Plain 
Language Statement, and click the ‘NEXT’ tab at the bottom of this page. You can 
withdraw from this study at any time by exiting the survey page; however any 
responses prior to ceasing the survey cannot be withdrawn/deleted. 
Participant Involvement 
Participation requires that you just complete the online survey.  
 
Potential Risks to Participants 
There are no anticipated risks to participants. 
 
Potential Benefits to Participants and the Community 
As an incentive to complete the study, participants can choose to enter a draw to win 
a $100 Coles Myer voucher once they have completed their responses. Participants 
may also personally benefit from participating in this study by being encouraged to 
self-reflect on their beliefs about human rights and certain social groups. 
Expected benefits of this study to the wider community include identifying 
community beliefs and attitudes towards social groups vulnerable to human rights 
violations, and providing empirical knowledge to guide viable policy and legislative 
decisions in keeping with community needs and expectations with reference to such 
social groups. 
  
Privacy and Confidentiality 
Participant responses will be strictly confidential- only the researchers will have 
access to this information. All individual responses are anonymous and non-
identifiable. To protect your confidentiality, we will not ask for identifying 
information such as your name, contact information, or a signed consent form.  
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Study Results 
Results of this study may be presented in Associate Researcher Alexa Hayley’s PhD 
thesis, published as one or more peer-reviewed journal articles, and/or presented as a 
conference paper. 
If you have any queries or would like to be informed of the overall findings of this 
project, please contact Ms Alexa Hayley at halexa@deakin.edu.au or Dr Arlene 
Walker at Arlene.walker@deakin.edu.au. 
 
Funding Declaration 
This study is funded by Deakin University’s School of Psychology in accordance 
with Associate Researcher Alexa Hayley’s PhD candidature agreement. There are no 
other funding sources involved. 
 Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being 
conducted or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may 
contact:  
 The Manager, Ethics and Biosafety, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, 
Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, research-ethics@deakin.edu.au. 
Please quote project number 2016-095. 
 
To consent to participate in this study, click NEXT. 
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Online Survey. 
SECTION 1: Demographics 
 
1. How did you first find out about this study?  
Facebook 
Twitter 
Instagram 
Email 
Other (please explain) ____________________ 
 
2. Are you: 
Male 
Female 
Other 
 
3. What is your age?_____________ 
 
4. Are you an Australian citizen? 
Yes 
No 
 
5. What is your nationality?____________________ 
 
6. What is the highest level of education you have attained? 
Some secondary school 
Year 10 
Year 12 
TAFE Certificate/s 
TAFE Diploma/s 
Undergraduate (Bachelor) degree 
Masters or other postgraduate degree 
Doctoral degree (PhD) 
Other (please explain) ____________________ 
 
7. In which Australian State or Territory do you primarily live and work? 
NSW 
VIC 
SA 
WA 
NT 
QLD 
TAS 
ACT 
I don't currently live and work in Australia 
 
8. What is your current employment status?  
Full time paid work 
Part time/casual paid work 
Volunteer worker 
I am not currently employed as a paid or volunteer worker 
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9. Are you currently, or have you ever, been employed or volunteered in the 
following sectors?  
 
a) Social work or disability sector?  
Yes 
No 
 
b) Criminal justice sector?   
Yes 
No 
 
 
10. Have you ever been employed in paid or volunteer work? 
No 
Yes. Please state your most recent occupation: ____________________ 
 
11. Do you identify with any of the following Australian social minority 
groups? You can select more than one. 
Sexual minority (e.g., gay/lesbian, bisexual, transexual, etc.) 
Cultural minority (e.g., Vietnamese, Indian, Sudanese, etc.) 
Indigenous Australian (Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander) 
Religious minority (e.g., Jewish, Muslim, etc.) 
Person with a disability 
Migrant 
Other ____________________ 
 
12. At any time in your life (as a child, adolescent or adult) have you personally 
known a person with an intellectual disability?  
Yes 
No 
 
13. At any time in your life (as a child, adolescent or adult) have you personally 
known a person who had been sentenced for a criminal offence?  
Yes 
No 
 
14. How religious and/or spiritual are you, if at all?  
Not at all religious or spiritual 
A little religious or spiritual 
Moderately religious or spiritual 
Very religious or spiritual 
Extremely religious or spiritual 
 
15. With which religion or spiritual practice do you identify? _________________ 
 
 
You've finished 25% of the survey already! 
 
SECTION 2: Beliefs about human rights  
 
16. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
human rights?  
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6-point Likert-type scale used. 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Moderately Disagree, 3 = 
Slightly Disagree, 4 = Slightly Agree, 5 = Moderately Agree, 6 = Strongly Agree. 
*indicates reverse scored item. 
 
All people deserve human rights. 
A society that does not respect and protect human rights is an immoral society. 
All social groups deserve human rights. 
It is my responsibility to respect and protect the human rights of other Australian 
people. 
Some people don’t deserve the same rights as me.* 
I often think that my human rights are not respected by Australian society.* 
Criminal offenders should have the same basic human rights as me. 
Human rights are taken seriously in Australia. 
Most Australians respect others’ human rights. 
People with intellectual disability should have the same basic human rights as me. 
Australia does a poor job protecting its citizens’ human rights.* 
Australian laws restrict the human rights of some Australian social groups.* 
 
SECTION 3: Moral concern for social categories 
 
17. Sometimes people feel like they should show concern for, care for, support, 
and/or advocate for the welfare and interests of particular social groups. This type of 
concern is generally referred to as feeling a 'moral obligation' towards that group.  
 
To answer the following question, follow these steps:  
1. If you personally feel morally obligated to show concern for the welfare and 
interests of any of the social groups listed below, drag them inside the box. You can 
include as many groups as you want in the box. 
2. Rank the groups you dragged into the box according to how strong your feeling of 
moral concern is for each group compared to the others.  The group you feel most 
concerned for should be '1', the group you feel second most concerned for should be 
'2', and so on. 
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You're half way (50%) done! Keep going! 
 
 
SECTION 4: Beliefs about the moral status of social categories 
 
Participants were randomly allocated to Condition 1 or Condition 2 (described 
below) at the beginning of Section 4, and were presented with the following stimuli 
upon being allocated to their condition. 
 
Condition 1 – People with intellectual disability  
 
Questions in this section relate to your thoughts about people with an intellectual 
disability as a social group. An intellectual disability is a developmental disorder, 
which means a person with this disability has an intelligence quotient (IQ) score 
under 70 and can experience trouble with aspects of daily living such as self-care, 
learning new skills and activities, understanding complicated instructions, and 
‘reading between the lines’ in social situations. A person is typically diagnosed with 
an intellectual disability by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and often requires 
specialist supports for education, employment, and housing.      
 
Condition 2 - Criminal offenders 
 
Groups I feel morally obligated to show concern for: 
 
x Primary school children 
x Ex-prisoners who have served a sentence for their 
crime 
x Centrelink recipients (e.g., people who receive 
family benefits, disability benefits) 
x People with an intellectual disability (e.g., low IQ, 
poor daily living skills) 
x People with a physical disability (e.g., sensory 
impairment, amputee, chronic illness) 
x Homeless people (e.g., sleeping rough) 
x People experiencing a mental illness (e.g., 
depression, psychosis) 
x Elderly people (e.g., people over 70 years old) 
x Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
x Adult men 
x Adult women 
x Adolescent boys 
x Adolescent girls 
x Criminal offenders serving community based 
orders (e.g., involving paying a fine and doing 
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Questions in this section relate to your thoughts about criminal offenders as a social 
group. In Australia, general categories of criminal offending include murder, 
manslaughter, sexual assault, kidnapping/abduction, robbery (armed/unarmed), 
blackmail and extortion, various types of theft and trespass, and the sale and 
possession of illicit goods (e.g., guns) and substances (e.g., ice). 
 
18. Rate the degree to which you think a person [Condition 1 – ‘with an intellectual 
disability’,  Condition 2 – ‘who has committed a criminal offence in the past’] is 
morally responsible for the following actions.  
 
Items were rated using a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 = Not at all morally 
responsible, 2 = A little morally responsible, 3 = Moderately morally responsible, 4 
= Mostly morally responsible, 5 = Absolutely morally responsible. 
 
They made a serious promise to a friend but didn't keep the promise. 
They pushed someone out of the way so they could be first in line. 
They blamed a serious mistake they'd made on a friend instead. 
They cheated on a significant other and never told them. 
They refused to help their parents when their parents were in need. 
 
 
19. Now rate the degree to which you think a person [Condition 1 – ‘with an 
intellectual disability’, Condition 2 – ‘who has committed a criminal offence in the 
past’] deserves moral credit for the following actions.  
 
Items were rated using a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 = Not at all deserving of moral 
credit, 2 = A little deserving of moral credit, 3 = Moderately deserving of moral 
credit, 4 = Mostly deserving of moral credit, 5 = Absolutely deserving of moral 
credit. 
 
They returned a lost wallet/purse with the money and other content intact. 
They didn't cheat on a test, even though a friend offered them the answers. 
They helped their parents when they were in need. 
They were nice to their co-workers, despite feeling stressed and under pressure 
themselves. 
They helped a stranger get their car out of a ditch on the side of the road. 
 
 
20. Now rate the degree to which you would feel like taking a moral stand and 
intervening on behalf of a person [Condition 1 – ‘with an intellectual disability’, 
Condition 2 – ‘who has committed a criminal offence in the past’] in the following 
situations. 
 
Items were rated using a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 = Would not feel like 
intervening on their behalf at all, 2 = Would feel like intervening on their behalf a 
little, 3 = Would moderately feel like intervening on their behalf, 4 = Would strongly 
feel like intervening on their behalf, 5 = Would absolutely feel like intervening on 
their behalf. 
 
They were pushed out of the way by someone else who wanted to be first in line. 
They politely asked a stranger on the street for directions to a shop and were given a 
rude and aggressive response. 
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You heard someone bad-mouthing them behind their back. 
You saw someone refusing to help them when they really needed it. 
 
SECTION 5: Beliefs about the social status of social categories 
 
21. How do you think society views [Condition 1 – ‘people with an intellectual 
disability’, Condition 2 – ‘criminal offenders’] as a social group, according to the 
following qualities? 
 
Items were rated using a 5-point Likert-type scale, where 1 = Not at all, 2 = Slightly, 
3 = Moderately, 4 = Very, 5 = Extremely. 
 
Capable 
Skilful 
Confident 
Competent 
Efficient 
Intelligent 
Warm 
Good-natured 
Sincere 
Friendly 
Having good intentions 
Trust-worthy 
 
22. Now indicate the extent to which you personally agree or disagree with 
the following statements about people [Condition 1 – ‘people with an intellectual 
disability’, Condition 2 – ‘criminal offenders’] as a social group. 
 
Items were rated using a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = 
Moderately disagree, 3 = Slightly disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5 = 
Slightly disagree, 6 = Moderately agree, 7 = Strongly agree.  
 
Members of this group typically hold prestigious jobs. 
Members of this group are usually economically successful. 
If members of this group get special breaks (such as preference in hiring decisions), 
this is likely to make things more difficult for people like me. 
Resources that go to members of this group are likely to take away from the 
resources deserved by people like me. 
 
You're almost finished- you've completed 75% of the study. Keep going! 
 
SECTION 6: Beliefs about the ‘human’ status of social categories 
 
23. Think about the average person [Condition 1 – ‘with an intellectual disability’, 
Condition 2 – ‘who commits a criminal offence’]. To what extent do they have the 
capacity for the following things? 
 
Items were rated using a 5-point Likert-type scale, where 1 = No capacity for this, 2 
= Slight capacity for this, 3 = Moderate capacity for this, 4 = Strong capacity for 
this, 5 = Highest capacity for this. 
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Hunger 
Fear 
Pain 
Pleasure 
Rage 
Desire 
A personality 
Consciousness 
Pride 
Embarrassment 
Joy 
 
24. Again, think about the average person [Condition 1 – ‘with an intellectual 
disability’, Condition 2 – ‘who commits a criminal offence’]. To what extent do they 
have the capacity to do the following things? 
 
Items were rated using a 5-point Likert-type scale, where 1 = No capacity for this, 2 
= Slight capacity for this, 3 = Moderate capacity for this, 4 = Strong capacity for 
this, 5 = Highest capacity for this. 
 
Use self-control 
Be moral 
Recall memories of past experiences and events 
Recognise emotion in others 
Plan activities and future events 
Communicate with others 
Think and reason 
 
 
25. Below are six characteristics people possess to varying degrees. Rate (as a 
percentage, %) the extent to which you think people [Condition 1 – ‘with an 
intellectual disability’, Condition 2 – ‘who commits a criminal offence’], as a social 
group, are likely to possess these characteristics. 
 
Items were rated using an interactive slider response with a range of 0 to 100%. * 
reverse scored item. 
 
Culturally refined 
Rational/logical 
Lacking self-restraint* 
Emotionally responsive 
Warm towards others 
Rigid and cold* 
 
SECTION 7: Causal beliefs about social categories’ key characteristics 
 
After completing Sections 4-6, participants were randomly re-allocated to Condition 
1:Vignette 1, Condition 2: Vignette 2, or Condition 3: Vignette 3 (described below) 
at the beginning of Section 7. Participants were asked to read the vignette, indicate 
they had read it, and then to provide an open ended explanation regarding their 
causal beliefs about the John’s specified characteristic.  
 
 438
Condition 1: Vignette 1 – John with an intellectual disability 
 
This is the final question! Please take some time to think about this and write a few 
sentences. Afterwards you can enter the draw to win a $100 ColesMyer voucher.  
 
John is 35 years old and has a mild intellectual disability. He has a below normal IQ 
(intelligence quotient) score of 65 and sometimes experiences trouble with aspects of 
daily living such as learning new skills and activities, understanding complicated 
instructions, and ‘reading between the lines’ in social situations. He works casually 
for a catering company, has some close friends with whom he plays sports and sees 
movies on weekends, and lives with his parents.       
 
26. What do you think caused John to have a mild intellectual disability? Provide as 
detailed an explanation as you 
can.  ____________________________________________________ 
 
Condition 2: Vignette 2 – John with an intellectual disability, commits a 
criminal offence 
 
This is the final question! Please take some time to think about this and write a few 
sentences. Afterwards you can enter the draw to win a $100 ColesMyer voucher.  
 
John is 35 years old and has been sentenced for a criminal offence including theft 
and assault. He also has a mild intellectual disability. He has a below normal IQ 
(intelligence quotient) score of 65 and sometimes experiences trouble with aspects of 
daily living such as learning new skills and activities, understanding complicated 
instructions, and ‘reading between the lines’ in social situations. Before he was 
sentenced, he worked casually for a catering company, had some close friends with 
whom he played sports and saw movies on weekends, and lived with his parents.   
 
26. What do you think caused John to commit this criminal offence? Provide as 
detailed an explanation as you 
can. ______________________________________________________ 
 
Condition 3: Vignette 3 – John commits a criminal offence, no intellectual 
disability specified 
 
This is the final question! Please take some time to think about this and write a few 
sentences. Afterwards you can enter the draw to win a $100 ColesMyer voucher.  
 
 John is 35 years old and has been sentenced for a criminal offence including theft 
and assault. Before he was sentenced, he worked casually for a catering company, 
had some close friends with whom he played sports and saw movies on weekends, 
and lived with his parents.         
 
26. What do you think caused John to commit this criminal offence? Provide as 
detailed an explanation as you 
can. ______________________________________________________ 
 
END OF SURVEY 
 
[Participants were invited to enter the draw to win one of two $100 gift cards] 
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To thank you for your time, the researchers invite you to enter a draw to win one of 
two $100 ColesMyer vouchers. If you would like to enter this draw, please state your 
(1) FIRST NAME and (2) EMAIL ADDRESS or MOBILE NUMBER. 
____________________________________________________________________
_______ 
[Participants were debriefed about the study aim and alternative study conditions 
they could have been allocated to.]   
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 
 
This survey aimed to measure the types of beliefs Australians hold about the moral 
status of two stigmatised social groups: people with intellectual disability and 
criminal offenders. You were randomly allocated to complete questions focusing on 
people with intellectual disability, or criminal offenders. The researchers would like 
to compare beliefs about these two groups, along with Australians' views on human 
rights, to inform their research on Australians' values, beliefs, and attitudes towards 
offenders with intellectual disability.                  
 
 If you have any queries or would like to be informed of the overall findings of this 
project, please contact Ms Alexa Hayley at halexa@deakin.edu.au. Please feel free to 
leave any additional comments about this study before exiting. 
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Appendix II: Pilot Study (relevant to Study 1) to Develop and Associate 
Measures for Australians’ Beliefs about Human Rights and their Moral 
Concern for Social Categories 
‘Human rights’ as an ideological and legislative principle is intrinsic to 
contemporary democratic cultures; however empirical investigation of beliefs about, 
and attitudes towards, human rights as a social psychological construct with 
implications for intergroup perception and behaviour has been limited, particularly in 
Australia.  
Research Question and Aims 
This pilot study aimed to develop and test a measure of Australians’ beliefs 
about human rights in the Australian context. This study also aimed to test a measure 
of relative moral concern for different social categories, including people with 
intellectual disability and criminal offenders, in the form of a modified version of the 
circle of moral concern task developed by Laham (2009). The research question 
addressed by this pilot study is whether these measures can be soundly applied, and 
whether these measures are related to one another. 
Method 
Participants 
 A convenience sample (N = 148) of Australians from the general community 
completed the pilot study measures. Participants were aged 18-77 years (M = 33.93, 
SD = 14.49), 67% were female, and all were Australian citizens/permanent residents. 
Overall, 39.2% of participants reported identifying with a social minority (e.g., 
cultural, racial, sexual).  
Materials 
Australians’ beliefs about human rights in the Australian context. A set 
of 30 items referring to beliefs about human rights in the Australian context was 
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initially generated by the researchers. These items were developed with reference to 
the principles expressed by key United Nations’ human rights instruments previously 
examined in Study 1, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (1971), Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons with Disability (1975), Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners (1955), and the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1991).  
Items were framed to reflect ontological beliefs that could be held by the participant 
as to the status and value of human rights to themselves as individuals, and to society 
generally. These 30 items were refined via group discussion among the research 
team, with 13 items developed which synthesised the general principles expressed by 
the original 30 items.  
Of these 13 items, nine items were framed to reflect positive beliefs about 
human rights and their possession and protection by oneself and others in Australian 
society (e.g., “Most Australians respect others’ human rights”), while four items 
were framed negatively (and consequently reverse scored) to reflect negative beliefs 
about human rights and their possession and protection by oneself and others in 
Australian society (e.g., “Some people don’t deserve the same rights as me”). 
Participants responded to items on a forced-choice Likert-type 6-point response scale 
(1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Moderately disagree, 3 = Slightly disagree, 4 = Slightly 
agree, 5 = Moderately agree, 6 = Strongly agree).  
Moral concern for social categories. To assess the social categories 
participants included their circle of moral concern, participants completed a modified 
version of the moral circle task developed by Laham (2009) Participants were 
presented with 15 social categories: three social categories described variations of 
criminal offenders, two described variations of people with a disability, and 10 other 
social categories described a variety of other Australian categories to whom 
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participants may attribute moral concern. Refer to Table 1 for a list of these social 
categories.presented with 15 social categories: three social categories described 
variations of criminal offenders, two described variations of people with a disability, 
and 10 other social categories described a variety of other Australian categories to 
whom participants may attribute moral concern. Refer to Table 1 for a list of these 
social categories. 
 To complete this measure, participants first read the following statement 
providing a definition for moral obligation (i.e., moral concern):  
Sometimes people feel like they should show concern for, care for, support, and/or 
advocate for the welfare and interests of specific social groups. This type of concern is 
generally referred to as feeling a 'moral obligation' towards that group. 
Participants were then asked to choose social categories for whom they felt 
moral concern:  
If you personally feel morally obligated to show 
concern for the welfare and interests of any of the 
social groups listed below, drag them inside the 
box. You can include as many groups as you want in 
the box.  
After including social categories, they felt moral concern for in the box, 
participants were then instructed:  
Rank the groups you dragged into the box according to 
how strong your feeling of moral concern is for each 
group compared to the others.  The group you feel most 
concerned for should be '1', the group you feel second 
most concerned for should be '2', and so on.  
Three variables were derived from participant responses to this task: (1) a 
dichotomous variable per social category identifying whether or not participants 
included that social category in their circle of moral concern (1 = Included social 
category in circle of moral concern, 0 = Did not include social category in circle of 
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moral concern); (2) a count variable indicating the total number of social categories 
the participant chose to include in their circle of moral concern; and (3) an ordinal 
variable indicating the rank participants’ accorded each social category. 
Identification with a social minority. Participants provided an open-ended 
response to the following item: ‘Indicate any social minority groups with whom you 
identify (e.g., on the basis of ethnicity, religious beliefs, sexuality, etc.’). Responses 
were dichotomised to indicate whether or not the participant identified with any type 
of social minority (1 = Yes, 0 = No).  
Demographics. Participants were asked to report their sex (i.e., male, female, 
or other) and age. 
Table 14.1 
Australian Social Categories Presented to Participants in the Circle of Moral 
Concern Task 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
Adolescent boys 
Adolescent girls 
Adult men 
Adult women 
Centrelink (welfare) recipients (e.g., people who receive family benefits, disability benefits) 
Criminal offenders not yet sentenced for their crime (e.g., on bail, on remand) 
Criminal offenders serving community-based orders (e.g., involving paying a fine and doing unpaid 
community work) 
Elderly people (e.g., people over 70 years old) 
Ex-prisoners who have served a sentence for their crime 
Homeless people (e.g., sleeping rough) 
People experiencing a mental illness (e.g., depression, psychosis) 
People with an intellectual disability (e.g., low intelligence quotient [IQ], poor daily living skills) 
People with a physical disability  
Primary school children 
 
Procedure 
 After first receiving approval for the conduct of this study from the Deakin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee, participants were recruited via the 
researchers’ personal email contacts lists and social media networks (i.e., Facebook, 
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Instagram, LinkedIn) using unpaid advertisements and snowballing techniques. 
Participants could choose to participate in the pilot study, hosted on survey site 
Qualtrics, by clicking on the study site’s URL imbedded in the online or emailed 
invitation.  
Participants first read the study’s Plain Language Statement and then were 
informed that by clicking ‘NEXT’ and moving on to complete the study items, they 
indicated their informed consent to participate in the study. After completing the 
pilot study items, participants were invited to leave comments about the study for the 
researchers before exiting the study site. The pilot study took approximately 10 
minutes to complete. 
Data Treatment and Analysis 
After data cleaning (removal of n = 10 false starts from the initial N = 158 
cases), frequency and descriptive statistics were provided for all items. Normality 
and correlation assumptions for the Australians’ beliefs about human rights items 
were assessed, and then exploratory factor analyses (EFA) using oblique (direct 
oblimin) and orthogonal (varimax) rotation methods were conducted to determine the 
underlying dimensionality of the items. Internal consistency reliability of resulting 
factors was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha, and bivariate Pearson correlations 
between factors was assessed to determine whether the factors were best 
conceptualised as cumulative or distinct subscales with respect to measuring 
Australians’ beliefs about human rights. For each factor, differences in human rights 
beliefs by sex and by identification with a social minority (yes/no) were investigated 
using independent samples t-tests. 
For the circle of moral concern task, average number of social categories 
included in participants’ circle of moral concern, proportion of participants who 
included each social category in their circle, and the median ranking per social 
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category were reported overall and by sex. Differences by sex were determined using 
an independent samples t-test (for total number of social categories included in the 
circle of moral concern), chi square tests of independence (for inclusion of social 
category versus not in moral circle), and independent samples Mann-Whitney U tests 
(for median ranking of social categories included in moral circle). 
To determine whether the pilot human rights measure and circle of moral 
concern measure were significantly related, bivariate correlations (Pearson and point-
biserial where required) between the beliefs about human rights factor subscales and 
inclusion (versus not) of social categories in their circle of moral concern were 
determined. Binary logistic regression analyses were then conducted to determine 
whether belief in human rights was a significant predictor of participants’ inclusion 
of specific social categories (i.e., criminal offenders and people with intellectual 
disability) in their circle of moral concern. IBM SPSS Statistics version 24 was used 
for all analyses. 
Results 
Beliefs about Human Rights in the Australian Context 
To ensure the beliefs about human rights items were suitable for use in an 
EFA, key assumptions of univariate normality and item intercorrelation were first 
addressed. Assessment of absolute skew and kurtosis scores indicated four of the 13 
items (i.e., Items 1, 2, 4, and 13; see Table 1 for item descriptions) were negatively 
skewed (skewabsolute > 2) and had excessive kurtosis (kurtosisabsolute > 7; Field, 2012).  
Rather than exclude the problematic items from the factor analysis, and risk 
misrepresenting sample variability in the small-medium sized sample, it was decided 
to include them given their face validity and theoretical relevance to the scale’s 
development. Non-transformed variables were used in subsequent analyses. 
Descriptive statistics for beliefs about human rights items are presented in Table 2.  
 446
Bivariate correlations. To determine the suitability of items for inclusion in 
the EFA, bivariate Pearson correlations (Table 14.2) were assessed between the 13 
items; items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 13 tended to be significantly and positively 
correlated with one another, while items 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 tended to be 
significantly and positively correlated with one another, suggesting two potential 
dimensions underlying the items. All items were subsequently included in an EFA.  
Exploratory factor analysis. A preliminary model (Table 3) was calculated 
using principal axis factoring with number of dimensions determined by eigenvalues 
> 1, and applied oblique (direct oblimin) rotation to account for possible correlations 
between dimensions. This preliminary model indicated a sound Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure (KMO) of Sampling Adequacy of .84, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant, F2 (78, N = 145) = 628.47, p < .001, indicating the absence of an identity 
matrix. The determinant of the correlation matrix was .01, indicating the absence of 
multicollinearity. This analysis suggested a three-factor solution to explain item 
variance.
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Table 14.2 
Descriptive Statistics For, and Pearson Bivariate Correlations Between, Beliefs About Human Rights Items 
  Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
M 5.67 5.70 4.80 5.83 5.43 2.02 5.36 3.53 3.88 3.86 3.10 5.61 5.61 
SD .86 .79 1.38 .53 .87 1.54 .94 1.32 1.34 1.17 1.60 1.43 .78 
1. All social groups deserve human rights. 1 
   
2. All people deserve human rights. .67*** 1 
   
3. Criminal offenders should have the same 
basic human rights as me. 
.60*** .44*** 1 
4. People with intellectual disability should 
have the same basic human rights as me.  
.54*** .47*** .44** 1 
   
5. It is my responsibility to respect and 
protect the human rights of other 
Australian people. 
.56*** .44*** .36*** .49*** 1 
  
6. Some people don't deserve the same rights 
as me.^ 
.46*** .39*** .42** .35** .24** 1 
7. A society that does not respect and protect 
human rights is an immoral society. 
.49*** .41*** .29** .36** .38** .21* 1 
8. Human rights are taken seriously in 
Australia.  
.02 - .02 - .10 - .06 .01 - .08 - .13 1 
9. Australia does a poor job protecting its 
citizens' human rights.^ 
.07 - .05 .04 - .14 - .06 - .13 - .11 .49*** 1 
10. Most Australians respect others' human 
rights. 
.13 .08 .02 .02 .02 - .11 .04 .46*** .39*** 1 
11. I often think that my human rights are not 
respected by Australian society.^ 
.10 -0.1 .07 - .05 .02 - .11 - .02 .35*** .45*** .40*** 1 
12. Australian laws restrict the human rights of 
some Australian social groups.^ 
-
.35*** 
-
.34*** 
-
.33*** 
-.26** -.28** -.24** -.23** .36*** .29*** .28** .25** 1 
13. It is the Australian government's role to 
make sure the human rights of its citizens 
are protected.  
.42*** .42*** .25** .32*** .26** .20* .28** .14 .04 .27** - .13 - .14 1 
Note. For all items N = 148 except items 7, 9, 10, and 12 where N = 147. ^Indicates reverse scored items; reversed scores applied for correlation analyses, but natural 
scores used for descriptive statistics. *p < .05, **p < 0.01, ***p < .001, all two-tailed. 
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Factor 1 had an eigenvalue of 4.12 and explained 31.68% of item variance, 
and included items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 10 with loadings ranging from .52 to .90. 
Factor 2 had an eigenvalue of 2.52 and explained 19.42% of item variance, and 
included items 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 with loadings ranging from .45 to .68. The third 
factor was weak and its explanatory contribution was arbitrary; it had an eigenvalue 
of 1.03, explained 7.93% of item variance, and contained three items with negative 
loadings (items 2, 10, and 13), which also cross-loaded positively onto Factor 1 and 
2. Given that dimensions did not appear to be correlated, orthogonal rotation 
methods were applied in subsequent EFAs. 
A second EFA (Table 3) was conducted using the same criteria and 
commands as previously described, except for the use of orthogonal (varimax) 
rotation to maximise distance between dimension loadings. This model indicated a 
sound Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (KMO) of Sampling Adequacy of .84, and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant, F2 (78, N = 145) = 628.47, p < .001, 
again indicating the absence of an identity matrix. The determinant of the correlation 
matrix was .01, indicating the absence of multicollinearity. 
A three-factor solution was suggested to explain item variance; Factor 1 had 
an eigenvalue of 4.12 and explained 31.68% of item variance, and included items 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, with loadings ranging from .51 to .91. Factor 2 had an eigenvalue 
of 2.52 and explained 19.42% of item variance, and included items 8, 9, 10, 11, and 
12, with loadings ranging from .45 to .68. The third factor was weak; it had an 
eigenvalue of 1.03, explained 7.93% of item variance, and contained two items (item 
2 and 13) with loadings of .31 and .60 respectively. Both items constituting Factor 3 
also cross-loaded positively onto Factor 1, with this cross-loading stronger for item 2 
on Factor 1 (.69), and weaker for item 13 on Factor 1 (.38). As such, item 2 was 
retained for loading onto Factor 1, while item 13 was removed from the item set. 
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Table 14.3 
Exploratory Factor Analyses for Beliefs about Human Rights in Australia (N = 147) 
   
EFA1: Three-factor solution 
(oblique rotation) 
EFA 2: Three-factor solution 
(orthogonal rotation) 
EFA 3: Two-factor 
solution (orthogonal 
rotation) 
  Item 1 2 3 h2 1 2 3 h2 1 2 h2 
1. All social groups deserve human rights. 0.90 
 
0.85 0.91 0.84 0.91 
 
0.85 
2. All people deserve human rights. 0.72 -0.36 0.58 0.69 0.31 0.60 0.73 0.53 
3. Criminal offenders should have the same basic human rights 
as me. 
0.68 
 
0.46 0.69 0.46 0.66 
 
0.44 
4. People with intellectual disability should have the same basic 
human rights as me. 
0.66 
 
0.43 0.64 0.44 0.66 
 
0.43 
5. It is my responsibility to respect and protect the human rights 
of other people. 
0.61 
 
0.37 0.6 0.38 0.62 
 
0.38 
6. Some people don't deserve the same rights as me.^ 0.53 0.29 0.52 0.27 0.52 0.28 
7. A society that does not respect and protect human rights is an 
immoral society. 
0.53 0.29 0.51 0.29 0.53 0.28 
8. Human rights are taken seriously in Australia. -0.47 0.69 0.55 0.68 0.55 -.51 0.70 0.49 
9. Australia does a poor job protecting its citizens' human 
rights.^ 
0.67 0.46 0.67 0.48 0.68 0.46 
10. Most Australians respect others' human rights. 0.66 -0.33 0.52 0.66 0.44 0.65 0.43 
11. I often think that my human rights are not respected by 
Australian society.^ 
0.66 0.54 0.66 0.60 0.60 0.36 
12. Australian laws restrict the human rights of some Australian 
social groups.^ 
0.45 0.39 -0.45 0.45 0.51 -.44 0.44 0.39 
13. It is the Australian government's role to make sure the human 
rights of its citizens are protected. 
0.44 -0.63 0.51 0.38 0.60 0.4 
Eigenvalue 4.12 2.52 1.03 4.12 2.52 1.03 3.91 2.47 
 
  Variance (%)  31.68 19.42 7.93 31.68 19.42 7.93 32.54 20.59 
 
Note. Principal axis factorisation applied to determine dimensions. Factor loadings are structure matrix values rather than pattern matrix values. Factor loadings > 
.30 determined meaningful and used as criterion for factor development. ^Items 6, 9, 11, and 12 are reverse scored. h2 = communality value. Only items 1-12 
constitute the final two-factor measure of Beliefs about Human Rights in Australia.
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A third and final EFA (Table 3) was conducted to determine parsimonious 
dimensionality of the data; orthogonal (varimax) rotation was again applied, all items 
except item 13 were included, and a two-factor solution was forced to explain item 
variance. The KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy was again sound at .84, and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant, F2 (66, N = 145) = 573.36, p < .001, 
indicating the absence of an identity matrix. The determinant of the correlation 
matrix was .02, indicating the absence of multicollinearity. Inspection of the 
eigenvalues per factor and the screeplot showed that the two-factor solution was 
sound, with Factor 1 possessing a total eigenvalue of 3.91, explaining 32.54% of 
item variance, while Factor 2 possessed a total eigenvalue of 2.47 and explained 
20.59% of item variance. The cumulative percentage of variance explained by the 
two-factor model (53.14%) was slightly lower than the cumulative percentage of 
variance explained by the prior three-factor solutions (59.03%), but more 
parsimonious due to the absence of cross-loading items. Factor 1 was labelled ‘Belief 
that human rights is a moral imperative’, and Factor 2 was labelled ‘Belief that 
Australian society supports human rights’.  
Internal consistency reliability of factors. Intercorrelations of items per 
factor and for all items overall were examined using Cronbach’s alpha to determine 
their degree of internal consistency reliability. The seven items constituting Factor 1 
‘Belief that human rights is a moral imperative’ demonstrated good internal 
reliability (D = .80), while the five items constituting Factor 2 ‘Belief that Australian 
society supports human rights’ demonstrated acceptable internal reliability (D = .74). 
Diagnostics indicated that neither factor’s internal reliability would be improved by 
removal of an item, so all items were retained per factor. Given the sound internal 
reliability of each factor it was decided to treat each item set as subscales for the pilot 
measure assessing beliefs about human rights in Australia.  
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To determine whether the two subscale dimensions were amenable to use as a 
composite scale yielding a global score indicating beliefs about human rights in 
Australia, internal reliability for all items, entered as a single scale, was assessed. 
Internal consistency for all items was questionable (D = .63) and diagnostics 
indicated this would not be improved by removing select items. A bivariate Pearson 
correlation was also conducted to determine degree of association between the 
subscale mean scores, indicating a weak negative, statistically significant association, 
r (146) = -.19, p < .05, two-tailed. Given the poor internal consistency between items 
when combined across dimensions, and the presence of a weak negative association 
between the dimensions, it was decided that it was most appropriate to conceptualise 
the beliefs about human rights in Australia measure as being multidimensional, with 
subscales applied as independent components. 
Bivariate correlations between beliefs about human rights subscales and 
demographic variables. Pearson correlations were conducted to assess significant 
associations between the beliefs about human rights subscales and age, while point-
biserial correlations were conducted to assess significant associations between the 
beliefs about human rights subscales, sex, and identification with a social minority. 
All correlation analyses were two-tailed. There was a significant, weak positive 
association between ‘Belief that human rights is a moral imperative’ and sex, with 
women more likely than men to endorse this belief, r (147) = .20, p < .05. A 
significant, weak negative association was also found between ‘Belief that Australian 
society supports human rights’ and identification with a social minority, with people 
who identified with a social minority less likely to believe Australian society 
supports human rights, r (147) = -.20, p < .05. Age was not significantly associated 
with either belief subscale (both p > .05). 
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Appendix III: Study 4 Qualitative Coding Criteria Applied during Thematic Analyses Exploring Causal Beliefs about Intellectual Disability 
and Criminal Offending 
Table 14.4 
Qualitative Coding Criteria for Vignette 1 Themes and Subthemes: Causes of John’s Intellectual Disability 
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 Theme  Subtheme  Coding criteria per theme 
1. Physical trauma  i. Forceful impact Includes: reference to physical accidents, injuries, or traumas involving impact, 
assault.  
 
General references to 'trauma' are interpreted as referring to physical rather than 
psychological trauma, unless otherwise specified.   
 
General reference to ‘acquired brain injury’ are interpreted as referring to injury 
via forceful impact. 
 
Excludes: reference to anoxia associated with suffocation, drowning, or 'birthing 
difficulties'.  
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: in utero, during birth, or at any 
stage after birth, including adulthood. 
    
    
  ii. Anoxia Includes: reference to anoxia, hypoxia, suffocation, or drowning. 
  
Generic reference to 'complications at time of birth' were interpreted as referring to 
experience of anoxia by the newborn, based on the number of other cases which 
typically attributed anoxia to labour/birth complications. 
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: primarily in utero and during 
birth, but some references to 'drowning' in later life. 
    
    
2. Illness i. Infectious illness Includes: reference to viruses, 'disease' (interpreted as referring to infectious 
disease), and infections.   
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: in utero, during birth, or at any 
stage after birth, including adulthood. 
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  ii. Non-infectious illness Includes: reference to malnutrition, neurodegenerative diseases, seizures, strokes, 
and metabolic problems impacting flourishing or the individual's functional status 
quo.  
 
Excludes: reference to generic ‘illness’ (to be coded as ‘Illness- Unspecified’) or 
‘disease’ (to be coded as ‘Illness – Infectious illness’). 
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: in utero, or at any stage after 
birth, including adulthood.  
    
    
  iii. Unspecified illness Includes: reference to generic 'illness' as a cause without providing enough 
information to classify it as either ‘infectious’ or ‘non-infectious’.  
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: in utero, or at any stage after 
birth, including adulthood. 
    
3. Exposure to 
chemical toxins 
i. Alcohol/ other drug 
use 
Includes: use of alcohol, cannabis, tobacco, stimulants such as ecstasy, and 
medicinal drugs such as vaccines.  
 
‘Alcohol use’ was often associated with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome/ Fetal Alcohol 
Spectrum Disorder; when the latter was specified either alone or in addition to 
‘alcohol use’, both ‘Exposure to chemical toxins - Alcohol/ other drug use’ and 
'Genetics- Specific Disorder or Syndrome' were coded.  
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: in utero (via the mother’s 
ingestion) or during adolescence/ adulthood (via self-ingestion).  
    
  ii. Environmental toxins  Includes: exposure to 'chemicals', 'pollutants', 'poisons', and 'toxins' present in the 
'environment', including pesticides in foods, chemicals in plastics, and heavy 
metals such as mercury.  
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: in utero up to childhood.     
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Reference to unspecified 'toxins', ‘chemicals’, or ‘poison’ was interpreted as 
meaning environmental toxins/pollutants.  
4. Genetics i. General genetics  Includes: general reference to being 'born' with an ID or to ID being due to 
'congenital' causes; and specific reference to 'genetics', 'inheritance', 'mutation', or 
'birth defect'. 
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: embryonic or fetal 
development.  
    
    
  ii. Specific disorder or 
syndrome  
Includes: reference to a specific congenital Disorder or Syndrome such as Down 
Syndrome, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, Fragile X syndrome, autism spectrum 
disorder, Angelman's syndrome. 
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: embryonic or fetal 
development.  
    
    
5. Psychosocial 
deprivation 
i. Social environment Includes: reference to the person's upbringing or 'home environment', including 
general parental support and competence; specific reference to socioeconomic 
status, or lack of access to health and/or education services. 
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: Infancy to adulthood.  
  ii. Psychosocial 
neglect/abuse  
Includes: specific reference to the person experiencing psychological abuse, 
psychosocial neglect, including insufficient stimulation and socialisation. 
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: Infancy to adulthood.  
    
6. Social 
construction 
i. Normative labelling  Includes: reference to the role of social norms and expectations in determining 
'disability'.  
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Note. ID = intellectual disability. n = 211. 
Table 14.5 
Qualitative Coding Criteria for Vignette 2 Themes and Subthemes: Causal Beliefs about John’s Criminal Offending without an Intellectual Disability 
Specified 
 
     
References tend to minimise the negative characteristics and instead emphasise the 
positive characteristics of the person with an ID portrayed.  
 
References also tend to assert that knowing or attributing a cause to the disability 
is either not important or helpful. 
 
Excludes: reference to the impropriety of speculating or asking someone about the 
cause of their disability, which is coded as 'Social construction- Impropriety'.  
 
Attributed to the following stages of development: Infancy to adulthood. 
    
    
  ii. Impropriety  Includes: reference to the impropriety of speculating or asking someone about the 
cause of their disability. 
Participant may state their lack of expertise or experience as a justification for this 
impropriety.     
7. Metaphysical 
mystery 
  Includes: reference to 'luck', 'chance', fate or destiny, etc., implying the ineffability 
or otherworldliness of causal explanation.  
8. Unknown causes   Participant specifies this. Can be coded even if the participant gives additional 
multiple causes.  
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 Theme  Subtheme  Coding criteria per theme 
1. Financial Pressure i. Working Poor Includes: Reference to dependence on casual employment, which is typically framed as being 
‘inadequate’ to support daily living costs and leisure/luxury pursuits. May refer to John living in 
‘poverty’ because he is assumed to be under-employed and under-paid as a casual employee. 
Reference to financial or material responsibility for other family members (e.g., wife, children, 
parents). Reference to ‘debt’, ‘bills’, or inability to pay for large sums associated with non-addiction 
related issues such as education, medical issues. Also includes general reference to financial 
‘stress’, ‘pressure’, ‘worries’, ‘concerns’, or implications of this that are not better categorised as 
one of the specific subthemes previously noted. 
 
Excludes:  Reference to ‘addition’, ‘dependence’, ‘habit’, and needing to fund these. Sources of 
addiction may be alcohol/other drugs or gambling. This is coded as ‘Financial Stress – Addiction’. 
Also reference to theft associated with acquiring goods that aid John’s socal inclusion and 
conformity to perceived social norms. This should be coded as ‘Entitlement – Social Comparison’.   
  ii. Addiction Includes: Reference to ‘addiction’, ‘dependence’, ‘habit’, ‘problem’, and needing to fund these. 
Sources of addiction may be alcohol/other drugs or gambling. 
 
Excludes: References to being ‘under the influence of alcohol/drugs’ at the time of committing the 
crime. This is coded at ‘Impaired Reasoning – Under the Influence of AOD’.  
2. Entitlement i. Social 
Comparison 
Includes: Reference to low self-esteem and frustration associated with the offenders’ social 
comparison of themselves to others who appear more ‘successful in life’; reference to the offender 
engaging in crime to ‘get ahead’ or ‘compensate’ for their perceived limitations. References may 
include indications that ‘getting ahead’ will help the offender gain social status or find a romantic 
partner. 
Excludes: Reference to compensating for slights or attacks; reference to criminal behaviour as self-
defence or self-protection. 
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ii. Preservation of 
Honour 
Includes: Reference to actual or imagined slights or attacks against the offender, indicating that the 
criminal behaviour was reactive rather than proactive and perceived to be justified in some way.  
Examples include (a) having been genuinely victimised and reacting aggressively in self-defence; 
(b) protecting another from an attack; or (c) having been discovered engaged in criminal behaviour 
(e.g., theft) and reactively attacking the interrupter to protect their theft from discovery/protect 
themselves from consequences of this. 
 
Excludes: Reference to malicious or selfish qualities in the offender (these should be coded under 
‘Immoral – Selfish’).  
iii. Irresponsible Includes: Reference to the offender ‘expecting’ resources to be given to him (e.g., by parents, ‘the 
government’, ‘welfare’); reference to the offender taking these resources for granted. May refer to 
offender lacking ‘direction’, ‘goals’, or ‘motivation’ in life as an influence on his criminal 
behaviour. 
 
Excludes: Reference to scenarios where the offender experiences ‘low self-esteem’ or ‘frustration’ 
at their limited resources, leading to their criminal behaviour – this should be referenced as the 
subtheme ‘Social Comparison’. 
3. Impaired reasoning i. Psychological 
Disorder 
Includes:  Reference to a general ‘mental illness’ or ‘psychological disorder’, or reference to a 
specific type of psychological disorder (e.g., depression, psychopathy, personality disorder) as a 
cause of criminal behaviour.  
 
Excludes:  Reference to psychological or existential distress/desperation associated with a specific 
event or situation (e.g., relationship conflict or loss, work conflict or loss).  This should be coded as 
‘Impaired Reasoning – Psychological Distress’. 
ii. Psychological 
Distress  
Includes: Reference to psychological or existential distress/desperation associated with a specific 
event or situation (e.g., relationship conflict or loss, work conflict or loss, trauma) in the distant or 
recent past. Includes reference to problems in John’s ‘private life’, ‘relationship’, or ‘workplace’. 
Includes reference to any emotional states attributed to acute or chronic stress.  Includes references 
to ‘anger’, ‘rage, ‘hate’, ‘desperation’ associated with being unable to manage emotions in response 
to key events or problems.  
 
Excludes:  Reference to a general ‘mental illness’ or ‘psychological disorder’, or reference to a 
specific type of psychological disorder (e.g., depression, psychopathy, personality disorder) as a 
 459 
cause of criminal behaviour. This should be coded as ‘Impaired Reasoning – Psychological 
Disorder’. 
iii. Substance 
Impairment 
Includes: Reference to John being under the influence of alcohol or other drugs at the time of 
committing crimes. If general reference is made to ‘drugs’ and/or ‘alcohol’, it is assumed this refers 
to being under the influence of these rather than requiring money to fund an addiction to these.  
 
Excludes: Reference to committing crimes in order to fund an addiction to alcohol, drugs, or 
gambling. This should be coded as ‘Financial Stress – Addiction’. 
iv. Low 
Intelligence 
Includes: Reference to John having generally low intelligence, or specific reference to John having 
an intellectual disability or acquired brain injury. 
 
Excludes: General reference to bad, poor or regretful ‘decisions’, ‘choices’, ‘actions’ that John has 
‘not thought through’ that are not contextualised with reference to John having low IQ, an ID, or an 
ABI. 
4. Social Connection i. Peer or Parent 
Pressure 
Includes:  Reference to having been actively encouraged or pressured to engage in criminal 
behaviour by peers or colleagues, including reference to ‘proving himself’ to others, ‘to impress’ 
others, or ‘to draw the attention’ of others.  
Excludes:  Reference to having passively or actively learned criminal behaviours via display by 
parents, family, friends, colleagues, or those in the community- should be coded as ‘Moral 
Disregard – Immoral’. Also excludes reference to engaging in crime as a perceived way to gather 
resources to ‘impress’ a potential partner – this should be coded as ‘Social Connection – Lack of 
Intimacy’. 
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ii.  Lack of 
Intimacy 
Includes: Reference to John feeling isolated, lonely, or disconnected from society due to the absence 
of affectionate and meaningful relationships, particularly due to the absence of an intimate partner.  
 
Excludes: Reference to ‘lost’ relationships as an event-specific source of psychological distress- 
should be coded as ‘Impaired Reasoning – Psychological Distress’. If emotions such as ‘frustration’, 
‘desperation’, etc. are mentioned in association with this lack of intimacy, then also code at 
‘Impaired Reasoning – Psychological Distress’ to indicate an ongoing form of psychological 
distress. 
5. Moral Disregard i. Immoral  Includes: Reference to John being generally immoral, unethical, not having moral or ethical ‘values’ 
or a ‘moral compass’.  Includes reference to being immoral by ‘nurture’ - having not learnt, or been 
taught, moral or ethical values by his parents, and reference to John having passively learned 
criminal behaviours via display by other family, friends, colleagues, or those in the community are 
also included. Also includes reference to being immoral by ‘nature’ – including ‘genetics’ or other 
‘predetermination’ explanations for John’s criminal behaviour, which imply he has no free-will and 
hence capacity for moral decision-making. Includes references to John being a recidivist or ‘career 
criminal’, implying he has chosen to repeatedly act contrary to known laws. May refer to 
motivations and emotions such as malice and spite, implying intention to harm or cause pain; 
participants who express this sentiment are interpreted as implying (rather than explicitly stating) 
that the offender’s behaviour is accords with immoral principles. 
  
Excludes:  Reference to John seeking revenge or reacting to provocations or slights, which should 
be coded as ‘Entitlement – Preservation of Honour’. Any reference to negative or irrational 
emotional states (e.g., ‘anger’, ‘hate’, ‘rage’) should be coded as ‘Impaired Reasoning – 
Psychological Distress’. 
ii. Thrill-Seeker Includes: Reference to John engaging in crime because he is ‘thrill-seeking’ or seeking a ‘rush’, is 
‘bored’, or wants to ‘take risks’ or act ‘impulsively’. Includes reference to John taking pleasure in, 
or gaining satisfaction from, criminal acts. May also include reference to ‘opportunity’ and not 
thinking through the consequences of his actions.   
 
Excludes: Reference to criminal behaviour attributed to other cognitive/emotional agendas such as 
anger, rage, panic, fear, or desperation – these should be coded as ‘Impaired Reasoning – 
Psychological Distress’.  
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Note. ID = Intellectual disability. ABI = Acquired brain injury. IQ = Intelligence quotient. N = 215 
 
 
 
6. Innocent   Includes: Reference to John having been falsely accused of or charged with an offence either 
generally or due to being victimised as a ‘marginalised’ group (including ‘men’).    
 
Excludes: Reference to any scenario in which John is assumed by the participant to have actually 
committed theft and/or assault either intentionally or unintentionally, for personal gain, in self-
defence, or for the protection of himself or others.  
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Table 14.6 
Qualitative Coding Criteria for Vignette 3 Themes and Subthemes: Causal Beliefs about John’s Criminal Offending with an Intellectual 
Disability Specified 
 Theme  Subtheme  Coding criteria per theme 
1. Intellectual 
Disability 
i. Consequential 
Reasoning 
Includes: Reference to John having poor reasoning, particularly an inability to think about the 
possible consequences of his actions, or an ability to differentiate between long term vs short 
term gain. References to ‘thinking things through’, not thinking about how his actions impact 
others are included.  
 
Excludes: Reference to John acting impulsively and/or emotionally, including acting on 
‘desire’. These references should be coded as ‘Intellectual Disability – Impulsivity’.  
  ii. Impulsivity Includes: Reference to John being impulsive, having poor emotional regulation or behavioural 
‘self-control’, and may include reference to stealing things he ‘fancies’ or ‘desires’.  
 
Excludes: Reference to John reacting aggressively when placed in a challenging situation 
(particularly confrontation about his intentional or unintentional theft); this should be coded as 
‘Intellectual Disability - Defensive Aggression’.  
  iii. Misunderstandings Includes: Reference to social misunderstandings on the part of either John, or of people with 
whom he is interacting. Types of misunderstandings described include: John having generally 
poor social awareness; John thinking he can have or take something without paying for it; John 
picking up an item and forgetting to pay for it; John appearing to have trouble completing tasks 
and being approached by others; John trying to help someone and his behaviour being 
misinterpreted as aggressive or illegal; John recognising that he has done something 
immoral/illegal, trying to return stolen item, and being discovered but unable to adequately 
communicate his moral intention. Reference to John’s poor communication skills (language 
comprehensive and ability to clearly express himself), and particularly his ‘inability to read 
between the lines’ (described in the vignette), may be referenced.  
 
Excludes:  Reference to John’s poor or slow reasoning, including his ability to predict the 
possible consequences of his actions– should be coded as ‘Intellectual Disability – 
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Consequential Reasoning’. Also excludes reference to John’s actions when associated with 
peers or media (should be coded as ‘Social Influences’ – ‘Peers’ or ‘Media’); and reference to 
defensive aggression associated with situational stress (frustration, fear, confusion, distress), 
which should be coded as ‘Intellectual Disability.  
  iv. Situational Stress Includes: Reference to John experiencing intense stress within a specific social situation, and 
reacting emotionally, including aggressively. Situations leading to stress include confrontations 
where John is discovered stealing (or suspected of stealing), where John is trying to return an 
intentionally or unintentionally stolen item, where John is trying to explain 
intentions/behaviours unsuccessfully, or where John is feeling patronised or 
misunderstood/misrepresented. Should be coded in addition to ‘Intellectual Disability – 
Misunderstandings’ if occurring after this. Emotions associated with this situational stress 
include confusion, irritation, frustration, distress, desperation, loss of control, and anger.  
 
Excludes: Reference to John being misunderstood, without John becoming stressed by this 
(code as ‘Intellectual Disability – Misunderstandings’). Reference to John having poor 
emotional control or acting impulsively (code as ‘Intellectual Disability – Impulsivity’), unless 
followed by a specific description of situational stress and reactivity.  
2. Social Influences i. Peers Includes:  Reference to John having had criminal behaviours socially modelled to him by peers, 
or to have been actively encouraged or pressured to engage in criminal behaviour by peers or 
colleagues. Includes references to John having fallen into the ‘wrong crowd’, ‘proving himself’ 
to others, trying ‘to impress’ others, or ‘to draw the attention’ of others. Also includes refers to 
John having been exploited by peers knowledgeable of his disability. Also includes reference to 
general social modelling experiences (including by parents), not related to media. 
 
Excludes:  Reference to having passively learned criminal behaviours via display by media, 
including movies- should be coded as ‘Social Influences – Media’.  
ii. Media Includes: Reference to John’s criminal behaviour having been influenced by the media 
generally, or specifically by the movies he has watched.  
 
Excludes: Reference to social modelling or influence of peers, or to his general ‘socialisation’ 
(unless with specific reference to media influence). 
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3. Entitlement i. Social Comparison Includes: Reference to low self-esteem and frustration associated with the offenders’ social 
comparison of themselves to others (without an ID) who appear more ‘successful in life’; 
reference to the offender engaging in crime to ‘get ahead’ or ‘compensate’ for their perceived 
limitations. 
 
Excludes: Reference to compensating for slights or attacks; reference to criminal behaviour as 
self-defence or self-protection.  
ii. Preservation of 
Honour 
Includes: Reference to actual or imagined slights or attacks against the offender, indicating that 
the criminal behaviour was reactive rather than proactive and perceived to be justified in some 
way.  Examples include (a) having been genuinely victimised and reacting aggressively in self-
defence, particularly due to experience of stigma or discrimination associated with their ID; (b) 
protecting another from an attack.  
 
Excludes: Reference to malicious or selfish qualities in the offender (these should be coded 
under ‘Immoral – Selfish’).  Reference to having been discovered engaged in criminal 
behaviour (e.g., theft) and reactively attacking the interrupter. This subtheme is distinct from 
‘Entitlement – ‘Preservation of Honour’ for offenders WITHOUT an ID, in that offenders 
without an ID were often described as reactively attacking individuals who discovered them 
engaged in theft with the intention of protecting their theft from discovery and/or to protect 
themselves from consequences of this. While offenders with an ID are described as reacting 
aggressively when confronted about theft, these attacks are attributed to their inability to 
comprehend their situation (e.g., why they are being apprehended). 
4. Working Poor   Includes: Reference to dependence on casual employment, which is typically framed as being 
‘inadequate’ to support daily living costs and leisure/luxury pursuits. May refer to John living 
in ‘poverty’ because he is assumed to be under-employed and under-paid as a casual employee. 
Also includes reference to lack of access to social and economic ‘supports’ intended to support 
people with a disability.  
 
Excludes:  Reference to theft associated with acquiring goods that aid John’s socal inclusion 
and conformity to perceived social norms. This should be coded as ‘Entitlement – Social 
Comparison’.  
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Note. ID = Intellectual disability. N = 215 
  
5. Immoral   Includes: Reference to motivations and emotions such as being selfish, malicious, and/or 
spiteful, implying the offender knows their actions should or could be otherwise and hence that 
they intend to harm or cause pain to others. Participants who express this sentiment are 
interpreted as implying (rather than explicitly stating) that the offender’s behaviour accords 
with immoral principles.  ‘Immoral’ intention behaviour was defined as John 'engaging in a 
behaviour being aware of its moral implications, to at least some extent’. This type of 
explanation could be accompanied by statements such as ‘John has some understanding of right 
and wrong’, or there being ‘no excuse’ for his behaviours, regardless of external influences on 
John such as economic disadvantage or social provocation.  
6. Innocent   Includes: Reference to John having been falsely accused of or charged with an offence either 
generally or due to being victimised as a person with an ID.  Includes references to John having 
been ‘scapegoated’ by peers or professionals based on his ID. 
 
Excludes: Reference to any scenario in which John is assumed by the participant to have 
actually committed theft and/or assault either intentionally or unintentionally, for personal gain, 
in self-defence, or for the protection of himself or others.  
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Appendix IV: Factorial Survey 2 for Studies 5 and 6 -  Ethics Approval, 
Materials, and Supplementary Results  
Ethics Approval Granted for Factorial Survey 2 (Studies 5 and 6) 
 
  
Memorandum
To:
From:
Date:
Subject: 2016-095
Community and Professional Beliefs, Values and Attitudes towards Offenders with Intellectual 
Disability in Australia
Dr Arlene Walker
School of Psychology
F
Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DUHREC)
03 August, 2016
Please quote this project number in all future communications
The application for this project was considered at the DU-HREC meeting held on 18/04/2016.
cc: Alexa Hayley
Human Research Ethics
Deakin Research Integrity
Burwood Campus Victoria
Postal: 221 Burwood Highway
Burwood Victoria 3125 Australia
Telephone 03 9251 7123
research-ethics@deakin.edu.au
Approval has been given for Dr Arlene Walker, School of Psychology, to undertake this project from 3/08/2016 to 
3/08/2020.
In addition you will be required to report on the progress of your project at least once every year and at the 
conclusion of the project. Failure to report as required will result in suspension of your approval to proceed with 
the project.
DUHREC may need to audit this project as part of the requirements for monitoring set out in the National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007).
• Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants
• Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time.
• Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the project .
• The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.
• Modifications are requested by other HRECs.
The approval given by the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee is given only for the project 
and for the period as stated in the approval. It is your responsibility to contact the Human Research Ethics Unit 
immediately should any of the following occur:
Human Research Ethics Unit
research-ethics@deakin.edu.au
Telephone: 03 9251 7123
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Materials 
Online Plain Language Statement (Participants). 
 
 
To:  Participant  
Date: 1st October 2016 
Full Project Title: Community and Professional Values and Attitudes towards the 
Correctional Treatment of Offenders with Intellectual Disability in Australia  
Principal Researcher: Dr Arlene Walker 
Student Researcher: Alexa Hayley (PhD Candidate) 
Associate Researcher(s): Dr Lucy Zinkiewicz, Prof. Joe Graffam 
Dear Participant,  
Thank you for your interest in this study. Your perspective is important to us! 
 
Purpose of study 
The aim of this study is to understand how Australian community members, and 
professionals in the disability and correctional sectors, think about offenders with 
intellectual disability. If you are 18 years or older and Australian (or living and 
working in Australia), you are eligible to participate in this study. 
 
Methods 
This study is an online survey and takes approximately 20 minutes to complete. It 
includes questions asking about your: demographics; personal values; attitudes 
 468
towards community-based correctional treatment and imprisonment of offenders 
with intellectual disability; and attitudes about punishment, rehabilitation, 
reintegration, and forgiveness of offenders. 
 
Consent and Withdrawal 
Participation in this study is voluntary and will not affect your relationship with 
Deakin University or your employer. To consent to participate in this online survey, 
simply read and save this Plain Language Statement, and click the ‘NEXT’ tab at the 
bottom of this page.  
Participants will not be asked for identifying information such as a name, 
organisation name, or personal or work phone number, or email address during this 
process. You can withdraw from this study at any time by exiting the survey page; 
however any responses made prior to ceasing the survey cannot be 
withdrawn/deleted. 
 
Participant Involvement 
Individuals who consent to participate in this study are required only to access, 
consent to, and complete the online survey, which will take approximately 20 
minutes of their time.  
Participants will not be asked for identifying information such as a name, 
organisation name, or personal or work phone number, or email address during this 
process. 
Depending on the participant’s personal perspective, they may experience emotional 
discomfort when reading and responding to certain questions about offenders with an 
intellectual disability.  If the participant identifies with this group in any way, they 
may feel personally offended and upset by some questions referring to this group. 
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Participants who experience emotional distress after completing this survey are 
encouraged to contact the Lifeline Telephone Crisis Support Service on 13 11 14.   
Participants can also contact the research team using the contact information at the 
end of this form to discuss specific concerns about the survey’s content, if desired. 
 
Potential benefits to participants and the community 
Participants will not receive an incentive or reimbursement for their 
participation. Participants may benefit from participating in this study by being 
encouraged to self-reflect on their beliefs about human rights and certain social 
groups. 
Expected benefits of this study to the wider community include: (1) improving 
knowledge about how professionals responsible for the assessment and treatment of 
offenders with intellectual disability perceive their clients within the context of 
beliefs about justice, identifying potential impacts this may have on service delivery 
and therapeutic/correctional practice; and (2) identifying community beliefs and 
attitudes towards contemporary policy and legislative regarding the treatment of 
offenders with an intellectual disability, providing empirical knowledge to guide 
viable policy and legislative decisions in keeping with community needs and 
expectations with reference to this social group. 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
Participant responses will be strictly confidential- only the researchers will have 
access to this information. All individual responses are anonymous and non-
identifiable. To protect your confidentiality, we do not want your name or other 
identifying information, and we don’t want you to sign a consent form. 
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Study Results 
Results of this study may be presented in Associate Researcher Alexa Hayley’s PhD 
thesis, published as one or more peer-reviewed journal articles, and/or presented as a 
conference paper. 
If you have any queries or would like to be informed of the overall findings of this 
project, please contact either Ms Alexa Hayley at halexa@deakin.edu.au, or Dr 
Arlene Walker at arlene.walker@deakin.edu.au. 
 
Funding Declaration 
This study is funded by Deakin University’s School of Psychology in accordance 
with Associate Researcher Alexa Hayley’s PhD candidature agreement. There are no 
other funding sources involved. 
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being 
conducted or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may 
contact:  The Manager, Ethics and Biosafety, Deakin University, 221 Burwood 
Highway, Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au 
Please quote project number 2016-095. 
 
To consent to participate in this study, click 'Next'. 
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Electronic Plain Language Statement and Consent Form (Organisations). 
 
 
 
To:  Organisations (Forensic Disability, Disability, and Correctional) 
Date: 1st August 2016 
Full Project Title: Personal Values and Attitudes towards Correctional Treatment of 
Offenders with Intellectual Disability in Australia 
Principal Researcher: Dr Arlene Walker 
Student Researcher: Alexa Hayley (PhD Candidate) 
Associate Researcher(s): Dr Lucy Zinkiewicz, Prof. Joe Graffam 
 
Dear [contact at organisation] 
  Your organisation and its contact information was identified by Deakin 
University researcher Alexa Hayley in an online search of services and professional 
staff working with people with intellectual disability, offenders, and/or offenders 
with an intellectual disability.  Our researchers would like to invite staff in your 
organisation to participate in our online study, which is hosted on Qualtrics via a 
secure Deakin server and can be accessed via the following link [study link]. 
 
Purpose of Study  
 The aim of this study is to understand how Australian correctional and 
disability professionals think about offenders with intellectual disability.  
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Methods 
 This study is an online survey and takes approximately 20 minutes to 
complete. It includes questions asking about your: demographics; personal values; 
attitudes towards community-based correctional treatment and imprisonment of 
offenders with intellectual disability; and attitudes about punishment, rehabilitation, 
reintegration and forgiveness of offenders. 
Consent and withdrawal 
 The decision for the organisation and individual staff to participate in this 
study is voluntary. Participation in this study is voluntary, and will not affect your 
relationship with Deakin University. The organisation may cease assisting the 
researchers at any time, after consenting to assist recruiting. 
Individual staff members who consent to participate in this study can simply read and 
save this Plain Language Statement, and click the ‘I consent’ tab at the bottom of this 
page. Participants will not be asked for identifying information such as a name, 
organisation name, or personal or work phone number, or email address during this 
process. Individual participants can withdraw from this study at any time by exiting 
the survey page; however any responses prior to ceasing the survey cannot be 
withdrawn/deleted.  
 
Organisation and Participant Involvement 
If the organisation consents to their staff being recruited to participate in this study, 
then a recognised authority (such as the CEO or Head of Department) will need to 
sign the attached consent form (see email attachment) either in pen or electronically, 
and return an image or scanned copy of this consent form to the researchers. An 
appropriate administrative contact at the organisation would then be required to send 
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an email invitation study link (see email attachment) to relevant staff, inviting them 
to participate in the study.  
 Individuals who consent to participate in this study are required only to 
access, consent to, and complete the online survey, which will take approximately 20 
minutes of their time. Participants will not be asked for identifying information such 
as a name, organisation name, or personal or work phone number, or email address 
during this process. 
 
Potential risks to participants 
 Depending on the participant’s personal perspective, they may experience 
emotional discomfort when reading and responding to certain questions about 
offenders with an intellectual disability. If the participant identifies with this group in 
any way, they may feel personally offended and upset by some questions referring to 
this group. 
 Participants who experience emotional distress after completing this survey 
are encouraged to contact the Lifeline Telephone Crisis Support Service on 13 11 14. 
Participants can also contact the research team using the contact information at the 
end of this form to discuss specific concerns about the survey’s content, if desired.
  
Potential Benefits to Participants and the Community 
 Participants will not receive an incentive or reimbursement for their 
participation. Participants may benefit from participating in this study by being 
encouraged to self-reflect on their beliefs about human rights and certain social 
groups. 
 Expected benefits of this study to the wider community include: (1) 
improving knowledge about how professionals responsible for the assessment and 
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treatment of offenders with intellectual disability perceive their clients within the 
context of beliefs about justice, identifying potential impacts this may have on 
service delivery and therapeutic/correctional practice; and (2) identifying community 
beliefs and attitudes towards contemporary policy and legislative regarding the 
treatment of offenders with an intellectual disability, providing empirical knowledge 
to guide viable policy and legislative decisions in keeping with community needs and 
expectations with reference to this social group. 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
Participant responses will be strictly confidential- only the researchers will have 
access to this information. All individual responses are anonymous and non-
identifiable. To protect your confidentiality, we do not want your name or other 
identifying information, and we don’t want you to sign a consent form. 
 
Study Results  
Results of this study may be presented in Associate Researcher Alexa Hayley’s PhD 
thesis, published as one or more peer-reviewed journal articles, and/or presented as a 
conference paper. 
If you have any queries or would like to be informed of the overall findings of this 
project, please contact either Ms Alexa Hayley at halexa@deakin.edu.au, 
or Dr Arlene Walker at Arlene.walker@deakin.edu.au 
 
Funding Declaration 
 This study is funded by Deakin University’s School of Psychology in 
accordance with Associate Researcher Alexa Hayley’s PhD candidature agreement. 
There are no other funding sources involved. 
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Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being 
conducted or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may 
contact: The Manager, Ethics and Biosafety, Deakin University, 221 Burwood 
Highway, Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Please quote project number 2016-095. 
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CONSENT FORM 
TO:  Organisations (Forensic Disability, Disability, and Correctional) 
 (To be used by organisational Heads providing consent for staff/members/patrons 
to be involved in research) 
 
Date: 1st October 2016 
Full Project Title: Personal Values and Attitudes towards Correctional Treatment of 
Offenders with Intellectual Disability in Australia 
Reference Number: 2016-095 
 
 
I have read and I understand the attached Plain Language Statement. 
I give my permission for [staff] of [name of organisation] to voluntarily participate 
in this project according to the conditions in the Plain Language Statement. I have 
been given a copy of Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep. 
The researcher has agreed not to reveal the participants’ identities and personal 
details if information about this project is published or presented in any public form.   
I agree that: 
An appropriate administrative contact at the organisation will distribute a study 
recruitment email and study link to eligible disability, correctional, and/or forensic 
disability staff members inviting them to participate in the researchers’ study.  
 477
 
The organisation is free to cease assisting the researchers with their study recruitment 
at any time.  
 
Name of person giving consent (printed) 
………………………………………………………  
 
Signature ………………………………………… Date: ………………………… 
 
 
  
This information is important for the study, so you won't be able to skip some
questions.°
Please provide the following information about yourself.
Are you:
What is your age?
Are you an Australian citizen?
What is your nationality?
In which Australian State or Territory do you primarily live and work?
What is the highest level of education you have attained?
What trade, area, or discipline did you primarily study? Please explain in a few words.
What is your current employment status?°
Are you currently, or have you ever, been employed or volunteered in the disability
and/or social work ﬁeld?
Male
Female
Other
Yes
No
NSW
VIC
SA
WA
NT
QLD
TAS
ACT
I don't currently live and work in Australia
Some secondary school
Year 10
Year 12
TAFE Certiﬁcate/s
TAFE Diploma/s
Undergraduate (Bachelor) degree
Masters or other postgraduate degree
Doctoral degree (PhD)
Other (please explain) 
Full time paid work
Part time/casual paid work
Volunteer worker
I am not currently employed as a paid or volunteer worker
Yes
SECTION 1
How did you ﬁrst ﬁnd out about this study?°
The following questions ask about who you are, your education, and your work
history.°
Facebook
Twitter
Email
Other (please explain)
For how many years did you work in this ﬁeld (disability and/or social work)?
Are you currently, or have you ever, been employed or volunteered in the°correctional
and/or criminal justice ﬁeld?
For how many years did you work in this ﬁeld (corrections and/or criminal justice)?
Have you ever been employed in paid or volunteer work?
Have you ever been sentenced for a criminal oﬀence?
Have you ever been clinically diagnosed with an intellectual disability?°This means a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist has assessed and told you that you have an
intelligence quotient (IQ) under 70 and trouble with some daily living tasks.
At any time in your life (as a child, adolescent or adult) have you personally known a
person with an intellectual disability?°
In a few words, what is/was their relationship to you? If you have known several such
people, please explain this brieﬂy.°
At any time in your life (as a child, adolescent or adult) have you personally known a
person who had been sentenced for a criminal oﬀence?°
In a few words, what is/was their relationship to you? If you have known several such
people, please explain this brieﬂy.°
Do you identify as a religious or spiritual person?
No
Yes
No
No
Yes. Please state your most recent occupation: 
 
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
How religious and/or spiritual are you, if at all?°
With which religion or spiritual practice do you identify?°
SECTION 2
Answering the following questions will help identify the things you think are important in
life.
  
There are 40 of these questions. Some might seem repetitive, but are necessary to
accurately measure your personal values. Please answer all of them.
°
Please read each description and think about how much you identify with each
statement.
Please read each description and think about how much you identify with each
statement.
°
0 = Not all religious ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
°0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
° °°
Not at all
like me
Not like
me
A little
like me
Somewhat
like me Like me
Very
much like
me
I think it’s important
that every person in
the world be treated
equally. I believe
everyone should have
equal opportunities in
life.
°°
It’s important to me
to be rich. I want to
have a lot of money
and expensive things.
°°
I believe that people
should do what
they're told. I think
people should follow
rules at all times,
even when no-one is
watching.
°°
Thinking up new
ideas and being
creative is important
to me. I like to do
things in my own
original way.
°°
I think it's important
to not ask for more
than what you have. I
believe that people
should be satisﬁed
with what they have.
°°
It’s important to me
to live in secure
surroundings. I avoid
anything that might
endanger my safety.
°°
I think it’s important
to do lots of diﬀerent
things in life. I always
look for new things to
try.
°°
It’s important to me
to listen to people
who are diﬀerent from
me. Even when I
disagree with them, I
still want to
understand them.
°°
I seek every chance I
can to have fun. It is
important to me to do
things that give me
pleasure.
°°
It's very important to
me to show my
abilities. I want
people to admire
what I do.
°°
Please read each description and think about how much you identify with each
statement.
° °°
Not at all
like me
Not like
me
A little
like me
Somewhat
like me Like me
Very
much like
me
It’s important to me
to be in charge and
tell others what to do.
I want people to do
what I say.
°°
Being very successful
is important to me. I
like to impress other
people.
°°
I like to take risks. I
am always looking for
adventures.
°°
It’s very important to
me that my country
be safe. I think the
State must be on
watch against threats
from within and
without.
°°
It’s important to me
to always behave
properly. I want to
avoid doing anything
people would say is
wrong.
°°
Religious belief is
important to me. I try
hard to do what my
religion requires.
°°
It’s important to me
to make my own
decisions about what
I do. I like to be free
to plan and choose
my activities for
myself.
°°
I strongly believe that
people should care
for nature. Looking
after the environment
is important to me.
°°
It’s important to me
to be loyal to my
friends. I want to
devote myself to
people close to me.
°°
It's very important to
me to help the people
around me. I want to
care for their well-
being.
°°
° °°
Not at all
like me
Not like
me
A little
like me
Somewhat
like me Like me
Very
much like
me
Enjoying life’s
pleasures is
important to me. I like
to ‘spoil’ myself.
°°
I believe I should
always show respect
to my parents and to
older people. It is
important to me to
respect my elders.
°°
I think it is important
to be ambitious. I
want to show how
capable I am.
°°
I like surprises. It is
important to me to
have an exciting life.
°°
I want everyone to be
treated justly, even
people I don’t know.
It is important to me
to protect the weak in
society.
°°
I believe all the
world's people
should live in
harmony. Promoting
peace among all
groups in the world is
important to me.
°°
It’s important to me
that things be
organised and clean.
I really do not like
things to be a mess.
°°
Please read each description and think about how much you identify with each
statement.
SECTION 3
The following information provides some background information about oﬀenders
who have an intellectual disability. Please keep the information you just read in mind
as you answer future questions.
 
An intellectual disability is a developmental disorder, which means a person with this
disability has an intelligence quotient (IQ) under 70 and can experience trouble with
aspects of daily living such as learning new skills and activities, understanding
complicated instructions, and ‘reading between the lines’ in social situations. A person is
typically diagnosed with an intellectual disability by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist.°
 
A person who commits a serious antisocial behaviour (e.g., a crime) is ﬁrst charged by
police and then, if proven guilty of a criminal oﬀence, may then be sentenced in various
° °°
Not at all
like me
Not like
me
A little
like me
Somewhat
like me Like me
Very
much like
me
I think it's important
to be interested in
things. I like to be
curious and to try to
understand all sorts
of things.
°°
It’s important to me
to respond to the
needs of others. I try
to support those I
know.
°°
I think it is best to do
things in traditional
ways. It is important
to me to keep up the
customs I have
learned.
°°
° °°
Not at all
like me
Not like
me
A little
like me
Somewhat
like me Like me
Very
much like
me
It’s important to me
to be independent. I
like to rely on myself.
°°
Forgiving people who
have hurt me is
important to me. I try
to see what is good
in them and not to
hold a grudge.
°°
I really want to enjoy
life. Having a good
time is very important
to me.
°°
It’s important to me
to be polite to other
people all the time. I
try never to disturb or
irritate others.
°°
I always want to be
the one who makes
the decisions. I like to
be the leader.
°°
It’s important to me
to adapt to nature
and to ﬁt into it. I
believe that people
should not change
nature.
°°
It’s important to me
to be humble and
modest. I try not to
draw attention to
myself.
°°
Getting ahead in life
is important to me. I
strive to do better
than others.
°°
Having a stable
government is
important to me. I am
concerned that the
social order be
protected.
°°
I try hard to avoid
getting sick. Staying
healthy is very
important to me.
°°
ways. Sentencing might include a suspended sentence, a community corrections order, or
imprisonment either with or without parole.°
 
A°suspended sentence is a prison sentence not put into immediate eﬀect. A community
corrections order is a sentence served in the community, and might involve frequent
reporting to police, home detention, and/or community-rehabilitation interventions.
Imprisonment typically includes rehabilitation and community reintegration interventions,
and might occur in a°minimum, medium, or maximum security prison.°
 
Oﬀenders with an intellectual disability are sentenced in varying ways in Australia.
The following information provides some background information about
imprisonment in Australia.°
 
Prison institutions provide a wide range of psycho-education and therapeutic programs for
prisoners designed to assist in their rehabilitation and successful return to the community
after release from custody.
 
Programs are typically dedicated towards reducing risk in sexual and violent oﬀenders, as
well as addressing more general causes of oﬀending (e.g., reducing substance use/abuse,
improving cognitive skills such as problem-solving and perspective taking).
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.°
The following information provides some background information about community
correction orders in Australia.°
 
A°community°correction°order is a ﬂexible sentencing°order served in the°community.
The°order°can be imposed by itself or in addition to imprisonment or a ﬁne. The community
correction order is often applied for minor crimes where imprisonment of the oﬀender is
not necessary for the protection of the community. They can assist in protecting the
° °°
Strongly
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly
agree
Moderately
agree
Strongly
agree
Being imprisoned
will teach oﬀenders
with an intellectual
disability discipline
and life skills.
°°
Prison facilities and
services should be
the same for all
prisoners,
regardless of
whether they have
an intellectual
disability.
°°
Oﬀenders with an
intellectual disability
are punished with
imprisonment for
only the most
serious crimes.
°°
It’s important to
punish oﬀenders
with an intellectual
disability as harshly
as possible for their
crimes, to teach
them not to
reoﬀend when they
leave prison.
°°
Prisons are the best
place to keep
oﬀenders with an
intellectual
disability, no matter
the type of crime.
°°
An oﬀender with an
intellectual disability
is at no greater risk
of harm in a prison
than any other type
of prisoner.
°°
It’s important to
punish oﬀenders
with an intellectual
disability as harshly
as possible for their
crimes, so that
others like them will
learn not to oﬀend.
°°
Prisons should
have specialist
wings, facilities,
and staﬀ to provide
support for
oﬀenders with an
intellectual
disability.
°°
oﬀender from potential negative inﬂuences of the prison environment. Oﬀenders
serving°community correction orders°can often interact with their°friends and family at will.°
 
Oﬀenders serving a°community correction order°may be required to attend community-
based rehabilitation programs (e.g., for substance use,°anger management, or driving
skills), work-skills or community reintegration program, and/or make restitution to the
community by completing unpaid work beneﬁtting the community.
 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.°
SECTION 4 - Dehumanisation oﬀender with ID vs no ID
Below are six characteristics people possess to varying degrees.°
 
Rate the extent to which you think a criminal oﬀender is likely to possess these
characteristics.
° °°
Strongly
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly
agree
Moderately
agree
Strongly
agree
The idea that there
are community-
based treatment
facilities for
oﬀenders with
intellectual disability
serving their
sentence makes me
feel worried for the
safety of my family.
°°
Community
correction orders
are too soft for
oﬀenders with
intellectual
disability.
°°
If I realised there
was a specialist
correctional facility
for oﬀenders with
intellectual disability
in my
neighbourhood, no
matter how secure
the council said it
was, I would move
to a diﬀerent
suburb.
°°
The idea that there
are community-
based treatment
facilities for
oﬀenders with
intellectual disability
serving their
sentence makes me
feel worried for my
own safety.
°°
I think that
specialist
correctional
facilities in
community settings
are the best way to
rehabilitate most
oﬀenders with
intellectual
disability.
°°
The idea that an
oﬀender with an
intellectual disability
can serve their
sentence while still
in the community is
a joke.
°°
Letting an oﬀender
with an intellectual
disability serve their
sentence in the
community setting
isn’t going to teach
them a lesson
they’ll remember.
°°
Community
correction orders
are the best way to
sentence oﬀenders
with intellectual
disability.
°°
°
Culturally reﬁned ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Rational/logical ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Percentage (%) rating
°0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Below are six characteristics people possess to varying degrees.°
 
Rate the extent to which you think a°criminal oﬀender°with an intellectual disability°is
likely to possess these characteristics.
SECTION 5 - Vignettes x 6
In this section, you will read a description of a person who commits a criminal
oﬀence.°
°
Read the story carefully before answering the questions that follow. This is the ﬁnal
task in this study.
°
°
 
Mark was attending a house party one night with one of his close friends. Having drunk
alcohol heavily all evening, they noticed a woman they both went to school with passed
out in a spare room. After a quick conversation, they entered the room, checked that she
was unconscious, and locked the door.°
 
Mark’s friend, and then Mark, raped the woman and then quickly left the house together. A
friend of the unconscious woman soon found her in the room and suspected that she has
been sexually assaulted. She called the police. Forensic evidence was collected,
witnesses described to police seeing Mark and his friend near the room the woman was
assaulted in, and the two were soon charged with rape. In time, Mark and his friend were
both convicted of rape.
 
At the time of the oﬀence, Mark was 25 years old and worked casually in a sports store
down town. Mark had a close, small circle of male friends that he works with. He came
from a supportive family and while there were some close shaves with the law in the past,
he’d never been charged with a criminal oﬀence before this rape.°
°
When Mark was 10 years old, he was diagnosed by a clinician with an intellectual
disability, meaning he has an IQ (intelligence quotient) of 65 and can experience trouble
with aspects of daily living such as learning new skills and activities, understanding
complicated instructions, and reading ‘between the lines’ in social situations.
 
In this section, you will read a description of a person who commits a criminal
oﬀence.°
 
Read the story carefully°before answering the questions that follow.°This is the ﬁnal
task in this study.
 
 
Mark was attending a house party one night with one of his close friends. Having drunk
alcohol heavily all evening, they noticed a woman they both went to school with passed
out in a spare room. After a quick conversation, they entered the room, checked that she
was unconscious, and locked the door.°
 
Mark’s friend, and then Mark, raped the woman and then quickly left the house together. A
friend of the unconscious woman soon found her in the room and suspected that she has
°
Lacking self-restraint ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Emotionally
responsive ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Warm towards
others ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Rigid and cold ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
°
Culturally reﬁned ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Rational/logical ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Lacking self-restraint ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Emotionally
responsive ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Warm towards
others ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Rigid and cold ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° °
Percentage (%) rating
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Please conﬁrm you have read this narrative by clicking this button.
been sexually assaulted. She called the police. Forensic evidence was collected,
witnesses described to police seeing Mark and his friend near the room the woman was
assaulted in, and the two were soon charged with rape. In time, Mark and his friend were
both convicted of rape.
 
At the time of the oﬀence, Mark was 25 years old and worked casually in a sports store
down town. Mark had a close, small circle of male friends that he works with. He came
from a supportive family and while there were some close shaves with the law in the past,
he’d never been charged with a criminal oﬀence before this rape.°
In this section, you will read a description of a person who commits a criminal
oﬀence.°°
 
Read the story carefully°before answering the questions that follow.°This is the ﬁnal
task in this study.
 
On his 25th birthday, David was enraged when a bouncer wouldn’t let him into a bar with
his mates because he seemed too intoxicated. David had recently started carrying a knife
when out on the town, and was so angry he stabbed the bouncer four times in the
stomach before being wrestled to the ground by security. David’s assault on the bouncer
was captured by CCTV and witnessed by numerous staﬀ and patrons, and he was soon
charged and sentenced for assault with a weapon.
 
David grew up in the city and had always been a brawler, even as a young boy. As a
teenager he used to get into ﬁghts with boys in the year levels above his. As young man,
David kept picking ﬁghts when he went out drinking on the weekends with his mates. He
developed a reputation among his mates as someone not to be challenged or provoked.°
 
When David was 10 years old, he was diagnosed by a clinician with an intellectual
disability, meaning he has an IQ (intelligence quotient) of 65 and can experience trouble
with aspects of daily living such as learning new skills and activities, understanding
complicated instructions, and reading ‘between the lines’ in social situations
In this section, you will read a description of a person who commits a criminal
oﬀence.°
 
Read the story carefully before answering the questions that follow.°This is the ﬁnal
task in this study.
 
On his 25th birthday, David was enraged when a bouncer wouldn’t let him into a bar with
his mates because he seemed too intoxicated. David had recently started carrying a knife
when out on the town, and was so angry he stabbed the bouncer four times in the
stomach before being wrestled to the ground by security. David’s assault on the bouncer
was captured by CCTV and witnessed by numerous staﬀ and patrons, and he was soon
charged and sentenced for assault with a weapon.
 
David grew up in the city and had always been a brawler, even as a young boy. As a
teenager he used to get into ﬁghts with boys in the year levels above his. As young man,
David kept picking ﬁghts when he went out drinking on the weekends with his mates. He
developed a reputation among his mates as someone not to be challenged or provoked.°
In this section, you will read a description of a person who commits a criminal
oﬀence.°
 
Read the story carefully°before answering the questions that follow.°This is the ﬁnal
task in this study.
 
Henry broke into a home while the family living there was asleep. He managed to collect
$5000 worth of their property before a family member awoke and found him in the house.
Henry ran oﬀ with the property but without injuring anyone. Police were able to track his
whereabouts using the GPS of a phone he’d stolen from the family, and ﬁnding him still in
possession of numerous stolen items, he was charged and ultimately sentenced with
home invasion and burglary.
 
Henry grew up in a regional town. He’d enjoyed studying at school when he was younger,
but lost interest as a teenager.° In high school he started dabbling with diﬀerent kinds of
drugs, and by the time he left school he was addicted to methamphetamine. For a while
Henry was able to pay for his habit with his part time job at Woolworths, but he was
eventually ﬁred for being unreliable. He was able to exchange sex for methamphetamine
for a while, but this arrangement didn’t last and he eventually began breaking into peoples
Please conﬁrm you have read this narrative by clicking this button.
Please conﬁrm you have read this narrative by clicking this button.
Please conﬁrm you have read this narrative by clicking this button.
homes in neighbouring suburbs to steal money, phones, and computers to sell online.
Henry was known to the local police for property and drug related oﬀences, and was 25
years old at the time of his latest oﬀence.°
 
When Henry was 10 years old, he was diagnosed by a clinician with an intellectual
disability, meaning he has an IQ (intelligence quotient) of 65 and can experience trouble
with aspects of daily living such as learning new skills and activities, understanding
complicated instructions, and reading ‘between the lines’ in social situations
 
In this section, you will read a description of a person who commits a criminal
oﬀence.°
°
Read the story carefully°before answering the questions that follow.°This is the ﬁnal
task in this study.
 
Henry broke into a home while the family living there was asleep. He managed to collect
$5000 worth of their property before a family member awoke and found him in the house.
Henry ran oﬀ with the property but without injuring anyone. Police were able to track his
whereabouts using the GPS of a phone he’d stolen from the family, and ﬁnding him still in
possession of numerous stolen items, he was charged and ultimately sentenced with
home invasion and burglary.
 
Henry grew up in a regional town. He’d enjoyed studying at school when he was younger,
but lost interest as a teenager.° In high school he started dabbling with diﬀerent kinds of
drugs, and by the time he left school he was addicted to methamphetamine. For a while
Henry was able to pay for his habit with his part time job at Woolworths, but he was
eventually ﬁred for being unreliable. He was able to exchange sex for methamphetamine
for a while, but this arrangement didn’t last and he eventually began breaking into peoples
homes in neighbouring suburbs to steal money, phones, and computers to sell online.
Henry was known to the local police for property and drug related oﬀences, and was 25
years old at the time of his latest oﬀence.°
SECTION 6 - Vignette responses
How much inﬂuence did alcohol/drugs have on this oﬀender's criminal behaviour?
How likely it is the oﬀender would have committed this crime, had he not been aﬀected by
alcohol/drugs?
The following questions relate to how well you think this oﬀender understood the
moral implications of their criminal behaviour.°
 
Using the scale below, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
Please conﬁrm you have read this narrative by clicking this button.
Please conﬁrm you have read this narrative by clicking this button.
°
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Percentage (%) inﬂuence of alcohol/drug use on behaviour
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° °°
Strongly
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly
agree
Moderately
agree
Strongly
agree
The oﬀender's
mental age should
be considered when
making a decision
about his sentence.
°°
The oﬀender's
physical age should
be considered when
making a decision
about his sentence.
°°
The oﬀender should
be considered fully
responsible for his
actions.
°°
 
The following questions relate to how you think this oﬀender should be punished for
their criminal behaviour.°
 
Using the scale below, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
The following questions relate to whether you think this oﬀender can be
rehabilitated.°
 
Using the scale below, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
The following questions relate to reintregrating this person back into the community
once they have completed their sentence.°
 
Using the scale below, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
° °°
Strongly
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly
agree
Moderately
agree
Strongly
agree
The oﬀender has
the mental capacity
to fully appreciate
the consequences
of his criminal
actions.
°°
The oﬀender did not
fully understand the
wrongfulness of his
actions.
°°
° °°
Strongly
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly
agree
Moderately
agree
Strongly
agree
The primary
concern with this
oﬀender should be
to make sure he is
severely punished
for his crime.
°°
The only way to
prevent this person
from committing
future crimes is to
keep him locked
up.
°°
The courts are
generally too easy
on people like this
who commit this
sort of crime.
°°
If the only way this
oﬀender and others
like him can be
controlled is to
build more prisons,
then so be it.
°°
° °°
Strongly
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly
agree
Moderately
agree
Strongly
agree
Trying to
rehabilitate this
oﬀender would
probably be a
waste of time.
°°
More eﬀort needs
to be made to
expand and
improve programs
that would give this
oﬀender the chance
to change his life.
°°
If this oﬀender
received
educational and
vocational training
in prison, he
probably would not
commit crimes in
the future.
°°
This oﬀender would
probably beneﬁt
from the
psychological
counselling
programs oﬀered in
prison.
°°
° °°
Strongly
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly
agree
Moderately
agree
Strongly
agree
 
The following questions relate to whether or not you think this person should be
forgiven for their criminal behaviour, after they complete their sentence.
 
Using the scale below, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
SECTION 7 - EXIT
Thank you for completing this questionnaire, and thank you for your time.
 
° °°
Strongly
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly
agree
Moderately
agree
Strongly
agree
The general
community has a
responsibility to
help the oﬀender
feel like he belongs
in society once his
sentence is done.
°°
If this oﬀender
moved into the
house next to mine
once their sentence
was ﬁnished, I
wouldn't worry
about it very much.
°°
I'd trust this
oﬀender to make a
strong eﬀort to
keep out of trouble
with the law once
they ﬁnished their
sentence.
°°
It's important the
oﬀender is given
ﬁnancial support by
the government to
help him live as a
member of the
community once
his sentence is
ﬁnished.
°°
I wouldn't mind it if
this oﬀender did a
trial at my
workplace once his
sentence was
ﬁnished.
°°
I wouldn't mind my
taxes helping pay
for social programs
for this oﬀender, if it
helped them ﬁnd
better friends or get
a good job.
°°
This oﬀender
should be given
every opportunity to
ﬁt back into society.
°°
° °°
Strongly
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly
agree
Moderately
agree
Strongly
agree
I'd be a fool to
forgive this oﬀender
for his crime - even
if he said he was
sorry, he wouldn't
really mean it.
°°
I would not forgive
this oﬀender for
their crime.
°°
This oﬀender was
not likely to have
suﬀered much
during their
sentence- their
penalty was not
severe enough.
°°
This oﬀender paid
their debt to society
during their
sentence.
°°
If I was the victim
and this oﬀender
apologised to me
for his crime, I
would forgive him.
°°
Everyone deserves
a second chance-
even this oﬀender.
°°
Powered by Qualtrics
If you have any queries or would like to be informed of the overall ﬁndings of this project,
please contact either Ms Alexa Hayley at halexa@deakin.edu.au, or Dr Arlene Walker at
Arlene.walker@deakin.edu.au
 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted
or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact:°
°
The Manager, Ethics and Biosafety, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood
Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, research-ethics@deakin.edu.au
°
Please quote project number 2016-095.
 
°
 Please feel free to leave any additional comments about this study before exiting.
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Appendix V: Supplementary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results for Chapter 
Nine 
To assess the validity of original outcome measures, EFAs were conducted 
using the overall sample recruited for of Factorial Survey 2. EFAs using oblique 
(direct oblimin) rotation methods were conducted to determine the underlying 
dimensionality of the items for each measure, given the expectation of 
unidimensional structure. Table 14.7 reports on EFA 1, for attitudes towards 
community treatment of offenders with an ID, while Table 14.8 reports on EFA 2, 
for attitudes towards prison-based treatment of offenders with an ID. Table 14.9 
reports EFA 3, for attitudes towards reintegration prospects of offenders, and Table 
14.10 reports EFA 4, for willingness to forgive an offender. All assumptions relevant 
to EFA were met prior to conducting analyses. 
 
Table 14.7 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 1: Attitudes towards Community Treatment Setting for 
Offenders with Intellectual Disability 
 Item M SD FL h2  
1 The idea that an offender with an intellectual disability can serve 
their sentence while still in the community is a joke.^ 
 
5.17 1.29 0.85 0.66 
2 The idea that there are community-based treatment facilities for 
offenders with intellectual disability serving their sentence makes 
me feel worried for the safety of my family.^ 
 
5.01 1.30 0.83 0.84 
3 The idea that there are community-based treatment facilities for 
offenders with intellectual disability serving their sentence makes 
me feel worried for my own safety.^ 
 
5.14 1.23 0.82 0.70 
4 Community correction orders are too soft for offenders with 
intellectual disability.^ 
 
4.88 1.23 0.75 0.53 
5 Letting an offender with an intellectual disability serve their 
sentence in the community setting isn’t going to teach them a 
lesson they’ll remember.^ 
 
4.88 1.30 0.68 0.49 
6 If I realised there was a specialist correctional facility for offenders 
with intellectual disability in my neighbourhood, no matter how 
secure the council said it was, I would move to a different suburb.^ 
 
5.15 1.25 0.66 0.48 
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 Item M SD FL h2  
7 Community correction orders are the best way to sentence 
offenders with intellectual disability. 
4.55 1.23 0.47 0.28 
8 I think that specialist correctional facilities in community settings 
are the best way to rehabilitate most offenders with intellectual  
disability. 
 
3.39 1.27 0.45 0.24 
 Eigenvalue 4.41 
 
  % variance 5.51       
Note. Principal axis factorisation applied; one factor forced. Oblique direct oblimin rotation with Kaiser 
normalisation applied. FL = Factor loading, >.30 determined meaningful and used as criterion for factor 
development; loadings derived from factor matrix model. ^Items 1-6 are reverse scored for EFA 1, so that 
higher scores indicate greater support for community treatment setting. M and SD are non-reversed. EFA 
1 N = 668. h2 = communality value.  
 
 
Table 14.8 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 2: Attitudes towards Prison Treatment Setting for 
Offenders with Intellectual Disability 
 Item M SD FL h2  
1 It’s important to punish offenders with an intellectual disability as harshly 
as possible for their crimes, to teach them not to reoffend when they leave 
prison. 
 
1.71 1.06 0.80 0.58 
2 It’s important to punish offenders with an intellectual disability as harshly 
as possible for their crimes, so that others like them will learn not to offend. 
 
1.56 0.98 0.79 0.57 
3 Prisons are the best place to keep offenders with an intellectual disability, 
no matter the type of crime. 
 
1.73 1.07 0.68 0.39 
4 Being imprisoned will teach offenders with an intellectual disability 
discipline and life skills. 
 
2.10 1.23 0.62 0.35 
5 Prison facilities and services should be the same for all prisoners, 
regardless of whether they have an intellectual disability. 
 
1.88 1.28 0.53 0.27 
6 An offender with an intellectual disability is at no greater risk of harm in a 
prison than any other type of prisoner. 
 
1.70 1.20 0.39 0.19 
7 Prisons should have specialist wings, facilities, and staff to provide support 
for offenders with an intellectual disability.^ 
 
1.63 1.07 0.34 0.10 
8 Offenders with an intellectual disability are punished with imprisonment 
for only the most serious crimes. 
 
3.03 1.57 0.00 0.06 
Eigenvalue 3.27 
% variance 40.81 
Note. Principal axis factorisation applied; one factor forced. Oblique direct oblimin rotation with Kaiser 
normalisation applied. FL = Factor loading,  >.30 determined meaningful and used as criterion for factor 
development; loadings derived from factor matrix model. ^; Item 7 is reverse scored for EFA 2. Only items 1-7 
contribute to the final measure from EFA 2.  M and SD are non-reversed. EFA 2 N = 670. h2 = communality value. 
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Table 14.9 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 3: Attitudes towards Offender Reintegration 
  Item M SD FL h2  
1 It's important the offender is given financial support by the government 
to help him live as a member of the community once his sentence is 
finished. 
4.36 1.35 0.75 0.53 
2 The general community has a responsibility to help the offender feel 
like he belongs in society once his sentence is done. 
4.66 1.26 .79 0.56 
3  I'd trust this offender to make a strong effort to keep out of trouble with 
the law once they finished their sentence. 
3.71 1.34 0.55 0.35 
4 I wouldn't mind it if this offender did a trial at my workplace once his 
sentence was finished. 
4.18 1.57 0.63 0.41 
5 If this offender moved into the house next to mine once their sentence 
was finished, I wouldn't worry about it very much. 
3.61 1.49 0.63 0.42 
6 I wouldn't mind my taxes helping pay for social programs for this 
offender, if it helped them find better friends or get a good job. 
4.99 1.22 0.77 0.58 
7 This offender should be given every opportunity to fit back into society. 5.20 1.00 0.76 0.54 
Eigenvalue 3.99  
  % variance 57.01       
Note. Principal axis factorisation applied; one factor forced. Oblique direct oblimin rotation with Kaiser 
normalisation applied. FL = Factor loading, >.30 determined meaningful and used as criterion for factor 
development; loadings derived from factor matrix model. EFA 3 N = 635. h2 = communality value. 
 
 
Table 14.10 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 4: Willingness to Forgive an Offender  
  Item M SD FL h2  
1 I would not forgive this offender for their crime.^ 4.45 1.37 0.81 0.60 
2 I'd be a fool to forgive this offender for his crime - even if he said he 
was sorry, he wouldn't really mean it.^ 
4.85 1.21 0.78 0.53 
3 This offender was not likely to have suffered much during their 
sentence- their penalty was not severe enough.^ 
4.83 1.18 0.74 0.48 
4 Everyone deserves a second chance- even this offender. 4.98 1.10 0.74 0.48 
5 If I was the victim and this offender apologised to me for his crime, I 
would forgive him. 
3.74 1.50 0.71 0.49 
6 This offender paid their debt to society during their sentence. 4.48 1.28 0.56 0.30 
Eigenvalue 3.64 
% variance 60.58 
Note. Principal axis factorisation applied; one factor forced. Oblique direct oblimin rotation with 
Kaiser normalisation applied. FL = Factor loading,  >.30 determined meaningful and used as criterion 
for factor development; loadings derived from factor matrix model. ^Items 1-3 is reverse scored for 
EFA 4.M and SD are non-reversed. EFA 4 N = 629. h2 = communality value. 
 
 
